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This thesis re-examines the Taiwan Strait Crises and offers new perspectives to 
understanding the crises through the use of newly available primary sources, the 
simultaneous presentations of the perspectives of the PRC, US and ROC, the re-evaluation 
of some of the major arguments in existing scholarship, and the incorporation of analyses 
relating to ―culture,‖ ―tacit communication-tacit accommodation‖ and ―ritualization.‖ 
Hitherto, most accounts have depicted the PRC-ROC-US relations in the 1950s as mired 
in hostilities and nuclear threats. However, this thesis contends that the situation was more 
complicated: tacit communication that was discernible during the Geneva Conference of 
1954 had allowed for tacit accommodation to take root by 1958. Such developments in the 
PRC-ROC-US relations were contested and negotiated at every stage of the Crises. 
Facilitating this process was the ritualization of discourses, embodied in signaling and 
symbolic gestures. Such a ritualization of foreign policy often happened in a ―symbiotic‖ 
manner, consisting of ―soft‖ and ―hard‖ elements, as an untidy confluence of nationalistic 
discourse, symbols, cultural images, military posturing, canvassing for international 
support, and diplomatic negotiations. The emphasis on ―untidy‖ underscored that the 
process of tacit accommodation was not an inexorable process destined to succeed, but 
one influenced by a plethora of factors – international relations, domestic developments 
and issues of national identity of Beijing, Taipei and Washington. Such an analytical lens 
has enabled this thesis to appreciate the complexity of adversarial and alliance diplomacy, 
so aptly captured in the many nuances of the PRC-ROC-US relations, as revealed in the 
unfolding of the many turbid diplomatic episodes of the Taiwan Strait Crises from 1954 to 
1958: the ―silent poetry‖ of diplomacy, the tacit allowances for withdrawals, the muted 
back-channel negotiations, the paradoxically loud denunciations, and the sound and fury 
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Nov 1952 Chiang Kai-shek‘s major speech at KMT Seventh National Convention  
  
1 Jan 1953 PRC‘s launched the First Five Year Plan 
27 July 1953 Armistice in Korea 
  
25 Jan 1954 Berlin Conference 
29 March 1954 Dulles warned of ―United Action‖ in the Indochina Conflict 
5 April 1954 2
nd
 warning by Dulles 
25 April 1954 Churchill and Eden officially rejected United Action. 
26 April 1954 Geneva Conference kicked off [Korea Phase] 
7 May 1954 Dien Bian Phu taken by N. Vietnamese 
8 May 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina opened 
13 May 1954 - 
4 July 1954 
General James Van Fleet mission to Asia  
12 June 1954 France - Laniel Government fell, 
18 June 1954 France - New Mendès-France government formed 
25-29 June 
1954 
Churchill in Washington  Joint Seven-Point memorandum 
3-5 July 1954 Liuzhou conference: CCP & Lao Dong 
21 July 1954 Geneva Accords  
3 Sept 1954 PRC shelled Quemoy & Matsu 
6-8 Sept 1954 Manila Conference [SEATO]  
12 Sept 1954 NSC mtg: introduce resolution in UN Security Council for ceasefire  
22 Sept 1954 PLA‘s heavy barrage at Quemoy again 
7 Oct 1954 Eisenhower decided on ROC-US treaty; CKS waived veto in UN 
2 Nov 1954 US Mid term elections results 
2 Dec 1954 ROC-US Mutual Defence Treaty 
  
10 Jan 1955 PRC 100 Planes raided Dachens 
18 Jan 1955 PLA stormed Yijiangshan 
24 Jan 1955 Eisenhower called for Formosa Resolution 
28 Jan 1955 Trevelyan - Zhou meeting : PRC rejected UN offer 
31 Jan 1955 NZ invited PRC to attend Security Council meeting [Oracle] 
31 Jan-8 Feb Commonwealth Prime Minister‘s Conference 
 xiv 
1955 
5 Feb 1955 KMT officially asked for US evacuation of Dachens 
11 Feb 1955 NY Times revealed US secret pledge to ROC 
13 Feb 1955 PLA took Dachen 
16 Feb 1955 
Washington Post, Joseph Alsop accused the US of not publicizing the ―Private 
assurances.‖ 
23-25 Feb 1955 Bangkok Conference  
28 Feb 1955 Trevelyan - Zhou meeting : Zhou denounced ―dirty deal‖ 
6 Mar 1955 Dulles convinced by Threat posed by PRC : Atomic solution 
16 Mar 1955 Eisenhower‘s news conference: Bullet = Atomic bomb  
5 April 1955 Eisenhower ―outpost‖ idea 




23 April 1955 Zhou Enlai‘s Bandung surprise 
25 April 1955 Radford and Robertson went to Taiwan  
26 April 1955 Dulles indicated possibility of bilateral talks 
18–23July 1955 Geneva Summit [Arms talks] 
1 Aug 1955 PRC-US Geneva Negotiations 
  
Feb 1956 Khrushchev denounces Stalin at 20
th
 Party Congress 
2 May 1956 Mao‘s major speech on the Hundred Flowers Policy 
1 July 1956 Journalist Cao Juren‘s visited the PRC  
  
Mid-April 1957 KMT secret emissary Sung Yi-shan‘s visited Beijing  
24 May 1957 Taiwan Riots 
8 June 1957 Anti-Rightist Movement 
4 Oct 1957 Soviet Union launched Sputnik the first artificial satellite 
17 Nov 1957 Mao declared ―East wind over West wind‖ in Moscow 
  
2-25 May 1958 CCP Eight Party Congress launched the Great Leap Forward 
15 July 1958 US troops entered Lebanon   
31 July 1958 Khrushchev in PRC 
6 Aug 1958 Eisenhower received intel on Taiwan Straits 
23 Aug 1958 PRC shelled Quemoy & Matsu (23-27 Aug only 5 days intensive) 
29 Aug 1958 6 aircraft carriers arrived at the Taiwan Straits 
4 Sept 1958 Dulles‘s Newport speech: warning & Offer 
6 Sept 1958 Zhou accepted offer 
7 Sept 1958 
Khrushchev‘s 1st letter:  
―An attack on the CPR which is a great Ally, friend, and neighbour of our 
country, is an attack on the SU.‖  
11 Sept 1958 Eisenhower did not think there would be war 
14-21 Sept 
1958 
USN protect KMT resupplies of Quemoy 
15 Sept 1958 Warsaw negotiations started 
19 Sept 1958 
Khrushchev‘s 2nd  letter: 
―Should such an attack be delivered on the CPR, than the aggressor will receive 
a fitting rebuff by the same means.‖ 
20 Sept 1958 Offshore Islands Blockade broken 
21 Sept 1958 Eisenhower rejected Khrushchev‘s 2nd letter. 
5 Oct 1958 PRC suspended bombardment for 1 week 
6 Oct  1958 Peng Dehuai‘s announcement 
12 Oct 1958 
PRC suspended bombardment for 2 weeks:  
American nation is a "great nation" and that its people 
"do not want war." They welcome peace." Suspension of shelling is "to enable 
our compatriots on Quemoy, both military and civilian, to get sufficient 
 xv 
supplies, including food and military equipment, to strengthen their 
entrenchment." [DSB, 3 Nov 1958] 
13 Oct 1958 Sec. McElroy in Taipei: failed to convince Chiang 
21 Oct 1958 Dulles in Taipei 
23 Oct 1958 Joint US-ROC communiqué: ―recovery of mainland through peaceful means‖ 
25 Oct 1958 PRC alternate-day bombardment  
  
1 Jan 1959 
Chiang Kai-shek announced ―Making Sanmin Zhuyi as vanguard and keeping 
armed force as the reserve.‖ 








Chapter 1 Introduction 
On 3 September 1954, the People‘s Republic of China (PRC or China), under the leadership of 
Chairman Mao Zedong, launched a massive artillery bombardment on Nationalist-controlled 
Quemoy and Matsu islands off the provincial coast of Fujian, triggering the First Taiwan Strait 
Crisis. This attack prompted the United States (US) to sign the Mutual Defence Treaty with the 
Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) on 2 December 1954. On 18 January 1955, the PRC 
recovered the obscure Nationalist-controlled Yijiangshan islands, two hundred miles north of 
Taiwan, as a prelude to occupying the neighbouring Dachen islands. Recognizing the hopelessness 
of defending Dachen, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower persuaded Generalissimo Chiang Kai-
shek to give them up in return for a clear commitment from the US. On 28 January 1955, the US 
Congress responded by passing the Formosa Resolution which stated that the US President would 
aid in Taiwan‘s defence (including Penghu and ―related positions) against any aggression. The 
40,000 Nationalist troops on Dachen then evacuated on 8-11 February.
1
 To reinforce the 
commitment of the US to the defence of Taiwan, the president in a news conference on 16 March 




The first Afro-Asian Conference was held on 18-24 April 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia, for the 
purpose of forming a body of non-aligned Third-World nations. PRC premier Zhou Enlai 
announced on 23 April, to the surprise of the delegates, that China was not averse to negotiating 
with the US over the Taiwan Strait Crisis. Zhou‘s conciliatory gesture was quickly accepted by the 
US over virulent protests by the ROC. The Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks began in Geneva on 1 
August 1955. However, the talks did not offer any immediate solution and were suspended 




On 23 August 1958, the PRC again targeted artillery barrages on Quemoy and Matsu, igniting the 
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Second Taiwan Strait Crisis.
4
 This resulted in a swift resolution, unlike the First Crisis.
5
 
On 6 September, Zhou and Dulles publicly announced possible peaceful measures and this led to 
the convening of the Sino-US negotiations in Warsaw from 15 September onwards. Both sides 
claimed credit for the resolution, but on different grounds. The Chinese expressed their satisfaction 
with the ―lesson,‖ the artillery bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu. Washington reaffirmed its 
faith in nuclear deterrence. Chiang Kai-shek proclaimed peaceably that the wisdom of Sun Yat-
sen's Sanminzhuyi (Three Principles of the People) would henceforth guide the ROC‘s effort in 
reclaiming China and launched the next phase of Taiwan‘s economic policy. The speed of the 
conflict resolution and the different explanations offered beg more questions than answers. 
 
The Taiwan Strait Crises were critical flash points for PRC-ROC-US relations. Eisenhower singled 
out these crises and the continuing hostilities with China as causing him the utmost frustration in 
the Cold War. Mao declared that without a resolution of the Taiwan question, ―[w]e do not want 
conciliation with the USA,‖ and the PRC moved on to develop its own atomic bomb in January 
1955.
6
 Chiang saw the crises as a threat to the political survival of the ROC and resorted to various 
stratagems and tactics in its relations with the US and the PRC. 
 
This thesis will re-examine the Taiwan Strait Crises by providing an in-depth study of the actions 
and interactions of the PRC, US and ROC from 1954 to 1958. How this thesis will be structured 
will be explained in this chapter. A literature review will first be presented: it will begin by briefly 
introducing the major monographs on the Taiwan Strait Crises, followed by a discussion of two 
main themes that emerge from existing scholarship – the causes of the Taiwan Strait Crises and the 
                                                 
4 Warren I. Cohen, American Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations 4th ed. (NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2000), 186. 
5 Akira Iriye is among the earliest to note a particular aspect of the 1950s Sino-US relations: ―So long as they [PRC] 
were sure that the US would not resort to force, they could remain content with the existing tension and meanwhile 
cultivate the friendship of Afro-Asian nations.‖ Elsewhere, Iriye commented on the state of Soviet-US relations: ―… so 
long as both sides tacitly acknowledged the policy of co-existence, there was unlikely to develop any military 
confrontation.‖ Turning Iriye‘s two arguments around, I would argue that in the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, both the US 
and China were contented with the status quo delineated by the crisis, with tacit acknowledgement also extended to the 
PRC. Both factors account for the speed of the conflict resolution. See Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-
East Asian Relations (NY: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1967), 296, 305.  
6 Cited in Gordon H. Chang, ―Eisenhower and Mao‘s China,‖ in Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment, ed. Gunter 
Bischof & Stephen E. Ambrose (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1995): 191; Mao Tse-tung, interview with 
Eduardo Mora Valverde, March 3, 1959, Current Digest of the Soviet Press 16, no. 25 (July 15, 1964): 5-6; John Wilson 
Lewis & Xue Litai China Builds the Bomb (Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1988), 37-38. 
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mode of communication between the US and China.    
 
1. Literature Review 
1.1 Monographs on the Taiwan Strait Crises 
There are at least six monographs on the Taiwan Strait Crises. M.H. Halperin‘s 1966 report on the 
1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, commissioned by the US Department of Defense, was among the 
earliest research undertaken that had access to US primary documents. Halperin looked at the 1958 
Crisis for lessons to be drawn for ―decision-making in crises‖ and argued for the need to deliver 
decisive warnings to the PRC. Based mainly from the perspectives of Washington and US 
commanders in the field, large parts of Halperin‘s study remain classified.7 
 
Thomas E. Stolper focused on political issues in discussing the two Taiwan Strait Crises in his 
1985 monograph. To Stolper, Mao was more interested in preventing the formation of ―two 
Chinas.‖ As Mao feared that the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty of 1955 would provide the 
momentum for a de jure separation of Taiwan from China, he began the 1958 crisis incrementally 
to keep the US entangled, but not enough for them to declare separation.
8
 Stolper also debunked 
contentions that the crisis represented an impending ―military‖ occupation of the islands. He 
further argued that both China and the US wanted negotiations to resolve the conflict. Hindered by 




An updated account of ROC-US relations from 1950 to 1955 was presented masterfully by Robert 
Accinelli in his 1996 monograph. Accinelli‘s most important contribution was detailing the role of 
the ROC in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis and arguing that Chiang Kai-shek proved to be no mere 
supplicant malleable to Washington‘s wishes.10 In a shorter 2001 article on the Second Taiwan 
Strait Crisis, Accinelli stressed how the White House‘s concern for Taiwan‘s security had also 
                                                 
7 M.H. Halperin, ―The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History,‖ Memorandum, RM-4900-ISA, December 
1966, Rand Cooperation.  
8 Thomas E. Stolper, China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands (NY: ME Sharpe, 1985), 115, 119, 125. 
9 John Garver, review of China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands by Stolper, The Journal of Asian Studies 46, no. 4 
(Nov 1987): 916. 
10 Robert Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy toward Taiwan, 1950-1955 (Chapel Hill: University of 
N. Caroline Press, 1996), 157-183 
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―strained relationship with Congress … almost to the breaking point.‖11  
 
John W. Garver examines the ROC-US relations over a longer period from the 1950s to the 1970s 
in his 1997 monograph. Garver argues that the ―bi-polar‖ rivalry pitting the US against 
communism explained the inability of the US and the PRC to come to an accommodation over the 
Taiwan issue in the 1950s. While Washington enjoyed Taiwan‘s strategic position in containing 
communism, it despaired over Chiang‘s independent tactics. Yet, as the overall benefits 
outweighed the cost and the Taiwan issue served to strain Sino-Soviet relations, Washington 
endured Chiang. Garver further contended that Eisenhower recognized the futility of nuclear 





Among Taiwanese scholars, the works of Lin Cheng-yi and Chang Su-ya stood out. While Lin‘s 
1995 monograph on the US policy toward China during the 1958 crisis was based on his Master‘s 
thesis, Chang has examined various episodes in the ROC-US relations in fifteen articles. Both 
scholars have exhaustively used US archival sources and offered important insights in highlighting 
the nuances of Taipei‘s responses. However, they did not have access to Chiang Kai-shek‘s Papers 




Two mainland Chinese scholars were prominent in their studies of the Taiwan Strait issue. The 
works of Su Ge and Dai Chaowu represented a new wave of Chinese scholarship that integrated 
extensive US published materials, especially the Foreign Relations of the United States series, 
                                                 
11 The GOP was a minority party in the Congress then. Robert Accinelli, ― ‗A Thorn in the Side of Peace‘ The 
Eisenhower Administration and the 1958 Offshore Islands Crisis,‖ in Reexamining the Cold War US China Diplomacy 
1954-1972, ed. Robert S. Ross & Jiang Changbin, (Cam., MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2001), 106-140. 
12 But when the interests of the US and PRC merged in the 1970s, the ―Taiwan issue was easily set aside.‖ John W. 
Garver, The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 
1997), 112-133. 
13 Lin Cheng-yi 林正義, Yi jiu wu ba nian Tai hai wei ji qi jian Meiguo dui hua zheng ce 一九五八年臺海危機期間美
國對華政策 [1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: US Policy] (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu, 1985); Chang Su-ya 張淑雅, ―The 
Taiwan Strait Crises and U.S. Attitude toward ‗Reconquering the Mainland in the 1950s‘‖ 台海危機與美國對「反攻大
陸」政策的轉變, Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History 中央研究院近代史研究所集刊中央研究院近代史研究
所集刊, 36 (December 1991): 231-295; ―Ambassador Karl L. Rankin and U.S. Policy toward Taiwan in the 1950s‖ 藍欽
大使與一九五○年代的美國對台政策, European-American Studies 歐美研究, 28:1 (March 1998): 193-262; ―Patterns 
of U.S. Policymaking with Respect to Taiwan in the 1950s‖ 一九五○年代美國對臺決策模式分析 Bulletin of the 
Institute of Modern History 40 (June 2003): 1-54. 
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with published Chinese materials. While Su‘s 1998 textbook treatment on Sino-US relations and 
the Taiwan issue detailed Mao‘s ―fighting while negotiating‖ style of crisis management, Dai 
examined perceptively the 1954-1958 period and underscored the Soviet factor. However, both 




1.2 Causes of the Taiwan Strait Crises 
Apart from monographs, the Taiwan Strait Crises have been analyzed in articles and chapters in 
books as case studies for theories in international relations and strategic studies, as a development 
in military history, and as part of the larger historical pattern of Sino-American relations.
15
 In this 
scholarship, a major theme focuses on the causes of the Taiwan Strait Crises, explained in such 
terms as Sino-US misperceptions and miscalculations and China‘s domestic imperatives.   
 
In a 1990 article on China‘s policy on the Taiwan Strait Crises, a PRC scholar, He Di, contended 
that misperceptions plagued Sino-US relations.
16
 He argued that the US could not differentiate the 
military attacks on Yijiangshan-Dachen from the political shelling on Quemoy-Matsu during the 
1954-55 crisis. He also saw the 1958 crisis as a logical outcome of the first, with Mao 
miscalculating the intensity of the US resolve, seen in the considerable increase of the US naval 
presence in the Taiwan Strait by September 1958.
17
 He Di noted that there were gains as well since 
the ensuing 1958 Sino-US diplomatic talks in Warsaw gave China a channel of communication 
with the US, at the same time demonstrating to the world its firm stand on the ―One-China‖ policy. 
However, there were incongruities in He Di‘s arguments. Despite his earlier contention of 
                                                 
14 Su Ge 苏格,  Mei guo dui hua zheng ce yu tai wan wen ti 美国对华政策与台湾問题 [American China policy and the 
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nian de zhong mei guan xi 敵對與危機的年代 : 1954-1958 年的中美關系 (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian chubanshe, 
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15 For a sample of textbooks by scholars of different persuasions, see: Judith F. Kornberg & John R. Faust, China in 
World Politics: Policies, Processes, Prospects 2nd ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub, 2005), 132-135; Michael Yahuda, 
The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (London: Routledge, 1996), 56-57; Warren I. Cohen, American 
Response to China, 184-185. 
16 The Chinese viewed the subsequent Formosa Resolution and US nuclear threats as unexpected negative outcomes. See 
He Di, ―The Evolution of the People‘s Republic of China‘s Policy toward the Offshore Islands,‖ in The Great Powers in 
East Asia, ed. Warren I. Cohen & Akira Iriye (NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 1990), 222-245. 
17 He Di also discussed the impact of such international events as Sino-Soviet relations, the stalemate in Sino-US 
negotiations and the provocative Middle East Crisis, where US Marines landed in Lebanon in July 1958. He argued that 
the PRC intended to recover Quemoy and Matsu only through an artillery blockade, hoping for a similar outcome as the 
ROC‘s voluntary evacuation of Dachen in 1955. He Di, ―The Most Respected Enemy: Mao Zedong‘s Perception of the 
United States,‖ The China Quarterly 137 (Mar 1994), 144-158. 
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misperceptions, He Di then reverted to the official PRC‘s tagline that the 1958 Quemoy operation 
was a ―well-orchestrated, integrated strategy.‖18  
 
On the US side, Gordon H. Chang had similarly stressed misperceptions, arguing in a 1988 article 
that Eisenhower, far from restrained, brought the US to the ―nuclear brink‖ in 1955; disaster was 
averted only because Chiang refused to give up the islands and China did not occupy them.
19
 
However, there are troubling areas to Chang‘s arguments. The possibility of the PRC‘s military 
actions in March-April 1955 triggering a nuclear war seemed a straw man. Was the issue of 
Eisenhower going over the brink all about the seemingly impending Chinese invasion of Quemoy 
and Matsu? More importantly, would Mao, a battle-hardened revolutionary, give up crucial 
strategic surprise by engaging in incremental annexation that stretched for nine months from 
September 1954 to May 1955?  
 
Chang and He Di subsequently co-authored in 1993 an article on the 1955 crisis which reiterated 
their arguments. But one contradiction remained. Beijing supposedly ―did not understand the 
serious effect its activity and statements would have in the United States… [and believed that] the 
political reaction of the US should be ignored.‖ Yet, Chang and He Di later stated that the ―[US] 
nuclear threats against the mainland not only stiffened Communist resolve, they also helped 
convince Beijing to launch its own nuclear weapons program.‖20 Did Beijing genuinely scoff at the 
US nuclear threat or did Mao understand well the nature of the threat? Chang and He Di could not 
have it both ways. Their efforts in this respect raised more questions than answers: did the 
misperception of 1955 extend to the 1958 crisis?  
 
Zhang Shu Guang also highlighted the importance of misperceptions during the Taiwan Strait 
                                                 
18 He Di used only memoirs, published documents and official accounts, with no access to Chinese archives. Only in two 
places, military plans for the 1955 crisis and territorial aims for the second, where He Di cited anonymous interviews 
were there novel findings. He Di, ―The Evolution,‖ 241. 
19 Gordon H. Chang, "To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis."  International Security 12, 
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day restricted. See Gordon H. Chang and He Di, ―The Absence of War in the US-China Confrontation over Quemoy and 
Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence?‖ The American Historical Review 98, no. 5 (Dec 1993): 1500-
1524.  
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Crises. In his 1992 book on Sino-US relations from 1949 to 1958, Zhang blamed the US for its 
ham-fisted threat of nuclear retaliation and China for ―overestimat [ing] the opportunity for 
success and miscalculat [ing] the role of belligerency‖ in the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Sino-US 
misperceptions, Zhang argued, arose from the different strategic cultures of the antagonists and 
this led to the outbreak of various Sino-US hostilities.
21
  However, if the misperceptions were so 
deep, why did another Korean War not break out again? Zhang‘s analysis appeared to downplay 
the degree of tacit understanding reached by both nations.   
 
Qiang Zhai, too, agreed that misperceptions lay at the root of most Sino-US crises. In his 1994 
book on Sino-British-US relations from 1949 to 1958, Zhai uncritically interpreted the PRC‘s role 
in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis as benign, asserting that the CCP‘s intentions were limited to 
―secur[ing] the tranquil external environment necessary for China‘s domestic development.‖ 22 
Zhai preferred to blame the blighted perceptions of the Eisenhower administration for escalating 
the conflict.
23
 Despite acknowledging the overall strategic flexibility of the US administrations, at 
important junctures, Zhai chose to depict the US as hindered by excessive moralism, emotional 
politics and ―volatile‖ domestic politics, as opposed to ―rational‖ Britain.24  The corollary 
implication would be a ―realistic‖ and ―cautious‖ Mao not given to flights of fancy.25 
 
Another explanation for the outbreak of the Taiwan Strait Crises stresses the domestic imperatives 
of the PRC. In a 1972 article, Allen Whiting posited that China‘s actions could be explained as 
―reactive, defensive and for deterrence purposes only.‖ Whiting did not think that China‘s 
                                                 
21 Apparently, ―neither side had the aggressive intentions that the other feared.‖ Zhang Shu Guang, Deterrence and 
Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontation, 1949-1958 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 268, 282. 
22 Together with ―domestic politics,‖ Zhai uses such approaches as ―rational choice, organizational and bureaucratic 
models.‖ Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion & the Eagle: Chinese/ British/ American Relations, 1949-1958 (Kent, Ohio: 
The Kent State Univ. Press, 1994), 4; James T. H. Tang, review of The Dragon, the Lion & the Eagle, by Qiang Zhai, 
The China Journal 35, (Jan 1996), 227-229; William O. Walker III, review of The Dragon, the Lion & the Eagle, by 
Qiang Zhai, The Historian 57, no.3 (Spring 1995): 628-629. 
23 Zhai, 154; Marc Gallicchio, review of The Dragon, the Lion & the Eagle, by Qiang Zhai, The Journal of American 
History 82, no.1 (Jun 1995):350. 
24 See Steve Tsang, review of The Dragon, the Lion & the Eagle, by Qiang Zhai, China Review International 2, No. 1 
(Spring 1995): 289-291; Rosemary Foot, review of The Dragon, the Lion & the Eagle, by Qiang Zhai, The International 
History Review 17, no. 3 (Aug 1995): 632-633. 
25 Su-Ya Chang, review of The Dragon, the Lion & the Eagle, by Qiang Zhai, The Journal of American-East Asian 
Relations 4, no.3 (Fall 1995): 287-288; Schaller, review of The Dragon, the Lion & the Eagle, 620. 
 8 
revolutionary ideology predisposed it to act belligerently,
26
 citing that in all the nine forays beyond 
her borders, China had always reacted defensively and preferred to signal strongly and retain 
―options for cutting her losses.‖27 During the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, Whiting argued that 
although Mao had the bombardment under control, the intense response from the US caught him 
off-guard; however, Mao surmised that China was in no imminent danger of being attacked as the 
US only had a ―few troops to send back and forth.‖ Whiting proceeded to contend that shoring up 
Chinese domestic needs, such as increasing agricultural and industrial output, were more important 
factors in Mao‘s calculations.28 
 
In their 1980 book on China‘s politics of strategy and diplomacy, Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo 
Hwang further argued that China‘s urgent domestic economic reforms needed a sound national 
security policy.
29
 While Gurtov and Hwang assumed the rationality of China‘s foreign 
policymaking despite its heavy doses of Maoism,
30
 they stressed more fundamentally the 
preeminence of ―domestic objectives over international ones.‖ Viewing domestic developmental 
issues as a determining factor in all of Chinese foreign policy deliberations,
31
 they argued that the 
world situation in 1958, with the US invasion of Lebanon, unrest in Tibet and the installation of 
                                                 
26 See Allen S. Whiting, ―The Use of Force in Foreign Policy by the People‘s Republic of China,‖ Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 402 (Jul. 1972): 55-66. 
27 Ibid, 55, 57. 
28 Buttressing his interpretation of a pragmatic Mao not given to idiosyncrasy in foreign policy, Whiting utilized four 
speeches given by Mao during the Quemoy Crisis. The new texts were collected in a bootlegged Cultural Revolution 
collection, Mao Zedong Sixiang Wansui. From the texts, Mao emerged as extremely well informed and sensitive to the 
security treaty Taiwan had with the US. Mao was also candid about the level of escalation he was prepared to raise. 
Echoing George & Smoke‘s interpretation of Chinese limits, Mao sought to force the Nationalists off the island through 
―slow strangulation by blockade.‖ In the 1960s, with the increasing availability of published works of Mao‘s speeches 
and groundbreaking declassified People‘s Liberation Army‘s (PLA) Gongzuo Tongxun (work bulletins), scholars 
displayed creative interpretations of Chinese foreign policies. See J. Chester Cheng, ed., Gongzuo Tongxun. The Politics 
of the Chinese Red Army: A translation of the Bulletin of Activities of the PLA (Cal.: Stanford University, 1966); Mao 
Zedong Sixiang Wansui (n.p., Aug 1969); Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought (Arlington, Virginia: JPRS, 1974); J. 
Chester Cheng, ed., Gongzuo Tongxun. The Politics of the Chinese Red Army: A translation of the Bulletin of Activities 
of the PLA (Cal.: Stanford University, 1966).Whiting, ―New Light on Mao: Quemoy 1958: Mao‘s Miscalculations,‖ CQ 
62 (Jun 1975): 263-270; Whiting, ―Mao China and the Cold War,‖ in The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, ed. Yonosuke 
Nagai & Akira Iriye (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977): 252-276. 
29 Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Bal.: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1980); Melvin Gurtov, ―The Taiwan Strait Crisis Revisited: Politics and Foreign Policy in 
Chinese Motives,‖ Modern China 2, no. 1 (Jan 1976): 49-103. 
30 Ronald C. Keith, review of China Under Threat, by Gurtov & Hwang, Canadian Journal of Political Science 14, no.4 
(Dec 1981): 870-872.  
31 Gurtov and Hwang also propose a Chinese Marxist-Maoist explanatory grid to cast light onto the perceptions of the 
Chinese.  Wang Gungwu, in China and the World Since 1949 (1977), has advocated interpreting China‘s foreign policy 
on its own terms,  along three themes: ―The desire to assert independence, the problems of modernity, and the 
determination to make revolution.‖  For Gurtov and Hwang, Chinese foreign policy can be similarly categorized by three 
impulses: an Asian nationalistic impulse, a Marxist revolutionary impulse, and a socialist developmental impulse. See 
Gurtov and Hwang, 17. 
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nuclear missiles in South Korea, looked very threatening to Mao, who then decided on the limited 
bombardment of Quemoy as it was cheap, safe and ―deflect[ed] an immediate threat.‖32 China‘s 
need to deflect threats in 1958 was also a position supported by John W. Lewis and Xue Litai who, 
in their 1988 book, China Builds the Bomb, examined the PRC‘s domestic development from the 
perspective of its burgeoning nuclear programme. According to Lewis and Xue, Beijing embarked 
on its nuclear course in January 1955 in response to perceived American threats;
33
 in addition, the 
Great Leap Forward was intended to complement China‘s nuclear programme. From this 
perspective, Lewis and Xue argued that Mao had every reason in 1958 to deflect possible threats 
from the US to safeguard China‘s crucial multi-faceted domestic programmes.34 
 
Along the same vein, Thomas J. Christensen persuasively argued in his 1996 work on Sino-
American relations from 1947 to 1958 that leaders often had to use scare tactics in their foreign 
policy rhetoric in order to garner support for unpopular domestic strategies. According to 
Christensen, Mao in 1958 wanted to cultivate domestic support for his radical Great Leap 
Forward,
35
 which he envisioned to be an economic enterprise that combined industrial expansion, 
formation of communes, and atomic research and development.
36
 Since sacrifices were needed if 
China was to surpass the US and become a force respected within the socialist fraternity,
37
 Mao 
sought neither a strategic probe into the US-KMT defense nor a takeover of Formosa itself, but a 
reinstatement of the civil war mentality using tensions generated by the Second Taiwan Strait 
Crisis.
38
   
                                                 
32 Complicating the matters were the actions of the US and Taiwan. Warsaw negotiations were going nowhere and 
harassments from Taiwan were increasing; the crisis ―manufacturing‖ methods of the Nationalists include 32 secret raids 
on the PRC‘s coastal areas within six months. Gurtov and Hwang, 75, 80, 84, 91. 
33 Leon V. Sigal combined an acknowledgment of the PRC‘s security needs with a scathing critique of US foreign policy 
for its many threats made against the PRC. Sigal thus interpreted the PRC‘s bombardments as ―reprisals,‖ meant only as 
a ―severe punishment‖ to Taiwan, with no danger of an expansion of conflict. See Leon V. Sigal, ―The ‗Rational Policy‘ 
Model and the Formosa Straits Crises,‖ International Studies Quarterly 14, no. 2 (Jun 1970): 121-156. 
34 By carefully scrutinizing all US intelligence briefings, Lewis & Xue found that, contrary to Chang‘s thesis, the US 
was very clear about the limitations of the 1955 Chinese bombardment and China‘s ―military weakness.‖ Lewis & Xue, 
China Builds the Bomb, 37-38. 
35 Christensen proposes approaching Sino-US relations through a ―two-level mobilization model,‖ combining the 
analysis of domestic with foreign policies. Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic 
Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958. 
36 Jean-Marc E. Blanchard, review of Useful Adversaries, by Thomas J. Christensen, Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 557, (May 1998): 180-181. 
37 Christensen, 214. 
38 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, review of Useful Adversaries, by Thomas J. Christensen, Political Science Quarterly 113, 
no.1 (Spring 1998): 139-140. 
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In more recent scholarship, Chen Jian contended that an ideology of ―continuous revolution‖ 
underscored both Mao‘s domestic economic policies and China‘s foreign policy orientation. In his 
2001 book, Mao‟s China and the Cold War, Chen found domestic concerns and foreign policy 
mutually reinforcing throughout China‘s developments from the 1940s to the early 1970s, and his 
analysis included a chapter on the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis.
39
 ―China‘s external behaviour,‖ Chen 
wrote, ―was primarily shaped by domestic concerns.‖40 Chen maintained that time and again Mao 
was able to exploit China‘s ―victim mentality‖ to garner domestic support for his domestic and 
foreign policies. For example, when the Soviet Union proved tardy in giving economic aid to 
China, the same specter of foreign encroachment was zealously used as a rationalization to embark 
on such economic policies as the Great Leap Forward, all in the name of societal transformation 
towards socialism.
41
 Hence, to Chen, the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis can be interpreted as yet 
another instance to illustrate how Mao‘s contests with the Soviet Union and the US had 
transformed into a ―struggle for true Communism‖ as well as ―a struggle for China‘s integrity.‖42 
1.3 Mode of Communication 
While the causes of the Taiwan Strait Crises explained in such terms as Sino-US misperceptions 
and miscalculations and China‘s domestic imperatives represents one major theme in existing 
scholarship, the mode of communication between the US and China constitutes a second major 
theme. Here, the interpretations focus on such issues as probing and deterrence, tacit 
communication, management of crises, and negotiations and tenuous peace. 
 
Emphasizing the PRC‘s purposeful probing and the US responses, Halperin and Tang Tsou 
asserted that China‘s revolutionary ideology was belligerent and China‘s action in the Taiwan 
                                                 
39 In this book, Chen Jian combines his four previously published articles (on the Chinese Civil War, American‘s ―Lost 
Chance,‖ the Korean War, and China‘s involvement in the Vietnam War) with four new areas of inquiry (the first 
Indochina War, the Polish and Hungarian Crises, the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, and Nixon‘s rapprochement with 
China). Each of the chapters can be read as stand-alone pieces, with a few central themes running through the entire 
analysis. See Chen Jian, Mao‟s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 
40 Chen, 82, 279. 
41 Daniel S. Markey, review of Mao‟s China and the Cold War, by Chen Jian, Political Science Quarterly 117, no. 2 
(Summer 2002): 328-329. 
42 Chen Jian 陈兼, ―Geming yu weiji de niandai‖ 革命与危机年代 [Revolution and Crisis], Lengzhan guojishi yanjiu 冷
战国际史研究 [Cold War International Studies], no. 7 (Dec 2008), 46-96. 
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Strait was the logical outcome. For the 1958 crisis, they argued in 1967 in a chapter in an edited 
volume, Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, that Mao and Khrushchev only wanted a probe 
―but in a way that would not risk a major attack by the United States.‖43 The conjecture of Morton 
H. Halperin and Tang visualized a near-monolithic communist bloc in the classic traditional Cold 
War interpretation of the 1950s where the Soviet Union played a large part in the affairs of the 
―Chinese Communist movement.‖44 To Halperin and Tang, the main purpose of the Communist 
Chinese was limited: the Chinese would tightly control the probe and force the Nationalists off the 
offshore islands should the US commitment be weak.
45
 There was never any danger of the Chinese 




Against the communist probe, Alexander George and Richard Smoke lamented the ―vulnerability‖ 
of the US deterrence strategy in their 1974 book on the theory and practice of deterrence in 
American foreign policy,
47
 and viewed the 1958 crisis as a ―depressing replay of the earlier [1955 
crisis].‖ George and Smoke criticized the White House for lacking the ―classical statesmanship in 
supplementing deterrence with conciliation and flexibility‖ as they concurred that the US did not 
have effective counter-measures to China‘s low-level threats. George and Smoke conceded that 
Beijing was well aware of the extent it was allowed to probe. Beijing‘s main aim was to kick-start 
deadlocked Sino-US negotiations called off by the US, and it would be all the better if the 
Nationalists could be forced off Quemoy with advanced artillery. Washington weighed accurately 
the cautiousness of China‘s bombardment and responded in kind. To George and Smoke, the key 
to resolve this ―gap‖ between ―action policy and declaratory policy‖ was to have a ―dependable 
channel of direct communication.‖48 
 
In contrast, in his 1987 work, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, Richard Betts discerned in 
                                                 
43 Morton H. Halperin & Tang Tsou, ―The 1958 Quemoy Crisis,‖ in Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, ed. Morton 
H. Halperin (Mass.: MIT, 1967), 265-303. 
44 Mark Selden, ―Yan‘an Communism Reconsidered,‖ Modern China 21, no. 1 (Jan 1995), 16.  
45 See Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb (NY: Prager, 1965), 15, 55-62 
46 Analyzing the data of the communist shells fired on Quemoy, Jonathan T. Howe‘s study also followed Halperin and 
Tang‘s interpretation that the Chinese Communists were only interested in a limited probe. See Multicrises: Seapower & 
Global Politics in the Missile Age (Cam., Mass.,: MIT, 1971), 242. 
47 Alexander L. George & Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (NY: 
Columbia University Press, 1974). 
48 Ibid, 370, 376, 381, 384. 
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Washington a tendency for a ―risk-maximizer‖ approach. To Betts, Eisenhower‘s confidence in 
brandishing nuclear threats underscored a position of strength and China had the dubious 
distinction of being the target of most of the US nuclear threats. Betts argued that Eisenhower‘s 
nuclear threats in the 1958 crisis came about as ―he saw little danger that war would occur and 
force the issue.‖ Hence, the White House was definitely not ―pussy-footing‖ over nuclear attacks, 
but responding pragmatically.
49
   
 
Other studies, however, have pointed out the tenuous communication maintained by the 
belligerents. Charles A. McClelland offered the counter-intuitive perspective. Analyzing the 1958 
crisis in a 1962 article, McClelland noted that the antagonists were highly ―restrain[ed]‖ and the 
US and China reached out for each other through ―tacit communication.‖ In addition, McClelland 
observed that the real intentions were conveyed through actions in the Taiwan Strait rather than in 
the 1958 Warsaw negotiations. Although McClelland was the earliest scholar who pointed out the 
tenuous communication taking place in Sino-US relations during the 1958 crisis, he did not 
elaborate on the sinews of ―tacit communication‖ or place the Sino-US ―restraint‖ in the larger 
context of ―tacit communication‖ since he speculated that the restraint was due to ―bureaucratized 
line of minimum action.‖50 
 
J. H. Kalicki‘s 1975 study of Sino-US political and military relations in the 1950s went a step 
further by claiming that both countries improved their management of crises over time and a 
―Sino-American crisis system‖ emerged in 1955. The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis proved Kalicki‘s 
argument that both China and the US ―demonstrated impressive flexibility of action as well as 
appreciation of desirable, self-imposed limits on their crisis behaviour.‖51 Although Kalicki viewed 
revolutionary fervor as having prompted China‘s boldness in confronting the US over the Taiwan 
                                                 
49 Through the lens of nuclear deterrence, Richard Betts examined the saliency of two theories in international crises: the 
balance of interest and the balance of power. The crises were divided into two types: high risk (involving direct 
superpowers) and low risk (through proxies). Betts postulated that both theories while useful have their limitations in 
describing the Americans and the Soviets. Richard Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution, 1987), 22, 70, 76 & 78. 
50 Charles A. McClelland, ―Decisional Opportunity and Political Controversy: the Quemoy Case,‖ The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 6, no. 3 (Sept 1962): 201-213.  
51 J. H. Kalicki, The Pattern of Sino-American Crises: Political-Military Interactions in the 1950s (Cam.: CUP, 1975). 
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Strait in 1958, he was quick to identify the realism that pervaded the military action. While Kalicki 
did not consider fundamental issues being settled during the Taiwan Strait Crises, he did see ―the 
establishment and relative stabilization of a balance of power system in the Far East.‖52  
 
For Gordon H. Chang, an overarching realpolitik outlook similarly evolved out of Washington‘s 
China Policy and crisis management seemed to have taken the form of Eisenhower‘s nascent US 
attempts at triangulation politics in the 1950s. In his 1990 book on US-China-Soviet relations from 
1948 to 1972, Chang argued that the US had always recognized that tensions existed between the 
Soviet Union and China and had thus sought to exploit such tensions.
53
 To Chang, despite all the 
hot air of ―unleashing Chiang,‖ Eisenhower and Dulles found civility towards the Soviets a more 




From another perspective, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker contended in 1990 in a book chapter on Dulles 
and US-Taiwan-China relations that despite the overall conservatism of Sino-US relations, 
Washington did maintain tenuous peace and attempt negotiations with Beijing. Tucker 
demonstrated that Dulles was actively restraining Chiang through the Mutual Defense Treaty.
55
 In 
the aftermath of the 1958 Crisis, Tucker also viewed Dulles as having made a conscious choice of 
resorting to negotiations to ease tension in the Strait as Dulles believed that peace could be 
achieved through the ―two-China‖ policy, even though both the Communists and the Nationalists 




                                                 
52 Ibid, 218, 172-175, 187, 190.  
53 Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford Univ. Press, 1990), 3; Marc Gallicchio, review of Friends and Enemies, in Pacific Historical Review 61, no.4 
(Nov 1992): 584-585; Arthur N. Waldon, review of Friends and Enemies, in Orbis 34, no.2 (Summer 1990): 470-471; 
Russell D. Buhite, review of Friends and Enemies, in The American Historical Review 96, no. 3 (Jun 1991): 848-849. 
54 The ideal situation would be ―not when Beijing disabused itself of Moscow, but when Moscow prompted by 
Washington, abandoned its militant Asian partner.‖ For an early discussion of triangulation politics, see Gerald Segal, 
The Great Power Triangle (London: Macmillian Press, 1982). However, Chang‘s position was odd given that his 1988 
and 1993 papers condemned Eisenhower‘s inferior handling of the 1955 Taiwan Straits Crisis. How did his papers 
square with the general assessment in his book? Chang did not seek to enlighten his readers. See Frank Ninkovich, 
review of Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972, by Gordon H. Chang, The 
Journal of American History 78, no. 1 (Jun 1991): 384-385. 
55 Richard D. Challener agreed with most of Tucker‘s observations. See ―John Foster Dulles: Theorist/ Practitioner,‖ in 
Centerstage: American Diplomacy since WWII, ed. Leon Carl Brown (NY: Holmes & Meier Pub., 1990), 346. 
56 Tucker, ―John Foster Dulles and the Taiwan Roots of the ‗Two Chinas‘ Policy,‖ in John Foster Dulles and the 
Diplomacy of the Cold War, ed. R. H. Immerman (NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1990), 235-262. 
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Similarly, Steven M. Goldstein noted Sino-US attempts at negotiations in his 2001 book chapter, 
highlighting how the Sino-US ambassadorial talks from August 1955 to December 1957 
functioned as Washington‘s tactical posturing for world opinion in the UN. Although Goldstein 
gave a scathing indictment of the US negotiation efforts led by Dulles, peace was nonetheless 
preserved.
57
 Goldstein also showed how Jacob Beam, the US ambassador, received explicit 
instructions from Dulles on 4 October 1958 during the second Taiwan Strait Crisis, with the US 
hoping that the PRC would use the Warsaw negotiations to end bombardment. Although this was 
not an exercise in seeking ―any bold new initiatives,‖58 Goldstein maintained that Washington was 
willing to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait with Beijing‘s tacit understanding.  
 
2. Scope of Study 
There is thus an interesting spectrum of scholarship on the Taiwan Strait Crises. However, the 
availability of new sources from three archives – Academia Historica (Taipei), Archives of the 
PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Beijing) and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (Abilene) – has 
made possible a re-examination of the crises. These sources will now be introduced, followed by 
the framework of analysis of this thesis. 
 
2.1 Primary Sources  
Scholars of the Chinese Republican era have long consulted Academia Historica. However, it was 
only in recent years that the post-1953 papers of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo are 
released. This liberalization of materials coincided with the tenure of the former Chen Shui-bien 
Presidency (2000-2008). Although the materials are rich, significant restrictions exist. This 
accounts for the slow trickle of research based on such sources. One major challenge is the 
prohibition of electronic reproduction of materials. As photocopying and digital reproduction of 
the materials are disallowed, researchers can only laboriously copy by hand or type in their 
computers the relevant materials. Despite this drawback, the bulk of the references and the analysis 
                                                 
57 Steven M. Goldstein, ―Dialogue of the Deaf? The Sino-American Ambassadorial-Level Talks,‖ in Reexamining the 
Cold War US China Diplomacy 1954-1972, 200-237. 
58 Ibid., 225. 
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of the ROC in the Taiwan Strait Crises in this dissertation are drawn from this gold mine of 
materials, the Chiang Kai-shek Papers and the Chiang Ching-kuo Papers. As existing scholarship 
have discussed the roles of the ROC during the Taiwan Strait Crises from largely US sources and a 
US-centric angle, this study will address this shortcoming by using these newly available sources 
to provide a more balanced analysis.  
 
The second source of materials this dissertation draws from is the newly opened Archives of the 
PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Beijing). Materials start from 1949 but sources from 1955 to 
1960 were only made available in May 2006.
59
 Up to 70% to 80% of the archives are declassified. 
While researchers could print most materials for a fee, they are prohibited from printing materials 
that either have significant handwritings of Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai or are memoranda of 
conversations that are verbatim records of the speeches of Mao and Zhou. These materials are 
usually the most valuable and researchers have to endure the rigors of manual copying. The 
discussion of the PRC during the Taiwan Strait Crises in this dissertation have benefited 
prodigiously from this archival collection. This archive has also published three volumes of 




American sources on the Taiwan Strait Crises are more easily accessible. Yet, no adequate study 
of the Taiwan Strait Crises can depend solely on the multiple volumes of the Foreign Relations of 
the United States, however excellent these are. Commercial microfilms of the primary sources 
pertaining to Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles are available from the mid-1980s onwards. 
Documents such as the National Security Council Series were either partially or fully declassified 
at that time. To obtain the latest declassified documents, this thesis has benefited enormously from 
a research trip to the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. New materials declassified from 2006 
                                                 
59 12 Nov 2008 marked the release of the third batch of materials (1961-1965). According to Zhang Sulin, an MFA 
archivist, the fourth batch (1966-1977) may be declassified within the next three years, by 2011. 
60 Director Zhang Sulin mentioned that only 60% of the archives are released. This represents one of the pitfalls of using 
such sources and thus I have meticulously cross-referenced with other sources. For additional information see, Zhang 
Sulin, ―The Declassification of Chinese Foreign Ministry Archival Materials: A Brief Introduction,‖ CWHIPB, Issue 16 
(Fall 2007-Winter 2008), 11. 
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onwards were consulted on-site.
61
 The archival staff had further granted on-the-spot Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) requests. Elsewhere, one particular commercial database, Declassified 
Documents Reference System, has enabled the tracking down of obscure materials missed during 
the field trip to Abilene. The public FOIA website of the Central Intelligence Agency also has 
many new materials which are useful for this dissertation. 
 
2.2 Framework of Analysis  
The availability of the above new sources has made it possible and timely to undertake a re-
examination of the Taiwan Strait Crises. This thesis will do so by providing an in-depth study of 
the actions and interactions of the PRC, US and ROC from 1954 to 1958.  It will explore the 
following three main questions: Why did the Taiwan Strait Crises erupt in September 1954 and 
August 1958 respectively? How did each crisis unfold, from outbreak to resolution? What can 
such a development of the Taiwan Strait Crises tell us about the foreign relations of the PRC, US 
and ROC in the 1950s? 
 
In addressing these questions, this thesis will contribute to existing scholarship in five ways. First, 
this thesis represents the first work in which the aforementioned newly available sources from the 
ROC, PRC and US have been used and integrated to present simultaneously the perspectives of the 
ROC, PRC and US on the Taiwan Strait Crises. While existing scholarship on the US-PRC-ROC 
relations do exist, most have relied largely on US sources, supplemented by published PRC and 
ROC materials. In contrast, 75% of the primary sources used in this thesis have not been cited in 
existing scholarship.
62
 Moreover, at each stage in the making and development of the Taiwan 
Strait Crises from 1950 to 1958, this thesis will pay almost equal attention to developments in the 
PRC, US and ROC. This differs again from much of existing scholarship, with their focus 
primarily on Sino-US relations and in a few instances, on the US-ROC relations. 
 
                                                 
61 Colleen Cearley, ―Eisenhower Presidential Library releases formerly secret documents,‖ News Release, 2 Feb 2006, 
DDEL. 
62
 This use of new primary documents has enabled and highlighted the need for a simultaneous and detailed 
presentation of the perspectives of the ROC, PRC and US on the Taiwan Strait Crises. 
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Second, this thesis will show how some of the main arguments in existing scholarship can be 
supported by the newly available archival sources and how some other arguments can be more 
clearly elucidated and elaborated. One example of such analysis will be the reasons for the 
outbreak of the Taiwan Strait Crises. The nuclear deterrence strategy of the US offers a second 
example. Another example will be how the PRC and the US went about seeking international 
support for their respective courses of action and how their alliances with other countries were 
affected by the developments of the Taiwan Strait Crises. A fourth example will be how the ROC 
planned for its fangong dalu (counter-offensive against the mainland) mission and the stratagems 
used by Chiang and his emissaries to bind the US to Taipei, as well as how the fangong dalu 
mission and rhetoric changed from 1950 to 1958.  
 
Third, while existing scholarship have rightly noted the importance of such factors as realism, 
strategy, economics, ideology and domestic concerns in analyzing the Taiwan Strait Crises, what is 
given inadequate attention is the consideration of cultural contexts. Hence this thesis will highlight 
as well relevant aspects of ―culture‖ to better understand the intricacies of the Sino-US-ROC 
relations.
63
 Historian Martin Stuart-Fox has argued that in examining China‘s foreign relations, 
affective domains, ―irrational‖ factors, ―cultural presuppositions‖ and ―historical influences‖ offer 
better explanatory powers in assessing strategic matters and military planning, as well as providing 
insights on ―how peaceful intercourse with other states should be conducted.‖64 Walter Hixson has 
similarly contended that a nation‘s international behavior flows directly from its culture and 
national identity and that for the foreign relations of the US, its national identity is its locomotive 
to action and policy.
65
 In more general terms, Frank Costigliola and Thomas Paterson have 
observed that ―culturally-conditioned feelings, such as injured pride, resentment, and a desire for 
                                                 
63
 My understanding of ―culture,‖ as used in this thesis, draws from Akira Iriye‘s exposition. ―Cultural 
relations,‖ according to Iriye, ―may be defined as interactions, both direct and indirect, among two or more 
cultures. Direct interactions include physical encounters with people and objects of another culture. Indirect 
relations are more subtle, involving such things as a person‘s ideas and prejudices about another people, or 
cross-national influences in philosophy, literature, music, art, and fashion.‖ See Akira Iriye, ―Culture and 
International History‖, in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, ed. Michael J Hogan and 
Thomas G Paterson, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 2004), p. 242. 
64 Martin Stuart-Fox, A Short History of China and Southeast Asia: Tribute, Trade and Influence (NSW: Allen & Unwin, 
2003), 4. 
65 Walter L. Hixson, The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and US Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2008), 1-4. 
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respect or revenge, can influence supposedly rational perceptions and decisions about foreign 
relations.‖66 Seen in such contexts, what appeared to be ―irrational‖ moves to the US, such as 
Chiang Kai-shek‘s refusal to budge from the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu or the odd-
day bombardments by the PRC during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, might well have been 
accepted as epitome of wisdom or ―coded‖ as ―toughness‖ by the Asians.67 
 
Fourth, in investigating the mode of communication in Sino-US relations, some of the existing 
scholarship have made references to such notions as ―tacit communication,‖ ―Sino-US crisis 
system,‖ and ―negotiations and tenuous peace.‖ This thesis will go further by demonstrating how 
conflict resolution in Sino-US relations took place in four main phases. One, how the foundation 
for a framework of ―tacit communication‖ was laid as early as April-July 1954 during the Geneva 
Conference which was convened to discuss matters pertaining to the conflicts in Korea and 
Indochina, prior to the outbreak of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. Two, how further steps in ―tacit 
communication‖ were constructed during the early months of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, 
leading to ―tacit accommodation‖ in the later months. Three, how progress in ―tacit 
accommodation‖ was made but at the same time how its limitations became apparent during the 
period between the two crises. Four, how ―tacit accommodation‖ was then consolidated, enabling 
the rapid resolution of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. In other words, while the Taiwan Strait 
Crises highlighted conflicts and tensions in Sino-US relations (the predominant stress in existing 
scholarship), this thesis will proceed further to argue that embedded in the crises were also 
seedlings that prepared the ground for conflict resolution in Sino-US relations. 
 
Fifth, in explaining the transformation of ―tacit communication‖ to ―tacit accommodation,‖ this 
thesis will show the significance of ―ritualization‖ in Sino-US relations. It will demonstrate how 
both parties engaged in ritualized actions that facilitated the process of conflict resolution. That 
                                                 
66 Frank Costigliola and Thomas G. Paterson, ―Defining and Doing History of United States Foreign Relations: A 
Primer,‖ in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, ed. Michael J. Hogan & Thomas G. Paterson (NY: 
CUP, 2004), 16. 
67 Frank Costigliola discusses the ―signaling of masculine-coded ‗toughness‘,‖ see ―Reading for Meaning: Theory, 
Language, and Metaphor,‖ in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, ed. Michael J. Hogan & Thomas G. 
Paterson (NY: CUP, 2004), 285. 
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rituals can be useful in ―conflict management‖ is seen in the cross-cultural work of Philip Gulliver, 
which showed how ritualization could function in negotiation and mediation in the societies of 
East Africa and North America.
68
 The conflict resolution scholarship of Lisa Schirch has also 
placed rituals squarely in ―the process of peace building.‖69 This thesis will demonstrate how the 
US and China achieved a limited but shared understanding of the modus operandi of the other 
party through their ritualized actions in terms of their use of  public symbols, identity issues, 
cultural images and official discourses on one hand, and military posturing, diplomatic canvassing 
for international support, and negotiations on the other hand. While the symbolic nature of China‘s 
military maneuvers during the Taiwan Strait Crises is mentioned in some of the existing 
scholarship, none has analyzed Sino-US interactions in the context of ―ritualization.‖ Yet, 
―ritualization‖ is particularly salient in unraveling the turbid diplomatic episodes of the Taiwan 
Strait Crises: the ―silent poetry‖ of diplomacy, the tacit allowances for withdrawals, the muted 
back-channel negotiations, the paradoxically loud denunciations, and the sound and fury of 
artillery bombardments.
70
 In the words of Robert Darnton: ―By picking at the document where it is 
most opaque, we may be able to unravel an alien system of meanings.‖71  
 
In short, through the use of the newly available primary sources, the simultaneous presentations of 
the perspectives of the PRC, US and ROC, the re-evaluation of some of the major arguments in 
existing scholarship, and the incorporation of analyses relating to ―culture,‖ ―tacit communication-
tacit accommodation‖ and ―ritualization,‖ this thesis will re-examine the Taiwan Strait Crises and 
offer new perspectives to understanding the crises.  
 
To address all the above issues, this thesis is structured chronologically. The genesis of the Taiwan 
Straits Crises could be traced to 1950 when President Harry S. Truman positioned the Seventh 
                                                 
68 Mark Davidheiser, ―Rituals and Conflict Transformation: An Anthropological Analysis of Ceremonial Dimensions of 
Dispute Processing,‖ in Beyond Intractability, eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess (Conflict Research Consortium, 
University of Colorado, Boulder, 2006), http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/rituals_and_ceremonials/ (accessed 
17/6/2008).  
69 Lisa Schirch, Ritual and Symbol in Peacebuilding (Bloomfield, Kumarian Press, 2005), 13. 
70 For an elaboration on the ―silent poetry‖ of negotiations, see Schirch, Ritual and Symbol in Peacebuilding, 9. 
71 Robert Darton, The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History (New York: Vintage Books, 
1985), 5. 
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Fleet in the Taiwan Strait to prevent hostilities between the PRC and the ROC. In order to 
understand the origins and making of the Taiwan Strait Crises, it is thus important to deal with the 
major developments in the foreign relations of the US, PRC and ROC from 1950 to April 1954, 
which is the topic of Chapter 2. After a brief account of events from 1945 to 1953, detailed 
analysis will be given to developments from 1953 to April 1954, which were important to 
understanding subsequent Sino-US interactions during the Geneva Conference and had 
implications for the unfolding of the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954-55. As the ROC was the most 
directly affected party right from the start, how the Taiwan Strait issue played out in Taiwan from 
1950 to April 1954 will also be examined.  
 
The Geneva Conference is the topic of Chapter 3. Held from 26 April to 21 July 1954, the 
Conference was significant in providing a major diplomatic platform for the US and China to 
undertake negotiations and work out differences so as to reach an understanding on outstanding 
issues regarding the ―Korean question‖ and the ―question of restoring peace in Indochina.‖ How 
Sino-US relations evolved during this Conference and what implications such developments had 
for the making of the Taiwan Strait Crises, as well as what actions Taiwan, not a participant in 
Geneva, took during this period and what impact such actions had in the unfolding of the Taiwan 
Strait Crises, will be discussed.  
 
On 3 September 1954, China launched a massive artillery bombardment on Quemoy and Matsu 
islands, triggering the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. This attack prompted the US to sign the Mutual 
Defence Treaty with Taiwan on 2 December 1954. China also courted neutralist countries in Asia 
in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. After the Geneva Conference, what developments in July 
and August 1954 led to the eruption of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis? How did China, the US and 
Taiwan act following the outbreak of this crisis? These are the two main questions raised in 
Chapter 4, which will analyze the major events related to the outbreak of the First Taiwan Strait 
Crisis from July to December 1954. 
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On 18 January 1955, the PRC upped the ante in the First Taiwan Straits Crisis by recovering the 
obscure Nationalist-controlled Yijiangshan islands as a prelude to occupying the neighbouring 
Dachen islands. Eisenhower in a news conference on 16 March publicly threatened the use of 
nuclear weapons. At the first Afro-Asian Conference held on 18-24 April 1955 in Bandung, 
Indonesia, PRC premier Zhou Enlai announced that China was not averse to negotiating with the 
US over the Taiwan Strait Crisis. Zhou‘s conciliatory gesture was quickly accepted by the US over 
virulent protests by the ROC. What were the motivations for the actions of China, the US and 
Taiwan and how did Sino-US relations develop from the eve of the Yijiangshan campaign to the 
Bandung Conference? Chapter 5, focusing on developments from January to April 1955, will 
explore these key questions. 
 
Zhou‘s conciliatory gesture in April 1955 at the Bandung Conference could be seen to mark the 
end of the First Taiwan Crisis which began in September 1954. Chapter 6 will examine the 
sustaining linkages in the US-PRC-ROC relations that occurred between May 1955 and December 
1957. It will examine four areas: the Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks (August 1955-December 
1957), the ROC-PRC secret back-channels (1955-1957), the May 1957 Taiwan Riots, and the 
ROC and its fangong mission (1955-1957). What the major developments in these four areas were 
and what their significance were for the US-PRC-ROC relations are the leading questions posed in 
this chapter. 
 
After the Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks ceased in December 1957, further talks were suspended 
indefinitely. On 23 August 1958, the PRC again targeted artillery barrages on Quemoy and Matsu, 
igniting the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. However, on 6 September, both Zhou and Dulles publicly 
announced possible peaceful measures and this led to the convening of the Sino-US negotiations in 
Warsaw from 15 September onwards. What were the positions of the ROC, US and PRC just prior 
to the outbreak of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis and what developments led to the eruption of 
this crisis? How did China, the US and Taiwan act following the outbreak of this crisis and why 
was Sino-US tacit accommodation reached almost immediately in the wake of the Crisis? In what 
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ways did China and the US seek to justify their actions to their domestic public and in the 
international arena and how did they attempt to court domestic and international support? These 
are the main questions raised in Chapter 7, which will examine developments from January to 
September 1958, culminating in the outbreak of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. 
 
Once Zhou Enlai accepted Washington‘s offer of restarting the negotiations in Warsaw, the 
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis retreated in urgency. Chapter 8, exploring developments from late-
September to December 1958, wraps up the discussion of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. How 
did the PRC, the US and the ROC relate to each other and in the international arena in the final 
months of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis? In what ways did the PRC respond to third-party 
proposals from Britain, the Soviets and neutralist Asian countries? How did Beijing and 
Washington consolidate their tacit accommodation and how did the ROC respond? Why did the 
PRC and the ROC again engage in secret back-channels? What were the positions of the three 
protagonists in the aftermath of the Crisis? These are the main questions posed in this chapter. 
 
As this thesis is structured and analyzed chronologically thus far, the Conclusion will collate and 
present the analysis thematically, spanning the period 1954-58 and the 1950s in general. It will 
address the 3 main questions that this thesis sets out to explore: Why did the Taiwan Strait Crises 
erupt in September 1954 and August 1958 respectively? How did each crisis unfold, from outbreak 
to resolution? What can such a development of the Taiwan Strait Crises tell us about the foreign 
relations of the PRC, US and ROC in the 1950s? 
 
On this note, it is now appropriate to examine the origins and making of the Taiwan Strait Crises 









Figure 2 Indochina – September 1953 (DDEL) 
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Chapter Two: The Making of the Taiwan Strait Crises, 1950-April 1954 
 
The genesis of the two Taiwan Strait Crises could be traced to 1950 when President Harry S. 
Truman positioned the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait to prevent hostilities between the PRC 
and the ROC. How did such a situation emerge? How did it unfold to April 1954, just before the 
convening of the Geneva Conference? What were the main developments in the foreign relations 
of the US, China and Taiwan from 1950 to April 1954 and how did the Taiwan Strait feature in 
these relations? In what ways would these developments be linked to the future unfolding of the 
Taiwan Strait Crises?  
 
This chapter will explore the above issues in three main sections. The first section will analyze US 
policy toward China, Taiwan and Asia. After a short account of the genesis of the Taiwan Strait 
Crisis from 1945 to 1953, it will proceed to an in-depth study of four major developments from 
1953 to April 1954, which were important to understanding subsequent Sino-US interactions 
during the Geneva Conference and had implications for the unfolding of the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 
1954-55:  the views of the CIA and Nixon; US domestic conservatism; the debate on US economic 
sanctions against China; and the formulation of ―United Action,‖ a US proposal to stem the 
communists‘ high tide in Indochina that would lead to the formation of the regional defence 
organization, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), in September1954. The second 
section will investigate the foreign relations of China, beginning with a brief narrative of events 
from 1945 to 1953, and then focusing on four main issues from 1953 to April 1954: Taiwan; the 
US and ―United Action‖; Asian neutralism; and Vietnam. Taiwan was the most directly affected 
party right from the start and how the Taiwan Strait issue played out in Taiwan from 1950 to April 
1954 will be closely examined in the third section, with the analysis centering on two major 




This chapter, through the use of newly available sources, stresses the entwining of the Taiwan 
Strait issue with events in Southeast Asia. Due to this entwining, it is thus important to analyze the 
positions of the US and the PRC relating to Southeast Asia. This chapter supports existing 
scholarship that highlighted the general reluctance of the US in directly intervening in the 
Indochina conflict; it also agrees with more recent scholarship that emphasized the PRC‘s 
extensive aid to North Vietnam. This chapter further contributes to existing scholarship on 
Eisenhower‘s China policy by showing the significant extent to which Eisenhower discussed with 
his cabinet on ways of liberalizing trade with communist China. In addition, this chapter enriches 
existing scholarship on the foreign relations of China by illustrating the creativity by which the 
PRC plotted its re-emergence onto the world scene. All these developments were important to 
understanding subsequent Sino-US interactions during the Geneva Conference and had 
implications for the unfolding of the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954-55. While existing scholarship 
on the US-ROC relations rightly noted the role of US economic aid in boosting Taiwan‘s 
developmental model, this chapter will demonstrate as well how the ethos of fangong dalu played 
significant roles in propelling military and foreign policy concerns, together with economic 
concerns, thereby underscoring how the Taiwan Strait issue delved hand-in-glove with the US 
larger concerns in the Cold War. 
1. The US  
1.1 1945-1953: The Genesis of the Taiwan Strait Crisis 
The Cold War provided the global context to understand international developments in Asia from 
1945 to 1953. With the fall of Nazi Germany, Washington became increasingly distressed by the 
number of Eastern European countries that were absorbed into the Soviet Union sphere of control. 
The US elucidated the Truman Doctrine in 1947, vowing to support democracy against 
communism. In the same year, the Marshall Plan, a US monetary bailout of European countries 
was also announced.
1
 The US set up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a mutual 
defence military alliance of Western European countries, in 1949 as a third step to stem the 
perceived communist high tide. With the Soviet Union‘s successful testing of the atomic bomb in 
                                                 
1 Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 2007), 37-79. 
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Post-1945 developments in Asia gradually became entangled with the Cold War. Following 
Japan‘s defeat in World War II, a civil war erupted between the CCP and the KMT from 1945 to 
1949 in a struggle for national supremacy. The US initially supported the KMT government by 
providing it with military and economic aid. However, by late 1948, when the ineffectiveness and 
corruption of the KMT regime became obvious, the US became unwilling to intervene further to 
support the tottering regime. With the emergence of the PRC in October 1949 and the 
establishment of the tottering KMT government on Taiwan, President Truman and his Secretary of 




From late 1949 to early 1950, the Truman administration appeared prepared for an accommodative 
policy toward China, seeing Mao as a ―potential Chinese Tito.‖ It hoped to create a wedge between 
China and the Soviet Union and used trade to divert China from the Soviet Union. It considered 
Taiwan and Korea to be outside of the US defence perimeter and seemed willing to accept China‘s 
planned invasion of Taiwan in mid-1951 and to offer diplomatic recognition of China.
4
 As the US 
was building up Japan to be the regional stabilizing power, China was not considered of vital 
interest.
5
 However, the eruption of the Korean War in June 1950 resulted in a ―lost chance‖ for 
improved Sino-US relations. Already the perceived ―loss of China‖ to Communism had led to a 
―conservative backlash‖ in US domestic politics and strengthened the virulent anti-communist 
specter of McCarthyism.
6
 The strength of the China Lobby (a group of pro-Taiwan Congressional 
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members) and the escalating Cold War in Europe were also obstacles to any attempt to 




The Korean War led to a rapid deterioration of relations between the US and China. When the US 
disregarded China‘s warning not to cross the Yalu River, Chinese troops stormed into Korea and 
fought the US troops, before both sides reached a stalemate along the 38
th
 parallel. 
Subsequent negotiations between the US and China to resolve issues associated with the Korean 
War were plagued by mutual suspicions and distrust. While the Korean War armistice agreements 




On the public front, President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, assumed 
a mantle of being tough on communism. Eisenhower allowed the State Department to be cleansed 
of any personnel associated with communism (real or imagined).
9
 Certain important posts in the 
administration were given to pro-Taiwan supporters. While Truman‘s orders of placing the 
Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait were in force throughout the Korean War, Eisenhower 
rescinded that restraint in 1953 and declared that the ROC would henceforth be ―unleashed.‖ 
According to the rhetoric, the leader of the ROC, Chiang Kai-shek, could launch a counter attack 
against mainland China. Such actions appeased the China Lobby.
10
 Moreover, the US also 
undertook covert operations against China, with the aid of Taiwan. Such operations began during 
the Korean War:  the US wanted to harass the communists in the southern parts of China while the 
Chinese People‘s Volunteers were held up in the Korea War. According to James Lilley, a former 
CIA operative, Taiwan ―became the principal base for launching [US/ ROC] clandestine military 
operations against mainland China.‖11 After the Korean War, the US restricted covert operations to 
intelligence, the recruitment of local guerillas and the enhancing of US embargo against the PRC. 
But the insertion of covert agents into mainland China continued.  
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Underlying Washington's aggressive foreign policy was also a belief that Communist China would 
dominate the power vacuum in the wake of a massive decolonization in Asia.
12
 As the PRC was 
regarded to be at the forefront of the international communist wave, it stood to reason that 
opposing communist China would be part and parcel of the US international anti-communist 
crusade. A rash of communist insurgencies in Burma and Malaya strengthened American 
perception that Beijing was exporting its revolution to Asia. By May 1950, Truman promised the 
French aid in their consolidation of Indochina. That commitment was sealed with the outbreak of 
the Korean War a month later. Despite some early successes by the French forces of General Jean 
de Lattre de Tassigny in 1951, Indochina was bleeding Paris white. Washington effectively funded 
two-thirds of the French war effort by the end of 1953.
13
   
 
Hence, the US involvements in the Taiwan Strait began in 1950, continued throughout the Korean 
War, and seemed to take on an increased significance in the aftermath of the Korean War. 
Maintaining Chiang‘s Taiwan became one of the main goals of US policy toward Asia, together 
with keeping Japan firmly in the US security umbrella, and preventing communism from spreading 
in Southeast Asia. However, the US was not prepared to go to war with China to achieve these 
goals. Instead Eisenhower‘s China Policy consisted of three major components: covert operations, 




Yet contradictions were readily apparent in the White House‘s China Policy. Economic embargoes 
against the PRC were hurting US allies as seen in the contention between Britain and the US. 
Southeast Asian nationalisms also became suspect in US eyes and were deemed to be communist-
inspired, triggering the launch of questionable US covert activities against such Southeast Asian 
countries as Vietnam.
15
 Despite the rhetoric of ―unleashing‖ Taiwan, Eisenhower and Dulles kept 
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Chiang at arm‘s length in reality. Both recognized that Chiang would only be too willing to 
involve the US in a larger war with communist China.
16
 To maintain a tight rein on US-ROC 
covert operations, ―American and [ROC] staffs closely cooperated in planning.‖ These hamstrung 
operations were not lost on Taiwan who played along with US needs.
17
 There thus emerged the 
need for the US to re-assess its policies toward China, Taiwan and Southeast Asia, and this would 
play a part in the making of the Taiwan Strait Crisis. 
 
1.2 1953-April 1954: Re-assessing China, Taiwan and Southeast Asia: Entwining 
the Taiwan Strait with Southeast Asia  
 
Following the signing of the Korean War armistice agreements, the US perceived China to be 
experiencing ―a period of relative quiescence,‖ reinforced by a seemingly severe US-led economic 
embargo.
18
 But Article IV of the armistice agreements provided for a political conference three 
months after the signing of the armistice to peacefully resolve the outstanding political questions 
of the Korean conflict.
19
 The Four Nations Berlin Conference (25 Jan-18 Feb 1954) settled on 26 
April 1954 for a Geneva Conference to discuss both the ―Korean question‖ and the ―question of 
restoring peace in Indochina.‖20 Eisenhower‘s awareness of the importance of engaging Asia and 
the need to clearly state the US position at the Geneva Conference led him to re-assess US policies 
toward China, Taiwan and Southeast Asia. Four developments stood out in this re-assessment: the 
views of the CIA and Nixon; US domestic conservatism; the debate on US economic sanctions 
against China; and the formulation of ―United Action,‖ a US proposal to stem the communists‘ 
high tide in Indochina that would lead to the formation of the regional defence organization, 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), in September1954. These developments 
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demonstrated that events in the Taiwan Strait continued to be entwined with events in Southeast 
Asia in the US policy toward Asia from 1953 to April 1954 and constituted a part in the making of 
the Taiwan Strait Crises. In particular, all these actions would later be perceived by the PRC to 
constitute a US strategy of encircling China and provided a pretext for China‘s bombing of the 
Quemoy and Matsu islands, which triggered the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. A close analysis of such 
developments is thus important. 
a. The CIA and Nixon 
As part of his effort to re-assess US policies in Asia, Eisenhower dispatched Vice-President 
Richard Nixon on a crucial official ―Goodwill‖ Asia trip at the end of 1953. An analysis of this 
development will shed interesting insights on the different views of US officials regarding Asia.  
Indeed, as Nixon remarked in his memoirs: ―None of these nations had ever received an official 
visit from a President or Vice-President.‖21 Before his trip, Nixon was briefed by the CIA, whose 
views will first be presented here, followed by Nixon‘s observations. 
 
The CIA reported that ―widespread sentiment‖ against ―Western imperialism‖ and the desire for 
―national independence‖ and improved economic status among Asians were critical factors that 
could be effectively exploited by the communists in the Far East. Compounding these was the 
leadership deficiency of the non-communist governments and their ―meager military resources.‖ 
As subversion was easier, armed communist conquest of ―additional territory‖ was unlikely.22 The 
CIA asserted that the communists‘ immediate modus operandi would be to strengthen ―their 
organization in non-Communist countries, weakening ties with the West and exploiting 
neutralism.‖ At the same time, the ―communist bloc will increase its use of economic inducements 
to influence the governments and peoples of the Far East.‖ For the long term, the CIA saw the 
Communists‘ goal as ―intensification of ‗armed liberation‘ movements at a later date.‖ However, 
prevailing Cold War ideological assumptions suffused the CIA‘s assessments. As the earliest 
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exposition of Eisenhower's domino theory, the CIA warned dramatically that: ―The security of 
Southeast Asia is closely interrelated. The fall of one, or even part of one, to Communism would 
seriously jeopardize the rest or bring about their collapse one by one.‖23 
 
In its evaluation of China, the CIA noted with chagrin that China remained stable and Beijing‘s 
relationship with Moscow remained firm. The Soviets had provided loans, advisory and technical 
aid and ―industrial equipment‖ to the Chinese for their five-year economic plan. The PRC military 
were also following the Soviet model in organization and equipment with the aid of ―several 
thousand Soviet military advisors.‖ For the moment, Beijing ―is still faithfully following the Soviet 
lead in both foreign and domestic affairs.‖ Developmental concerns meant neither ―Moscow [nor] 
Peiping is contemplating another Korean-type venture in the near future.‖ The CIA viewed the 
CCP as exercising unassailable domestic control and grudgingly found that the Chinese economy 
―still appears to be sound.‖ To its dismay, the CIA found no lack of enthusiastic ―Western trade 
missions‖ who were willing to negotiate ―large contracts‖ with Beijing. The PLA was also 
depicted as ―the most effective indigenous ground combat force in Asia.‖24 
 
In sharp contrast, the CIA considered Taipei‘s suppliant status troubling. The likelihood for the 
eventual ―military neutralization of Formosa was also growing day by day.‖ It was only due to US 
obduracy in the UN against the PRC's entry that ―this issue would not blow up.‖ However, the CIA 
noted that Chiang Kai-shek‘s KMT had ―firm control‖ of the ROC‘s internal security. Although 
the mainlanders were the minority, ―discontent among Formosans is not now a major problem.‖ 
Internal Communist subversions had been taken care of and ―has been reduced to negligible 
proportions.‖ US aid of $100 million per year had also yielded positive results in Taiwan‘s 
industrial and agriculture growth. Strict internal audit checks and non-corrupt governance by 
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―following sounder practices‖ had by 1953 made Taiwan a model of US foreign aid. Only its 




At the same time, the CIA expressed growing skepticism of US-ROC covert operations against 
China: 
Those of us working clandestinely in Asia recognized that covert operations, 
including missions … into China, were not revealing much about the closed-off 
Middle Kingdom … our missions were unable to locate or exploit the kind of 
discontent among the Chinese population that could be used to establish 
intelligence bases in China … The missions were also costing a lot of money.26  
Nonetheless, covert training centers were well established by 1953. One raid from Dachen on 25 
February recruited 124 ―young men interested in volunteering for guerrilla service.‖ Ironically, the 
CIA seemed more enthusiastic about training guerilla officers than Taipei as ―support by the 
Chinese [ROC] has not been forthcoming.‖27 The CIA also viewed ―[their] Taiwan partners more 
as refugees, dependent on the US for work and pay.‖ Lilley recalled that ―our intelligence partners 
on the Taiwan side were a defeated and demoralized group who… lacked the motivation to work 
clandestinely against a formidable enemy on the mainland.‖28 In fact, few Chinese officers with 




Upon his return from his official ―Goodwill‖ Asia trip at the end of 1953, Nixon expounded on the 
mass appeal of communism and his views differed from the CIA‘s in some aspects. To Nixon, 
Communist appeals stemmed from the effects of moribund colonialism. ―Asians want 
independence and economic progress,‖ indicated Nixon, ―and not communism as such.‖ The 
solution was to listen to the Asians themselves as these ―people were hungry to be listened to.‖30 
Nixon observed that racism and colonialism were the main bane of US efforts in the Far East, 
especially among the Chinese. He added that ―the Asians generally resent the Western world 
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because people from the West look down on them.‖31 It was this eddy of racial resentment that 
propelled the PRC forth among Third-World opinion in the aftermath of the Korean War. ―They 
went into the war a third-rate power,‖ reported Nixon about the Overseas Chinese perceptions of 
the PRC, ―and came out a first-rate power.‖32 As a remedy, Nixon suggested soft power: ―We must 
guard against internal subversion in almost every area in the Far East …The US must increase its 
propaganda in this area.‖33 The US must reassure Asians ―that we were not a colonial power, nor 
did we approve of the lingering colonialism of our European allies.‖34  
 
Nixon‘s insights, though significant and succinctly delivered on 23 December 1953 to the NSC, 
did not make an immediate impact.
35
 Nonetheless Eisenhower had gained an important ally in 
Nixon for his Asia policies. Nixon displayed a remarkable broadmindedness in major foreign 
policy issues which belied his personal politics. As Nixon was firmly aligned with his conservative 
Republican constituents, he did not advocate recognition for the PRC and he believed that the US 
must support the KMT. However, Nixon was a realist and came out strongly on the issue of trade 
with Communist China. Nixon recommended  ―containment but with trade‖ and this should take 
place ―gradually over a long range period based upon the assumption that trade is inevitable and 
will aid the US in getting intelligence out of China.‖36  
b. Currents of Domestic Conservatism 
While having Nixon‘s internationalist outlook significantly eased the Eisenhower‘s 
administration‘s dealings with the GOP Old Guard, Eisenhower still had to gingerly navigate the 
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shoals of Republican conservatism. How such conservatism impeded Eisenhower‘s efforts to re-
formulate US policies toward China, Taiwan and Southeast Asia will now be briefly discussed.  
 
Richard O. Davies painted a vivid picture of the composition of the conservatives during the post- 
war period. By the time the 80
th
 Congress started in 1947, it was a Republican Congress, which 
was determined to overturn the New Deal. This ―class of 1946‖ conservative Republicans both in 
the Senate and the House were also named the ―Old Guard.‖37 Eisenhower‘s tenure as a 
Republican president was difficult and most of his problems were from his party. Philip Grant 
showed that when Senator John Bricker introduced S.J. Res. 1 on January 1953 to curb the 
imperial presidency by bringing the Congress back into the federal government, he struck a chord 
in the 83
rd
 Congress, gaining conservative support for his amendment.
38
 Bricker‘s supporters were 
strongly isolationist and agreed with Senator Joseph McCarthy‘s anti-communist rhetoric.39 In fact, 




Although the Bricker Amendment eventually failed, Cathal J. Nolan emphasized that it left a deep 
impression upon the manner which the White House conducted foreign policy. Eisenhower 
pledged not to sign any agreement that would bypass the Senate.
41
 Even Eisenhower‘s subsequent 
saber-rattling antics against Soviet proxies were conducted with full consultations with 
Congressional leaders.
42
 Two trends emerged. One, Eisenhower‘s proclivity for covert actions was 
an indirect result of the intensity of the Bricker Amendment.
43
 Two, the tendency to associate 
Third-World nationalism with communist conspiracy ensued. Both actions could be understood as 
the lack of viable rationalizations or alternative instruments available to the White House, 
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constrained by the tumult of the Bricker Amendment. Opposing communism became a convenient 




In addition, Eisenhower suffered some drubbing at the hands of McCarthy.
 45
  McCarthy, as the 
chairman of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, objected to the White House 
appointments of General Walter Bedell Smith and Charles Bolen. Subsequent investigations into 
the Voice of America spewed forth a renewal of McCarthyism in the new administration.
46  
The 
long shadow cast by McCarthy also accounted for the obsequiousness of Dulles towards 
Congress.
47
  Foreign trade briefings were given personally by Dulles in April 1953. To pass 
muster, Dulles dutifully reported that the Eisenhower administration had complied religiously in 
administrating the ―embargo on the shipment of strategic materials to the countries of the Soviet 
Bloc.‖ But Dulles did warn McCarthy of the ―dangers that would result if Congressional 
Committees entered into the field of foreign relations, which is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Chief Executive.‖48 On 4 May, Dulles also argued that the US risked being isolated by allies with 
its overly strict enforcement of the embargo.
49
  
c. US Economic Sanctions against the PRC  
Even with the ponderous rightwing GOP oversight, Eisenhower was increasingly impatient with 
the US rigid embargo on China.
50
 How Eisenhower and other US officials viewed this issue will 
now be addressed. 
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Eisenhower learnt just how ineffective the embargo was against the PRC. Beijing was willing to 
offer exorbitant rates to Ceylon for its rubber. Although the PRC was hurting from the US-led 
embargo as there were reports of a ―definite shortage on the mainland of industrial raw materials, 
capital goods and replacement parts,‖ materials surreptitiously managed to find its way into the 
PRC. Around 5,000 tons of goods flowed through the porous borders of Hong Kong and Macao 




However, Eisenhower‘s cabinet strenuously opposed any relaxation of the embargo. Various 
reasons were cited ranging from crippling the Soviet bloc to preserving US negotiation leverages 
in Geneva. ―With a show of great impatience and exasperation,‖ the President struggled on the 11 
March 1954 NSC meeting to make his associates see the folly of trading the alliance with Britain 
for an ossified embargo. Eisenhower urged the NSC to take the long view: 
How could we rationally insist that neither we nor our allies can sell any of these 
materials to the Soviets when we in the United States find ourselves weighed 
down with vast agricultural surpluses and when our allies are told that we are not 
in a position to buy from them the materials and products which we don‘t wish 
them to sell to the Soviet bloc? The question boils down, therefore, to what we are 
going to do to our allies over the long term.
52
   
 
Washington was thus at an impasse. On one hand, it wished to cripple the PRC, but on the other 
hand, the US had to boost its allies‘ long-term trade prospects. Treasury Secretary George E. 
Humphrey underscored the need to adjust a key assumption about the PRC. Ostracizing the PRC 
was only a short-term measure. ―If we estimated that the Chinese Communist régime was there to 
stay,‖ stated Humphrey perceptively, ―we would be well advised to give up the effort to destroy 
this régime and concentrate instead on trying to separate it from the Soviet Union.‖53     
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Agreeing, Eisenhower tried another track. Eisenhower proposed using trade ―as a means of 
straining the existing relationship between Communist China and the Soviet Union.‖ Displaying a 
sophisticated understanding about human psychology and the weakness of communist régimes 
way ahead of his associates, Eisenhower argued with ―some impatience‖ and with ―considerable 
heat‖ that consumerism would undermine Communist China more effectively than any of US 
advanced weapon systems. Nixon agreed, arguing that ―it was necessary to be calculating and 
hard-boiled‖ and he ―could see no reason not to expand trade with Communist China as a 
negotiating point.‖ Nixon even believed that ―the time had come to sit down and determine under 
what conditions, what level of trade, would best serve the interests of the United States vis-à-vis 
Communist China.‖54  
 
However, Eisenhower moved too fast for his cabinet. The embargo debates were symptomatic of 
Washington‘s difficulties in developing a comprehensive Far East policy. Eisenhower felt that if 
the JCS were to argue for relaxing the embargo, Congress reception would be less hostile. But 
other obstacles compounded this issue. One, the US recognized that not all countries desired to 
join in a US-sponsored defense organization. Two, Japan, which was the primary concern of the 
US, ―had not yet been received back into the Asian community‖ due to its wartime atrocities in 
Asia. Three, there was the perennial problem of China.
55
 Eisenhower recognized that ―so many 
members of Congress want to crucify anyone who argues in favour of permitting any kind of trade 
between the free nations and Communist China.‖56   
d. The “United Action” 
The turmoil in Indochina further ossified Washington‘s stubbornness not to move away from its 
prevailing policy toward China. Why the US decided to formulate a new course of ―United 
Action,‖ a US proposal to stem the communists‘ high tide in Indochina that would lead to the 





formation of SEATO, which will have implications for the making of the Taiwan Strait Crises, 
will now be examined. 
 
In January 1954, the NSC learnt that ―attempts to mop up Vietminh centers in the southern part of 
Vietnam were proving only partially successful.‖57 The CIA assessment was bleak. Despite being 
driven gradually to the delta area of Tonkin, the French made no political concessions to the 
locals.
58
 There was ―increasing popular support‖ for the Viet Minh and it was becoming 
―apparent‖ that ―the French are losing.‖59 Moreover, the French appeared to be merely 
maneuvering to negotiate a way out of the cesspool.
60
 To check the PRC in Indochina, the US 
resolved to have a ―plan for defensive arrangements in Southeast Asia.‖ 61 Smith reported that such 
a plan would involve ―Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and such parts of Vietnam as could be 
saved from Communist control.‖ As the US ―could be subjected to every kind of pressure to agree 
to some kind of compromise‖ at Geneva, it hoped to counter this with a security arrangement.62  
 
In essence, the White House wanted to confront the communists with a united front at Geneva. 
63
 
One, the US-led coalition would ―go into that Conference strong and United, with a good hope that 
we would come out of the conference with the Communists backing down.‖ Two, the need to 
boost the French confidence in Geneva was paramount. Should the French be backed by the 
cohesiveness of the regional organization, ―there would be a settlement reflecting Communist 
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willingness to abandon the attempt to seize control of Indochina.‖ Finally, with a united front, 
―military intervention might prove to be unnecessary.‖ 64   
 
Washington feared above all the lack of any leverage and the ceding of concessions to the 
communists in Geneva.
65
 One strategy was to provoke Communist intransigence with regard to a 
settlement in Korea. This would deflect demands for a negotiated settlement in Indochina.
66
 In 
addition, on 13 April 1954, Smith reported that Eden was agreeable to a communiqué to explore 
the ―possibilities for united action.‖67 But Washington misread London.68 One Foreign Office 
official noted that ―AE [Eden] did indicate that we should be willing to start talks at once, provided 
we were not committed to any action in Indochina.‖69 Reportedly, the British feared Dulles‘ 
―united action‖ would ―give the impression that we had closed the door on any results from the 
Geneva Conference.‖ 70 Despite these warning signs, Dulles dismissed them as mere ―pressure 
from Nehru.‖71  
 
On the whole, developments from 1953 to April 1954 thus highlighted the entwining of the 
Taiwan Strait issue with events in Southeast Asia and contributed to the making of the Taiwan 
Strait Crises, as they would later be perceived by the PRC to constitute a US strategy of encircling 
China and provided a pretext for China‘s bombing of the Quemoy and Matsu islands, which 
triggered the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. How the Taiwan Strait featured in the foreign relations of 
China would be the focus of the next section. 
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2. China 
2.1 1945-1953: The Genesis of the Taiwan Strait Crisis 
 
The collapse of Japan in 1945 heralded the end of the Second United Front, established in 1937 by 
the CCP and KMT forces. Whereas the erstwhile enemies had cooperated against the invading 
Japanese, now they competed for the mastery of China. Despite the efforts of US General George 
C. Marshall to mediate in late 1946, neither the Nationalists nor the Communists were in any mood 
to compromise. In fact, the Communist propaganda went into overdrive, accusing the US of 
abetting the civil war.
72
 Ultimately, the ability of the CCP to pose as the sterling contrast to the 





With Mao Zedong‘s strident announcement at the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People‘s 
Political Consultative Conference on 21 September 1949 that ―We have stood up,‖ the Chairman 
was signaling that the mandate of China was given to the CCP because it was effective in 
eliminating the proverbial ―Century of Shame.‖74 Mao became deeply cognizant of the PRC‘s role 
as the revolutionary beacon. After all, it was Stalin who hoisted the PRC to be the ―leader of the 
east‖ in mid-1949.75 Mao‘s subsequent pro-Soviet ―leaning to one side‖ policy (June 1949) could 
be interpreted as ―the logical outcome of the policies – national revival and alliance with the 
Communist bloc – that Mao had been developing in stages.‖ In Mao‘s calculations, Stalin was the 
only viable option in terms of ―economic and security assistance.‖76  
 
Nevertheless, the tortuous bargaining behind the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 1950 left Mao 
with an increasing distaste for its Soviet ally. In several secret protocols, Beijing reluctantly 
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permitted Soviet territorial and legal concessions in Xinjiang and Manchuria. Stalin‘s aversion to 
Mao‘s ideology and actions during the war also prompted him to view Mao with deep suspicion.77 
Yet, as China appeared to bring great geopolitical opportunities for the Soviet Union, Stalin 
considered it more profitable to treat Mao as an equal. Herein lay the rationale for the odious 
nature of the Sino-Soviet treaty: China gained status as Soviet Union‘s strategic partner, but it 
came at a price.
78
   
 
The PRC‘s participation in the Korean War in late November 1950 was the outcome of the muddy 
confluence of realpolitik, nationalism and upholding of international communism. Kim Il Sung, 
armed with wild promises of success in taking South Korea, managed to wrangle permission from 
Stalin and Mao‘s tacit consent. For Stalin, Kim‘s proposal presented a decisive opportunity for 
China to be firmly tucked into the Soviet Union‘s fold and to regain the strategic initiative in Asia. 
For Mao, he could not deny Kim his unification while seeking Soviet aid for the subjugation of 
Taiwan. Moreover, there was no better mobilizing force for Mao‘s domestic revolution than 
having a war at hand.
79
 Finally, the US reaction to the North Korean invasion, such as the 
imposition of the US Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait on 27 June 1950, seemed to Mao that 
Washington might use the Korean conflict to resolve the Chinese civil war.
80
 To counter the US in 




By simply fighting the Americans to a stalemate, the PRC gained tremendous international 
prestige among Third-World nations. The Vietnamese revolution was given an additional moral 
impetus as Ho Chi Minh‘s forces battled the French in Indochina.82 While the stalemate continued 
in Korea along the 38
th
 Parallel, the communist Chinese Advisory Group (CMAG) prevailed upon 
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their Vietnamese allies to consolidate north-western Vietnam in early 1952.
83
 Nevertheless, the 
PRC suffered 900,000 to 1.5 million in casualties in the Korean War, a grim testament to the 
effectiveness of US firepower, the PLA's futile human-wave assaults, and the corresponding lack 
of modern weapons supplied by the Soviets to the Chinese Communists.
84
 As the PRC fought 
against a US-led UN coalition, it was punished with UN economic sanctions in May 1951. More 
importantly, the issue of the PRC‘s entry into the UN was permanently put on hold.85 The PRC 
was effectively an international pariah.     
 
2.2 1953-April 1954: Re-assessing Taiwan, the US and Southeast Asia 
In the aftermath of the Korean War armistice agreements, Beijing was anxious to emerge from 
diplomatic isolation. There was thus a need for China to re-assess its policies toward the US, 
Southeast Asia and Taiwan. This would also better prepare China for its participation in the 
Geneva Conference. Four developments stood out in this re-assessment: Taiwan; the US and 
―United Action‖; Asian neutralism; and Vietnam. They represented China‘s responses and 
initiatives in dealing with the US actions and played a part in the making of the Taiwan Strait 
Crises for, had these actions elicited what China considered to be acceptable US responses, China 
would most likely not have proceeded with the 1954 bombardments of Quemoy and Matsu. 
However, as events would subsequently show, this was not to be the case, and these features 
would continue to be displayed in the subsequent unfolding of the Taiwan Strait Crises.  
a. Taiwan 
While the Taiwan Strait issue remained, it took a backseat for the moment. This was seen in 
China‘s caution with regard to military plans to counter the US-ROC covert operations. To the 
PLA commanders at the East China Command (ECC), their concern was wholly to interdict the 
ROC harassments. Chiang‘s control of the offshore islands off the coast of Zhejiang (Dachen) and 
Fujian (Quemoy) formed a twin threat to China‘s eastern seaboard trade. General Zhang Aiping, 
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Chief of ECC General Staff, recalled that the defence of eastern China was caught between these 
―horns of a bull.‖ But the ECC lacked the necessary air and naval power to stop Chiang‘s raids and 
the Korean War had absorbed most of the war matériel. Zhang Aiping had to settle for a modest 
strategy of reclaiming remote offshore islands nearest the mainland one at a time, and retaking 




One plan which called for taking Dachen first and to make preparations for taking Quemoy after 
one to two years was submitted by General Zhang Zhen with the aid of Soviet advisors on 11 June 
1952. The Central Military Commission (CMC) granted permission for reclaiming Dachen in 
September or October. However, General Peng Dehuai, back from the Korean War, stopped the 
plan, criticizing its lack of consideration of the reactions of the US. Agreeing with Peng, Mao 
scrapped the plan on 27 July, cautiously citing that resolution of the Korean War was not firmed 
up.  
 
The second plan which called for attacking the Quemoy complexes directly was submitted on 7 
September 1953 by the ECC. Mao tentatively agreed with the plan and ordered preparation to be 
completed by January 1955. On 15 October, the PLA General Staff code-named the exercise 
―Operation United Military Action.‖ However, Zhang revealed that ―Fujian‘s infrastructure could 
not support a major combined arms military operation.‖ Moreover, reinforcements from Zhejiang 
were obstructed by KMT military complexes in the Dachen area. The PLA General Staff came to 
similar conclusions. On 21 December, Peng again scrapped the plan for taking Quemoy. The 
following day, Mao weighed in: ―I agree with Peng, this operation needs 5 trillion dollars (五万亿
元), and we cannot afford it. At least in 1954, we should not expedite such a colossal sum of 
money.‖87   
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Demands on the PRC‘s state budget were indeed tight. With the signing of the Sino-Soviet 
Alliance in 1950, the Chinese borrowed wholesale the Soviet model of industrial development and 
other forms of development. In the first Five-Year Plan (1953-1957), the PRC set aside $20 billion 
for development and up to 58% went into heavy industries. The Soviets‘ contributions were 
mainly in terms of technical knowledge and advisors. Not only did the Chinese have to provide 
most of the $20 billion with only a small amount of Soviet aid, the Chinese also had to pay for all 
the industries set up by the Soviets.
88
 Still, Mao looked on favourably on Soviet aid and declared a 
thoroughly Soviet version of a ―general line for socialist transition‖ for China on Oct 1953.89   
b. The US and “United Action”  
While the Taiwan Strait issue took a backseat for the moment, China was constantly vigilant and 
wary of US actions. It had an intense fear of ―United Action‖ and was worried that Indochina 
would become another Korea. How such concerns developed will now be examined. 
 
Beijing was bitterly aware that Washington shunned compromises.
90
 During the Berlin 
Conference, the US insisted that the forthcoming Geneva Conference would not constitute a de 
facto recognition of the PRC.
91
 China was also aware that the US domestic opinion was up in 
arms. Beijing noted that Congressman Walter Judd publicly warned Eisenhower in the US News 
and World Report on 15 January 1954 against any rapprochement with the PRC: ―Accepting 
Communist China into the UN will weaken our national security and the security of the world … 
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Such an act will legitimize the CCP government, increase its international prestige and power.‖ 
The UN as a function of ―righteousness, freedom and peace‖ would be made a ―laughing stock.‖92   
 
For Beijing, a rough road lay ahead for Geneva. Chinese diplomats in Bern reported that the US 
was shoring up the French in Indochina even though war weariness had eaten away French public 
support.
93
 One, the US opposed any division of Vietnam or giving up of the valuable Hanoi delta 
area. Two, it also objected to any form of coalition government with the communists, lest Ho seize 
power through parliamentary means. Three, free elections in Vietnam were anathema to the 
Americans as they were not confident that Bao Dai would prevail. Finally, they were extremely 
reluctant to involve the PRC as this might implicate a host of other problems vis-à-vis recognition 




The Chinese background guidance stated explicitly that the PRC faced formidable and adverse 
Western opinions.
95
 The impact of such adverse opinions on the PRC was multifold. One, the 
danger of such negative publicity generated by the West had the effect of shoring up support for a 
US-led ―United Action‖ put forth by Dulles on 29 March 1954. Two, the French emphasis on 
Chinese aid to the Vietnamese deflected French public attention from the failure of the Navarre 
plan.
96
 Three, by highlighting the Red scare, the US was able to dispense aid to Southeast Asian 
countries easily. The real issue of independence for Indochina was submerged and there was a real 
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danger that the upcoming peace talks on Indochina would be held hostage to the issue of Chinese 




To China, complicating the entire situation was the specter of a successful French Union. 
Fortunately for China, the ongoing political tussle between France and South Vietnam proved 
unrelenting. South Vietnamese Prime Minister Buu Loc‘s 8 March negotiations with French Prime 
Minister Joseph Laniel in Paris were mired over the question of what kind of independence the 
French would grant. Beijing noted that Buu Loc patriotically wanted ―total independence‖ first 
before joining the French Union. But the French were leery of giving up anything even to the 
South Vietnamese without losing them the battlefield.
98
 Paris threw up various ingenious 
objections to Buu Loc‘s demands.99   
 
Beijing‘s trump card lay with French reluctance to internationalize the war. Such a move would 
dilute French control of Indochina affairs; no French government would survive in the pursuance 
of war without retaining control. On the other hand, further US aid came with strings attached. The 
US pushed for more American control in the conduct of the Indochina war and true independence 
for the Vietnamese. Paris lamely responded with vague promises of Vietnamese independence and 
its emphasis on the moribund Navarre Plan. The French public was genuinely struck by war-
weariness; this accounted for the contradictory French move towards the Geneva conference while 
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Historian George Herring speculated that the specter of possible ―military involvement [via United 
Action]…may have helped bring about a settlement.‖101 Richard Immerman argued that actual 
troop deployment was not on the cards. But Dulles‘ ―menacing tone [on 29 March] effectively 
masked his intent.‖102 Beijing was certainly disturbed. Various editorials of the PRC‘s influential 
journal Shijie zhishi reflected a deep concern. Dulles‘ ―United Action‖ was even compared to the 
odious wartime Japan‘s ―Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.‖103  
 
The CCP politburo was focused on the possibility of US intervention. Overall, it received two 
pieces of good news. One, the French was unsettled by Dulles‘ ―ominous‖ plans. The Chinese 
intelligence noted that the Laniel government was lukewarm towards the US plan. To thwart US 
pressure, the French cabinet decided on 6 April that no decision would be made vis-à-vis the EDC 
ratification and ―united action‖ before the Geneva conference. Two, Britain was also reluctant to 
endorse ―united action.‖ In fact, during Dulles‘ trip to London on 12 April, Eden argued for no US 
action in Indochina before the Geneva conference.
104
 
c. Asian Neutralism  
While vigilant and wary of the US and ―United Action,‖ China hoped to tap the anti-colonial 
rhetoric to win over Asian neutralist third world countries. How it managed to exploit this rich 
vein of post-colonial condition and positioned its actions as a reaction to imperialism will now be 
explored. 
 
Beijing perceptively observed a groundswell of favorable attitudes from neutralist countries 
towards China. Nehru was in the forefront and stated to the press that: ―The Vietnamese had 
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already during the time of the Chiang government started their anti-colonialism struggle; 
subsequently this movement was gradually influenced by communism.‖ Nehru further claimed that 
―China had no territorial ambitions; if they had, they would have used the Nationalist armies at the 
Burmese border to invade Burma, but to date it had not.‖ Even the English-language Burmese 
press noted that the ―PRC increased military aid to the Vietnamese only very recently, perhaps a 
response to US aid to the French in Indochina.‖105   
 
Beijing diligently worked on these ―friends.‖ To Indian Ambassador Nedyam Raghavan, 
Zhou evoked loaded anti-imperialist rhetoric. Lambasting the US public pronouncements 
that the Geneva Conference ―would not beget any result on the Korean issue,‖ Zhou told 
Raghavan on 19 April 1954 that, ―[o]bviously, the US wished to create a deadlock so that 
it could continue to occupy Taiwan, arm Japan and maintain tensions in the Far East.‖ 
Zhou then singled out the role of Nehru for praise and proceeded to underscore the larger 
imperialist designs of the US: ―The US main target is the Middle East and Far East, … it 
needed the Indochina imbroglio to prop up its larger conspiracy.‖ Zhou then rubbished the 
proposed SEATO as a ―NATO duplicate, NATO enlarged,‖ and stressed that these were 
plain designs at a hostile invasive grouping that sought to do the biddings of the US, in 
effect a ―colonial empire.‖106 
 
The PRC adopted a dual-track approach. Beijing‘s advisory to the PRC‘s Geneva delegates 
scripted that the PRC stood on the side of indigenous attempts in Indochina to ―gain independence 
from colonialism‖ and the ―righteous war of liberation.‖ As such Beijing would give the 
appropriate ―sympathy, aid and encouragement.‖ However, for practical state-to-state relations, the 
PRC would use ―international laws and practices.‖ National interest behooved Beijing ―not to 
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abandon relations with the imperialists and just depend on their political discourse of liberation.‖107 
One scholar perceptively noted that ―Beijing showed that vocal encouragement for revolutionary 
movements did not necessarily translate into material support [for the Burmese communists].‖ In 
sum, ―the Chinese leaders were prepared to make a distinction between state-to-state and party-to-
party relations in their pursuit of China‘s national interest.‖108 
 
The advisory continued that at Geneva, Beijing would project itself as an impartial and influential 
―third party.‖ This would deny the Americans the legal excuse to back out from the negotiations, 
enlarge the war and would regain the PRC the initiative. As for the PRC‘s aid to the North 
Vietnamese, the advisory instructed the delegates to avoid being wrangled into a debate over the 
amount of aid given but to ―simply put it down to the existing diplomatic relations the PRC had 
with the North Vietnamese.‖ This meant that Beijing‘s aid stemmed from natural ―historical and 
geographical‖ ties and that politically, they shared similar anti-imperialist sentiments, reinforced 
by their common war against the Japanese imperial army. The advisory further asserted that efforts 
should be made to steer the French to undertake ―constructive negotiations towards peaceful 
resolution of the Indochina problem.‖109  
 
Beijing deftly scripted its reinterpretation of the Indochina war. It plugged into the experiences of 
the former colonies‘ dissatisfaction and the anti-imperialist discourse. This propaganda aligned the 
Chinese Communist experiences with the larger pan-Asian movement and gave relevance to its 
rhetoric for Asian nationalists. As the PRC had just emerged from the shadows of its semi-colonial 
status, the Chinese communists‘ words had special significance and authority. In the PRC‘s 
advisory, it was emphasized that ―the age of imperialism had passed.‖ The Chinese Communists 
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adroitly painted the Asian struggle for independence as a struggle of David-versus-Goliath. Asians 
were depicted as ―friendly and hardworking‖ and colonialism was cast as ―enslavement, 
exploitation and deception.‖ The PRC ―deeply empathized‖ with the plight of Asians and its 
supportive position ―is completely understood by the world.‖  
 
China argued that, on the other hand, the Americans were the font of imperialist attempts to 
reassert and interfere with the independence of Indochina. Nonetheless, Beijing noted that US aid 
to France had not stemmed the tide of ―the righteous and total commitment‖ of the Indochina 
nationalists.
110
 The PRC was further encouraged by Asian countries‘ hostilities towards ―United 
Action.‖ Most Asian countries had branded Dulles‘ proposal the ―biggest threat to peace since the 
Korean War.‖ Both Indonesia and Burma declined to join in. Thailand was on the side of the US, 
but not without grave reservations. It espoused the same qualifications as Britain of ―opposing 
communism, but not Red China.‖ Even the Philippines, a staunch US ally, made no immediate 
response to Dulles‘ clarion call. The Chinese intelligence report noted with satisfaction that Nehru 
had categorically stated that ―united action‖ was against the Geneva Conference.  
 
In general, editorials from India, Indonesia and Burma were hostile toward the US initiative. A 
Burmese editorial tarred ―United Action‖ as a march of folly for hoodwinked allies. Others 
questioned the motive of the US alarmist warnings, suspecting these to be a conspiracy to edge out 
and supplant the communists. Moreover, Asian editorials condemned the Navarre Plan‘s training 
of Vietnamese soldiers as ―Asians fighting against Asians.‖ In contrast, sympathy abounded for 
Ho Chi Minh‘s struggle against French colonialism. The 10 April 1954 editorial of The Hindustan 
Times offered commiseration to Vietnamese nationalism: ―Most of Asia editorials recognized that 
Ho Chi Minh is a communist; still he represented the Vietnamese nationalistic impulse of opposing 
French imperialism. But the Americans persist in propping up French colonialism.‖ Likewise, a 
Burmese paper wrote: ―We totally sympathize with the Vietnamese struggle for independence. 
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There is no need to differentiate a communist independence from a non-communist one. All they 
need is independence.‖111  
d. Vietnam: Talking While Fighting 
Besides trying to win over the goodwill of Asian neutralist countries, China was also evaluating 
how it should act in relation to developments in Vietnam, particularly in terms of how China could 
bolster its position during the Geneva Conference.  
 
Initially, the PRC urged haste upon the Vietnamese communists. Encountering US intransigence, 
Dulles‘ malevolent ―United Action,‖ and the potential fait accompli via the French Union, Zhou 
cabled the Chinese military advisory group in Vietnam in early March. ―In order to gain the 
diplomatic initiative [at the impending Geneva Conference],‖ asked Zhou, ―similar to the situation 
prior to the Korean War armistice, could we have a few decisive battles?‖ Zhou‘s naked reference 
that actions spoke louder than words could not fail to impress.
112
 In another cable in mid-March, 
Zhou again stressed the advantages of expanded territories gained by military actions.
113
 
     
Mao was even more ambitious, envisioning the entire Vietnam under the communists before 
turning to negotiations. Recalling Stalin‘s distasteful orders to negotiate with Chiang in 1946 and 
the Soviet brief flirtation with the idea of a divided China, Mao alluded that Stalin had ordered the 
CCP not to cross the Yangtze River to take Nanjing in April 1949; now Mao would brook no such 
ambiguity for the Vietnamese comrades.
114
 Over-estimating the prowess of the Vietnamese 
Communists, Mao boldly urged them on 3 April to take Hanoi and Saigon with three artillery 
divisions and five infantry divisions by the winter of 1954. To facilitate the Vietnamese warpath, 
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Mao argued: ―Dien Bien Phu must be decisively conquered, if the timing is right together with 
ample confidence, one should go for an early conclusion of the campaign.‖115  
 
Mao‘s belligerent encouragement was subsequently curtailed by grim realities. The North 
Vietnamese forces were sorely stretched. General Vo Nguyen Giap had internalized the bitter 
lessons of the Red River debacle in 1951 well: ―Our troops lacked experience in attacking fortified 
entrenched camps … If we sought to win quickly, success could not be assured.‖ As direct 
experience had shown up the poverty of the Chinese MAG Chief General Wei Guoqing‘s advice 
for ―human-wave‖ lightning assaults, Giap chose a more deliberate maneuver and postponed in 
January 1954 a frontal attack on Dien Bien Phu.
116
 Nonetheless, Chinese advice was initially 
followed but these assaults caused brutal attrition rates.
117
 The Vietnamese decisions in changing 
the methods of assault meant that Mao‘s grand strategy of taking Saigon and Hanoi simultaneously 




For the PRC, Geneva had immense attractions. Beijing desperately needed a breathing space in the 
aftermath of the Korean War for its domestic reconstruction. In Khrushchev‘s stinging 
reminiscence, Zhou allegedly said in one of the preparatory sessions for the Geneva Conference in 
Kremlin (April 1954):    
―Comrade Ho has told me that their situation is hopeless. If they don't get a cease-
fire in the near future, they won't be able to hold out against the French forces. 
They have therefore decided to retreat to the Chinese border, so that China can 
move its troops in, as it did earlier in North Korea, and help the Vietnamese 
people drive the French out of Vietnam.‖ Then Zhou added that they [the 
Chinese] couldn't do it, because in Korea they had lost a lot of people and that 
war had cost them dearly. They were in no position to become entangled in a 
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As Dien Bien Phu had drained Hanoi, talking while fighting was a better gambit. Chinese historian 
Yang Kuisong highlighted the Soviet factor. Moscow had pushed for its fraternal allies to use the 
Geneva Conference to their advantage. Since Moscow had obtained, during the Berlin conference, 
Laniel‘s acquiescence for Geneva, it followed that the communist bloc should follow its lead.120  
Indeed, the PRC had already acknowledged that the discussion ―on peacefully resolving the 
Korean question‖ would be ―difficult.‖ But the Indochina question held more promise as ―there are 
contradictions between France and the United States.‖ To encourage the irrevocable split, the 
Chinese Communists resolved in ―showing the carrot to France while using the stick to deal with 
the United States.‖ Therefore, the PRC should ―concentrate our criticism on America, and should 
leave France with some hope.‖121 
 
On the whole, developments from 1953 to April 1954 therefore represented China‘s responses and 
initiatives in dealing with the US actions and played a part in the making of the Taiwan Strait 
Crises for, had these actions elicited what China considered to be acceptable US responses, China 
would most likely not have proceeded with the 1954 bombardments of Quemoy and Matsu. 
However, as events would subsequently show, this was not to be the case, and these developments 
would continue to be displayed in the subsequent unfolding of the Taiwan Strait Crises. How the 
Taiwan Strait featured from the perspectives of Taiwan would be the focus of the next section. 
3. Taiwan  
As the defeated KMT régime made its way to Taiwan in 1949, all had seemed lost. Even the 
Truman administration officially stated that the KMT régime was beyond all help.
122
 Paradoxically, 
it was at this nadir of despair that Chiang demonstrated extraordinary leadership. For Taiwan, US 
patrols of the Taiwan Strait helped to ensure its survival. Taiwan also stationed its troops on the 
offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu to deter China‘s aggression while hoping to eventually 
recover the mainland. The Taiwan Strait issue thus assumed crucial significance for Taiwan. How 
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the Taiwan Strait issue played out in Taiwan from 1950 to April 1954 can be analyzed from two 
main angles: political survival and cultural revival; and fangong dalu (counter-offensive against 
the mainland). These aspects contributed significantly to the making of the Taiwan Strait Crises 
and would continue to feature prominently in the subsequent unfolding of the Taiwan Strait Crises.  
 
3.1 1950-April 1954: Political Survival and Cultural Revival 
The Taiwan Strait issue was considered, first and foremost, a matter of political survival and 
cultural revival. Chiang reassumed the presidency (now of the ROC) officially on March 1950, 
with a swift admission of responsibility for the mainland debacle and proceeded to restore the 
embattled ROC government.
123
 He coupled the admission of failure with the exhortation for 
renewed efforts to attack the problems which had landed China in this predicament. Chiang used 
the trope of rejuvenation from the ashes of defeat, that failures were deemed mere lessons for ever 
greater endeavor for greatness. He wrote on Christmas Day 1949: 
All the past had died and everything from now on is newly-born … These days I 
have thought over the reform of the Party, government and military affairs and the 
starting point of its implementation. If we cannot reform the party thoroughly at 
this moment, it cannot carry out its revolutionary functions smoothly.
124
 
In spite of the less than candid rhetoric of ―newly born,‖ in retrospect the KMT régime effected a 
revolution almost by default.
125
 The 1950s interestingly saw two régimes side by side separated by 
the Taiwan Strait vying for legitimacy by attempting to reform their country and engineering a 
new society out of the ashes of war.
126
 The Communists and the Nationalists were locked in a race 
for their version of a better society and the results would only be visible by the end of the decade. 
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Chiang‘s speech at the Seventh National Convention of the KMT in 1952 presented a summary of 
the state of the Taiwan polity three years after the Nationalists fled from Mainland China. This 
report was important because the task which Chiang had set out to do, namely reforming the KMT 
structure, had largely been done.
127
 So thorough was Chiang‘s coverage that even Henry Luce, of 
the Time Inc., noted in a letter to Chiang, ―it has been a long time since a comprehensive statement 
by you has been made available to the American public.‖128 In the forty-page report, Chiang 




It is worth stating here Chiang‘s vision of the ROC as this will form a useful yardstick and context 
to assess the ROC‘s actions domestically and in the international arena.130 Chiang emphasized in 
his speech that the reform of the KMT required ―firm attitude and quick action to regroup the loyal 
Party members and to re-establish the revolutionary machine in preparation for a military counter-
attack as well as for national salvation and regeneration.‖ Chiang set five goals: ―economic 
stabilization, enforcement and army discipline, social stability, internal unity and the establishing 
of a democratic system.‖ To achieve the goals Chiang devised five approaches:  
(1) Maintenance of confidence in the currency and the repletion of currency 
reserves, (2) the carrying out of government orders and abolition of unnecessary 
organs, (3) protection against enemy espionage and elimination of Communist 
agents, (4) abolition of party cliques and concentration of our will power, and (5) 
cultivation of a law-abiding spirit and introduction of local self government.  
Chiang, dictated by practical necessities, ultimately aimed to create from Taiwan ―a strong base for 
the counter-attack, and a model province of the Sanmin Zhuyi.‖131   
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spirit and a new life.‖ ―总裁对七全大会政治报告” [Zhongcai dui qiquan dahui zhenzhi baogao] draft, November 
1952, serial no.002080106039002, CKS papers, AH.           
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Another theme expounded by Chiang was the intense need to remove the humiliation of defeat at 
the hands of the communists. The urgency and rhetoric of reform tapped into the deep vein of 
shame of those who followed the KMT régime to Taiwan. This grievous sense of displacement 
was compounded by betrayal as the central KMT bureaucracy was riddled with communist covert 
agents.
132
 Chiang accurately pitched his call for xuechi (cleanse the shame) on his followers‘ 
desires for reform.
133
 He explicitly stated that their achievements presented a valuable pre-
figuration of the future and a solution to their shame:  
Our party has experienced the following tribulations:  failure in eliminating the 
communist bandits, ignoble retreat to Taiwan, and suffering exile in extreme 
uncertainty. It is only with our reforms that we are able to finally hold this 
Congress ... We will swear to strengthen ourselves, cleanse our shame, and repay 
our sins in order to comfort our President [Sun Yat-sen] and all other 




To keep up the pressure and to make guoci (national humiliation) work harder as a motivational 
factor, other episodes from history were also dredged up. Chiang evoked the ancient example of 
King Guojian (BC 520－465) to urge the Chinese public to woxin changdan (sleep on thorns and 
taste bile).
135
 Wuwang zaiju (Forget not the time at Ju) was the other familiar slogan that went 
hand-in-hand with woxin changdan in urging forbearance from the citizens of Taiwan. For the 
defenders of Taiwan‘s offshore islands, this military posting presented a certain amount of 
hardship, loneliness and danger. Chiang used Wuwang zaiju to encourage and remind them that 
their hardship would temper the steel in their endeavor to reclaim the mainland. In 1952, Chiang 
had those four words carved onto the rock of Mount Taiwu in Quemoy, facing the mainland. In the 
years that followed, other inscriptions of Wuwang Zaiju mushroomed all over the island of 
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Quemoy, carpeting the inhabitants and soldiers of the offshore islands under the eternal 




As evident by Chiang‘s emphasis on Chinese culture, the ROC in Taiwan was championed as the 
―bastion of cultural revival.‖137 Coupled with its Leninist organizational structure and its 
traditional emphasis on Chinese cultural orthodoxy, the ROC achieved what Antonio Gramsci 
would term a ―collective national-popular will.‖138 On this, Article II of the KMT Charter spelled 
out clearly:  
The Kuomintang shall be a revolutionary and democratic political party charged 
with the mission of completing the national Revolution, carrying out the Sanmin 
Zhuyi, recovering the Chinese mainland, promoting Chinese culture, aligning with 
other democratic nations, and building the Republic of China into a unified, free, 
peace loving, and harmonious democracy based on the Sanmin Zhuyi. 
139
     
The only acknowledgement of Taiwanese cultural symbols was grudgingly given to Zheng 
Chengong or Koxinga (1624-1662), a Ming Dynasty patriot who held out against the Qing 
conquerors in Taiwan. However, the KMT reworked the image of Zheng Chengong to tie up with 
Chiang‘s mission of reclaiming the mainland. Some went as far as to claim that Zheng Chenggong 
was the ―pre-incarnation‖ of Chiang. In school textbooks, Zheng Chenggong‘s domestication of 
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Chenggong‘s Tainan temple. Much later in 1961, in a speech to commemorate Zheng Chenggong, the Ming patriot‘s 
utility was given a Cold War twist. Locals were reminded that exploits of Zheng Chenggong were ―stimulating the entire 
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In short, Chiang argued that Taiwan represented a rejuvenated China.
141
 The failures on mainland 
China constituted the past and the lessons of the mainland became effectively a series of ―self-
defining memories‖ for Chiang and the ROC.142 Chiang actively used his failures on the mainland 
to construct a new narrative of the new China in Taiwan, and this narrative became the national 
discourse of Taiwan. 
 
3.2 1950-April 1954: Fangong Dalu (Counter-offensive Against the Mainland)  
Together with political survival and cultural revival, the Taiwan Strait issue was used as a clarion 
call to stage fangong dalu, which led to a militarization of Taiwan‘s society and constituted a 
major component of its foreign policy. In numerous English accounts of the Taiwanese economic 
miracle, a common observation runs as follows: ―With the security of Taiwan guaranteed by the 
US, the ROC government was able to devote more energy and resources to agricultural, economic 
and political development and transformed Taiwan from a developing society into a modern 
industrialized country.‖143 Straightforward and elegant, this supposition won over many followers; 
yet, what emerges from the primary sources was more complicated. It showed that the early ROC 
government devoted as much time and energy on the quixotic campaign to fangong dalu. That an 
economic miracle occurred two decades later was a joint-product of this fangong (counter-
offensive) culture. Fangong was the ethos that permeated the higher military command and upper 
political echelons of Taiwan and the singular systematic economic planning went hand-in-hand 
with this military planning for fangong. How fangong militarized Taiwan‘s society will first be 
examined, followed by how fangong was manifested in Taiwan‘s foreign relations. 
a. Fangong Dalu and the Militarization of Taiwan‟s Society 
As the country geared itself up for fangong, the net effect was a militarization of Taiwan‘s society. 
The ROC government ruled by decrees, with martial law declared in 1948. This sped up 
                                                 
141 ―总裁对七全大会政治报告‖ [Zhongcai dui qiquan dahui zhenzhi baogao] draft, November 1952, serial 
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suppression of communist elements through the Political Activities Committee (Zhenzhi xingdong 
weiyuanhui).
144
 Citizens were drafted for two years of conscription. Being sent to the frontlines of 
the Cold War battlefields at the offshore islands was the norm.
145
 Draft resisters were executed as 
―communist spies.‖146 The sense of crisis and violence gave rise to an atmosphere in which 
political ambiguity was not tolerated or condoned. In the ―you are either with us or against us‖ 




The first stage of cowing the population of Taiwan was already accomplished with the 28 February 
Incident in 1947.
148
 When Chiang Ching-kuo and his father arrived in Taiwan, the KMT régime 
aimed to consolidate power through a two-prong approach. First, Chiang Ching-kuo launched a 
second wave of persecutions and was given the green light to unify all intelligence and security 
agencies, the most important being the Bureau of Military Investigation and Statistics and  the 
Bureau of Central Investigation, under his command through the Political Action Committee.
149
 
The focus was on rooting out communist agents that had joined the exodus to Taiwan.
150
 
During the period of the ―White Terror‖ from 1949 to 1955, the régime arrested about 90,000 
suspects, executing possibly up to half of them.
151
 Exiled Governor-General Wu Kuo-chen referred 
specifically to the abuses of the security apparatus in an open letter on 3 April 1954 to the National 
Assembly: 
They interfered with free elections. They made numberless illegal arrests. They 
tortured and they blackmailed . . . the secret police of our country at present, 
relying on their special backing, have so abused their powers that they have no 
regard whatever for law … so Formosa has become virtually a police state. The 
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liberties of the people are almost totally suppressed.
152
 
Wu‘s admonishments were to no avail. Chiang Ching-kuo further tightened the security apparatus 
by heading the newly-created National Security Bureau in 1954.
153
   
 
Next was the total control of the army by the party. In 1950, Chiang Ching-kuo assumed 
directorship of the General Political Department of the Ministry of Defense.
154
 Chiang Kai-shek 
fully supported his son‘s adoption of the Soviet apparatus, the Political Commissar system. The 
Political Warfare Cadres Academy (renamed Political Staff College in 1951) churned out 
commissars who were inserted into military units.
155
 These organizations were the answer to 
Chiang‘s demand for discipline and loyalty from the troops. While Chiang admitted that the 
system encountered some resistance from ―a few senior commanders,‖ he intended to push it 
through: in ―a year‘s time, this system can be sold to the whole armed forces from top to 
bottom.‖156 This was thus an outright attempt to impose yidang lingjun (Party leads the military). 
Party recruitment was also carried out in the military. By 1954, more than one-third of the military 




Fangong dalu was spelled out in the ROC‘s war plans. The Korean War was seen as an 
opportunity for fangong. The ROC‘s Joint Chiefs planned for an amphibious assault on the south 
bank of the Yalu River. From the east, the ROC force would ―attempt to cut off the North Koreans 
linkages with Communist China‖ by controlling the northern reach of the Yalu River as far as 
Kanggye. Having fulfilled its Allied obligations, the ROC force would then ―turn north and drive 
into Northeast China,‖ counter-attacking the main city of Shenyang in its bid for mainland China.  
However, this fangong fantasy did acknowledge that ―to bring the communists to a decisive battle 
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might be difficult given the distances in mainland China.‖ The ROC also had a few caveats. One, 
should the US agree to utilize ROC forces, it must never ―enter into negotiations with the 
communists.‖ Two, Allied support was required as ―its entry into Northeast China will trigger 
international condemnation for causing a global conflict.‖ Finally, naval and air support and all 
war matériel would come from the Allies.
158
   
 
Taipei also wanted to transform the US-ROC covert raids into miniature practice runs for the real 
fangong. A raid from Quemoy on 13 February 1953 involved a commando battalion and an 
infantry regiment. Supporting this operation were naval elements such as 2 LSTs, 3 junks, 2 
frigates, 1 minesweeper, and 3 guerilla gunboats.
159
 Another ―Operation Pulverize‖ scheduled for 6 
July 1953 targeted the Dongshan Island. Its aims were to capture or eliminate all PLA elements 
and then leave. The huge 7,000 raiding party involved: 2 marines battalions, 2 commando 
battalions, 2 infantry regiments, 2 medium airborne battalions, and 9 ships of varying sizes. Both 
operations involved amphibious capabilities with landing parties. While the intelligence gathered 
was modest, the experience in amphibious landing was considered priceless.
160
 Chiang also saw 
covert operations as a way to ferment unrest on mainland to facilitate fangong. According to a 
1953 ―counter-offensive‖ plan, the aim of the ROC-trained guerillas was to ―instigate countrywide 
guerrilla attacks.‖ These guerillas were ―equipped with machine guns, signal equipment and 
explosives.‖ Supposedly, these guerrillas would be airdropped into the mainland before the main 
counter-offensive.
161
     
 
Despite the strident rhetoric of fangong dalu, the ROC military were sober in their assessments. In 
1953, the ROC‘s Joint Chiefs conducted a military audit of the ROC forces. The report was 
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submitted at the KMT 7
th
 plenum, the second session of the party central. This report stated that as 
the communists had ―ten times as many soldiers as the ROC,‖ it was ―no longer possible to 
compete with the communists in terms of numerical strength.‖ The ROC chiefs could only offer 
such suggestions as undertaking ―propaganda warfare‖ to weaken the enemy and ―planning 
carefully‖ for an effective expansion of mobilization of the ROC‘s existing population. In terms of 
actual warfare, it could only hope for momentary ―situational advantage‖ which existed only at the 
―initial stage of battle.‖ It hoped to exploit an element of surprise, after which it had to press local 
inhabitants into ROC‘s service as quickly as possible.162    
 
The ROC military further remarked on the population size of Taiwan and its implications for 
fangong dalu. In 1953, the population census of Taiwan stood at 7,694,884. Out of this, only 769, 
659 men were of the premium age between 18 and 35. The ―most critical problem‖ confronting the 
chiefs was the training to be conducted for the mobilized. According to their estimates, if ―every 
year they could train 90,000 men, to reach the target of 600,000 would take seven years.‖ By the 
chiefs‘ own admission, ―even if the huge amounts of US aid should arrive, the lack of manpower 
and trained personnel meant that the aid could not be absorbed.‖ The ROC military was caught by 
the horns of dilemma. To achieve the targeted mobilization would consume $247,635,860. This 
―strain‖ on the finances of the country was considered ―excessive.‖ Yet, without the money spent 




In spite of the limitations faced by the ROC military in staging a fangong dalu, it seemed that such 
a threat was perceived by China. Most accounts have interpreted China‘s suppression campaigns 
throughout the early 1950s as representing a consolidation of power.
164
 Only Jack Gray 
acknowledged the source of such anxieties: ―When disaffected elements at home began to spread a 
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rumour that ‗Chiang Kai-shek would be back in time to eat his moon cakes‘ the communist party 
swung from generosity to severity.‖165 In the 1953 counter-offensive plans submitted by the Joint 
Chiefs, inciting unrest on the mainland was one of the major ways to offset the numerical strength 
of the communists. While the US would view the unrest on mainland China as wishful KMT 
thinking, the communists were not so sanguine. In retrospect, judging by the severity of the 
campaigns, it seemed that the communists were well aware of the KMT danger. However, in the 
later years, with each Taiwan Strait crisis initiated by the communists, the ROC would find itself 
ironically bound tighter to the US which severely restricted its movements, albeit with enhanced 




b. Fangong Dalu and Taiwan‟s Foreign Relations  
Fangong dalu was also closely tied to and shaped the ROC‘s perceptions of the Soviet bloc and 
the US. The Soviet bloc was perceived as a communist, war-mongering coalition on a rampage to 
―weaken the democratic world.‖167 A report by the ROC‘s Ministry of Defence in January 1953 on 
ways of joining the Allies with the possible widening of the Korean conflict gave a succinct 
summary of the Korean quagmire vis-à-vis the world situation: ―The Soviet Union ordered 
Communist China and North Korea to start the Korean War so as to quickly conquer the entire 
Korean peninsula, threaten Japan and to control entire Asia.‖ As the communist forces faced 
severe logistical problems, they had to ―enter into negotiations to stem a deteriorating situation.‖ 
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, reaped rich rewards in causing the ―massive expenditure of 
US resources, distortion of the economy, creating rifts among the Allies and paralyzing US 
initiatives in Western Europe and Southeast Asia.‖ The report thus painted the communist foes as 
duplicitous and crafty, given to broken promises and tactical retreats.  
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In contrast, the US was portrayed in a positive light as the leader of democracy. However, the US 
was also depicted as a giant tethered by a hostile public opinion and Congress.
168
 The Republican 
victory in the US presidential elections blew a breath of fresh air into the ROC‘s efforts to 
cultivate US aid. Chiang hailed the decision by Eisenhower to lift restrictions from the ROC in 
conducting operations against Communist China as a ―moral‖ one backed by ―international 
justice,‖ implicitly criticizing these restrictions from the Truman Presidency as immoral, short-




Responding to Eisenhower‘s 1953 ―unleashing‖ of Chiang, General Peng Meng-chi loyally 
submitted another study to Chiang. General Peng‘s study represented the first cut in ROC‘s policy 
directions towards the new US administration. In order of priority, the study identified three major 
areas of action. The ROC was urged to ―follow the US as closely as possible,‖ especially the US 
trade embargo towards the Soviet bloc. It should also support the UN in its mission to increase 
ROC‘s ―international diplomatic status.‖ Furthermore vigorous preparation for the hallowed 
mission of a mainland counter-offensive must be established. However, General Peng‘s main 
thrust was about preparing for fangong. The ROC must ―conserve its strength‖ for such an 
eventuality. Superficially, it should subject its ambition to ―the aegis of the UN in the best possible 
way.‖ Should the UN call for military aid in hot spots such as Korea, the study indicated that it 
was ―unnecessary [sic]‖ for the ROC to provide soldiers. Meanwhile, the ROC would eagerly 
acquire military equipment from the US. By 1955, the ROC would be fully poised for fangong. 
Henceforth, it would be simply to wait for the ―right circumstances‖ in order to launch ―an 
immediate counter-attack.‖ Implicitly, General Peng correctly identified Chiang‘s hopes for 
Eisenhower. By being so politically astute, the general availed himself as Chiang‘s new fighting 
strategist sans pareil.
170
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Nonetheless, even at this early stage of the Cold War, the ROC knew that its thematic congruence 
with US strategic needs was paramount.
171
 In February 1953, Chiang expounded on the 
international character of the anti-communist struggle, asserting that ―Soviet Russia and the puppet 
Peiping regime have stepped up their aggressive actions and have thus made themselves the 
common enemy of the United Nations.‖ Placing the ROC on the side of justice, Chiang shrewdly 
positioned his ―regaining the mainland‖ as ―an important link in the general plan of the free world 
to combat world-wide Communist aggression,‖ a pertinent element in the ―solidarity necessary for 
arresting the aggression of international communism.‖172 In September 1953, the ROC‘s Joint 
Chiefs stressed war material stockpiling in preparation for a counter-offensive. Its report plainly 
stated that: ―This present augmented strength constitutes part of the pre-counter-offensive‘s three 
years of preparation and is also to protect the integrity of Taiwan.‖  Yet when requests were sent to 
the Americans, a more pedestrian ―defensive‖ term was used.173 Deceptions were weapons of the 
weak, and subterfuges in aid requests had to be packaged as closely as possible to address US 
strategic needs. 
 
As the vice-chairman of the ROC-US AID Commission, Harvard-trained Yü Ta-wei also worked 
intensely in Washington to convince the new Eisenhower administration of ROC‘s cause. The 
nature and range of the ROC‘s requests signaled how hopeful Chiang was towards a Republican 
administration. It requested for the following: 
1. Setup of a Joint US-ROC General Staff  
2. Military aid for the ROC troops, especially those on the offshore islands  
3. Transfer a portion of the US Air Force from nearby bases for the defence 
                                                                                                                                                   
General Staff within the same year. However, in terms of its military request, it was highly unrealistic as its demands 
were astronomical. See General Peng Mang-chi to CKS, ―台湾中立化解除后对军事上之意见” [Taiwan zhonglihua 
jiechuhou dui junshishang zhi yijian], 13 February 1953, serial no. 002080102049005, CKS papers, AH.       
171 Hence, the ROC argued that ―the nationalist armies‘ entry into Northeast China is not just an internal problem, but a 
method of destroying international communism in the Far East.‖ By internationalizing the Chinese civil war, the KMT 
government was seeking US endorsement and support. Ministry of Defence to CKS, ―国军反攻作战指导方案‖ [Guojun 
fangong zuozhan zhidao fangan], January 1953, serial no.002080102008008, CKS papers, AH. 
172 Draft and Official CKS statements, Released by ROC Government Spokesman‘s Office, 3 February 1953, serial no. 
002080106003005, CKS papers, AH. 
173 Ministry of Defence to CKS, “中国国军反攻大陆作战准备计划概要 – 兵员与装备部份”    [Zhongguo guojun 
fangong dalu zuozhan zhunbei jihua gaiyao – binyuan yu zhuangbei bufen], 6 September 1953, serial 
no.002080102008008, CKS papers, AH. 
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of Taiwan  
4. Increase training for ROC troops 
5. Delivery of 75 F84-G ―Thunderjets [nuclear bomb capable]‖174  
 
But the White House used a series of delaying tactics to signal its caution about giving aid to 
Taiwan.
175
 Yu was only told on 6 June that the budget for foreign aid had ―long been submitted to 
the Congress.‖ Any additional increase would be impossible and aid for the ROC would be 
―considered in a regional sense: i.e. Asia wide general situation.‖ One hot spot highlighted by the 
administration was the volatile situation in Vietnam. This implied that Taiwan‘s request would not 
be exclusively considered and its needs would be part of the US strategic consideration in Asia. To 





One reason for the US action was the concern Washington felt about Chiang‘s fangong dalu 
vision. Nixon gave a thumbs-up to the reforms in the army and government administration on 
Formosa and noted in particular the ethos of fangong – ―austerity‖ and non-corruption – in Taiwan 
where ―both leaders and the troops carry out every move with the thought of returning to the 
Chinese mainland.‖ While Nixon believed that Taiwan ―is still a definite symbol to many overseas 
Chinese communities,‖ the vice-president noted that ―it is unrealistic for Chiang to think that he 
will eventually be able to conquer the mainland of China.‖177 Moreover, faced with ponderous 
commitments in Indochina and Congress cuts in appropriations, Eisenhower wanted to cut back on 
US military presence and projected aid to Formosa. The president thought that the present ―force 
of the size contemplated…ought by itself to be able to resist such an attack [by the Chinese 
                                                 
174 Yü Ta-wei to CKS, telegram, 27 February 1953, serial no.002080106047014, CKS papers, AH. 
175 When the ROC requested aid had not materialized by April, Yü frantically sought to meet the Director of Foreign 
Operations Administration Harold E. Stassen. Yu also spoke to Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson over the 
same matter. But Washington intended a strong signal to Chiang that aid was not automatic. Although Eisenhower was a 
Republican president, he intended to keep Chiang at arms length. Despite persistent meetings with various members of 
the Eisenhower administration, Yu was not successful in prying any information vis-à-vis aid for ROC. Yü Ta-wei to 
CKS, telegram, 4 April 1953, serial no.002080106043008, CKS papers, AH. 
176 Yü Ta-wei to CKS, telegrams, 5-6 June 1953, serial no. 002080106043008, CKS papers, AH. 
177  ―Meeting with the Vice President,‖ 8 Jan 1954 (Friday), State Department, DDRS. 
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Communists].‖ Secretary Wilson contended that the US should ―show some caution with respect 
to the number of Orientals we proposed to take responsibility for.‖ 178  
 
Director of Foreign Operations Administration Harold E. Stassen recognized that while the US 
could not tell the KMT to drop its fantastic scheme of counter-offensive, neither should the US 
promise to build the ROC military up for an eventual takeover of the mainland. The best option 
was to fudge the issue. Subsequently, Dulles and Eisenhower would use Stassen‘s suggestion of 
allowing Chiang to pine for some hypothetical unrest on the mainland as the basis for the ROC‘s 




Faced with the dithering of the US, Taipei stepped up its attempts to win over the US. Eventually 
assiduous efforts by Yu did lead to the securing of a promise by Stassen that ROC request would 
be ―considered first.‖180 Taipei‘s indefatigable efforts to seek out sympathetic US office holders 
gave it an important edge. Friendly officers were quickly sized up and cultivated. From the flow of 
telegrams to Taipei, Admiral Radford was singled out as one who was an ally of the ROC.
181
 Mme. 
Chiang invited Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson and his wife to visit the ROC.
182
 
Nonetheless, there were limits to the ROC‘s efforts. Chiang‘s request for the US to protect its 
offshore islands via some form of treaty failed. The limitations of US aid were clearly drawn, with 
the US using its aid to dampen Chiang‘s vaulting ambitions. The ROC, in other words, had learnt 
to identify its operating boundaries.
183
    
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how the genesis of the two Taiwan Strait crises could be traced to 1950 
when Truman positioned the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait to prevent hostilities between the 
                                                 
178 However, Chairman of JCS Admiral Radford staunchly protested that although the KMT‘s position on Taiwan had 
been ―strengthened,‖ additional Seventh Fleet patrols were the only thing that was between Formosa and the Chinese 
communists. Nonetheless, Secretary Wilson believed that the US had given too much support to the ROC. The US could 
not tap upon it for Korea and it was increasingly unlikely for Indochina. Supplying the ROC was like a bottomless abyss. 
183rd Meeting of NSC, 4 February 4, 1954, NSC Series, box 5, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
179 187rd Meeting of NSC, 4 March, 1954, NSC Series, box 5, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
180 Yü Ta-wei to CKS, telegrams, 13 June 1953, serial no.002080106043008, CKS papers, AH. 
181 Chiang‘s private conversation with Radford was subsequently closely studied by Yu to identify areas to squeeze for 
aid.Yü Ta-wei to CKS, telegrams, 7 July 1953, serial no.002080106043008, CKS papers, AH. 
182 Yü Ta-wei to CKS, telegrams, 6 & 13 June 1953, serial no.002080106043008, CKS papers, AH. 
183 Yü Ta-wei to CKS, telegrams, 22 July 1953, serial no.002080106043008, CKS papers, AH 
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PRC and the ROC. US involvements in the Taiwan Strait subsequently continued. From 1953 to 
April 1954, despite attempts by Eisenhower to re-assess US policies toward China, Taiwan and 
Southeast Asia and in the face of domestic conservative currents, maintaining Chiang‘s Taiwan 
remained one of the main goals of US policy toward Asia, together with keeping Japan firmly in 
the US security umbrella, and preventing communism from spreading in Southeast Asia. US non-
recognition of China and economic embargo and covert operations against China also persisted. A 
new course of ―United Action,‖ a US proposal to stem the communists‘ high tide in Indochina that 
would lead to the formation of SEATO in September1954, also emerged as a strategy to counter 
PRC‘s involvements in Indochina. All these actions highlighted the entwining of the Taiwan Strait 
issue with events in Southeast Asia and contributed to the making of the Taiwan Strait Crises as 
they would later be perceived by the PRC to constitute a US strategy of encircling China and 
provided a pretext for China‘s bombing of the Quemoy and Matsu islands, which triggered the 
First Taiwan Strait Crisis.  
 
In the aftermath of the Korean War armistice agreements, Beijing was anxious to emerge from 
diplomatic isolation. Together with the need to better prepare China for its participation in the 
Geneva Conference, China re-assessed its policies toward Taiwan, the US and Southeast Asia. In 
this re-assessment, China placed the Taiwan Strait issue on the backseat for the moment, expressed 
its concerns regarding the US and ―United Action,‖ sought to win over Asian neutralist countries, 
and advocated a ―talking while fighting‖ posture with respect to Vietnam. Such features 
represented China‘s responses and initiatives in dealing with the US actions and played a part in 
the making of the Taiwan Strait Crises for, had these actions elicited what China considered to be 
acceptable US responses, China would most likely not have proceeded with the 1954 
bombardments of Quemoy and Matsu. However, as events would subsequently show, this was not 
to be the case, and these features would continue to be displayed in the subsequent unfolding of the 
Taiwan Strait Crises.  
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Taiwan was the most directly affected party right from the start of the Taiwan Strait Crises. US 
patrols of the Taiwan Strait in 1950 helped to ensure its continued survival. Taiwan also stationed 
troops on the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu to deter China‘s aggression while hoping to 
eventually recover the mainland. The Taiwan Strait issue thus assumed crucial significance for 
Taiwan. This was seen in how the Taiwan Strait issue played a significant role in the formulation 
and implementation of policies to uphold Taiwan‘s political survival and cultural revival. Its 
importance was further seen in the construction of the clarion call to wage fangong dalu (counter-
offensive against the mainland), which led to a militarization of Taiwan‘s society and constituted a 
major component of its foreign policy. These aspects contributed significantly to the making of the 
Taiwan Strait Crises and would continue to feature prominently in the subsequent unfolding of the 
Taiwan Strait Crises. 
 
All these developments portended the limitations of an agreement in the Geneva Conference. To 
what extent the inclinations towards peace in Washington and Beijing could be further nurtured 






Chapter 3: The Geneva Conference  
 
The Geneva Conference was held from 26 April to 21 July 1954 to discuss both the ―Korean 
question‖ and the ―question of restoring peace in Indochina.‖ It was to pave the way for the 
departure of foreign troops from Korea and hopefully kick-start political negotiations between 
North Korea and South Korea. It was also to provide a forum for the French and the Viet Minh to 
work out the political future of Indochina. The US and China were important players in these two 
conflicts as US support of France and China‘s support of the Viet Minh in Indochina portended the 
possibility of yet another Sino-US conflagration. The Geneva Conference was thus significant in 
providing a major diplomatic platform for the US and China to undertake negotiations and work 
out differences so as to reach an understanding on outstanding issues.  
 
Robert Accinelli has rightly pointed out the looming shadow of the Geneva Conference over the 
First Taiwan Strait Crisis but has not given sufficient attention to the importance of the 
contestation for world opinion undertaken there by the US and the PRC. Through the use of newly 
available sources, this chapter contributes by locating and elucidating the making of the First 
Taiwan Strait Crisis in the Geneva Conference where many significant issues were not settled, 
highlighting again the entwining of the Taiwan Strait issue with events in Southeast Asia, and 
necessitating again an analysis of the positions of the US and the PRC relating to Southeast Asia. 
This chapter supports existing scholarship on the Geneva Conference that highlighted the 
disarrayed nature of the US-Britain-France alliance. It also agrees with more recent scholarship 
that underscored China‘s successful international debut in Geneva and the crucial role Beijing 
played in steering North Vietnam towards territorial integrity.
1
 This chapter will further contribute 
                                                 
1 On Anglo-US differences in Geneva, see Victor S. Kaufman, Confronting Communism: US & British Policies toward 
China (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2001), 65-96. On trade embargo and the UN, see Rosemary Foot, The 
Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 52-66. A short account is presented 
in George C. Herring, & Richard H. Immerman. ―Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu: ‗The Day We Didn‘t Go to 
War‘ Revisited.‖ The Journal of American History, Vol 71, no. 2 (Sep 1984): 343-363. For a rigorous treatment from 
Beijing‘s perspective, see Chen Jian, Mao‟s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of N. Carolina Press, 
2001), 129-138. On Zhou Enlai‘s role, see Shao Kuo-kang, Zhou Enlai and the Foundations of Chinese Foreign Policy 
(NY: St. Martin‘s Press, 1996), 179-191. A narrative based on selected Chinese sources but without proper citation is 
given in Xu Jingli 徐京利, Jiemi Zhongguo waijiao dangan 解密中国外交档案 [Declassified: Chinese Foreign Affairs 
Archives] (Beijing: Zhongguo dangan chubanshe, 2005), 249-289. For an analysis from the French-Vietnamese 
perspective, see Arthur J. Dommen, The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and 
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by showing how China influenced Cambodia and Laos and how China‘s successful international 
debut was facilitated by a strategy of combining cultural blitzkrieg and realpolitik. Moreover it 
will build upon the limited scholarship on Taiwan with an elaboration of Taiwan‘s involvements. 
While existing scholarship rightly noted the belligerent undertones that colored this period, none 
considered Geneva to have constructed a foundation for Sino-US tacit communication, which is a 
proposition that this chapter will also make.  
 
In their preparation for this Conference, the US and China had already been re-assessing their 
foreign policies since 1953, as discussed in the previous chapter. Focusing on developments from 
April to July 1954, this chapter will explore the above themes in three sections. The first section 
will analyze the position of the US in Geneva, highlighting the difficulties that the US faced in 
gaining support from its allies for the ―United Action‖ and the differences in opinions between 
Eisenhower and his cabinet members regarding US policies toward China. The second section will 
investigate how China‘s aim to break out of international isolation led it to take up a position of 
―reasonableness‖ in Geneva that disarmed many potential antagonists and improved China‘s 
diplomatic standing. It will also examine how China sought to win over Asian countries through a 
combination of cultural blitzkrieg and realpolitik, followed by an analysis of how China responded 
to the specter of ―united action.‖ The third section will explore how Taiwan, although not a 
participant in Geneva, exploited the international crisis in Indochina to further its fangong mission. 
It will then analyze how Chiang tried to win over US officials to his cause, through a case study of 
Chiang‘s meetings with General James A. Van Fleet. 
 
1. The US in Geneva: A Season for Adjustments 
US policies toward China during the Geneva Conference could be seen as a continuation of its 
earlier policies, highlighting again the entwining of the Taiwan Strait issue with events in 
Southeast Asia. The US was not prepared for war with China.  Maintaining Chiang‘s Taiwan 
                                                                                                                                                   
Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam (Indiana University Press, 2001), 216-233. Finally, the best work on the 
ROC vis-à-vis Geneva, based solely on US sources, is Robert Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy 
toward Taiwan, 1950-1955 (Chapel Hill: University of N. Caroline Press, 1996). 
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remained one of the main goals of US policy toward Asia, together with keeping Japan firmly in 
the US security umbrella, and preventing communism from spreading in Southeast Asia. US non-
recognition of China and economic embargo and covert operations against China persisted. The 
pursuit of ―United Action,‖ a US strategy to counter PRC‘s involvements in Indochina that would 
lead to the formation of SEATO in September1954, continued. This section will analyze US 
actions in Geneva, highlighting first the difficulties that the US faced in gaining support from its 
allies for the ―United Action,‖ and the differences in opinions between Eisenhower and his cabinet 
members regarding US policies toward China. It will then show how the disarrayed alliance 
reached a compromise to form a ―United Front.‖ Nonetheless, it was clear that in Geneva, US 
difficulties in rallying allies to its cause and the negativity of its association with neo-colonialism 
hampered its efforts in developing a regional counter-measure against China. US dissatisfaction 
with the outcome of the Geneva Conference would subsequently lead it to undertake actions 
perceived by China to be threatening to China‘s security and led to China‘s triggering of the First 
Taiwan Strait Crisis. 
 
1.1 The Disarrayed Alliance and Differences within Eisenhower’s Cabinet 
Eisenhower was wary of getting the US embroiled in another war in Asia and stood firm against 
intervention in Indochina. He emphasized the unwelcomed historical and cultural baggage that the 
US inherited from its colonial allies, highlighting that the US actions ―in the eyes of many Asiatic 
peoples merely replace French colonialism with American colonialism.‖ The US representative in 
Geneva, Bedell Smith, agreed that the US public would never allow us to ―fight with the French 
alone in Indochina.‖ The thought that the US might have to insert up to six US divisions in 
Indochina and elsewhere in the world ―frightened [Eisenhower] to death.‖ Eisenhower again 
reverted to apocalyptic warnings that US intervention in Indochina would be transformed into a 
―general war with China and perhaps with the USSR.‖2 However, should Communist China ―move 
                                                 
2 This tendency is brilliantly depicted in Campbell Craig‘s Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War 
(NY: Columbia University Press, 1998), chapter 4. 
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against Korea,‖ Eisenhower stated that instead of being ―exhausted in piecemeal conflicts,‖ it 
would be better to ―hit the biggest one with all the power we had.‖3 
 
A safer bet was to pursue the course of ―United Action.‖ However, in its effort to persuade Britain 
and France to support ―United Action,‖ the US encountered various difficulties, reflecting how 
disarrayed the alliance was. Churchill‘s refusal to support ―United Action‖ derailed Washington. 
Bedell Smith reported that the US alliance had become ―unstuck‖ and possessed ―a lesser degree 
of common understanding‖ in the Geneva Conference than in any other international conferences.4 
What was more galling to Dulles‘ racial and cultural sensitivities was the influence of the 
Colombo Powers. Dulles was clearly disdainful of Eden‘s concern for ―India‘s position and of the 
desirability of inducing Nehru to take a cooperative attitude.‖ To be thwarted by a neutralist Third-
World nation was simply unacceptable. Worst of all, none had defended the US in the face of 
Communist ―vicious attacks‖ during the Korea phase of the Geneva Conference.5   
 
Yet, not wishing to have a complete break with the US, whom the British had a history of ―special 
relationship,‖ Eden offered a Five-Power Staff Agency meeting that did not contravene the on-
goings of the Geneva Conference. So desperate was Washington for regional grouping in any form 
that both Dulles and Eisenhower expressed satisfaction. One issue that was agreed upon by the US 
and the British was the importance of the participation of Asian states. As pointed out by Nixon, 
the participation of Asian states was essential so that the arrangement would not be branded as 
―sheer colonialism.‖ Even if Asian states such as Thailand were ―too small to carry much weight‖ 
their presence, noted Eisenhower, provided the ―semblance of Asian participation.‖6  
                                                 
3 Eisenhower argued that the US would act if the Communists crossed a boundary, but Indochina was different because 
―the communists had already got into Indochina‖ before his watch. 194th Meeting of NSC, 29 April, 1954, NSC Series, 
box 5, Ann Whitman File, DDEL 
4 Dulles reported that all of US allies were either ―badly frightened‖ or needed a lot of US encouragement. 194th 
Meeting of NSC, 29 April, 1954, NSC Series, box 5, Ann Whitman File, DDEL 
5 Eisenhower complained to the NSC that the US had a serious international image problem: ―Everyone seems to think 
we're skunks, saber-rattlers and warmongers, we ought not to miss any chance to make clear our peaceful 
objectives.‖195th Meeting of NSC, 6 May 1954, NSC Series, box 5, Ann Whitman File, DDEL 




Nonetheless, with the fall of Dien Bien Phu on 7 May, coupled with the start of the Indochina 
phase of the Geneva Conference, London engaged in deliberate dithering. Dulles reported to the 
NSC that revived discussions consisted of ―lots of scenery but not very much substance.‖7 Dulles 
reluctantly adopted a more reconciliatory posture, stating on 20 May, that ―when you stir up a 
thing like this regional grouping, you couldn‘t be sure precisely what would come up.‖ Although 
Dulles was obliged for most of the way to blindly ―feel his way‖ and ―accommodate his views‖ to 
other nations, he felt that this might be for the better. Having rejected the US proposal, the British 
would be at pains to make their alternative a success; India and Pakistan might be roped in. But 





Dulles was lukewarm to Eden‘s proposal for a ceasefire in Indochina. He believed that this was a 
preliminary to ―a de facto partition of all three of the Associated States.‖ Such a respite was futile 
because according to Dulles, ―the communists would certainly infiltrate the areas assigned to the 
other side, with the result that sooner or later they would obtain complete control of all three 
States.‖ Part of Dulles‘ pessimism stemmed from intelligence reports that Viet Minh forces were 
streaming towards the Delta region ―more rapidly than originally anticipated.‖9 
 
Washington belatedly became aware of the influence of Britain‘s Asian allies. Dulles reported that 
Britain ―remained heavily influenced by the point of view of India and by their fear of a desire on 
the part of the United States to provoke general war with Communist China.‖10 Nehru appeared to 
have an inordinate influence over Whitehall. US fear about the collapse of Southeast Asia was met 
with British insistence ―about their ability to hold Malaya.‖ Like the rest of Asia, Britain was 
                                                 
7 Dulles engaged in some hyperbole that the French would collapse in the same way that it did in 1940.197th Meeting of 
NSC, 13 May, 1954, NSC Series, box 5, Ann Whitman File, DDEL 
8 ―It was quite possible that the end result of our efforts to create a regional grouping would be different from what we 
had originally planned,‖ announced Dulles to the NSC, ―but the results, nevertheless, might be very useful to us.‖ 198th 
Meeting of NSC, 20 May 1954, NSC Series, box 5, Ann Whitman File, DDEL 
9 Added to the US woes, Saigon was in ―near chaotic situation.‖ Dulles also reported that ―the Saigon press had now 
taken a very strong anti-American position.‖ 199th Meeting of NSC, May 27, 1954, NSC Series, box 5, Ann Whitman 
File, DDEL. 
10 201th Meeting of NSC,  10 June 1954,  NSC Series, box 5, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
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―highly sensitive‖ about US threats to use atomic weapons. The British also adhered closely to its 
Asian allies‘ views of Beijing, as noted in a Department of State memo:  
The UK seeks to develop trade with Communist China. The UK is opposed to our 
[US] recognition of National China, and while it has agreed to maintain the status 
quo of China in the UN, this agreement is on a very short-term basis, and British 
policy basically favors the ousting of the Nationalist régime and the admission of 
Red China to the United Nations. The cleavage of our China Policy makes us both 
ineffectual in Asia.
11
   
  
When American yearning for strength through unity in the Geneva Conference seemed thwarted 
by this disparate coalition, the US ambassador to the Soviet Union, Charles Bohlen, urged action: 
―If the communists obtain the impression from Western disunity that they can proceed to acquire 
all of Indochina without a serious risk of major hostilities, the USSR would not attempt to restrain 
Chinese ambitions.‖12 Responding to a flawed intelligence of possible Chinese intervention in 
June, Dulles similarly argued that China‘s aggression was likened to a challenge: ―If we did not 
pick it [the thrown gauntlet] up we might just as well get out of the Pacific.‖13 
 
However, Eisenhower remained unmoved. Diem Bien Phu showed that US allies were unwilling 
to join the US. In the Congress, Eisenhower also ―doubted whether many of its members would 
understand what was really at stake.‖ Eisenhower again raised the specter of global war: to go 
against China ―would be much greater and more significant than the decision merely to bomb 
airfields.‖ Such a momentous endeavor would be to ―go to all-out war with Communist China and 
bomb such cities as Peiping.‖ World opinion would be against such as a move.14 Eisenhower 
insisted that the US should empathize with Britain. He was fast losing patience with his colleagues 
over their intransigence against the British. ―The best defense against Communism,‖ stressed 
Eisenhower, ―was a policy of cooperation among free world nations.‖ If a firm alliance was the US 
                                                 
11 ―They oppose the US policy of treating atomic weapons,‖ the report stated strongly, ―and particularly atomic missiles, 
as conventional weapons usable in case of war.‖ Memo, ―Specific problems with the UK,‖ 16 May 1954, Department of 
State, DDRS. 
12 Memo, Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) Daily Intelligence Abstracts, No. 143, 21 May 1954, White House, 
DDRS, CK3100117710. 
13 In June, US concerns were exacerbated by French reports there would be overt Chinese threat of ―MIG-15 planes over 
the Delta area‖ aiding the Viet Minh‘s expansion. 200th Meeting of NSC, 3 June, 1954, NSC Series, box 5, Ann 
Whitman File, DDEL. 
14 Eisenhower was adamant that US would not be shanghaied into countering ―such Chinese Communist aggression 
alone.‖ 200th Meeting of NSC, 3 June, 1954, NSC Series, box 5, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
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basic security policy, this must girdle US attitude towards East-West trade, ―other wise our efforts 
to defend ourselves would prove sterile.‖15   
 
Eisenhower‘s stance was remarkable in view of the lack of British support at Geneva. The NSC 
minutes recorded that ―the President repeated his familiar view‖ that negotiations with allies over 
the embargo list must not be rigid. If the US refused to empathize with the British economic 
―privation,‖ London may join India‘s ―neutralist position.‖16 On international trade, Eisenhower 
cited Japan‘s trade with China, asking the NSC: ―If you forbid them to trade with Communist 
China and if you will not admit their products to the United States, or if you do not find some other 
way out for them, they will slip into Communism.‖ Dulles admitted that the embargo could not 
hold the ―flood of nations who wish to extend their trade with the Communist nations.‖ With the 
Geneva Conference in mind, Dulles proposed a delaying tactic of ―a moratorium on the 80 
disagreed items‖ with the British until the ―Indochina situation was clarified.‖17 
 
1.2 Toward a “United Front” 
By June, the US began preparing for the most likely scenario that ―the French would accept a 
settlement at Geneva which would be quite unsatisfactory to the United States.‖ Director of Policy 
Planning Staff Robert R. Bowie posited that Beijing would not be ―hopelessly adamant‖ to the 
French need for a ―kind of partition of Indochina.‖ ―The United States could initially disassociate 
itself from such French agreement,‖ Bowie told Nixon, ―but from a practical point of view we 
would have to recognize the boundaries established by the partition agreement if the United States 
proposed to try to defend the rest of Southeast Asia against Communist control.‖ 18 
 
                                                 
15 In even stronger terms, Eisenhower demanded Radford to justify the continuing strong stance of the JCS against 
compromising with the British on the embargo list. Radford argued that if the Soviet could buy cargo vessels, that would 
free up Soviet capacity to build ―large cruisers in addition to submarines and destroyers.‖ 197th Meeting of NSC, 13 
May, 1954, NSC Series, box 5, Ann Whitman File, DDEL197th Meeting of NSC, 13 May, 1954, NSC Series, box 5, 
Ann Whitman File, DDEL 
16 198th Meeting of NSC, 20 May 1954, NSC Series, box 5, Ann Whitman File, DDEL 
17 205th Meeting of NSC, July 1, 1954,  NSC Series, box 5, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
18 200th Meeting of NSC, 3 June, 1954, NSC Series, box 5, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
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Fortunately for the US, Churchill belatedly came round to the US views for a regional grouping. 
He wrote to Eisenhower on 21 June: ―We should certainly have a SEATO corresponding to NATO 
in the Atlantic and European sphere.‖ However, Churchill urged that ―it is important to have the 
support of the Asian nations.‖19 When Churchill arrived in Washington on 25-29 June, it was an 
occasion ―for clearing the air and re-creating good feelings.‖ The US promised not to sabotage the 
diplomatic outcome of the Geneva Conference.
20
 On 29 June, both the US and Britain consented to 
a joint seven-point memorandum which allowed a partition of Vietnam provided that the non-
communist governments of Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam remained. There should also be a 
provision for the reunification of Vietnam. This new Anglo-US agreement was communicated to 




Washington was further heartened that the British did not support Beijing‘s search for ―admittance 
to the UN.‖ Churchill had reiterated in Washington that ―there has got to be peace first.‖ 
Eisenhower agreed with Churchill, but added that a few steps must be in place so that ―they would 
withdraw to their own borders, release our prisoners, and say they would observe propriety in 
international relations.‖ Once these conditions were fulfilled, Eisenhower would ―consider using 
his influence to obtain recognition.‖22 Anglo-US alliance quickly recovered. By 1 July, Dulles 
reported that there had been a ―joint US-UK position regarding a settlement in Indochina.‖23  
 
To minimize any loss of prestige, Dulles ventured to ―withdraw from the Indochina phase of the 
Conference inconspicuously.‖ Dulles drew for the NSC the dilemmas facing the US in Geneva. 
There was the fear that Geneva would be another Yalta ―guaranteeing Soviet conquest.‖ At the 
same time, the US could not easily reject the French search for a settlement, as this would provoke 
                                                 
19 Churchill to Eisenhower, June 21, 1954, in The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1953-1955, ed. Peter G. Boyle 
(Chapel Hill: The University of N Carolina Press, 1990), 147. 
20 24 June 1954, in John Colville, The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries, 1941-April 1955 Vol.2 (London: 
Hodder & Stoughton, 1987), 691; Leszek Buszynski, SEATO: The Failure of an Alliance Strategy (Singapore: Singapore 
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the ―hostility of French public.‖ Paradoxically, the US was chary of ―stiffen[ing]‖ the French too 
much. ―They might then turn to us,‖ contended Dulles, ―and ask us to participate unilaterally with 
them in continuing the war.‖ Dulles wanted to avoid the shoals of over-commitment and the 
humiliation from the allies‘ capitulation to communism.24 Dulles wrote to Eden on 7 July that the 
US presence in Geneva ―might prove an embarrassment to all concerned.‖25 
 
Mendès-France‘s urgent requests on 12 July 1954 for the US to stay turned out to be the perfect 
solution for Washington.
26
 The Geneva Conference grinded to a ―standstill‖ when Mendès-France 
left for Paris to consult with Dulles on 13 July. In a hurried meeting between Dulles, Eden and 
Mendès-France, all parties finally agreed on the US envisioned ―united front.‖27 The French 
imploring had the unexpected effect of granting the US a veto over the settlement. Dulles boasted 
that the US had finally impressed upon Britain and France that ―we did not particularly like the 
idea of partition of Vietnam but would go along with it if they agreed to support the American 
effort to form promptly in the Far East area a Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.‖28 Bedell Smith 
and Eden further agreed on 19 July to canvass potential Asian members for SEATO.
29
   
  
On the whole, US policies toward China during the Geneva Conference could thus be seen as a 
continuation of its earlier policies, highlighting again the entwining of the Taiwan Strait issue with 
events in Southeast Asia. How China acted in the Geneva Conference will be the focus of the next 
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2. The PRC in Geneva: Culture and Power 
In the aftermath of the Korean War armistice agreements, Beijing was anxious to emerge from 
diplomatic isolation and re-assessed its policies toward Taiwan, the US and Southeast Asia. In this 
re-assessment, China placed the Taiwan Strait issue on the backseat for the moment and 
concentrated on other pressing but inter-related issues. This section will begin by exploring how 
China‘s aim to break out of international isolation led it to take up a position of ―reasonableness‖ 
that disarmed many potential antagonists and improved China‘s diplomatic standing. It will then 
examine how China sought to win over Asian countries through a combination of cultural 
blitzkrieg and realpolitik, followed by an analysis of how China responded to the specter of 
―united action.‖ China‘s relative success vis-à-vis the US in Geneva, however, led the US to 
subsequently undertake actions perceived by China to be threatening to China‘s security and led to 
China‘s triggering of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. Yet, at the same time, the Geneva Conference 
could be seen to have ushered in the first full-fledged opportunity, after the Korean War armistice, 
for the belligerents and allies, including China and the US, to take stock of each other and work 
out a tentative modus operandi. In this sense, the Geneva can be seen to have laid a foundation for 
Sino-US tacit communication, a framework that would further evolve during the Taiwan Strait 
Crises. Moreover, what China learnt in Geneva China would apply again throughout the duration 
of the Taiwan Strait Crises. Hence, China‘s actions in Geneva were important in understanding the 
subsequent unfolding of the Taiwan Strait Crises.  
 
2.1 Positioning and Unexpected Paths  
In March 1954, Premier Zhou Enlai spelled out clearly the broad aims that the PRC should achieve 
in Geneva: 
We should adopt a policy of actively participating in the Geneva Conference, of 
enhancing diplomatic and international activities, in order to undermine the policy 
of blockade, embargo, and expanding armaments and war preparations by the US 
imperialists, and of promoting the relaxation of the tense international situation. 
Even though the United States will try everything possible to sabotage reaching all 
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kinds of agreements favourable to the cause of peace, we should still go all out at 
Geneva Conference to strive for some agreements, even agreements only 
temporary [in nature] and limited [in scope], so as to open the path to resolving 
international disputes through discussion and negotiations by the big powers. 
 
The Geneva Conference was the international debut for the PRC and Zhou stressed the need to 
establish a ―path‖ for resolving international disputes. The Premier ordered China‘s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to ―prepare other materials and opinions concerning China, the Far East, and peace 
and security in Asia.‖ Zhou also wanted the PRC to reach out to other countries. Ironically, Beijing 
set very low expectations for other communist gains. Beijing did not expect much progress beyond 
the Korean armistice. Beijing also calculated that Hanoi might have to pursue ―negotiating while 
fighting‖ for the long haul, a policy that China had earlier advocated. Should conditions allow, the 
PRC much preferred a more stable ―division along a demarcation line between south and north, 
such as the 16
th
 parallel‖ rather than ―an on-site ceasefire.‖30 
 
Reflecting on the Geneva Conference thirty years later, Wang Bingnan, one of the PRC‘s 
negotiators in Geneva, found out just how ―unexpected‖ the way ―paths‖ were forged:   
Formally, the Geneva Conference was an arena of conflict where delegations from 
various nations read their prepared statements and enunciated their official 
positions. Privately, the conference served as a channel of communication and 
understanding which helped bring about a tacit agreement on many an issue (moqi 
de qudao 默契的渠道). Much inside information was revealed during chats in the 
bar. The comrades of our delegation actively circulated among, and made friends 
with, a large group of people. …Before the Geneva Conference, we had no idea 




Beijing‘s newfound reasonableness disarmed the West. One Chinese delegate, Shi Zhe, noted that 
the Canadians privately approved Zhou‘s reasonable position.32 Canadian delegate Chester 
Ronning, in his memoirs, supported this view and noted that the US had adamantly refused to 
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 Privately, the Canadians blamed the ―rigidity‖ of the US for the failure to even gain 
a ―compromise‖ statement on the talks over Korea. The Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paul-
Henri Spaak, was also tired of US intransigence. ―Spaak, who had been indignant over the 
treatment given to the Soviet proposal,‖ reported the Canadian delegation to Ottawa, ―exploded 
over the [US refusal to entertain the] Chinese suggestion.‖34 
 
Even Bedell Smith, the US representative in Geneva, was not immune to the Chinese. Prior to the 
conference, he privately revealed to Molotov that the US position (Dulles) was ―unrealistic.‖ 35 
Molotov swiftly passed this message to Zhou.
36
 On 16 June, in an off-the-cuff comment, Smith 
indicated that Zhou‘s six-point comprehensive peace plan (mainly regarding the situations in Laos 
and Cambodian) ―contain a basis for discussion.‖ Cabling Washington, Smith added that ―at first 
glance there appeared to be certain points in Chinese proposal which might be agreed to.‖37 When 
Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson denigrated the six-point proposal on 18 June, Zhou 
criticized the contradictions of the US position.
38
 Wang concluded ―that US officials were not a 
monolithic bloc; Smith, for instance, had his own views. The premier was alert to this kind of 
things and adept at turning it to his advantage when the opportunity presented itself.‖39 
 
Zhou was ―alerted‖ that Smith might be signaling Washington‘s bottom line. Smith had reported to 
Washington: 
Yesterday [16 June] at recess Molotov asked me what I thought of the Chinese 
proposals on Laos and Cambodia. I said they seemed reasonable but they did not 
                                                 
33 Chester Ronning, A Memoir of China In Revolution: From the Boxer Rebellion to the People‟s Republic (NY: 
Pantheon Books, 1974), 220-225. 
34 Delegation to Geneva Conference on Korea to Secretary of State for External Affairs, telegram 174, 16 June 1954, 
DEA/50069-A-40, Documents on Canadian External Relations Vol 20 (1954), doc no. 87. 
35 Wang, Zhong Mei huitan, 19. 
36 The hints of rifts within the Western camp likely educated Moscow and Beijing on how much to push. On the role of 
Bedell Smith, see D.K. R Crosswell, ―Anglo-American Strategy and Command in Northwest Europe, 1944-1945,‖ in 
WWII in Europe, Africa and the Americans with General Sources, ed. Lloyd E. Lee (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 
1997), 212; Nixon, Memoirs, 198; Wang, Zhong Mei huitan, 19. 
37 Smith indicated that ―he listened with interest to Chinese statement which seemed to him restrained and reasonable.‖ 
The United States Delegation to the Department of State, Fourteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva (June 16, 
3 p. m.), telegram, June 17, 1954-1 a. m., in FRUS (1952-54), vol XVI, 1160. 
38 ―[Zhou] stated Mr. Robertson's statement was obviously different from General Smith‘s … [Zhou] would put 
emphasis on conciliation and attempt to reach agreement in principle.‖ The United States Delegation to the Departnent 
of State, Fifteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, (June 18, 3 p. m.), Telegram, June 18, 1954-midnight, in 
FRUS (1952-54), vol XVI, 1181; for the same speech see Zhou‘s speech in document, serial no. 206-Y0043, Rineiwa 
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provide for withdrawal of Viet Minh troops. If this was provided for, and 
satisfactory control commission agreed upon, they would deserve careful 
consideration…. I said that I would not speak against the Chinese proposals at this 
time and that if China's principal preoccupation, as I had heard, was that United 
States not establish military bases in Laos or Cambodia, there should be no 
concern about that, as the United States had no desire or intention to do so as long 




Subsequently, Beijing pressured Hanoi, during the Liuzhou conference on 3-5 July, precisely 
along these lines indicated by Smith. Beijing was determined that concessions be given to 
Cambodia and Laos. 
  
Smith disagreed with Dulles‘ Geneva direction. He also frowned upon the petty stunts Dulles 
seemed to favour vis-à-vis withdrawing the US team from Geneva.
41
 ―Presumably US Del would 
be kept informed by French and Associated States,‖ argued Dulles on 17 June, ―but we would 
avoid official participation in day-by-day Committee discussions which would mold decisions 
from which we might find it awkward subsequently to disassociate ourselves.‖42 Eisenhower did 
not agree and the idea dissipated.
43
 Ever the practical man, Bedell Smith undertook his ―personal 
diplomacy‖ toward the end of the conference by engaging Zhou‘s translator, Pu Shouchang, in 
small talk about ―China‘s ancient civilization‖ and Pu‘s ―beautiful‖ spoken English. The Chinese 
Communists ―were impressed with Smith‘s extraordinary gesture, given the adversarial relations 
between the two nations.‖ Smith continued along the same vein about Chinese ―civilization‖ and 
―Chinese porcelain‖ with Premier Zhou subsequently.44 Finally, Bedell Smith took the initiative on 
the last day of the Geneva Conference to ―shake the sleeve of the Premier [Zhou].‖ That the 
veteran diplomat Wang Bingnan should so vividly recount this little episode thirty years later 
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2.2 Cultural Blitzkrieg 
Zhou highlighted the ritualistic symbolism of the PRC‘s role in Geneva: ―This is akin to Mei 
Lanfang‘s operatic performance, … every role must be complete, and the entire endeavor has to be 
flawless.‖ Roles were rehearsed and press conferences were play-acted out. Huang Hua, the 
spokesman for the PRC, had to endure three rounds of grilling in China.
46
 Sparing no effort in 
managing its international image, the PRC rented one of the grandest château available, the ―Grand 
Mont-Fleuri.‖ The château was transformed into a museum as antiques were shipped from China 
to decorate its rooms and corridors.
47
 Zhou calculated that the international and media curiosity 
regarding the PRC would make the château a beehive of activities and elicited informal visits from 
foreigners. PRC press attaché Xiong Xianghui later estimated that 505 international groups and 
3,800 people had visited the PRC‘s premises.48 
  
To demonstrate China‘s progress, Zhou screened to a full house a documentary of the PRC‘s 1952 
National Day celebration. The choreography, the mass movements and the weapons parade 
impressed many. ―The Chinese sense of theatre‖ was in overdrive.49 Xiong recalled with pride that 
some foreign reporters opined that ―it is no longer possible to view the PRC through the pre-1949 
lens.‖ Nevertheless, some US correspondents claimed that the military parades were a sign of the 
PRC‘s growing militarism.50 Zhou was unfazed, again referring to the PRC‘s flexibility in 
responses: ―We are like Mei Lanfang‘s opera; we can deliver whatever roles demanded.‖51   
 
To combat negative views, Zhou also held the overseas screening of PRC‘s first color feature film, 
Liang Shanbo yu Zhu Yintai 梁山泊与祝英台 [The Butterfly Lovers], during the Geneva 
Conference. The film belied negative perceptions of Communist China as a faceless totalitarian 
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régime, and showcased such ―Asian‖ values as the importance of education and filial piety. More 
importantly, the film transmitted such universal tropes as unrequited love and fidelity beyond 
death.
52
 It was hardly possible to demonize the PRC when the first feature movie they showed 
overseas ruminated weepy love. The audience was enthralled by this version of ―Eastern Romeo 
and Juliet.‖ Molotov was moved to comment: ―I finally understand Chinese concept of proprieties 
and its standard of morality: to see one‘s love, but to be restrained from a touch, a kiss and a 
hug!‖53 One Indian reporter further noted that ―China could shoot this movie in the midst of the 
Korean War and Land Reform signaled in spades just how stable the régime was.‖54 In addition, 
Zhou made use of the screening of the movie as a neutral meeting space for the Laotian, 




Zhou turned news conferences into gastronomic events as well. The conventional Question-and-
Answer session was regarded as too ―boring.‖ Xiong recalled that ―we treated them to Chinese 
cigarettes, liquor and food, so that we could talk while eating.‖ Zhou had a five-point brief for the 
PRC negotiation team: 
1. Do not reject any correspondent; adopt a case-by-case approach. 
2. Be alert, but do not be overcautious. Be conscious of security, but not overly secretive. 
Take initiative, but do not be rash. 
3. When taking questions from foreign press, do not overly use ―No comments.‖ Anything 
that has been cleared or information that has been authorized, share it publicly, 
comprehensively and succinctly. Difficult questions must be noted down, studied and 
answered. 
4. In responding to challenges, rationally reply. Do not adopt a hectoring attitude. 
5. In entertaining guests, adopt a give-and-take attitude; sincerely try to understand the 
others‘ point of view. Make an effort to secure friends based on common grounds.56  
 
Acquiring friends was the diplomatic mantra of the PRC. When Laotian Foreign Minister Phoui 
Sananikone openly denounced the PRC for harboring ―imperialistic‖ intentions,57 Zhou instructed 
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Wang Bingnan and Shi Zhe to wine and dine the Laotians. First, the Chinese diplomats had a tête-
à-tête with the Laotians in a beautiful garden, impressing upon the guests the ―reasonableness‖ of 
the Chinese Communists.
58
 Later on 21 June, Zhou had dinner with them. Zhou reported to the 





The biggest target was India. India‘s special envoy in Geneva, Krishnan Menon, was impressed 
with Zhou. Nehru invited Zhou to visit India. ―[E]ven if it was for a day,‖ Menon said that ―the 
impact on the world would be great.‖60 Mao immediately cabled Zhou that ―the opportunity should 
not be passed up.‖61 As Eden was attentive to Nehru, there was no better conduit to Britain. 
Moreover, India took the initiative to sound the PRC out; Beijing could hardly miss this golden 
opportunity. When Zhou and Nehru issued a joint statement based on the Panch Sheel (Five 
Principles of Peaceful Co-existence) on 28 June 1955, Nehru had decided he could do business 




Zhou waved aside all cultural references that the PRC was a dominant power. Tep Phan, the 
Cambodian Foreign Minister, stated in the first meeting on 20 June with Zhou that ―China is a big 
country, we hope that China can continue to help our small nation to peacefully co-exist.‖ Zhou 
graciously dismissed such hierarchies and insisted that the ―blood‖ relationship between China, 
Vietnam and Cambodia was akin to that of xiongdi xiangchu 兄弟相处 [brotherly relationship].63 
Similarly, Zhou used the ―blood ties‖ gambit in his meeting on 23 June with Phoui Sananikone: ―I 
have said that eastern nationalities have some blood ties, hence we should be more respectful of 
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each other‘s independent sovereignty and unification.‖64 Zhou reassured the Laotians on the eve of 
the Geneva Accords that the PRC had no designs on Laos. ―Perhaps you will think that China is a 
big country and will be anxious [about us]. However, after the peace agreement has been reached, 
the Kingdom of Laos will be a unified country through elections,‖ promised Zhou and he 
continued, ―…The Five Principles [of Peaceful Coexistence] we referred to before can also apply 
to the relationship between us.‖65 The PRC‘s charm offensive thus pervaded all quarters of the 
Geneva Conference. 
 
Interestingly, appeals to cultural and affective ties were often raised first by the Cambodians and 
Laotians, suggesting attempts by the weaker party to also stress commonalities with the stronger 
party. Tep Phan informed Zhou that his Chinese grandfather‘s ancestral worship artifacts were still 
with him and averred that: ―We are very close to China … three out of four Cambodians have 
Chinese blood in them.‖66 Phoui Sananikone talked about how he had visited China and that the 
ethnic roots of Laotians could be traced to the Tibetan highlands. Given this implicit understanding, 




2.3 Foundation of Realpolitik  
Underlying China‘s cultural approach was a solid foundation of realpolitik. Mao‘s moves were 
rooted deeply in domestic considerations and fears of containment by the US. In the aftermath of 
the Korean War, the PRC considered economic development of paramount importance and used 
the Soviet model of centralized planning. The Chinese state was then in the midst of consolidating 
its administrative apparatus nation-wide, a ponderous task that saw the final drafting of the First 
Five-year Plan starting as late as February 1955.
68
 In terms of China‘s fears of containment by the 
US, although North Vietnam was a fraternal ally, Beijing did not hesitate to press Ho Chi Minh for 
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concessions to safeguard the PRC‘s borders. China was also concerned of the potential threat of 
the US presence in Cambodia and Laos.  
 
In the first meeting with the Cambodians, Zhou raised the concerns of the PRC vis-à-vis US 
military bases in Cambodia and proposed that the PRC and the Cambodians build a ―close 
relationship.‖69 On 20 July, Zhou readily met the Cambodian requests for restraining the North 
Vietnamese. Zhou promised Tep Phan that Ho Chi Minh was not interested in invading Cambodia 
―because an invasion is destined to fail.‖ When Tep Phan complained that the North Vietnamese 
chief delegate was overly legalistic in defining Cambodia‘s ―domestic defense‖ [defense a 
l‟interieur] requirements, Zhou proved immensely agreeable, responding that ―this is ridiculous. 
Of course [one] should not make strict rules [restricting Cambodian armed forces] like these.‖ 
Zhou also promised to push the North Vietnamese harder to withdraw from Cambodia and asked 
the Cambodians in return not to be blindly ―pro-America,‖ to allow the North Vietnamese more 





To the Laotians on 21 June, Zhou advised Phoui Sananikone to be ―extremely wary of US 
disruptive attempts.‖71 In response to the argument by North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong 
for a legalistic version of ―an independent administration unit‖ of ―eleven‖ places, Zhou promised 
that the ―delimitation of concentration areas is simply a temporary one‖ restricted to ―two 
provinces in northeast Laos.‖ Moreover, Zhou declared that the PRC only recognized ―one Royal 
government‖ of Laos.72 When it was time to apply pressure, the Soviets and the Chinese 
Communists did not veer away. By June, the North Vietnamese stubbornly resisted giving any 
concession. Head of Soviet MFA Southeast Asia Department, K. V. Novikov, harshly humiliated 
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Dong for having ―no clear ideas on the plan for division of zones [in Laos].‖ That a mere 





On the Vietnam problem, Li Kenong concluded that Dong had finally come round to the idea that 
―the minimum goal is the 16th parallel.‖ Wang Bingnan recalled the burning issue: ―At that time, 
some people in Vietnam hoped that they would unify Vietnam at one go. However, judging from 
the relative strength of both sides, we realized that this was impossible.‖74 Shielding the 
Vietnamese from further humiliation, the PRC moved this critical issue to the remote Liuzhou 
Conference (3-5 July), away from prying eyes. No less than eight strenuous rounds of negotiations 
were needed to secure the deal. Zhou stressed to Chairman Ho Chi Minh, Ambassador Hoang Van 
Hoan and General Giap that the danger of the Indochina situation was that the conflict had been 
―internationalized.‖ Zhou elaborated: 
In Vietnam, the imperialists feared the expansion of China; therefore it would not 
allow the Democratic Republic of Vietnam a big-scale victory. If we insisted on 
too much, Indochina would not gain peace, the US will intervene, the conflict will 
be internationalized, and this will be detrimental to us. The problem of Indochina 
is not restricted to three nations, but it affects the entire Southeast Asia, it will 
have impact on Europe and the world situation. We now have only one mission, to 
fight for peace.  
 
Zhou promised that the barest minimum for the division line would be ―Route Nine [close to 17th 
parallel].‖ But for Laos, the PRC believed that realistically only the northern provinces would be 





                                                 
73
 On 26 June, Pham Van Dong criticized K. V. Novikov for not having ―mature ideas‖ about the Laotian situation. 
When Pham presented his overly ambitious plan of occupying and expanding communist areas in Laos, Novikov 
lectured Pham on the importance to ―have further studies [on this topic] and then come up with concrete ideas.‖ See, Li 
Kenong to PRC CC, Telegram, 26 June 1954, serial no. 206-00046-34, in CWIHPB 16 (Fall 2007/ Winter 2008), 57. 
74 Wang, Zhong Mei huitan, 12. 
75 To date, the PRC has not released the transcripts of these sensitive meetings. Liu Wusheng, Du Hongqi (eds.) 刘武生, 
杜宏奇, Zhou Enlai junshi huodong jishi : 1918-1975, vol 2. 周恩来军事活动纪事[Military activities of Zhou Enlai] 
(Beijing : Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2000), 337. 
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Strong-armed by the Chinese, Ho observed that the West ―would at most concede territory to the 
17
th
 parallel.‖76 Ho conceded: ―We must help Mendès-France, ensure that he does not fall, this is 
the best bet for us.‖77 But it was only on 20 July that Pham Van Dong reluctantly accepted the 
inevitable. ―The French had already revealed their bottom line; they just want a face-saving and 
honorable exit from Vietnam,‖ counseled Zhou, ―whereas Vietnam will still belong to the 
Vietnamese.‖78 
 
Just how contentious the Liuzhou decision was could be gleaned from Mao‘s personal intervention. 
Mao stamped his approval on the PRC‘s Geneva policy in the enlarged Politburo on 7 July 1954.79 
He commended Zhou‘s efforts: ―Our activities for the last two months are very good … We, the 
Soviets, Korea and Vietnam have cooperated well, our policy is correct and our activities have 
gained results.‖ 80 Mao elaborated that the ―peace slogan‖ had isolated the US: ―In negotiations, 
things which can be compromised, we should compromise, things which we should insist upon, we 
must be firm.‖ In sum, the act of forcing concessions out of the Vietnamese Communists was 




Mao highlighted the strategic dangers posed by the US: ―Look at this Far East, it [the US] 
occupied Japan, took over South Korea, controlled Taiwan, and the Philippines, Thailand and 
Pakistan too. In addition, there is Turkey, Australia and New Zealand.‖ As Mao considered the 
Geneva Conference a done deal from this point onwards, his attention turned next to the ―long-
term problem‖ of Taiwan: ―We need to destroy any possibility of a ROC-US defence treaty, we 
                                                 
76 Wang, Zhong Mei huitan, 13. 
77 Quoted in Jin Chongji 金冲及 (ed), Zhou Enlai Zhuan 2nd ed. 周恩来传 [The Biography of Zhou Enlai] 
(Beijing:Zhongyang Wenxian chubanshe, 2008),1022. 
78 Tong, Fengyu, 88. 
79 Since his return from Hangzhou on 17 March, Mao chaired at least five Politburo meetings to discuss the PRC‘s 
approaches to the Geneva Conference. Throughout the Geneva Conference, Zhou (or Li Kenong) sent almost daily 
reports to Mao. Pang Xianzhi & Jin Chongji 逄先知 与 金冲及(ed.), Mao Zedong Zhuan (1949-1976) 毛泽东传 [The 
Biography of Mao Zedong] (Beijing:Zhongyang Wenxian chubanshe, 2003), 555. 
80 Mao, ―Tong yiqie yuanyi heping de guojia tuanjie hezuo‖ 同一切愿意和平的国家团结和作 [Unite and work 
together with all peace loving countries], speech, Meeting of the Politburo of the CC CCP, 7 July 1954, Mao Zedong 
wenji 毛泽东文集, vol. 6 (Oct 1949-Dec 1955), ed. Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi 中共中央文献研究室编 
(Beijing: Remin chubanshe, 1999), 332-337. 
81 Mao, ―Tong yiqie yuanyi heping,‖ 333. 
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need to think of some solutions, and more propaganda is necessary.‖82 Yet, the international 
situation was so positive that ―to shut the door is no longer possible.‖ This ideal situation 
beseeched the PRC to ―venture out.‖83 Mao advocated an intense diplomatic effort to win over 
countries like India and Burma. Finally, Mao reminded his colleagues that the PRC‘s desire to 
uphold peace was solely for the purpose of ―protecting our country, protecting socialism and to 
strive for building up a great socialist country.‖84  
 
2.4 The Specter of “United Action”  
Like the earlier period, China remained concerned with ―united action.‖ Beijing‘s actions in 
Liuzhou premised upon alarming reports of ―United Action‖ redux. The Chinese communists 
noted glaring examples of high-level consultations between Britain and the US and harbored a 
deep sense of foreboding.
85
 Britain was the linchpin as the French were safely entangled by their 
obduracy.
86
 Beijing surmised accurately that the fear of Sino-Soviet opposition and the resistance 
of the Asian nations played important roles in British equivocation. Subsequently, the British had 
further claimed, much to the annoyance of the Americans, that the forthcoming Five-Power 
Military Conference in Washington (3-11 June 1954) had nothing to do with the Southeast Asian 
Defence treaty. Gary Hess noted that ―British influence in the former European colonies, US 
officials believed, was instrumental for enlisting wider Asian support.‖ Hence, by playing the 
                                                 
82 Ibid. 
83 ―Obviously, the international situation is such that even reactionary figures like Churchill,‖ Mao pointed out on 5 July, 
―are beginning to acknowledge Marxist-Leninist principles [peaceful co-existence] in foreign policy.‖ V.V. Vaskov, 
Soviet Charge d‘Affaires, recorded Mao‘s enthusiasm, see V.V.Vaskov with Mao, Memorandum of conversation, 5 July 
1954, Journal of VVVaskov, 27 August 1954, AVPRF, f.0100, o.p. 47, papka 379, d.7, ll.69-70, in CWIHPB 16 (Fall 
2007/ Winter 2008), 88; Declaration by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill, 29 June 1954, FRUS (1952-
1954), Western Europe and Canada, vol. VI, (1986), 1130. 
84 Mao commended the Soviet policy of relieving international tensions and coexisting with countries with different 
social systems. He repeated the same message the next day in a session of the Chinese People‘s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC), highlighting that ―[t]o protect our economic development and industrialization, we cannot do 
without improvements to our diplomatic camp.‖57th session of the 1st National committee of the CPPCC, quoted in Pang 
& Jin, Mao Zedong Zhuan, 563; Mao, ―Tong yiqie yuanyi heping,‖ 334-5. 
85 Washington had been canvassing members, including British Malaya, for a ―Southeast Asia Defence treaty.‖ 
Eisenhower wrote to Churchill that ―a greater show of unity is essential.‖ Eisenhower to Churchill, cable, 12 May 1954, 
in PDDE (XV), 1069; Immerman, John Foster Dulles, 94; ―奠边府解放后美国在东南亚的做法及与英、法的矛盾‖ 
[Dianbianfu jiefanghou meiguo zai dongnanya de zuofa ji yu ying 、fa de maodun], MFA Intelligence division, no. 87, 
28 May 1954, serial no. 102-00159-10, AMFA. 
86 In the aftermath of Dien Bien Phu, Beijing observed that the US had asserted more pressure on the French but had 
encountered French intransigence. Eisenhower to Gruenther, 8 June 1954, in PDDE (XV), 1119; PDDE (XV), 1132; ―奠
边府解放后美国在东南亚的做法及与英、法的矛盾‖ [Dianbianfu jiefanghou meiguo zai dongnanya de zuofa ji yu 
ying 、fa de maodun], MFA Intelligence division, no. 87, 28 May 1954, serial no. 102-00159-10, AMFA. 
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Asian card, the British tried stalling the US programme of a Southeast Asian Defence treaty, to at 




To Beijing‘s relief, the renewed US push for a regional security pact met with similar disdain from 
Asian ―neutralists.‖ Beijing observed that Indonesian attention was on securing a mutual non-
aggression treaty with the PRC. In mid-May, Indonesian Ambassador to France, Ide Anak Agung 
Gde Agung, had reassured Zhou Indonesia wanted no part in the US defense arrangement.
88
 The 
Indonesian assembly vice-chairman and the foreign minister also publicly announced their support 
of a treaty with the PRC, deflecting any US attempt to entice Indonesia.
89
 Instead of a US security 
pact, Burma proposed an opposite idea: an agreement among India, Indonesia and Burma for non-
aggression. India‘s editorials renewed accusations that the regional defence treaty was a deliberate 




At the end of June, Beijing concluded that for the moment, the revival of ―united action‖ was 
unlikely. The crucial key was Britain‘s unwillingness to commit. It noted that Churchill had 
declared in the House of Commons on 27 April that any ―Southeast Asian Security pact‖ would 
have to consider the ―opinions of Asian countries.‖91 If the British proved obdurate, the Asian 
countries were stridently so. The Chinese communists observed that India, Indonesia and Burma 
were against such a security pact, opting instead for neutralism. But the US was working on other 
more pliable Asian countries such as Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, South Korean and Taiwan.
92
  
                                                 
87 The PRC intelligence speculated that should the Americans make no headway with the British, it might resort to 
―bilateral treaties‖ with individual friendly Asian countries. Hess, ―The American Search,‖ 282;  Geneva Conference to 
FO, 22 May 1954, D1074/46, FO 371/111863,  cited in Lowe, ―Change and Stability in Eastern Asia,‖ 145; ―奠边府解
放后美国在东南亚的做法及与英、法的矛盾‖ [Dianbianfu jiefanghou meiguo zai dongnanya de zuofa ji yu ying 、fa 
de maodun], MFA Intelligence division, no. 87, 28 May 1954, serial no. 102-00159-10, AMFA. 
88 Zhou with Indonesian Ambassador Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Minutes of Conversation, 15 May 1954, serial no. 
206-Y0009, Rineiwa Dangan, 363-365. 
89 ―印度、印尼、缅甸以及英国对美国积极筹组 ‗东南亚联防‘ 的反应‖ [Yindu、yinni、miandian yiji yinguo dui 
meiguo jiji chouzhu ‗dongnanya lianfang‘ de fanying], MFA Intelligence division, no. 88, 5 June 1954, serial no. 102-
00159-11, AMFA. 
90 As the senior partner among the neutralist countries, India exercised considerable influence. ―印度、印尼、缅甸以及
英国对美国积极筹组 ‗东南亚联防‘ 的反应‖ [Yindu、yinni、miandian yiji yinguo dui meiguo jiji chouzhu 
‗dongnanya lianfang‘ de fanying], MFA Intelligence division, no. 88, 5 June 1954, serial no. 102-00159-11, AMFA. 
91 The Chinese Communists further speculated that it was also partly due to British resentment with the US over the 
relative loss of English influence in Southeast Asia. Hess, ―The American Search.‖ 281. 
92 ―美国拼凑 ‗东南亚防卫集团‘ 的情况‖ [Meiguo pincou ‗dongnanya fangwei jituan‘ de qinkuang], 30 June 1954, 




However, the Chinese detected that British resolve was gradually crumbling. Beijing noted that 
Anglo-US differences were over means not aims. Attempts were also made by Britain to draw 
India into Eden‘s ―Asia Locarno pact.‖93 For the Indochina case, a British Foreign Office 
spokesman revealed: ―A Locarno-type guarantee was, in fact, in our minds throughout the first half 
of the Geneva Conference. Our hope was that the Colombo powers might be induced to assume 
the role of guarantor that had been played by Great Britain and Italy in the original Locarno 
Agreement.‖94 But Beijing feared that Eden‘s Locarno plan might be a fig leaf for ―United 
Action.‖ Indeed, the Five-Power Military Conference had gradually eroded the British opposition 
against a regional defensive pact. Beijing‘s fears were heightened by Churchill‘s Washington visit. 
On both counts, the PRC was correct in casting suspicion on Whitehall‘s habitual inclinations.95 
Zhou complained to Eden that London ―was trying to counter a Southeast Asian defense pact with 
Locarno. If the two were to exist at the same time, it would be unthinkable.‖ Eden admitted that ―I 
have run into some trouble. I used the word ‗Locarno,‘ not knowing that the US did not like it.‖ 96 
The meeting was inconclusive; Eden did not manage to persuade Zhou. But it was clear that Zhou, 
Nehru and U Nu were misled by Eden‘s Locarno proposal and now they would have to accept the 
fait accompli of the impending development of SEATO.
97
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1954, serial no. 105-00626-01, AMFA. 
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CWIHPB 16 (Fall 2007/ Winter 2008), 66-67. Judd had also reported to Eisenhower that the Congress was against 
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Walter H, Judd, 25 June 1954, ACW Diary Series, box 2,  ACW Diary June 1954 (1), Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
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On the whole, like the US policies in Geneva, China‘s actions during the Geneva Conference 
could be seen as a continuation of its earlier policies. While China seemed momentarily successful 
in countering the specter of ―united action,‖ later developments would derail China‘s expectations 
and led it toward the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. How Taiwan acted during the period of the Geneva 
Conference will be the focus of the next section. 
 
3. Taiwan and Geneva  
From 1950 to April 1954, the Taiwan Strait issue played a significant role in the formulation and 
implementation of policies to uphold Taiwan‘s political survival and cultural revival, and in the 
construction of the clarion call to wage fangong dalu, which led to a militarization of Taiwan‘s 
society and constituted a major component of its foreign policy. Although Taiwan was not a 
participant in Geneva, this section will first demonstrate how it exploited the international crisis in 
Indochina to further its fangong mission. It will then examine how Chiang tried to win over US 
officials to his cause, through a case study of Chiang‘s meetings with General James A. Van Fleet. 
Taiwan‘s search for security succeeded because it learnt to situate itself firmly in the US Cold War 
strategic interests. Through Taiwan‘s unceasing efforts to win over the US, Washington also began 
to grasp the symbiotic ties between Chiang‘s fangong mission with the raison d‘être of the KMT 
government. Nonetheless, despite Chiang‘s repeated offers to aid the US to counter the PRC, the 
US kept Chiang at arm‘s length. These aspects constituted important parts of the making of the 
Taiwan Strait Crises and would continue to feature prominently in the subsequent unfolding of the 
Taiwan Strait Crises. 
 
3.1 Exploiting the International Crisis in Indochina 
The ROC government perceived the international crisis in Indochina as a boon to its counter-
offensive ambition. In April 1954, Assistant Secretary of Defense Wilfred J. McNeil revealed to 
ROC diplomat Hsiao Po that the US and its allies were in disarray. The remaining option was 
―anti-communist troops of the Far East nations and other nations sending troops to aid Vietnam.‖ 
Hsiao enthusiastically appraised McNeil of the ROC‘s plans to ―set up base camps‖ once the 
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counter-attack of the mainland started. McNeil proved agreeable to plans to set up an ―anti-
communist government on the remote boundaries [Burma or Tibet]‖ of Communist China.98 Hsiao 
even speculated that General James Van Fleet‘s forthcoming trip to the Far East as a presidential 
emissary might be a fig leaf to disguise his eventual ―appointment as commander-in-chief of the 
Allied Forces in Indochina.‖99     
 
Taipei assiduously prepared for a potential ROC involvement in an Indochina war. General Peng 
Meng-chi submitted war plans in May 1954. Peng explicitly called for an invasion of the Lei Zhou 
peninsula and Hainan Island, pending the expansion of war in Indochina. One of its aims was to 
cut off ―Zhu-Mao‘s connections with the Vietnamese Communists.‖ The plan stated that the 
ROC‘s counter-offensive ―must obtain aid from the US navy and its coastal landing abilities‖ and 
that with US aid, the first stage of the counter-attack ―would not be difficult.‖ In this ambitious 
invasion which would involve four army groups (about twelve divisions), it postulated that the US 
would have 700 LSTs available for the ROC. In terms of airpower, it assumed that the ―US naval 
airforce would provide the necessary cover for the ground troops.‖ The plan also presupposed that 
there would a large-scale military units‘ defection from the communist ranks once the ROC 




However, Peng‘s plans had two glaring shortcomings. If the US invaded Vietnam, ROC Southern 
China operations would be a sideshow or at best a feint. As the Vietnam operation would 
monopolize all resources, it was unlikely that the US would divert a large amount of LSTs to the 
ROC. Moreover, in a bid to dovetail with US needs, Peng exaggerated how the Lei Zhou-Hainan 
operation would sever China-Vietnam communication. Yet, the oldest major railway line that 
                                                 
98 Hsiao Po to CKS, telegram, 26 April 1954, serial no.00208020035032, CKS papers, AH. In September 1954, CIA 
Director Allen Dulles sanguinely assured the NSC council that ―in the last year there had been no such raids because 
experience had shown that they were not very profitable.‖213th Meeting of NSC, September 9, 1954, NSC Series, box 6, 
Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
99 Hsiao reported that the Americans were wary of British and French tendencies to ―privately compromise with the 
Communists in Geneva.‖ McNeil‘s conversation with Hsiao also demonstrated the contradictions in the US policy in 
Asia: ―The US cannot afford to retreat from the situation in Vietnam‖ so it continued to assist the French and Indochina 
troops in war material. Hsiao Po to CKS, telegram, 26 April 1954, serial no.00208020035032, CKS papers, AH. 
100 General Pang Mang-chi to CKS, ―复与作战计划‖ [Fu yu zuozhan jihua] (secret), 22 May 1954, serial 
no.002080102008011, CKS papers, AH. 
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stretched from Yunnan (China) into Vietnam was the Kunming-Hanoi line and the newer line, the 
Nanning-Hanoi line, began in Guangxi. None of the lines was thus remotely near the proposed 
ROC‘s Lei Zhou-Hainan operation and given that the common border of Guangxi and Yunnan 
with North Vietnam ran hundreds of miles, the ROC‘s proposed military objective was clearly 
unattainable.
101
   
 
This optimistic study did indicate an awareness of the potential problems. For example, it 
concluded that the ―urgency‖ in determining or ―improving‖ US aid and supplies remained a 
priority. Without US aid, there would be no counter-attack. Finally, after estimating the huge 
amount of equipment needed for the counter-attack, the study conceded that finding trained 
personnel for the US equipment ―remained a major obstacle.‖102 Indeed even in January 1955, 
Admiral Radford complained to Foreign Minister Yeh that the ROC still did not have sufficient 
trained personnel for the US military hardware.
103
   
 
A separate study by ROC Chief of Staff General Chou Chih-jou offered an alternative Plan B of 
counter-attacking Nanning (Guangxi). Chou‘s report stated even more explicitly that Taipei‘s role 
was to study how it could best ―coordinate‖ with American efforts in the two geopolitical Cold 
War flashpoints of Korea and Vietnam. The study envisioned its Nanning counter-attack as an arm 
of the US-led coalition against Communist Vietnam. One of its stipulated aims was to ―disrupt 
China-Vietnam communication.‖104 Plan B was a slightly more realistic scenario and had the 
potential of meeting US needs but it had major drawbacks for the ROC. Plan B presented immense 
difficulties for a simultaneous engagement of multiple targets [at least 5 important towns] over a 
wide area upon establishing three beachheads. The carefully harbored strength of the ROC forces 
                                                 
101 Ibid.. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Record of conversation, George Yeh K. C. and Admiral Radford, 18 January 1955, serial no. 002080106035005, 
CKS papers, AH. 
104 Chou‘s report was an attachment to General Pang‘s main report but its Lei Zhou-Hainan campaign was presented as a 
ROC counter-offensive into Guangdong. Chou Chih-jou to CKS, ―复与计划纲要 – 附件二‖ [Fu yu jihua gangyao – 
fujian er] (secret), 22 May 1954, serial no.002080102008011, CKS papers, AH. 
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would be squandered away. In other words, what was good for the US coalition would be injurious 
to the counter-offensive ambition of the ROC.
105
   
 
The general staff of the ROC were thus alert to potential Cold War hotspots in East Asia that they 
could capitalize. However, the ROC‘s strong sense of autonomy and preservation meant that none 
of the plans had any chance of being accepted by Washington. Despite the urgency of ―winning 
American aid,‖ Chou postulated a few conditions before the ROC should plunge into any 
coordinated US-ROC Indochina offensive. One, the ROC forces must be part of the SEATO forces, 
presumably to heighten the legitimacy of the military effort. Two, it would be good if the ―US 
request for our assistance first‖ as this would be a diplomatic victory for the ROC. Three, ―there 
would be a joint consultation and planning between ROC and US general staff modeled on the 
ROC military and MAAG Taiwan cooperation in the past three years.‖  The last condition signaled 
Chiang‘s main fear of the ROC forces becoming cannon fodder. Maintaining a tight grip on the 
military was the only way of guaranteeing Chiang‘s titular position as president of the ROC.106  
 
3.2 Chiang’s Meetings with James Van Fleet  
Besides attempting to exploit the international crisis in Indochina to further its fangong mission, 
the ROC also made use of personal diplomacy to try to win over US officials to its cause. A fine 
example was seen in Chiang‘s meetings with General James A. Van Fleet. 
 
With the fall of Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1954, the security of the rest of Free Asia was cast into 
sharp relief. To understand the security demands on US resources, Eisenhower sent General James 
A. Van Fleet (retired) on a fact-finding mission to Asia from 13 May to 4 July. Van Fleet‘s sterling 
record with allies in Greece and South Korea made him the best man for the job. Ostensibly, Van 
Fleet‘s mission was to promote democracy and independence as opposed to moribund colonialism. 
                                                 
105 In contrast, in Chou‘s Lei-Hainan campaign (Plan A), the geographical bottleneck of the Lei Zhou peninsula meant 
that the battlefield would be self-contained and offer fewer opportunities for a communist overland flanking movement. 
Chou Chih-jou to CKS, ―复与计划纲要 – 附件二‖ [Fu yu jihua gangyao – fujian er] (secret), 22 May 1954, serial 
no.002080102008011, CKS papers, AH. 
106 Chou Chih-jou to CKS, ―对《复与计划纲要》之研究意见 – 附件一‖ [Dui ―Fu yu jihua gangyao‖ zhi yanjiu yijian 
– fujian yi] (secret), 22 May 1954, serial no.002080102008011, CKS papers, AH. 
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He was also to ascertain the ―strength of the anti-communist forces‖ in Asia. More specifically, 
Van Fleet would report on the amount of aid and troops to be stationed in South Korea and Taiwan, 
and investigate and recommend ways to train the indigenous Vietnamese forces with US aid.
107
 
However, ROC Ambassador Wellington Koo rightly reported Van Fleet‘s real mission was ―how 
to cut down on the yearly military expenditure and to increase the role of indigenous people in 
their own defense.‖108 But Chiang was not disconcerted; instead, he approached Van Fleet‘s 
mission carefully, deploying his knowledge of Van Fleet‘s record to change the emissary‘s mind. 
  
Chiang‘s experiences with the US formed a firm schema in his approach to American 
representatives. Having learnt from his corrosive encounters with General Joseph Stilwell, Chiang 
used flattery and demonstrated finesse in his first meeting with General Van Fleet and Assistant 
Secretary of Defense McNeil.
109
 Chiang complimented Van Fleet for his cultural sensitivity in 
dealing with foreign nations: ―If ten years ago, when you went to Greece, you could have come to 
the Far East and helped us fight against Communists, China might long have been saved from the 
Communist scourge.‖110 Chiang then stressed the importance of the offshore Islands-Formosa 
complex within the larger rubric of the Cold War. All the US had to do was to ―settle on an overall 
plan‖ which would involve ―the three battle lines of Korea, Formosa and Indochina.‖ Chiang then 
adroitly welcomed Van Fleet to visit the offshore islands which ―are very important to the defense 
of Formosa.‖ Van Fleet was further told that the ―islands are spring-boards‖ for the recovery of 
Mainland China.
111
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Conversation between President Chiang Kai-shek and General James A. Van Fleet, 13 May 1954, serial no. 
002080106034006, CKS papers, AH. 
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In the second meeting, Chiang expressed that US methods of countering anti-communism were 
penurious. Dulles‘ United Action was a signature example of US stop-gap measures which limped 
from crisis to crisis. Washington should cease courting the neutralists. How would friends of the 
US not feel ―skeptical‖ when uncooperative neutralist India continued to receive US aid, but the 
faithful like Chiang ―can scarcely obtain a quarter of a million dollars to build an airstrip or wharf 
on one of the off-shore islands‖?112 In the third meeting, Chiang situated his counter-attack in 
coordination with US forces attacking Indochina. Chiang was prepared to have an amphibious 
landing on the Leizhou Peninsula ―to undertake this mission on our own…to help to relieve the 
situation in Vietnam… All we need is some support in the way of transportation and supplies.‖113 
Chiang effected total agreement with Van Fleet in the fourth meeting and even declared, ―I shall 
be glad to place our troops under your command.‖114 
 
In the fifth meeting, Chiang pointed out US contradictions in Southeast Asia. Washington aided 
Western colonial powers in Southeast Asia in the fight against communism. But at the same time, 
mused Chiang, ―the US wants Britain and France to give up entirely their colonial interests in that 
area.‖ This could scarcely succeed.115 But the rest of Free East Asia was a sterling alternative to 
the quagmire in Southeast Asia. Chiang was the perennial salesman of his China-first strategy: 
―The completion of military plans in East Asia will … create strength not only against the 
Communists in that region but also reduce the threat of Communism in Southeast Asia.‖116 
 
The generalissimo was also anxious to obtain a mutual security treaty and expressed this through 
cultural allusions. In the fifth meeting, Chiang emphasized that he would not ―involve the US in a 
                                                 
112 Chiang viewed ―neutralism [as] nothing but the vanguard of Communism.‖ Record of Second Conversation between 
President Chiang Kai-shek and General James A. Van Fleet, 13 May 1954, serial no. 002080106034007, CKS papers, 
AH. 
113 Record of Third Conversation between President Chiang Kai-shek and General James A. Van Fleet, 16 May 1954, 
serial no. 002-080106-034-008, CKS papers, AH. 
114 Record of Fourth Conversation between President Chiang Kai-shek and General James A. Van Fleet, 24 May 1954, 
serial no. 002-080106-034-009, CKS papers, AH. 
115 Nixon would agree with Chiang‘s analysis as Nixon believed that while colonial polices were bad, to have a French 
colonial pullout in Vietnam would be disastrous. Historian Stephen E. Ambrose also noted how ―America‘s leaders 
simply ignored the logical fallacy inherent in their position [toward Vietnam].‖ See Nixon, Memoirs, 125; Stephen E. 
Ambrose, Nixon, Vol.1, 322; Record of Fifth Conversation between President Chiang Kai-shek and General James A. 
Van Fleet, 28 May 1954, serial no. 002080106034010, CKS papers, AH. 
116 Record of Fifth Conversation between President Chiang Kai-shek and General James A. Van Fleet, 28 May 1954, 
serial no. 002080106034010, CKS papers, AH. 
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war against the mainland‖ and made his promise in a specific cultural context, the integrity of his 
word. Chiang repeated: ―I would be betraying your friendship if I tried to induce you to send 
ground forces to help us recover the mainland.‖117 Unfortunately for Chiang, the cultural import of 
his words was lost in translation. Other instances of cultural divergence abounded. Chiang 
illustrated the steadfastness and righteousness of his cause with a Chinese aphorism: ―I would 
rather be a broken piece of jade than be preserved as one piece of tile.‖ Van Fleet did not respond 
to Chiang‘s allusions but it was not hard to imagine the degree of cultural dissonance involved. For 
officers trained in the Western tradition of Clausewitz‘s military thought where war is an 
instrument of policy, hunkering down to fight for another day is perfectly acceptable; being a ―tile‖ 
might not sound too bad. In fact, Chiang could come across as being fatalistically stubborn, 
oblivious to the advantages of a strategic compromise. Hence, Chiang‘s schemes might be cast as 




In the same meeting, Chiang highlighted three historical themes to Van Fleet. One, the KMT and 
the army were riddled with spies and fifth columnists. Two, China was overwhelmed by 
Communist propaganda. ―Today the Chinese people have awakened to the danger of Communist 
deception,‖ Chiang claimed, ―they have now placed all their confidence in my leadership to carry 
out the mission of liberating the people of the mainland from their present misery.‖ The third 





Van Fleet and McNeil responded with ambiguous statements. Van Fleet ended up with 
unwarranted encouragement, saying: ―However, my personal view is that your plan is excellent 
                                                 
117 In addition, Chiang saw the treaty as an endorsement both for the ROC‘s preparation for ―an invasion against the 
mainland‖ and for ―bolstering the confidence of the people of the mainland.‖ Record of Fifth Conversation between 
President Chiang Kai-shek and General James A. Van Fleet, 28 May 1954, serial no. 002080106034010, CKS papers, 
AH. 
118 This fifth meeting was especially contentious as it took two Chinese and five English drafts to iron out the transcripts. 
When Chiang turned down the Japanese offer of a limited sovereignty on the eve of the Pacific War, he said: ―I would 
rather be a broken piece of jade than be preserved as one piece of tile.‖ He meant by this anecdote and Chinese idiom to 
cast himself in favorable light where his steadfastness shone in the face of the enticing but craven offers from the 
Japanese. Record of Fifth Conversation between President Chiang Kai-shek and General James A. Van Fleet, 28 May 
1954, serial no. 002080106034010, CKS papers, AH. 
119 Record of Fifth Conversation between President Chiang Kai-shek and General James A. Van Fleet, 28 May 1954, 
serial no. 002080106034010, CKS papers, AH. 
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from the strategic point of view, although further study will have to be made of the tactics of the 
battle.‖120 As did McNeil: ―Mr President, assuming that the Chinese Army can maintain a footing 
on the mainland for a period of from three to six months, as you have just said, apart from the 
political support, what other kinds of aid would you want from the US?‖ Such an inquiry possibly 
gave Taipei the false impression that the US was seriously contemplating its requests. McNeil‘s 
subsequent comment even sounded like a home-run to Chiang: ―If [Chiang] will give us more 
comprehensive statistics concerning the requirements in air and naval support, it would greatly 
facilitate our present work of investigation.‖121 
    
Eisenhower chose the wrong man for his mission. The President was too sanguine to assume that 
Van Fleet would lay down Washington‘s line. To be fair, Van Fleet did state that ―[t]he US 
certainly does not expect the alliance to deal with Communist threats from outside or to 
exterminate the Chinese Communists.‖ But Van Fleet did not empathize with US budgetary 
constraints, nor was he convinced by America‘s strategic concerns.122 Instead, Van Fleet agreed 
with Chiang about the offshore islands‘ importance. This was unfortunate because Washington 
was adamant in reducing the garrison at the offshore islands.
123
 This episode illustrated the 
deftness of Chiang in turning US emissaries around to Taipei‘s interests.  Finally, Van Fleet was 
completely sold on the ―Kai‖ plan, Chiang‘s version of outfitting the ROC army. Van Fleet 
―thought there should be a third field army consisting of ten under-strength reserve divisions, 
which should be kept in good training.‖124 His recommendations went against Washington‘s 
                                                 
120 Record of Third Conversation between President Chiang Kai-shek and General James A. Van Fleet, 16 May 1954, 
serial no. 002-080106-034-008, CKS papers, AH. 
121 Record of Fifth Conversation between President Chiang Kai-shek and General James A. Van Fleet, 28 May 1954, 
serial no. 002080106034010, CKS papers, AH. 
122 Van Fleet fundamentally disagreed with the ongoing reduction of US troops stationed overseas and the reorganization 
of the US army. Record of Seventh Conversation between President Chiang Kai-shek and General James A. Van Fleet, 1 
July 1954, serial no. 002-080106-034-012, CKS papers, AH.       
123 Record of Fourth Conversation between President Chiang Kai-shek and General James A. Van Fleet, 24 May 1954, 
serial no. 002-080106-034-009, CKS papers, AH. 
124 Record of Tenth Conversation between President Chiang Kai-shek and General James A. Van Fleet, 3 July 1954, 
serial no. 002-080106-034-015, CKS papers, AH. 
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austerity plan. Eisenhower complained that Van Fleet was ―a good field commander but not a 
planner.‖125 
 
It was thus clear that visiting US officials were drilled with Chiang‘s mantra that the US ―was 
wasting its time and money in Indochina.‖ Chiang also told Defense Secretary Wilson that 
Indochina was a sideshow. Chiang further complained that the US had mutual defense treaties with 
the Philippines, the ROK and Japan, but not with the ROC. When Chiang boasted that his counter-
attack ―could be successfully carried out without the need for any American ground forces,‖ 
Wilson openly expressed skepticism. Hence, despite Chiang‘s offer to aid US against the PRC‘s 
aggression, the US kept Chiang at arm‘s length.126  
 
Conclusion 
US policies toward China during the Geneva Conference could be seen as a continuation of its 
earlier policies, highlighting again the entwining of the Taiwan Strait issue with events in 
Southeast Asia. The US was not prepared for war with China. Maintaining Chiang‘s Taiwan 
remained one of the main goals of US policy toward Asia, together with keeping Japan firmly in 
the US security umbrella, and preventing communism from spreading in Southeast Asia. US non-
recognition of China and economic embargo and covert operations against China persisted. The 
pursuit of ―United Action,‖ a US strategy to counter PRC‘s involvements in Indochina that would 
lead to the formation of SEATO in September1954, continued. In Geneva, the US initially faced 
difficulties in gaining support from its allies for the ―United Action‖ and there were differences in 
opinions between Eisenhower and his cabinet members regarding US policies toward China. The 
US-Britain-France disarrayed alliance, however, did reach a compromise eventually to form a 
―United Front.‖ Nonetheless, it was clear that in Geneva, US difficulties in rallying allies to its 
cause and the negativity of its association with neo-colonialism hampered its efforts in developing 
a regional countermeasure against China. US actions in Geneva contributed to the making of the 
                                                 
125 PDDE, 1161; ―Report of Ambassador James A. Van Fleet (Formosa), 25 August 1954, White House Office, Office of 
the Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Aff: Records 1952-1961, Special Asst Series, Presidential Subseries, Box 2, President‘s 
Papers 1954 (10), DDEL. 
126 201th Meeting of NSC,  10 June 1954,  NSC Series, box 5, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
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Taiwan Strait Crises because US dissatisfaction with the outcome of the Geneva Conference 
would subsequently lead it to undertake actions perceived by China to be threatening to China‘s 
security and led to China‘s triggering of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis.  
 
Like the US policies in Geneva, China‘s actions during the Geneva Conference could be seen as a 
continuation of its earlier policies. In the aftermath of the Korean War armistice agreements, 
Beijing was anxious to emerge from diplomatic isolation and re-assessed its policies toward 
Taiwan, the US and Southeast Asia. In this re-assessment, China placed the Taiwan Strait issue on 
the backseat for the moment, expressed its concerns regarding the US and ―United Action,‖ sought 
to win over Asian neutralist countries, and advocated a ―talking while fighting‖ posture with 
respect to Vietnam. Such features represented China‘s responses and initiatives in dealing with the 
US actions and they were pursued in Geneva. China‘s aim to break out of international isolation 
led it to take up a position of ―reasonableness‖ that disarmed many potential antagonists and 
improved China‘s diplomatic standing. China‘s efforts to win over Asian countries through a 
combination of cultural blitzkrieg and realpolitik also reaped dividends. While China seemed 
momentarily successful in countering the specter of ―united action,‖ later developments would 
derail China‘s expectations. Nevertheless, what China learnt in Geneva China would apply again 
throughout the duration of the Taiwan Strait Crises. 
 
Taiwan was the most directly affected party right from the start of the Taiwan Strait Crises. From 
1950 to April 1954, the Taiwan Strait issue played a significant role in the formulation and 
implementation of policies to uphold Taiwan‘s political survival and cultural revival. Its 
importance was further seen in the construction of the clarion call to wage fangong dalu, which led 
to a militarization of Taiwan‘s society and constituted a major component of its foreign policy. 
From April to July 1954, fangong dalu continued to be the central motif that guided Taiwan‘s 
foreign relations. Although Taiwan was not a participant in Geneva, it exploited the international 
crisis in Indochina to further its fangong mission. Taiwan also made various attempts to win over 
US officials to its cause, a good example being Chiang‘s meetings with General James A. Van 
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Fleet. Taiwan‘s search for security succeeded because it learnt to situate itself firmly in US Cold 
War strategic interests. Through Taiwan‘s unceasing efforts, Washington also began to grasp the 
symbiotic ties between Chiang‘s fangong mission with the raison d‘être of the KMT government. 
Nonetheless, despite Chiang‘s repeated offers to aid the US to counter the PRC, the US kept 
Chiang at arm‘s length. These aspects constituted important parts of the making of the Taiwan 
Strait Crises and would continue to feature prominently in the subsequent unfolding of the Taiwan 
Strait Crises. 
 
On the whole, during the Geneva Conference, China was relatively more successful than the US in 
the pursuit of national goals. This, however, would lead the US to subsequently undertake actions 
perceived by China to be threatening to China‘s security and resulted in China‘s triggering of the 
First Taiwan Strait Crisis. Yet, at the same time, the Geneva Conference could be seen to have 
ushered in the first full-fledged opportunity, after the Korean War armistice, for the belligerents 
and allies, including China and the US, to take stock of each other and work out a tentative modus 
operandi. A good example was seen in the initiative taken by the US representative in Geneva 
Bedell Smith, without reprimands from Eisenhower, to establish fleeting personal links with Zhou. 
Eisenhower himself was intuitively working to shift his colleagues towards the eventual loosening 
of trade sanctions against the PRC. All parties demonstrated room for readjustment and change of 
policies, however limited in manner. In this sense, the Geneva Conference can be seen to have laid 
a foundation for Sino-US tacit communication, a framework that would further evolve during the 
Taiwan Strait Crises, a tortuous path towards a mutual understanding conditioned by realism and 
littered with misperceptions. How the First Taiwan Strait Crisis broke out and how it added 










Chapter 4: The Outbreak of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis 
 
The Geneva Accords, signed on 21 July 1954, marked the end of the Geneva Conference. On 3 
September 1954, China launched a massive artillery bombardment on Quemoy and Matsu islands, 
triggering the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. This attack prompted the US to sign the Mutual Defence 
Treaty with Taiwan on 2 December 1954. What developments in July and August led to the 
eruption of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis? How did China, the US and Taiwan act following the 
outbreak of this crisis? These are the two main questions addressed in this chapter. 
 
Existing scholarship concentrated on the major events in Sino-US relations and viewed 
misconceptions as the primary factor in igniting the hostilities. However, the process of 
reconciliation of misconceptions to produce a more nuanced appreciation of each other‘s motives 
and intentions were not adequately highlighted. Little consideration was also given to Beijing‘s 
courting of neutralist elements in Asia in the immediate aftermath of the crisis.
1
 In addition, 
monographs which focused on ROC-US relations did not refer to materials in Taipei. How Taiwan 





This chapter forms the first part of a reevaluation of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, spanning from 
the end of the Geneva conference to the end of 1954. Based on new primary sources, it will first 
highlight how Chiang Kai-shek adroitly used the crisis to secure a treaty and more aid from the US 
by situating Taiwan firmly in US strategic concerns. Indeed the calculated aggressiveness of 
Taiwan‘s fangong plans made the ROC-US Mutual Defence Treaty looked like a bargain from 
Washington‘s perspective. Second, it will demonstrate that Washington was caught in a dilemma 
                                                 
1 The standard works are Thomas E. Stolper, China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands (NY: ME Sharpe, 1985), 34-94; 
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for three reasons: it knew of Beijing‘s limited intentions; Beijing firmly secured the majority of 
Asia‘s opinion; and Washington had the problem of preserving its prestige while quelling 
precipitating factors which might worsen its international position. Third, it will examine Beijing‘s 
wide-ranging propaganda offensive to placate neighboring countries. By deftly scripting the 
Taiwan problem into an issue tapping strongly on the discourses of nationalism and sovereignty in 
the wake of decolonization in Asia, Beijing made it extremely difficult for Washington to marshal 
world opinion and brand Beijing as the aggressor.      
 
This chapter will explore the above themes in two main sections. The first section will analyze the 
pre-crisis rumblings, highlighting developments in July and August in relation to the positions 
taken by the US, Taiwan and China. The second section will investigate the contours of the 
negotiations for the ROC-US Mutual Defence Treaty and the Asia-wide publicity offensive 
launched by Beijing in the aftermath of the September bombardments.    
 
1. Pre-Crisis Rumblings  
What developments in July and August led to the eruption of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis? This 
section will first examine the actions of the US, followed by those of Taiwan and China. 
 
1.1 The US 
The US was dissatisfied with the Geneva Accords and decided to disregard it. Yet, although 
Washington viewed the additional prominence that the PRC gained in Geneva with dread, it noted 
that China‘s gains in Geneva were limited and the probability of a Communist armed attack low. 
US budgetary constraints, the limitations of US nuclear deterrence and Eisenhower‘s firmness 
against casual belligerency further meant that the US was not about to provoke a war with China. 
Although ―united action‖ culminated in the formation of SEATO and this would unsettle China, 
Dulles was aware of the limitations of US sponsorship. 
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 a. Disregarding Geneva 
The Geneva Accords was a temporary hiatus in the Indochina conflict. It did not resolve the 
Korean question; neither was the Indochina imbroglio settled satisfactorily. Ceasefire was 
established and Vietnam was divided at the 17
th
 parallel. Cambodia and Laos were neutralized. 
The Viet Minh were supposed to withdraw from the south and the French troops the north. 




Washington chafed at the restraints of the Geneva Accords. Chairman of JCS Admiral Radford 
complained that US military materiel and the Military and Assistance Group [MAAG] could not 
be sent to Laos and Cambodia. But Dulles agreed with the Commander of the French Forces in 
Indochina General Paul Ely, who suggested that ―it would be necessary to ‗get around‘ the 
armistice prohibitions.‖ The US would fudge the issue of MAAG being stationed in Vietnam.4 By 
August, disregarding the armistice prohibitions became the official US position. This was reflected 
in the policy review of NSC 5429, ―US Policy in the Far East.‖ Deflecting US Defense Secretary 
Wilson‘s charge that the US was undermining the Geneva agreements, Dulles ―pointed out that we 
did not become a party to these agreements.‖ Eisenhower largely agreed with Dulles.5 
 
Washington viewed the additional prominence that the PRC gained in Geneva with dread. Despite 
mounting international pressure for the PRC‘s entry into the UN, the US was determined to 
maintain its position of non-recognition of China.
6
 However, Dulles did note that ―the communists 
had settled for less than they could have obtained at Geneva.‖ To Dulles, this meant the 
communists respected US firmness in the region and he concluded that ―it was unlikely that the 
                                                 
3 R.B. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War: Revolution vs Containment, vol. 1 (London: Macmillan 
Press, 1983), 22-23. 
4 207th Meeting of NSC, July 22, 1954,  NSC Series, box 5, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
5 210th Meeting of NSC, 12 August 1954,  NSC Series, box 5, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
6 Former Special Assistant to the President C. D. Jackson argued in a 3 August letter to Dulles that Geneva was a 
―harrowing process of withdrawal from the Delta and the raw sight of Free World defeat.‖ The US must act to shore up 
Free Asia‘s confidence. See, C.D. Jackson to Dulles,  3 August 1954, General Correspondence & Memoranda Series, 
box 2, Strictly confidential - I- k (1), JFD papers; Dulles to C.D. Jackson,  24 August 1954, General Correspondence & 
Memoranda Series, box 2, Strictly confidential - I- k (1), JFD papers; 210th Meeting of NSC, 12 August 1954,  NSC 
Series, box 5, Ann Whitman File, DDEL; Burton I. Kaufman, Trade and Aid: Eisenhower‟s Foreign Economic Policy, 
1953-1961 (Baltmore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982), 49-52. 
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Communists would make a major military move anywhere in the world.‖ Dulles summarized the 
possible scenarios for Asia: 
In the Far East they would make efforts to undermine Thailand and Japan, and 
would make Formosa a major diplomatic issue, diversionary attacks on the 
offshore islands near Formosa were possible.  The Communist would probably not 
violate the armistice in Indochina, but would use subversive means to gain control. 
The Communists apparently regard Korea as a stable stalemate. They would 
emphasize Asia for the Asiatics and seek to increase neutralism to prevent the 
establishment of additional US bases. Throughout the world, the Communist 




This led to the assumption that communist ―creeping expansion‖ manifested in such forms as 
―local aggressions‖ or ―brush fires‖ were ―more likely than Communist armed attack,‖ a position 
reflected in NSC 162/2, ―Basic National Security Policy.‖ To counter the communist soft appeal, 
the US came up with a three-prong approach. Economically, the US would furnish ―cooperative 
programs for economic growth.‖ For affected countries, the US would provide ―political support, 
covert operations, and military assistance.‖ In low-level insurgencies, the US would turn to 
―indigenous forces, provided with US military assistance, economic defense support, and logistic 
support, and aided by mobile US forces.‖ Despite the allies‘ reluctance in ―united action‖ during 
Geneva, the NSC still resolved to ―act unilaterally, if it is to our net advantage.‖8   
 
US budgetary considerations permeated the review of NSC 162/2. The US must not become ―an 
armed camp.‖ It supported SEATO based on ―the assumption that there would be no build-up of 
US military power in Southeast Asia sufficient to stop an aggressor.‖ The dependence of 
indigenous forces assumed that ―if people don‘t want to be free and won‘t fight for freedom 
…there is not much we can do.‖ However, should affected Asians show pluck and determination 
in countering communism, ―we can send the Marines and the Air Force.‖ Eisenhower believed that 
―if we get many more divisions tied down the way we have some tied down in Korea now, we will 
have to go to general mobilization.‖  
 
                                                 
7 209th Meeting of NSC, 5 August 1954,  NSC Series, box 5, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
8 209th Meeting of NSC, 5 August 1954,  NSC Series, box 5, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
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NSC 162/2 also highlighted the limitations of US nuclear deterrence. Dulles observed that such a 
policy was inadequate for ―brush fires.‖ Eisenhower admitted that ―the theory of retaliation falls 
down unless we can identify the aggressor.‖ In many cases aggression consisted of subversion or 
civil war in a country rather than an overt attack on that country. But should such countries as 
Indonesia which Washington considered to be under Beijing‘s influence turn Red, the US would 
support ―non-Communist elements in a counter-revolution and impos[e] a naval blockade.‖9 
 
Finally, Eisenhower remained firmly against casual belligerency. In NSC 5429, ―US Policy in the 
Far East,‖ Eisenhower repeated his conviction that a ―democracy such as the US could not be led 
into war unless public opinion overwhelming[ly] favored war.‖ Even when there was ―overt armed 
aggression by Communist China,‖ Eisenhower firmly stipulated that ―decisions as to US action 
could not be reached instantaneously. There would be time to call a special session of Congress 
and to ask it to make the decision.‖ Eisenhower cast disdain at planning staff‘s ―automatic counter- 
action‖ or formulating ―interpretations of vital interests.‖10  
b. The Limitations of SEATO 
Besides the US disregard of Geneva, Dulles decided to counter the ―catastrophic‖ outcome of 
Geneva by pursuing ―united action‖ and developing it into a regional defense organization, 
SEATO, which took shape by 8 September as manifested in the Manila Treaty.
 11
 Dulles was blunt 
about the utility of SEATO: ―In the Far East, we are moving ahead trying to build a dike in SEA.‖ 
Dulles boasted that there was no reason why this should not work as the US ―had some very 
spectacular successes in Iran, Egypt and Guatemala.‖ Although the Geneva Agreement had been 
concluded, Dulles reassured Senator Alexander Smith that ―Indochina could have been worse if we 
had not contributed strength to the situation.‖12  
 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 210th Meeting of NSC, 12 August 1954,  NSC Series, box 5, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
11 Barbara Barnouin & Yu Changgen, Zhou Enlai: A Political Life (HK: The Chinese University Press, 2006), 155. 
12 Telephone call From Senator Smith, 7 August 1954, Telephone Conversation Series, box 2, telephone memos July-
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Although the formation of SEATO would unsettle China, Dulles was aware of the limitations of 
US sponsorship. He pointed out that SEATO was not a ―treaty commitment for local defence.‖ 
While the US wished to include internal subversions within the provisions of SEATO, Dulles 
acknowledged that the final product ―would probably provide for no action stronger than 
consultation among signatories.‖ Agreeing, Stassen highlighted that the treaty was more about 
preparing the ―local government to defeat Communist subversion.‖ As for US intervention, it 
would be a decision ―taken at the time rather than in advance.‖ Still Dulles insisted that despite the 
limitations of the treaty, the US had to have ―military forces in combat readiness and be willing to 
send them to the scene of the subversion.‖ SEATO also had the advantages of indicating clearly to 
the communists not to breach the line, with ―public warnings‖ on US counter-action.  
 
Eisenhower was of two minds about SEATO. On one hand, Eisenhower was uncomfortable about 
the provision of US armed forces to defeat local subversions; he saw the inevitability of turning the 
US into an armed camp. On the other hand, Eisenhower indicated he still wanted a treaty as ―we 
can‘t go on losing areas of the free world forever.‖ Using the zero-sum game metaphor in which a 
Soviet gain represented a US loss, Eisenhower responded instinctively as a Cold War warrior, 
despite some concerns.
13
    
 
Allied vocal reservations soured Dulles‘ taste for SEATO. Dulles mentioned to US Ambassador to 
Canada Livingston T. Merchant how the US allies had thwarted US designs. One, the allies ―are 
more concerned with trying not to annoy the Communists.‖ Two, Dulles was disgusted with the 
British and the French who were ―blocking everything we want to do.‖ Merchant was sympathetic 
but rightly pointed out that the British ―are anxious to avoid anything that can be publicly 
exploited as contrary to the Geneva Agreement.‖14 SEATO was pared down to the bare minimum 
to appease the British. Ironically, Washington had trouble convincing others who expected more. 
                                                 
13 210th Meeting of NSC, 12 August 1954,  NSC Series, box 5, Ann Whitman File, DDEL 
14 Dulles continued harping about how US had to ―tie oneself up with people who are not willing to fight.‖ He even 
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Australian Ambassador Sir Percy Spender complained that Canberra was expecting specific 
detailing of ―obligation of each in terms of concerted planning and joint contributions.‖15  
 
Returning from the Manila Conference (6-8 Sept 1954), Dulles claimed that the US had 
successfully veered away from another NATO with its ―elaborate military organization.‖ Dulles 
referred to the ―Monroe Doctrine‖ as the basis of SEATO, deeming its moral sanction as sufficient 
to make up for the deficiencies. Dulles admitted that ―there is no commitment as to action‖ against 
indirect aggression as ―he did not feel he could press this further than that.‖16 Hence, SEATO was 
so diluted by the US allies that it did not possess any bite. 
 
1.2 Taiwan: Security Arrangements 
Taiwan was upbeat regarding US actions in Asia. Although Taiwan faced the threat of increasing 
international isolation, it was assured by the US adamant position in not recognizing China. While 
Taiwan was concerned that its interests might be neglected in SEATO talks, it was assured by the 
increasing willingness of the US to consider a mutual defense treaty.  
 
The US push for the international recognition of the ROC encountered ―growing difficulty and … 
an accretion of resentment against the United State,‖ with the US finding its position increasingly 
isolated in international bodies. ―There appears to be a slow ground swell of opinion against 
acceptance of the Chinese Government as the Government of all China,‖ reported the OCB, ―on 
the grounds that it is unrealistic and not in accordance with the facts of the situation.‖17 
Nonetheless, the OCB urged the administration to press the British and French not to admit the 
PRC into the UN. Otherwise, there would a diplomatic tsunami of US allies rushing to recognize 
                                                 
15 Telephone call from Sir Percy Spender, 31 August 1954, Telephone Conversation Series, box 2, telephone memos 
July-aug 1954 (1)-(4), JFD papers, DDEL. 
16 Lacking any real gain to show, Dulles characteristically tried to read some long-term meaning into the formation of 
SEATO. See 214th Meeting of NSC, September 12, 1954 NSC Series, box 6, Ann Whitman 
17 During the International Labour Organization (ILO) meeting, the US had to make extraordinary appeals to member 
countries not to throw the ROC out. Progress report on NSC 146/2, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action 
with Respect to Formosa and the Chinese National Government," 14 Jul 1954, OCB, White House, DDRS. 
 113 
 
the PRC and US delaying tactics in the UN through the ―moratorium‖ on the PRC admission into 




Taiwan was keen to elicit more support from the US actions. Chiang flew his son, Ching-kuo, to 
Washington for a visit and he was presented as the new face of the ROC. Chiang also 
demonstrated deep appreciation for such individuals as Robertson, who was responsible for US 
affairs in Taiwan. This was seen in Mme. Chiang‘s invitation to Robertson and his wife to visit the 
ROC.
19
 At the same time, George Yeh happily observed in July 1954 that Washington was 
―stepping up its anti-communist efforts in Asia and Europe.‖ He asserted that ―[o]ur official 
position in the face of US defeat in Southeast Asia was not to point fingers and blame, but to 
concentrate our diplomatic efforts upon the US on our two requests‖: obtaining a mutual defense 




In May 1954, Washington lauded the ROC as an ―efficient fighting force‖ for ―limited combat 
operations‖ and deemed that the ROC Combined Service Force depots had the sufficient amount 
for the projected 350,000-strong ROC army. The US viewed offensive operations as being 
restricted to ―limited raids where resupply is not a major factor.‖ Exercising control over war 
materiel would give the US the ultimate veto over Chiang‘s fangong.21 As Washington‘s strategic 
aim was the ―furtherance of over-all US military strategy in the Far East,‖ the ROC ―will not 
engage in offensive operations considered by the United States to be inimical to the best interest of 
the United States.‖ The ROC‘s role was to absorb the PRC‘s attention while adding to the Far East 
                                                 
18 Progress report on NSC 146/2, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the 
Chinese National Government," 14 Jul 1954, OCB, White House, DDRS. 
19 Later Chiang expressed alarm that Robertson was not involved in the Manila talks on the formation of SEATO. As the 
ROC was not a party to SEATO, Chiang was concerned that Robertson might be left out in the formulation of SEATO, 
with the possibility that the ROC would then be permanently sidelined. CKS to Wellington Koo, telegram, 29 August 
1954, serial no.002080200350078, CKS papers, AH; Yü Ta-wei to CKS, telegrams, 6 & 13 June 1953, serial 
no.002080106043008, CKS papers, AH. 
20 George Yeh to CKS, ―越南停战后中国外交及涉外事项所应考虑态度及办理事务‖     [Yuenan tingzhan hou 
zhongguo waijiao ji shewai shixiang suoying kaolü taidu ji banli shiwu], 27 July 1954, serial no.002080106003009, CKS 
papers, AH. 
21 The US ensured that the ROC navy was similarly tethered as it was only retrofitted as ―a small navy capable of 
conducting limited coastal patrol, anti-shipping, and commando operations.‖ Likewise, the ROC air force was only 
―designed to provide limited air defense, troop support and interdiction capabilities.‖ Progress report on NSC 146/2, 
"United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the Chinese National Government," May 
6, 1954, Draft, OCB, White House, DDRS. 
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Free World‘s ―strategic reserves.‖ At the national level, Taiwan would simply present a 
―significant deterrent to any Chinese Communist intention to invade Taiwan.‖ This narrow 
perception would restrict the ROC army to defending Taiwan, Pescadores and the offshore islands 
and when the circumstances were right ―to raid Chinese Communist territory and commerce.‖ 
 
As for Chiang‘s fangong, Washington reaffirmed the aim of ―avoiding implication of US 
obligation to underwrite the Government or to guarantee its return to power on the mainland.‖ 
Washington was aware of Taipei‘s disgruntlement. The OCB stated that the ―GRC [Taiwan] will 
become progressively more dissatisfied with the absence of US agreement to support‖ its national 
objectives. The shackles imposed by the US might also embolden the communists, especially in 
the midst of the Geneva Conference. As such, by early May 1954, the US was finally coming 
around to ―actively considering the negotiation of a bilateral security pact with the GRC.‖22 
 
Taipei was in a favorable position to gain from Washington‘s change of heart. In July 1954, the 
OCB despaired in finding a suitable counter-weight in Asia against the PRC. Only the forces of the 
ROC were available. The OCB suggested ―raising force levels‖ beyond 350,000 or ―enhancing the 
offensive potential of the GRC forces.‖ Its second suggestion was to ―consider extending direct US 
military defense to the offshore islands.‖ By July, a defence treaty with Taipei was deemed as 
strategically essential. The OCB report revealed that Washington‘s excuse of not wanting to ―tie 
the hands of the GRC‖ no longer rang true as a security treaty would ideally strike a balance 
between providing confidence to Taipei, while not encouraging any fangong adventure.
23
 Thus, 
ironically, the US saw the treaty as a way to further restrict the ROC.    
 
To secure more reassurances from Taipei, Washington had earlier feigned disinterest in any 
security treaty with Taiwan. First, Dulles explained to Ambassador Koo on 19 May that the mutual 
                                                 
22 Progress report on NSC 146/2, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the 
Chinese National Government," May 6, 1954, Draft, OCB, White House, DDRS. 
23 The OCB envisioned that the ―Free World capabilities in Southeast Asia may be severely curtailed while those of 
Communist China are expanding.‖ Added to the US woes was the ―slow progress‖ which Japan was building its military 
potential. Progress report on NSC 146/2, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and 
the Chinese National Government," 14 Jul 1954, OCB, White House, DDRS. 
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security with Korea was really ―to restrain Syngman Rhee from engaging in hostilities.‖ Second, 
Dulles claimed that ―the United States Government does not want to hamper the operations of the 
Chinese Government against the Chinese Communists.‖ Third, Dulles professed that should the 
US assist ROC raids into the PRC, it did not want to be ―hampered by formal treaty obligations or 
restrictions.‖24 Yet, Dulles unwittingly handed to Taipei the perfect solution. As Washington had 
used the security treaty to control the impulsive Rhee, it stood to reason that an inspired 
recklessness by Taipei would force the US to bind Taiwan with another defensive treaty. There 
thus existed a strong incentive for the ROC to tacitly allow the Taiwan Strait to be heated up to its 
advantage. The real action in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis was hence not the communist 
bombardment of the offshore islands, but how Chiang positioned the ROC into receiving a 
defensive treaty and more US aid. Either Chiang could show the Communists to be aggressors 
perennially poised to invade Taiwan or Chiang could do a Rhee with constant exhortations for 
―counter-offensive‖ in public campaigns and actual military planning and maneuvers. In 
retrospect, Chiang used both ways since 1950 (as discussed in the previous two chapters) to 
ensnare the Americans. Nevertheless, changing US perceptions of international developments and 
their relation to US national interests were equally significant. Moreover, while Dulles aspired 
towards trouble-free treaties with minimal heartburn,
25
 he could not ignore increasingly strident 
voices in Washington. For instance, Dulles reluctantly promised Walter Judd, a pro-ROC 




1.3 China  
Although Mao Zedong‘s pivotal change of China‘s international orientation towards ―peaceful co-
existence‖ and Zhou Enlai‘s whirlwind diplomacy clearly caught the US flatfooted at the Geneva 
                                                 
24 Excerpts from Minutes of Meeting, Wellington Koo with Foster Dulles, 19 May 1954, serial no.002080106034003, 
CKS papers, AH.           
25 Dulles‘s practical attitude towards international treaties and the way he presented them in the Congress was revealed 
in a letter to Arthur Krock, ―Dean of Washington newsmen,‖ in 1956. See Dulles to Arthur Krock, 21 May 1956, 
General Correspondence & Memoranda Series, box 1, Memos of Conversation - General - A through D (2), JFD papers, 
DDEL. 
26 Judd had forcefully contended that the US ―[sh]ould clarify our position‖ as ―[w]e are losing in Asia.‖ The reluctance 
of the White House was immediately apparent. Eisenhower came up with the tired ―Acheson-Bradley argument‖ that the 
ROC forces were unreliable. Dulles came up with the ―constitutional situation,‖ argument that the treaty with South 
Korea was covered by the UN Charter, but a treaty with the ROC would benefit from no such coverage. Telephone call 




Conference, Washington‘s disregard for the Geneva Accords dulled Beijing‘s diplomatic 
achievements. Beijing was unhappy with the continued insistence of the US on non-recognition for 
China but was encouraged by the support of Asian neutralist countries as well as China‘s relatively 
successful international debut in Geneva. However, China was frustrated with the formation of 
SEATO and the likelihood of a potential ROC-US defence treaty which it viewed to be targeting 
directly at China. Coupled with the continuation of ROC commando raids and the danger of ―two 
Chinas‖ looming ahead, the PRC launched massive bombardments on the islands of Quemoy and 
Matsu on 3 September, thereby setting off the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. However, Beijing‘s 
overriding international concerns diluted the ambitious plans of its military commanders.  
a. Non-Recognition and China‟s International Debut in Geneva  
The Chinese communists were unhappy with the continued insistence of the US on non-
recognition for China and glumly noted the tumult in Congress over the rumored admission of the 
PRC into the UN.
27
 Eisenhower placated the nation by firmly squashing the rumor on 7 July and 
wrote to Churchill the following day: ―… American opinion is so firmly fixed that in the absence 
of a series of deeds that would evidence a complete reversal of Red China's attitude, the 
introduction of this question for debate in the United Nations would create real difficulty in this 
country ….‖28 Stung by US criticisms, Churchill told the House of Commons on 12 July that ―the 
time was not ripe for the admission of Communist China to the UN.‖29  
 
Nevertheless, Beijing was gratified with its neutralist Asian friends. Nehru fully supported the 
admission of the PRC into the UN, asserting on 12 July: ―The international unrest for the past four 
years from the Korea conflict to the chaos in Southeast Asia boils down to not letting the PRC into 
the UN.‖ Burmese dailies termed the US actions a ―conspiracy.‖ The Mandalay People‟s Daily 
editorial speculated that the US was trying to ―salvage a modicum of victory from the failure of its 
position in the Geneva Conference.‖ The Yangon Daily scoffed at the threat of the American 
                                                 
27 ―东南亚国家对美国反对我国加入联合国的反应‖ [Dongnanya guojia dui meiguo fandui woguo jialu lianheguo de 
fanyin], MFA Intelligence division, no. 90, 24 July 1954, serial no. 102-00159-13, AMFA. 
28 Eisenhower to Churchill, 8 July 1954, PDDE (XV), 1171. 
29 Memo of Conversation, McConaughy with ROC ambassador Wellington  Koo, 16 July 1954, in FRUS (1952-54), Vol. 
XIV, pt. 1, 494. 
 117 
 
Congress to withdraw the US from the UN. Indonesian editorials were also of the general opinion 
that the PRC‘s presence in the UN would have a ―definite effect on world peace,‖ spelling the end 
of the troublesome ―international embargoes.‖30   
 
The PRC‘s grand international début at the Geneva Conference was a checkered success.31 Zhou‘s 
diplomacy had successfully ensured the passage of the Geneva Accords. That Hanoi was strong-
armed by its fraternal allies into accepting the 17
th
 parallel was downplayed.
32
 The only blight on 
the Accords was the non-participation of the US.
33
 Nevertheless, Zhou noted jubilantly: ―The 
agreements that we have achieved … will enable the people of the three states of Indo-China to 
engage in the construction of their respective countries in a peaceful environment.‖34 Zhou 
distilled the wisdom of his success in a five-point summary and specifically emphasized the value 
of compromises.
35
 Nevertheless, compromises could not alleviate China‘s frustrations with the 
formation of SEATO and the likelihood of a potential ROC-US defence treaty which it viewed to 
be targeting directly at China. 
b. SEATO and US-ROC Security Negotiations  
Washington‘s decision to counter China by pursuing ―united action‖ and developing it into 
SEATO unsettled China. The protocol of the Manila Treaty unilaterally included Cambodia and 
Laos under the treaty‘s ―protection‖ and from September onwards, the US also pumped in aid to 
                                                 
30 Even editorials from Sweden opined that US action was ―impractical,‖ seeing this as a Republican ploy for the 
upcoming election. Most Indian editorials felt that the US position was ―unreasonable.‖ Nevertheless, Chinese 
Communists reported that India‘s rhetorical support did not translate into action. An India foreign ministry spokesman 
affirmed on 8 July that while India was prepared to support admitting the PRC into the UN, India had no plan to submit 
such a proposal to the UN. ―东南亚国家对美国反对我国加入联合国的反应‖ [Dongnanya guojia dui meiguo fandui 
woguo jialu lianheguo de fanyin], MFA Intelligence division, no. 90, 24 July 1954, serial no. 102-00159-13, AMFA. 
31 While Zhou performed well under the glare of international attention and Dulles displayed the ―pinched distaste of a 
puritan in a house of ill repute,‖ the Korea phase of negotiations in Geneva was a galling experience for China as China 
handed the US a ready excuse for rejection when China insisted that the UN should not administer any future Korean 
election for reunification. Since none of the other countries relished subverting the prestige of the UN, the PRC scored 
no point for the first round. Henry W. Brands, Jr., ―The Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration, Syngman Rhee, and the 
‗Other‘ Geneva Conference of 1954,‖ Pacific Historical Review, Vol 56, no. 1 (Feb 1987), 80; Herring. From Colony to 
Superpower, 662. 
32 Yang Kuisong, ―Mao Zedong and the Indochina Wars,‖ in Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam and the 
World Beyond Asia, ed. Priscilla Roberts (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 62. 
33 Keith, Diplomacy of Zhou, 78-79. 
34 Quoted in Shao Kuo-kang, ―Zhou Enali‘s Diplomacy and the Neutralization of Indo-China, 1954-1955,‖ CQ, no. 107 
(Sep 1986), 499. 
35 Zhang Shu Guang, ―In the Shadow of Mao: Zhou Enlai and New China's Diplomacy,‖ in The Diplomats, 1939-1979, 





 The new US ambassador to South Vietnam, General J. Lawton Collins, 
stated in a news conference on 17 November that his mission was to ―ensure that the Diem 
government received aid in all possible areas from the US.‖37 Beijing projected a stoic outlook 
publicly, but privately, it was upset with this turn of events and saw it as an enormous loss of face. 
China‘s unhappiness with SEATO was abundantly seen in later reflections.38 On 30 July 1955, 
Zhou regretfully reported during the National People‘s Congress: 
The Military Assistance Agreement signed between the Royal Government of 
Cambodia and the United States Government on 16 May 1955 is incompatible 
with the neutrality of Cambodia under Geneva agreements. In Laos, there is the 
danger of similar developments. Moreover the SEATO, which is totally 
incompatible with the Geneva agreements, is attempting to interfere in the internal 
affairs of Laos by making use of the armed attacks by the Royal Government of 




Besides SEATO, Beijing anticipated that Washington‘s dissatisfaction with Geneva would prompt 
it to attempt other hostile policies towards the PRC. In particular, Beijing viewed the ominous US-
ROC negotiations over a security treaty as extremely provocative. The Central Committee of the 
CCP, in a 27 July telegram to Zhou‘s delegation in Moscow, warned that the expansion in the 
containment of China from Guangdong to the Gulf of Tonkin was a distinct possibility.
40
 In 
exasperation, Zhou complained to Soviet Politburo member G. M. Malenkov that ―this act [ROC-
US defence treaty] will provoke still stronger anti-American feelings in China and might hinder 
the settling of differences with China in the future.‖ Zhou outlined to Malenkov the PRC‘s 
counter-moves against the US and ROC: 
1. To again raise the question of the liberation of Taiwan and take steps to disrupt the 
conclusion of the pact between the US government and the Jiang Jieshi regime … 
                                                 
36 An unnamed US diplomat in Cambodia was quoted approving a Joe Alsop‘s column that the US ―intends to turn 
Cambodia into an American citadel. The US further plans to build a 300-mile highway along the Cambodian and Laotian 
borders to deliver war materials.‖ ―美法破坏印度支那停战协定的情况‖ [Meifa pohuai yinduzhina tinghuo xieding de 
qinkuang], 19 March-8 April 1955, serial no. 106-00058-04, AMFA; Frances FitzGerald, Fire in The Lake: The 
Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam (NY: Vintage Books, 1972), 85. 
37 On 12 February 1955, the US MAAG in Vietnam under General John W. O‘Brien took over the responsibility of 
―training and outfitting‖ the South Vietnamese army. ―美法破坏印度支那停战协定的情况‖ [Meifa pohuai yinduzhina 
tinghuo xieding de qinkuang], 19 March-8 April 1955, serial no. 106-00058-04, AMFA.         
38 Zhou confessed to journalist Harrison E. Salisbury in June 1972 that the US actions made the Geneva Accords a 
virtual ―sellout of North Vietnam.‖ Even Mao ―in later years repeatedly criticized himself to Vietnamese party 
representatives for having urged them to make concessions at Geneva.‖ Harrison E. Salisbury, To Peking and Beyond: A 
Report on the New Asia (London: Arrow Book, 1973), 225; Keith, Diplomacy of Zhou, 79; Yang, ―Mao Zedong and the 
Indochina Wars,‖ 63. 
39 Shao, ―Zhou Enali‘s Diplomacy,‖ 502. 
40 Central Ccommittee of CCP to Zhou (Moscow), telegram, 27 July 1954, in ZENP vol 1, 405. 
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A declaration of the PRC government would be published … pointing out that … 
with US government aid, the Jiang Jieshi clique is committing outrages at sea, 
raiding Chinese territory, and committing hostile acts against China; 
2. To strengthen the defense of the Chinese coastline. The navy and air force will 
need to be strengthened. The Chinese Armed Forces must be ready at any moment 
to halt a violation of the maritime or air boundaries of China; 
3. To ensure the failure of the organization of an aggressive bloc in Southeast Asia. 
To do this means tearing their allies away from the US and exacerbating the 
differences between the US and other capitalist countries. 
 
Zhou‘s outline underscored the main contours of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. Malenkov 
approved Zhou‘s plan, even adding that the ―inclusion of Indonesia in the American bloc [SEATO] 
being forged in Southeast Asia cannot be permitted.‖41 Verbal warnings coded in historical and 
cultural allusions from Beijing were aplenty. In the conference of the Central People‘s 
Government Committee on 11 August, Zhou especially singled out the Taiwan issue as a 
―historical mission‖ of the PRC.42 On the following day, Zhou told a group of Foreign Ministry 
cadres: ―If we do not raise the issue of liberating Taiwan and disregard protecting our motherland, 
we would be dishonorable to our ancestors.‖43 To the visiting British Labour Party delegation led 
by Clement Attlee, Zhou stressed the historical fear of China being carved, pointing out that even 
Chiang Kai-shek recognized that Taiwan was an integral part of China, and that this issue was 




In addition Mao emphasized the economic developmental needs of China, telling a British 
delegation that the PRC needed ―several decades‖ and a ―peaceful environment‖ to industrialize 
itself: ―It is difficult to get things done if you have to fight frequent wars, and the maintenance of a 
large number of troops would hamper economic development.‖ He elucidated that ―links and trade 
were sorely needed and ―isolation is not what we want.‖ Mao obliquely noted toward the end of 
                                                 
41 It is safe to say that Malenkov represented the view of Kremlin as he still retained his Politburo seat, even though he 
was in a bitter power struggle with Khrushchev. G.M. Malenkov with Zhou, Memorandum of conversation, 29 July 
1954, AVPRF f.06, o. 13a, d.25, ll.8, in in  CWIHPB 16 (Fall 2007/ Winter 2008), 102-103. 
42 Zhou coupled the liberation of Taiwan with maintaining the five principles of co-existence, friendship with foreign 
countries and preserving the peace in Southeast Asia. Zhou, ―Foreign Relations Report,‖ 11 August 1954,  33rd session 
of the Central People‘s Government Committee Conference,  in ZENP vol 1, 406. 
43 Zhou, ―Tuijin Zhongying guangxi, zhenqui heping hezuo,‖ 推进中英关系 争取和平合作 [Improve Anglo-Sino 
Relations, Strive for Peaceful Cooperation]  12 August 1954, speech, Foreign Ministry cadres meeting, in Zhou Enlai 
Waijiao Wenxuan 周恩来外交文选 [Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy], ed. Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi 中共中
央文献研究室编(Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1990), 84. (hereafter cited as ZEWW) 
44 Zhou with British Labour Party delegation, record of conversation, 15 August 1954, in ZENP, 408. 
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his speech that the harassing tactics of the ROC on China‘s coastline were reaching a critical point 
and explicitly warned the US: ―Do not go in for SEATO, which runs counter to the trend of history. 
Rather, if a pact is to be concluded, let it be a pact of collective peace.‖45 
c. China‟s Military Moves and Its International Concerns  
As Taiwan‘s control of the offshore islands off the coast of Zhejiang (Dachen) and Fujian 
(Quemoy) posed a twin threat to China‘s eastern seaboard trade, the primary concern of the PLA 
commanders at the East China Command (ECC) was to interdict the ROC‘s harassments. Since the 
ECC lacked the necessary air and naval power to stop Chiang‘s raids, Chief of ECC General Staff 
Zhang Aiping had to settle for a modest strategy of reclaiming remote offshore islands nearest the 
mainland one at a time.
46
 In June 1952, a plan to seize Dachen first followed by Quemoy one to 
two years later was submitted by General Zhang Zhen but was aborted. A second plan that 
proposed attacking the Quemoy complexes directly was submitted in September 1953 by the ECC 




In the aftermath of Geneva, the Taiwan problem loomed larger and the 1952 Dachen plan was 
revived. Compared to Quemoy, the advantages of making an example of Dachen were obvious. 
The KMT Dachen military installations were weaker and Dachen‘s significant distance from 
Taiwan meant that reinforcements would be slow. Zhang Zhen‘s original plan was approved by 
General Peng Dehuai on 2 August 1954. On 13 August, the Central Military Commission (CMC) 
issued ―On military strategy against Chiang‘s Taiwanese bandits‖ and adopted Zhang Aiping‘s 
plan of taking vulnerable KMT islands first, the first being the Dachen islands followed by other 
KMT island bastions.
 48
 On 24 August, the CMC officially approved the ECC‘s plans on attacking 
                                                 
45 ―On the Intermediate Zone, Peaceful Coexistence, Sino-British and Sino-US relations,‖ memorandum of conversation 
with the British Labour Party, 24 August 1954, in Mao Zedong on Diplomacy, ed. PRC MFA & Party Literature 
Research Center (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1998), 124. (hereafter cited as MD) 
46 But the permission for taking down the main KMT island military complexes was long in coming. As revealed in an 
extensive interview by Zhang Aiping‘s son Zhang Sheng, Cong zhanzhen zhong zhoulai, 158-159. 
47 Zhang Sheng, 162-164 
48 Li Xiaobing, A History of the Modern Chinese Army (Louisville: University of Kentucky Press, 2007), 137; Zhang 





 and three days later, the forward command was set up for the Dachen operation with 
Zhang Aiping as commander. Meanwhile, General Ye Fei, the military commander of Fujian, 
received instructions on 25 August to plan for a ―punishing blow‖ against the Quemoy area.50 Ye 





However, the PLA generals‘ direct aim of eradicating KMT harassments conflicted with Beijing‘s 
international concerns.
52
 The extreme caution Mao showed in the military instructions was 
instructive.
53
 Mao explained: ―As this is a period of peace, there will not be any attack and no 
defensive problems are foreseen; all other foreign naval aircraft must not be attacked.‖ Mao firmly 
added that any infraction of his orders would be severely dealt with.
54
 Even when the ECC had 
submitted a combined arms plan to attack Dachen‘s KMT warships, Mao wanted a full review.55 
After aerial military intelligence on Dachen was submitted to the PLA General Staff, Mao 
instructed on 21 August: ―… we must ensure that there are no US ships and planes before we 
attack Dachen. Otherwise, do not attack.‖56 The twin concerns over caution and sovereignty were 
also underscored in Zhou‘s private conversations with North Korea Foreign Minister Nam Il on 27 
August. Zhou confided that the official slogan of the PRC would be ―Liberate Taiwan‖; however, 
                                                 
49 Within the Dachen military complex, the most vulnerable forward position was the Yijiangshan garrisons. Zhang thus 
decided to take the smaller Yijiangshan first before moving on to Dachen. See ―Shi Yiceng jiangjun qinli sanchi Taihai 
weiji‖ 石一宸将军亲历三次台海 [General Shi Yiceng in three Taiwan Strait crises], in Li Li 李立, Muji Taihai fengyun 
目击台海风云 [Eyewitness in the Taiwan Strait crises] (Beijing: Huayi chubanshe, 2005), 97-100. 
50 Ye Fei 叶飞, Zhengzhan Jishi 征战纪事 [A Record of military Campaigns] (Shanghai: Shanghai wenyi chubanshe, 
1988), 342. 
51 Although the CIA surmised this correctly, Allen Dulles and Stassen did not consider further the significance of this 
finding during the NSC meeting on 24 Sept as they were overwhelmed by the ROC‘s incessant demands for a treaty. See 
215th Meeting of NSC, September 24, 1954 NSC Series, box 6, Ann Whitman File, DDEL; Li, Chinese Army, 140. 
52 Li, Chinese Army, 137.  
53 PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Su Yu gave orders, endorsed by Mao, for strict rules of engagement: ―Unless the enemies 
bombard us, we cannot open fire, this is to avoid an armed clash … but if Chiang‘s Dachen islands targeted our islands 
troops, we may return fire.‖ Addendum, General Su Yu‘s instructions to Eastern Military Area, 2 June 1954, in Mao 
Zedong junshi nianpu, 1927-1958 毛泽东军事年谱 [A Chronology of Mao Zedong Military activities], ed. Zhongguo 
renmin jiefangjun junshi shike xueyuan 中国人民解放军军事事科学院 (Guangxi remin chuban she, 1990), 853. 
(hereafter cited as MJN) 
54 Mao reiterated his caution in the CMC‘s orders on 23 July. ―When our Air force deploy their patrols or convoy 
protection duties, they must not attack any foreign airplane or ship.‖ Mao to CCP Military Commission, 23 July 1954, in 
JGMWG Vol. 4, 516.  
55 Mao requested military representatives from Fujian, Zhejiang and Shanghai military areas to proceed to Beijing for 
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24 July 1954, in JGMWG Vol. 4,, 520. 
56 Mao to Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Dehuai & Huang Kecheng, 21 August 1954, in in 
JGMWG Vol. 4,, 533. 
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he stressed that the process would be protracted:
57
 ―Because our navy is not adequately trained and 
all other aspects needed extra time, we initiate this struggle to place the central question in front of 
the Americans: all-out intervention or limited intervention. According to our estimates, the US will 
intervene, but it would not dare to engage in full intervention.‖58  
 
The political import of the PRC‘s bombardment hence clearly outweighed military acquisitions of 
the offshore islands. The PRC Foreign Ministry‘s ―Directive on CCP Propaganda Policy on the 
Liberation of Taiwan‖ stressed that the struggle would be a ―prolonged‖ affair. The national 
priorities of the directive were: ―strengthen our national defence, reinforce navy and air force 
capabilities, increase production, complete overwhelmingly our country‘s developmental plans, 





Three days before the bombardment of the offshore islands, a special assessment was made 
regarding the likelihood of a ROC-US Mutual Defence Treaty and the formation of SEATO. The 
implicit finding was that a sustained artillery attack on the offshore island would probably cause 
no huge international outcry. Beijing assumed Washington knew that China had no short-term 
design on Taiwan and calculated that a limited bombardment would signal its displeasure but 
would not provoke alarm. The report stated that most US papers felt that the US was in a dilemma 
over the offshore islands and averred that a significant number of US officials were ambivalent 
about the offshore islands.
60
   
                                                 
57 Significantly, Zhou highlighted precisely the very same factors on the PRC‘s military limitations that were pointed out 
in the CIA report submitted by Allen Dulles to the NSC on 9 September. NIE 100-4-54, ―The Chinese Offshore Islands,‖  
CIA no. 50318, Formosa, 1952-1957 (1), box 9, International Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
58 Zhou with Nam Il, record of conversation, 27 August 1954, in Zhou Enlai junshi huodong jishi : 1918-1975, vol 2. 周
恩来军事活动纪事 [Military activities of Zhou Enlai], ed. Liu, Wusheng & Du Hongqi 刘武生, 杜宏奇 (Beijing : 
Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2000), 345.  
59 It pointed out the deficiencies of the PRC‘s military and emphasized that this ―complicated‖ struggle involved 
domestic and international facets. Zhou with Lu Dingyi, Liao Chengzhi, Deng Ta, Wu Lengxi, Zhu Muzhi (Xinhua 
News Agency Deputy editor), record of meeting, 1 September 1954, in ZENP, 412. 
60 This is a survey of foreign news agencies on the Taiwan problem dated 31 August 1954, annotated and read by Zhou. 
The sections were seemingly structured as answers to the questions posed by the Chinese leadership concerning their 
impending military action. One section was devoted to the world opinion on the PRC‘s reconnaissance artillery barrage 
at Quemoy on 23 August. It concluded from information gleaned from news wires that the US and Britain did not 
express undue alarm with the Chinese Communists‘ actions. ―外电对台湾问题的报道‖ [Waidian dui Taiwan wenti de 




Taiwan was clear on the implicit message in any PRC military movement. One analyst, Liu Yü-
chang, reported to the ROC Chief of General Staff in May 1954 that a real invasion would not 
have ―small-scale probing movements.‖ Should there be an invasion of Quemoy they would have 
to launch a ―decisive‖ and large-scale ―land-sea-air operation.‖ The main invasion approach would 
be by parachutists as the land of Quemoy is ―flat without obstructions.‖ By the second day, the 
outcome of the battle would be determined. Hence, Taipei understood clearly the difference 
between a major invasion and a probing exercise. When Mao launched an artillery bombardment 
on Quemoy with no attending military build-up around the Xiamen area, it was clear to the ROC 
this was anything but a major invasion. The number of men-at-arms in Quemoy also gave a good 
indication of its higher relative importance compared to the Dachen islands. That Chiang should 
kick up a big fuss over the abandonment of Dachen stemmed clearly from nationalistic pride and a 




2. The Outbreak of Crisis 
Following the outbreak of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, what actions did the US, Taiwan and 
China take? This section will first examine the actions of the US and Taiwan in four phases from 
September to December, and then the actions of China.  
 
2.1 The US and Taiwan 
In the first week of the crisis, while the US assessed that Beijing‘s intentions were limited and was 
thus not prepared to escalate the crisis by militarily engaging Beijing, Taiwan worked hard toward 
securing a defence treaty and procuring more US aid. From 10 September to October, the US 
decided to pursue Operation Oracle, which aimed at introducing a UN resolution to the Security 
Council calling for ceasefire in the Taiwan Strait and hopefully a ―neutralization of these offshore 
                                                 
61 Liu‘s report gave a good snapshot of the ROC military‘s mindset and state of Quemoy‘s preparation. Liu stated the 
communists had learnt their lesson in their abortive 1949 invasion of Quemoy, stressing that no ―probing‖ of Quemoy 
defense would precede the main invasion. Quemoy defenders should ―not expect a break in the battle momentum‖ and 
―no reinforcement would be in time to relieve them.‖ Based on such a bleak prognosis, it became easier to understand 
why Quemoy was so heavily fortified with about 60,100 soldiers. Liu Yü-chang to ROC Chief of General Staff, “金门
防务观察报告书” [Jinmen fangwu guancha baogaoshu], 2 May 1954, serial no.002080102100006, CKS papers, AH. 
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islands,‖ but Taiwan resisted this stiffly so as to wrangle even more concessions from the US. By 
November, the US agreed to a defence treaty and this was signed on 2 December, much to 
Taiwan‘s satisfaction.  
a. The First Week: Treaty and Aid 
Allen Dulles gave the CIA‘s assessment of the PRC‘s intentions six days after the 3 September 
bombardment of Quemoy. He reported the lack of Chinese amphibious presence and ruled out the 
possibility of an amphibious assault.
62
 Similarly, there was an absence of air power projection. 
Logistically, the Chinese Communists were not ready for any prolonged conflict. The PRC poured 
6,000 rounds of 120mm and 150mm artillery rounds onto Quemoy for five hours in the initial 
barrage but for the next six days, artillery attacks were only ―sporadically‖ reported.  Beijing‘s 
signaling was obvious: ―The Communists have chosen to proceed cautiously. They have taken no 
action against US forces and have not indicated that they are readying their forces for an attempted 
invasion of Quemoy ….‖ 63 
 
However, Beijing‘s 2 September telegram to Moscow stuck to formulaic boilerplate rhetoric: ―The 
Chinese people staunchly oppose this aggressive war policy of the US clique; we must liberate 
Taiwan and protect China‘s sovereignty and territories in order to safeguard the peace in the Far 
East and the world.‖ This indicated the two issues central to Beijing‘s unhappiness: SEATO and 




The 9 September NSC session was bathed in an uncanny half-light of pessimistic foreboding 
mixed with raring expectations of fighting the Chinese. However, the loss of the offshore islands 
appeared a moot point. Should the PRC really want Quemoy, according to Bedell Smith, no 
amount of US commitment would prevent Beijing. Moreover, Washington doubted that Quemoy 
                                                 
62 The PRC navy ―was of negligible strength, consisting of six small patrol boats and 400 or 500 junks.‖ 213th Meeting 
of NSC, September 9, 1954, NSC Series, box 6, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
63 The Chinese Communists‘ air force units ―were not close enough to provide effective fighter close for operations in 
the Quemoy area.‖ Even if the local 160,000-strong PRC force was activated, it could only truck 1,000 tons a day to 
Xiamen (Amoy). NIE 100-4-54, ―The Chinese Offshore Islands,‖ CIA no. 50318, Formosa, 1952-1957 (1), box 9, 
International Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL 
64 This was published in the People‟s Daily the following day. Mao & Zhou to Malenkov & Molotov, telegram, 2 
September 1954, in JGMWG, 539-540. 
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was ―so vitally important to the defense of Formosa.‖ Smith perceptively outlined a plan without 
US intervention. One, the US would reinforce the ROC‘s defenders with additional war matériel. 
Two, the US ―could keep the US fleet nearby.‖ Three, ―we could keep open the lines of 
communication and tell the world what we were proposing to do.‖ Finally, ―we could agree to take 
part in a ―rescue operation‖ of the ROC. US subsequent actions followed closely Smith‘s sensible 
recommendations. Smith reported that Dulles would cautiously qualify US commitment to the 
offshore islands provided they were ―militarily defensible and after talking with Congressional 
leaders.‖ Dulles wished to avoid a ―Dien Bien Phu‖ at all cost. For this, Dulles traveled to Taipei 




Chiang sought hard to understand the US strategic needs.
66
 When Chiang and Dulles finally met 
on 9 September, the five-hour meeting concentrated on the prospective ROC-US mutual defense 
treaty.
67
 Chiang‘s ―great plea‖ for a mutual security treaty worked. Dulles reportedly found Chiang 
―beginning to get tired and had aged considerably.‖ The projection of such world weariness 
persuaded Dulles that Chiang lacked the ―previous conviction‖ for the counter-offensive and thus 
would not surreptitiously drag the US into a Chinese civil war. Chiang reassured Dulles that ―they 
wished to do that [counter-offensive] themselves, with only US logistic support.‖ 68 Chiang even 
promised that no counter-offensive action would be taken, ―not until US approved.‖69 ―He put Free 
China‘s case in such reasonable terms,‖ noted Rankin, ―that no fair-minded man could have 
seriously objected.‖70 Dulles‘ criticisms of Taiwan‘s security circumstances were dutifully noted 
                                                 
65 213th Meeting of NSC, September 9, 1954, NSC Series, box 6, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
66 Reports on the inner working of the NSC were prepared by ROC Chief of General Staff General Chou Chih-jou and 
sent to Chiang. Chiang requested a transcript of Ambassador Hollington Tong‘s conversation with Dulles in Japan and 
paid close attention to nuances in the utterances of the American leaders to assess how he could obtain the best leverage. 
CKS to Hollington Tong, telegram, 3 September 1954, serial no.002080200350079, CKS papers, AH 
67 But Chiang chose to inform his wife on the personality of Dulles rather than the details of the discussion, revealing his 
modus operandi with foreign dignitaries where he paid special ―attention to Dulles‘ attitude.‖ Chiang intuitively 
concluded the deal was in the works. CKS to Soong Mei-lin, telegram, 10 September 1954, serial no.002080200350085, 
CKS papers, AH 
68 214th Meeting of NSC, September 12, 1954 NSC Series, box 6, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
69 As early as 28 June, George Yeh had informed Rankin that ―if a mutual defense treaty could be concluded, President 
Chiang would agree to seek the prior agreement of the United States before undertaking any important military action.‖ 
Rankin, 197 Rankin to Department of State, telegram, 9 Sept 1954 (8pm), in FRUS (1952-54) vol. XIV, 582. 
70 Karl L. Rankin, China Assignment (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), 206. 
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and he was pleased that Chiang lavishly praised the Manila Pact and made ―no criticism‖ of US 




Nevertheless, in a telegram to his wife, Soong May-ling, Chiang complained bitterly that the ―US 
completely neglect the crisis at hand at Dachen and Quemoy.‖ Worse still, the ROC‘s request for 
aid had been ―absolutely unattended.‖ ―Such an attitude toward one‘s allies is unexpected,‖ 
criticized Chiang, ―and it constitutes an insult to China.‖ But the sum requested was a staggering 
100 million dollars and Admiral Radford chided Chiang for his request. ―This [ROC‘s] request is 
no different from last year‘s,‖ Radford remonstrated MAAG Taiwan Chief, General Chase, and 
―[g]iven the new US government‘s austerity policy, there could be no possibility in fulfilling it.‖72  
b. 10 September to October: Operation Oracle 
The Taiwan Strait Crisis was ―a horrible dilemma‖ for the US. The only path available was to 
―take the offshore island situation to the UN Security Council to obtain an injunction to maintain 
the status quo.‖ Dulles warned the NSC on 12 September that the ROC ―might not be too happy.‖ 
But going to war was equally unpalatable: ―It will be important to find out if the UK will go along 
with this plan. If so, it might mark the beginning of our coming together on the Far East.‖73 
 
Ironically, the luxury of a circuitous UN route was opened because there was no immediate danger 
in the Taiwan Strait.
74
 Dulles‘ UN gambit was an inceptive but feeble gesture at resolving 
longstanding problems. Eisenhower fully backed Dulles as the US farm areas were urging him not 
to ―send our boys to war.‖ Eisenhower decided that no armed forces would be sent ―to defend 
these islands against Chinese Communist attacks.‖75 ―Moreover, if we shuck the UN and say we 
are going to be the world‘s policemen,‖ reiterated Eisenhower, ―we had better get ready to go to 
                                                 
71 214th Meeting of NSC, September 12, 1954 NSC Series, box 6, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
72 CKS to Soong May-ling, telegram, 21 September 1954, serial no.002080200350087, CKS papers, AH. 
73 Dulles lamented the NSC ―never have to make a more difficult decision‖ than this Taiwan Strait quagmire. See 214th 
Meeting of NSC (Denver), September 12, 1954, NSC Series, box 6, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
74 The lack of ―emergency‖ was also noted by Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, 165. 
75 221st Meeting of NSC, November 2, 1954 NSC Series, box 6, Ann Whitman File, DDEL 
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war.‖ Eisenhower came down strongly on ―enlist[ing] world support and the approval of the 
American people.‖76  
 
By early October, Dulles and Eden had finalized the UN plan as Operation Oracle.
77
 New Zealand 
would introduce a UN resolution to the Security Council calling for ceasefire in the Taiwan Strait 
and hopefully a ―neutralization of these offshore islands.‖ Should Beijing refuse to consider 
Oracle, it would put ―the Chinese Communists in a very bad light before the rest of the world.‖78 
However, Oracle faced two major obstacles. Eden gave only grudging acceptance as he had the 
impression that this UN initiative could not resolve the China problem.
79
 Chiang was equally 
opposed to Oracle. Dulles admitted that the Oracle meant ending ―Chiang‘s only hope of returning 
to the mainland.‖ 80 
 
Assistant State Secretary Robertson was given the unenviable task of persuading Chiang. Chiang, 
in meetings on 12-14 October, recounted no less than four times ―if that assistance were withdrawn, 
his people were fully resolved to carry on the struggle regardless.‖ Chiang revealed a host of 
negative assumptions about the Americans: ―The US is again trying to prevent us from fighting the 
Communists‖; ―US policy toward China may change any time‖; following US leadership entailed 
―a sacrifice.‖ These points formed the ROC‘s ―bitterness‖ trope that was used to evoke pangs of 
guilt from such ―old friends‖ as Robertson.  
 
Chiang was only slightly mollified when Robertson coaxed him with a mutual security treaty. 
Robertson reported to the State Department that Chiang was ―deeply suspicious‖ but understood 
that the US only wanted to offer a defensive treaty.
81
 More importantly, Chiang managed to 
wrangle from Robertson an agreement that the treaty ―be signed before the adoption of the New 
                                                 
76 214th Meeting of NSC (Denver), September 12, 1954, NSC Series, box 6, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
77 Scott Kaufman, ―Operation Oracle: The United States, Great Britain, New Zealand, and the Offshore Islands Crisis of 
1954-55,‖ The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 32, no. 3 (Sept 2004): 113. 
78 216th Meeting of NSC, October 6, 1954, NSC Series, box 6, Ann Whitman File, DDEL 
79 Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, 167. 
80 216th Meeting of NSC, October 6, 1954, NSC Series, box 6, Ann Whitman File, DDEL 
81 Walter Robertson to Dulles, telegram, 14 Oct 1954, Formosa, 1952-1957 (5), Box 10, International Series, Ann 
Whitman File, DDEL 
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Zealand resolution.‖82 Taipei politely maintained the fiction that the NZ resolution came from 
Britain. Chiang claimed on 18 October that such a resolution ―could only place the US in a more 
difficult position‖ and he waylaid the US with the counter-proposal of an additional ―mutual 
assistance programme,‖ which appeared to be the price the US had to pay to save face.83   
 
The generalissimo also leant heavily upon friends in Congress. US Ambassador Henry Cabot 
Lodge had warned Dulles that ―it would be politically very dangerous to have a collision with the 
Chinese Nationalists now.‖84 On 19 October, Lodge reported to Dulles that Chiang ―was in a bad 
state of mind.‖ There was the specter of the ―China Lobby [getting] started‖ by Chiang. Dulles 
indicated that the administration was aware of Chiang‘s demands and that the ROC ―wants it 
badly.‖ The White House was ―working‖ on it and would pull in Senator George to rally the 
Congress.
85
 To quicken the pace in the treaty negotiation, Taipei orchestrated a chorus of protests 
in Washington. On 20 October, the ROC emissaries George Yeh and the ROC representative to the 
United Nations Tsiang Ting-fu adamantly denounced the NZ resolution. Robertson laboriously 
insisted that the NZ resolution would only ―protect and improve the defenses of the offshore 
islands controlled by the ROC government and enhance the international reputation of the ROC 
government.‖ Robertson further promised that the PRC‘s entry into the UN was not on the agenda 
and Taipei stood to gain a ROC-US Mutual Security Treaty. 
 
The ROC emissaries highlighted Taiwan‘s deteriorating morale and sovereignty. Tsiang branded 
the NZ resolution a ―two-China‖ policy in disguise and reacted ―viscerally‖ to Robertson‘s blunt 
view that ―two Chinas‖ had ―already been in existence‖: 
… retaining the hope of returning to Mainland China is … more important. I 
would not be a party to any maneuver or rationalization that conspires to deal a 
blow to our hopes or deride them as absurd fantasies. The question is not whether 
it is really a dream, but how it shines forth as a beacon of hope for all the Chinese 
                                                 
82 Chiang was no fool; American fingerprints were all over the NZ resolution. ―But if the [NZ] proposal was intended to 
lay a foundation for a defence pact,‖ commented Chiang, ―it would be viewed differently.‖ Chiang with Robertson, 
Memo of conversation, 13 Oct 1954 (8am-11:15pm) in FRUS (1952-54) vol. XIV, 733-749. 
83 CKS to Wellington V. K. Koo, telegram, 18 October 1954, serial no.002010400023032, CKS papers, AH.   
84 Telephone call from Amb. Lodge, 5 Oct 1954, Telephone Conversation Series, box 3, telephone memos Sept 1, 1954-




people ….86  
Robertson‘s headlong rush into reassurances was seized upon by Taipei. ―Should the communists 
reject the resolution,‖ Robertson had imprudently offered, ―the US government would be better 
prepared to offer even more aid to the ROC.‖87 The intensity of the ROC officials‘ protests 
obviously threw Robertson off. When the NZ resolution was presented in the UN, the US hoped 
that the ROC would not officially register its protest. But with Robertson‘s slip-up, Taipei had 
even less incentive to be malleable. Obstructing the resolution seemed to be a wiser option since 
the US was predisposed to offer aid.
88
 
c. November: Plugging the Gap in the Western Pacific 
By the end of October, the last inhibition against a treaty with Taipei was removed. Dulles 
reminded Yeh that the treaty would ―apply only to Formosa and the Pescadores.‖ Yeh agreed that 
the ROC would be ―flexible.‖ In getting Taiwan to ―plug the gap in the strategic defensive line in 
the West Pacific,‖ US geo-strategic concerns predominated; ROC‘s interest was only incidental.89 
Yeh heartily rejoined that the ROC government would never dream of ―using the treaty for the 
purpose of a ‗counter-offensive‘ and had no intention of embroiling the US in the civil war.‖90 
However, Taipei had every intention of entangling the US, having insisted on maintaining its 
sacred rights to the fangong mission.
91
 It was no small feat that the ROC negotiators had worked 
its way into acceptance by the US.    
 
                                                 
86 In addition, Ambassador Koo raised the specter of Communist China using the NZ resolution as a Trojan gaining entry 
into the UN. The ROC‘s record of conversation conveyed a fuller favour of the heat of the argument. The ROC 
emissaries‘ visceral reactions could hardly be detected from the memo by McConaughy, see Memorandum of 
conversation, 20 October 1954 (9pm), in FRUS (1952-54) vol. XIV, 781-782. 
87 The US version was vague: ―If the Communists turned down the proposal, a climate much more helpful to Nationalist 
China would be established.‖ The ROC‘s version pinpointed exactly what the US was offering. See Memorandum of 
conversation, 20 October 1954 (9pm), in FRUS (1952-54) vol. XIV, 785. 
88 Robertson then dangled the prospective Mutual Security Treaty which he stressed ―was raised extemporaneously‖ in 
his meeting with Chiang a week ago.  Minutes of meeting, George Yeh and Wellington Koo with Walter Robertson, 
Walter P. McConaughy and Adm. Arthur W. Radford, 20 October 1954, serial no. 002080106034004, CKS papers, AH.    
89
 On 2 November, Dulles posited grandly a treaty with the ROC that would ―complete the defensive line which 
stretches from Alaska to the Aleutian Islands, Japan, Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia and New 
Zealand.‖  ―This defensive chain is a necessity for the security of the Western Pacific,‖ justified Dulles, ―and for loyal 
allies such as the ROC.‖ See Minutes of meeting, George Yeh and Wellington Koo with Foster Dulles and Walter 
Robertson, 2 November 1954, serial no.002080106034003, CKS papers, AH. 
90 Memo of Conversation, 27 Oct 1954 (10:30am), in FRUS (1952-54) vol. XIV, 797-801. 
91 For the moment, Yeh promised that even if the ROC wished to launch any large-scale operation, ―it would seek 
permission from the US government.‖ Minutes of meeting, George Yeh, Wellington Koo with Foster Dulles, 27 October 
1954, serial no.002080106034003, CKS papers, AH.           
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The US sense of compunction in dealing with its Asian allies, coloured by its cultural assumptions, 
alternated uneasily with its Cold War hard-nosed realism. When Ambassador Koo appealed that 
the ROC retained the right to counter-offensive, Dulles denied crushing the ROC‘s martial spirit 
and advocated ―patience and to await the right opportunity‖ in view of the PRC‘s superior military 
strength. Dulles then delved into a vapid lecture on the imminent implosion of communist régimes: 
―The window of opportunity may come within one or five years, but I have the confidence that the 
day of reckoning for the communists will soon arrive.‖92 Nevertheless, Washington insisted on 
Oracle as that was the US public raison d‟être for the security treaty with the ROC. Without the 
Oracle to guarantee the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, a security treaty would be considered too 
risky. Although Yeh had declared that Chiang had ―completely agreed to the NZ resolution and its 
conditions,‖ Washington believed Oracle would doubly maintain the peace.93   
 
Dulles presented Oracle as a preemptive peace initiative, forestalling attempts by neutralist states 
from introducing rival resolutions which the US could not control. Dulles also stressed that the US 
―could not engage in any step that may provoke the Soviet Union or Communist China into war.‖94 
With Taipei, Dulles assumed that the US held all the cards. He reassured the NSC that the US 
could force the ROC towards the NZ resolution. He also dismissed Chiang‘s fangong mission.95 
For Eisenhower, should the UN award the islands to the PRC, ―it was better to accept some loss of 
face in the world than to go to general war in defenses of these small islands.‖96 Dulles thus firmly 
instructed Radford that while it was important for a firm show of resolve, ―he didn‘t want it to be 
something that might involve a major war.‖97 
                                                 
92 Dulles observed: ―As Communism goes against human behaviour, the Chinese people would not tolerate it for long.‖ 
Minutes of meeting, George Yeh, Wellington Koo with Foster Dulles, 27 October 1954, serial no.002080106034003, 
CKS papers, AH.           
93 Yeh insisted that the resolution should state that ―communist China is the aggressor.‖ Robertson responded that could 
be difficult, not least the fact that ―the ROC government had been engaging in hostile air raids and illegal seizures of 
merchant shipping [off south China coast] for sometime.‖ Minutes of meeting, Wellington Koo with Foster Dulles, 2 
November 1954, serial no.002080106034003, CKS papers, AH.          
94 The US source lists the missing context: ―The US military experts believe that it would not be possible to defend the 
offshore islands without taking measures against the mainland which would entail the risk of general war with 
Communist China.‖ Yet such an important message is missing in the ROC sources. See Memo of Conversation, 2 
November 1954, in FRUS (1952-54) vol. XIV, 845-846; Minutes of meeting, George Yeh and Wellington Koo with 
Walter Robertson, Walter P. McConaughy, 2 November 1954, serial no. 002080106034004, CKS papers, AH.   
95 220th Meeting of NSC, October 28, 1954,  NSC Series, box 6, Ann Whitman File, DDEL 
96 221st Meeting of NSC, November 2, 1954 NSC Series, box 6, Ann Whitman File, DDEL 
97 Telephone call to Adm. Radford, 1 Nov 1954, Telephone Conversation Series, box 3, telephone conv. - general Nov 1, 




However, Chiang calculated that the NZ resolution was moot once the US decided to sign a 
defensive treaty with the ROC. Chiang ordered Yeh to ignore the issue and correctly guessed that 
Dulles would later quietly drop the NZ resolution. Chiang focused his attention on more minute 
matters such as stretching as much latitude from the prospective treaty as possible. ―The US must 
mention explicitly in the treaty terms such as ‗Taiwan, the Pescadores and the surrounding 
areas‘ … ,‖ advised Chiang, ―only then would we allow ambiguous terminologies for the coverage 
of the offshore islands.‖ If the US wanted Chiang to give these islands up, they would have to 
promise something more.
98
    
 
Once committed to a ROC-US Mutual Defense Treaty, Washington objected to most covert 
Nationalist activities. On 22 November, Robertson raised concerns about ROC‘s ―blockade of 
Mainland China‘s ports.‖ 99 These actions might ―provoke retaliatory actions from the 
communists.‖ In addition, the ROC should desist from ―detaining and searching foreign ships.‖ 
Other covert militant activities must also be curbed.
100
 However, Dulles was less perturbed, 
asserting that the treaty ―will not enable the Chinese Nationalists to involve us in a war with 
Communist China.‖101  
d. December: ROC-US Special Relationship 
The ROC-US Mutual Defence Treaty was signed on 2 December 1954 and Chiang thanked 
Eisenhower effusively in a 10 December 1954 telegram. Three main themes stood out as the leit 
motif of Chiang‘s perception of ROC-US relations. One, Chiang evoked the pseudo-―special 
relationship‖ between China and the US: ―What was broken in the past [Truman‘s noxious White 
Paper] could be said to have been restored to a new page, worthy to be treasured by both parties.‖ 
                                                 
98 CKS to George Yeh, telegram, 5 November 1954, serial no.002080200350078, CKS papers, AH. 
99 The ROC promised that further blockades or ―larger operations‖ plans would be done jointly or ―in consultations 
with‖ the MAAG. Minutes of meeting, George Yeh and Wellington Koo with Foster Dulles and Walter Robertson, 23 
Nov 1954, serial no.002080106034003, CKS papers, AH.           
100 Yeh protested that for years the ROC navy had been blockading coastal China without endangering US international 
standing. For the ROC, the blockade was a defensive action that did not amount to the level of ―offensive military 
actions.‖ Robertson advised Yeh to further consult this matter with Dulles and reiterated that further blockade activities 
should be ―cautiously administered.‖ See Minutes of meeting, George Yeh and Wellington Koo with Walter Robertson, 
22 November 1954, serial no.002080106034003, CKS papers, AH.           
101 Dulles to Eisenhower, Memorandum for the President, 22 Nov 1954, Formosa, 1952-1957 (5), box 10, International 
Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL 
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Two, Chiang understood the necessity of pitching the ROC-US Mutual Defense Treaty as a 
function of anti-communism as such discourse struck a powerful chord in the US domestic circle. 
Finally, Chiang went on give credit to the leader of the free world, Eisenhower: ―But for the 
wisdom and spirit possessed by Eisenhower, the determination to sign [the treaty] would not have 
come to pass.‖102  
 
Nevertheless, Yeh badgered Washington on how the offshore islands would be provisioned by the 
US, worried that with no firm promise of aid, the offshore islands would slide into obscurity. 
Ambassador Koo advocated a memorandum to cover Taipei‘s concerns. Robertson retorted that 
with the ratification of the treaty there would be time for the wrapping up of miscellaneous items 
and Yeh should ―stop insisting on this matter.‖103 Chiang petitioned Eisenhower ―to nip in the bud 
any tendency [toward ‗two Chinas‘]‖ and insisted on ―some form of assurances that the US would 
provide logistic support for Chinese forces engaged in their [offshore islands] defence.‖ 104  
Eisenhower deftly deflected Chiang‘s requests, advising Yeh that ―developments in China must be 
viewed in terms of long periods of time.‖  
 
The advice of Dulles and Eisenhower had unintended consequences at times. One, such advice 
possessed interpretative elasticity for different cultural audiences. Washington meant that changes 
were not forthcoming in the near future, so Taipei must drop all fangong plans. But to Chiang, it 
probably meant that once changes were detected, be prepared to counter-attack. Two, pseudo-
encouragements were latched on by a desperate Chiang. Phrases like ―there are signs that the 
                                                 
102 ―The treaty reaffirmed henceforth the traditional friendship for hundreds of years of two great people across the 
Pacific,‖ proclaimed Chiang. CKS to George Yeh, telegram, 10 December 1954, serial no.002080200350115, CKS 
papers, AH. 
103 Robertson wryly commented that the treaty was of such significance that news of it was met with a ―vehement storm 
of violent protests launched by the communists.‖ See Minutes of meeting, George Yeh and Wellington Koo with Walter 
Robertson, 13 December 1954, serial no.002080106034003, CKS papers, AH.            
104 Chiang‘s concern was based on a ROC Ministry of Defense study of US military aid which noted that the offshore 
islands did not qualify for aid as it was out of the purview of the treaty. See Lai Ming-tang to CKS, “中美共同防禦條
約簽訂後: 重要軍事政策之檢討及意見” [Zhongmei gongtong fangwei tiaoyue qianting hou: zhongyao junshi 
zhenche ji yijian] (Top Secret) serial no. 002080102049006, 21 December 1954, CKS papers, AH.        
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Soviets and the Chinese Communists are having some difficulties‖ were enough for Chiang to 
constantly harp about an impending counter-offensive against the mainland.
105
    
 
In January 1955 the PRC finally launched a military campaign to recover the distant ROC- 
controlled Dachen islands. Chiang exploited Beijing‘s actions to orchestrate for additional US 
military aid, demanding ―24 full strength divisions‖ on 3 January 1955. ROC Minister of Defence 
Yu Ta-wei also requested for ―4 more destroyers, 15 LSTs, more expeditious deliveries of F86‘s 
and reconnaissance planes.‖ However, the US regarded the Taiwanese requests as outrageous since 
the ROC lacked qualified pilots and sailors to benefit from US largesse. Radford substituted 
Chiang‘s demands for 24 divisions with 9 divisions of reserve but admitted that Chiang drove a 
hard bargain, as the ROC army was not far behind South Korea‘s ten reserve divisions.106  
 
2.2 PRC Public Relations Offensive 
In the wake of the First Taiwan Crisis, Beijing launched a battery of domestic and international 
propaganda efforts to justify its actions. Besides appealing to its domestic audience, China worked 
hard to present its case to the Communist bloc, Japan, neutralist countries (especially India and 
Burma) and Britain. Such efforts in the international arena were facilitated by the success of 
China‘s earlier attempts to break out of diplomatic isolation following the Korean War and could 
be seen as China‘s continuing quest for international recognition and participation. 
 
After the second artillery barrage on 22 September, Zhou rationalized the Quemoy bombardment 
to the National People‘s Congress, describing how the US had tried to contain China on three 
fronts: Korea, Indochina and the Taiwan Strait. With the stabilization of the two other fronts, 
Beijing turned toward the Taiwan problem. Zhou stated that ―placing Taiwan in the UN or a 
neutralist third party trusteeship, a ‗neutralized‘ Taiwan, and the so-called independent Taiwan are 
all attempts at quartering China‘s territory.‖ Moreover, he condemned the hostility of SEATO: 
                                                 
105 Memo of (George Yeh) Conversation with President, 20 Dec 1954, 10:30am, ACW Diary Series, box 3, ACW Diary 
Dec 1954 (2), Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
106 Record of conversation, George Yeh K. C. and Admiral Radford, 18 January 1955, serial no. 002080106035005, 
CKS papers, AH.           
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―Colonialist attempts to manipulate the Asian countries are incongruent with Asian aspirations 
towards independence and sovereignty … this is also against the Geneva spirit.‖107  
 
Significantly, Mao underscored Beijing‘s cautious actions by referring to the danger of nuclear 
warfare. In a speech to the Central Military Commission, Mao highlighted how the PRC was 
―totally ignorant‖ in that area but he characteristically turned the technological backwardness of 
the PRC into a national asset:  
Now our industrial, agricultural, cultural and military developments are less than 
desirable. Hence the imperialists … are at liberty to bully us. They ask, ―How 
many atomic bombs do you have?‖ But they have underestimated us at least in 
one area, China‘s hidden potential strength which would be astounding once 
revealed in the future. 
Mao also hinted at historical precedents of the Quemoy bombardment. He stressed the CCP‘s 
experiences in dealing with the KMT in the 1945 Chongqing negotiations: ―The more we soundly 
thrashed Chiang Kai-shek, the better progress we made in negotiations.‖108 Mao was at once 
asserting the political nature of his Quemoy bombardment which aimed at thwarting the ROC-US 





To the Communist bloc, Mao scripted the Taiwan Strait actions in the mien of Chinese cultural 
tradition of ―punishing‖ the ROC‘s ―arrogance.‖ First, Mao highlighted the baneful potential of a 
ROC-US treaty to the visiting Bulgarian representatives on 27 September 1954. Second, Mao 
complained about the irritants posed by ROC‘s covert operations: ―In the Taiwan Strait, 
surrounding the mainland, are lots of little islands still under the control of CKS; this creates a lot 
of problems … They obstruct the passage of shipping, attack commercial shipping, e.g. British, 
                                                 
107 ―Zhongguo renmin yiding yao jiefang Taiwan,‖中国人民一定要解放台湾 [The Chinese People must liberate 
Taiwan], Zhou speech to the National People‘s Congress, 23 September 1954, Zhou Enlai junshi wenxuan 周恩来军事
文选 [A selection of Zhou Enlai‘s military writings], ed. Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi 中共中央文献研究
室 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1997), 350-355. (hereafter cited as ZEJW); MJN, 854. 
108 Mao‘s stratagem of ―fighting while negotiating‖ originally stemmed from the need for a momentary respite from 
Chiang‘s armies. Here, against the powerful US, selected military engagements could underscore the PRC‘s international 
demands and offset its military disadvantages. See Yang Kuisong 杨奎松, ―Mao Zedong yu liangchi taihai weiji,‖ 毛泽
东与两次台海危机 [Mao Zedong and the two Taiwan Strait Crisis] Shixue yuekan 史学月刊, no. 11 (2003): 57. 
109 Mao‘s speech to the Military Commission, 18 Oct 1954, in Mao Zedong Junshi wenji 毛泽东军事文集 [Mao Zedong 
selected military writings], vol 6, ed. Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi 中共中央文献研究室编(Beijing: Junshi 
kexue chubanshe, 1993), 357-361. 
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Polish and Soviet ships.‖ Finally, Mao established his Taiwan Strait actions as the PRC‘s 
contribution to world communism, comparing the world-wide US covert activities launched 
against Soviet-bloc countries with China having its fair share of ―airdrop saboteurs‖ and 
―scatter[ing] of propaganda materials.‖ Since sovereign communist states had the means, it stood 
to reason that they must respond firmly against US provocations.
110
      
 
To the Japanese who were US allies, Zhou dug hard into the shared cultural and affective domains 
establishing Beijing‘s sincerity. Would the PRC threaten Japan? Zhou declared: ―I can guarantee 
to everyone, we are definitely on the side of world peace … this is  … our fundamental policy.‖ 
Zhou further stated: ―Compared to our several thousand years of shared history, sixty years [of 
Japanese aggression] is nothing.‖ The Japanese and the Chinese had historically mutually 
beneficial relations 共存共荣 and mutually shared common cultural roots 同文同种. Turning to 
Japan‘s non-recognition of the PRC, Zhou pointed out that the PRC‘s ―feelings were very hurt.‖ 
But he quickly quoted legislator Yamaguchi Kikuichirō (1897-1981) who had claimed that the 
―fault lay not with China.‖ Zhou attacked Washington instead: ―I also know that basic difficulties 
reside not with the Japanese government because on top of the Japanese government‘s head is 
another overlord, the Americans.‖111 
 
The Chinese Communists assiduously courted neutralist countries. Nehru received an 
unprecedented welcome in Beijing. In Mao‘s conversation with Nehru on 19 October 1954, Mao 
praised India because ―India had the courage to stay away [from SEATO].‖112 Nevertheless, only 
                                                 
110 Record of conversation between Mao Zedong with the Bulgarian representatives, 27 September 1954 (2100hrs, serial 
no. 109-00411-02, AMFA.      
111 Zhou pointed out how scores of Chinese scholars and revolutionaries such as himself had studied in Japan and they 
were ―grateful‖ for this intellectual debt. Zhou also announced that Beijing was prepared to work with any Japanese: ―If 
the Japanese elect Yoshida Shigeru, we will recognize Yoshida. If the Japanese elect Suzuki Mosaburo, we will also 
recognize Suzuki.‖ Zhou also  quoted Yamaguchi Kikuichirō 山口喜久一郎 (1897-1981) in  ―Zhongri guanxi de 
guanjian shi heping gongchu,‖中日关系的关键是和平共处 [The Key to Sino-Japanese Relations is Peaceful Co-
existence], Zhou‘s speech to Japanese delegation, 11 Oct 1954, in ZEWW, 87-93; Zhou‘s reassurances presented a stark 
contrast to US seemingly indifference in the Lucky Dragon incident. Japanese fishermen were affected by US hydrogen 
bomb test on Bikini atoll in March 1954. See, John Swenson-Wright, Unequal allies?: United States security and 
alliance policy toward Japan, 1945-1960 (Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, 2005), 150. 
112 Mao stressed the huge economic development tasks which China and India faced, and intoned: ―China wants peace 
… application of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence should be extended to state relations among all countries.‖ 
See Summary of talks with Mao Tse-tung, Beijing, 19 Octobter 1954, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second 
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in the Indian sources could one detect the rare glimpses of Mao‘s impatience with Nehru‘s 
judicious comments about Washington‘s ―fear complex.‖ Mao‘s staccato comments included: 
―What of communism?‖; ―But US cannot be afraid? ―What are they afraid of?‖; ―America had so 
much of strength and wealth.‖113 In response, Nehru even-handedly highlighted the perceived 
threat China posed. One, adjacent smaller Asian nations were frightened and Nehru advised Mao 
to ―remove this fear from the minds of smaller countries.‖ Two, Nehru explained SEATO was 
―American reaction against the Geneva Conference. The Americans … wanted to show that their 
views still counted and that their strength and influence in Asia had not become less.‖ Three, most 
European nations avoided the PRC. Their fear of being isolated ―in the event of any armed conflict 
with Russia‖ meant at most they would try to influence America‘s opinion ―without leaving the 
American camp.‖ Against Nehru‘s multi-faceted response, Mao insisted that the US ―is frightening 
others through its activities. We cannot have even good sleep, you know.‖114   
 
In the next meeting on 23 October, Mao went quickly to the root of his concerns: ―Do you think 
that US wants war and would use war to achieve its interests?‖ Nehru pointed out that ―many in 
the civilian administration do not [think in terms of war].
115
 Mao was clearly daunted by atomic 
weapons, but he made a show of philosophizing away the threat. But Nehru pointed out that if 
China‘s population were killed off in large numbers, China ―cannot easily start again.‖ Mao 
conceded to Nehru‘s logic: ―We have just started our Five-Year Plan. Should there be a war, all 
our plans will be destroyed.‖116 Thus, Beijing wanted Nehru‘s sponsorship in the PRC‘s search for 
peace. In a critical section missing in the Chinese sources, Mao asked Nehru‘s advice for 
―convening a World Peace Congress.‖ Zhou had raised this issue in an earlier meeting: ―We 
support the … Afro-Asian Conference … because this conference is for Afro-Asia peace in the 
context of a larger world peace; not only would this conference expand the peace process, it would 
                                                                                                                                                   
Series Vol. 27(Oct 1 1954-Jan 31 1955), ed. Sarvepalli Gopal (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002) (hereafter 
cited as SWJN) 
113 Mao with Nehru, record of conversation, 19 Oct 1954, in MD ,128. 
114 Nehru with Mao, 19 October 1954, SWJN vol. 27. 
115 Nehru acknowledged that the military were hawks. See Minutes of talks with Mao Tse-tung, Beijing, 23 October 
1954, in SWJN. 
116 Mao proceeded: ―We have spent all our money on construction. If war should come we will have to gather everything 
to wage the war and all construction will be stopped. War plans will have to be drawn up and this would postpone the 
industrialization of China.‖ For an alternative record, see ―We should work together to prevent War and Win a lasting 
peace,‖ Mao with Nehru, record of conversation, 23 Oct 1954, in MD, 131-133. 
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also ease international tensions.‖117 Mao also reaffirmed PRC‘s interest: ―Over a hundred nations 
all over the world can participate, and there should be a sort of treaty for peace and non-
aggression.‖118 
 
Beijing quickly acted to placate its neighbour‘s fears. In the first meeting with U Nu on 1 
December 1954, Mao freely endorsed Sino-Burmese trade agreements and even invited the 
Burmese to inspect Yunnan.
119
 Mao endorsed the Burmese role in organizing the Bandung 
Conference. In a subtle quid pro quo, Mao requested: ―We hope to attend this conference, if that is 
agreeable to the other countries.‖ Presented with such generous hospitality, U Nu formally 
extended the Bandung invitation to the PRC the next day. Zhou ―heartily‖ accepted, echoing that: 
―This meeting will facilitate a common meeting place for countries with hitherto no relations with 
each other. This will build up mutual appreciation and remove misunderstandings and 
estrangements.‖120 
 
Mao intuitively understood that Beijing‘s reassurances to Yangôn were a clear statement about the 
reality of the PRC‘s burgeoning hegemonic status in Asia. To U Nu‘s verbal posturing that ―I shall 
listen to their suggestions with the humbleness of a younger brother toward his elder brothers,‖ 
Mao waved aside and insisted that the PRC and Burma were ―brothers born in the same year.‖ 
Mao pressed home the anti-imperialist rhetoric: ―Countries in Asia and Africa have for many years 
been bullied by imperialist powers, mainly Britain, the US, France, Germany and Japan … The 
day will come when we shall have genuine independence ...‖121 
 
                                                 
117 Nehru merely summarized the activities of the Colombo powers but Zhou moved in to express interest. Xiong 
Huayuan, Zhou Enlai Wanlong zhi Xing 周恩来万隆之行 [Zhou Enlai in Bandung] (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian 
Chubanshe, 2002), 1-7. 
118 Mao also subtly beseeched Nehru to make a case to Eisenhower that the PRC had no desire to ―go to war.‖ This was 
in stark contrast to the bombastic assumptions about China‘s survivability in a nuclear war. Minutes of talks with Mao 
Tse-tung, Beijing, 23 October 1954, in SWJN. 
119 Concerned that the Burmese were ―afraid our Yunnan Province will be harmful to you,‖ Mao went to reassure U Nu 
that he could ―take a look at Yunan, to observe what is going on there.‖ Mao further stated that ―we have issued strict 
orders to our people in the border areas to confine themselves to defensive measures and never take even one step across 
the boundary.‖ See ―We should Promote Understanding in the course of Cooperation,‖ Mao with U Nu, record of 
conversation, 1 Dec 1954, in MD, 136-142. 
120 Xiong Huayuan, 7; Zhou Enlai Dashi Benmo 周恩来大事本末[A complete account of Zhou Enalai‘s activities], ed. 
Wen Yan 闻岩 (Jiangsu Jiaoyu chubanshe, 1998), 609. 
121 Mao with U Nu, record of conversation, 11 Dec 1954, in MD, 143-150. 
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Mao further reassured U Nu that ―revolution cannot be exported‖ and ―we do not organize a 
Communist Party among overseas Chinese.‖ Citing the CIA coup in Guatemala, Mao promised 
that the PRC ambassador, Yao Zhongming, would never instigate such a dastardly act. Even when 
U Nu extended an invitation for the CCP to send a delegation to Burma, Mao refused as it might 
upset other political parties in Burma.
122
 However, Beijing‘s overtures via India and Burma were 
rejected by the US. In January 1955, Dulles dismissed U Nu‘s appeals for direct Sino-US talks.123  
 
Nonetheless, Beijing maintained an informal back-channel linkage with London. Chinese sources 
demonstrated that this linkage provided Beijing with a credible assessment of US intentions. 
Foreign Office Deputy Undersecretary Harold A. Caccia selectively highlighted intimate debates 
in the Eisenhower administration to Chinese chargé d‘affaires Huan Xiang on 6 November 1954. 
Huan Xiang concluded from Caccia‘s information that Eisenhower was against armed intervention 
with China and the US ―would not be launching any big-scale war any time soon.‖124 The Chinese 
chargé perceived two possible motives for Caccia‘s sharing. One, this might be a British search for 
a territorial quid pro quo: the offshore islands in exchange for leaving Taiwan alone. This would 
not lead to a setback for the West, and more importantly the international position of the British 
would rise with its new-found reputation as peace maker.
125
 Two, this was a ploy towards 
neutralizing Taiwan. One way was for the US to replace Chiang Kai-shek and Taiwan be given to 
the UN in trusteeship. A less drastic solution would be to make both the US and Chiang foreswear 
counter-attacking mainland China. Britain would facilitate as a guarantor, in exchange for the 
PRC‘s tacit renunciation of force toward Taiwan.126  
 
                                                 
122 Ibid. 
123 Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communist: The United States Experience, 1953-1967 (NY: 
McGraw-Hill, 1968), 43-44. 
124 Beijing also learnt that the Republicans‘ loss in the recent mid-term elections had dampened any bellicosity of the 
White House, in view of American anti-war sentiments. Moreover, with the success of Soviet hydrogen bombs, the US 
no longer held the monopoly on nuclear weapons and any action in the Far East would have to ―take that into 
consideration.‖ See Chinese Embassy at Britain to MFA, telegram, no. 384, 10 November 1954, serial no. 110-00035-
05, AMFA. 
125 Nehru had reportedly told the British that the recovery of Taiwan was not on the cards of the PRC,but the offshore 
islands were another matter. Nehru felt that the West had no business in preventing the inevitable. Apparently, the 
British agreed with the Indian leader. Chinese Embassy at Britain to MFA, telegram, no. 384, 10 November 1954, serial 
no. 110-00035-05, AMFA. 




The US, Taiwan and China pursued their own courses of action in the aftermath of the Geneva 
Conference in late-July and August 1954. The US was dissatisfied with the Geneva Accords and 
decided to disregard it. Yet, although Washington viewed the additional prominence that the PRC 
gained in Geneva with dread, it noted that China‘s gains in Geneva were limited and the 
probability of a Communist armed attack low. US budgetary constraints, the limitations of US 
nuclear deterrence and Eisenhower‘s firmness against casual belligerency further meant that the 
US was not about to provoke a war with China. Although ―united action‖ culminated in the 
formation of SEATO and this would unsettle China, Dulles was aware of the limitations of US 
sponsorship. Taiwan was upbeat regarding US actions in Asia. Although Taiwan faced the threat 
of increasing international isolation, it was assured by the US adamant position in not recognizing 
China. While Taiwan was concerned that its interests might be neglected in SEATO talks, it was 
assured by the increasing willingness of the US to consider a mutual defense treaty. As for China, 
although Mao Zedong‘s pivotal change of China‘s international orientation towards ―peaceful co-
existence‖ and Zhou Enlai‘s whirlwind diplomacy clearly caught the US flatfooted at the Geneva 
Conference, Washington‘s disregard for the Geneva Accords dulled Beijing‘s diplomatic 
achievements. Beijing was unhappy with the continued insistence of the US on non-recognition for 
China but was encouraged by the support of Asian neutralist countries as well as China‘s relatively 
successful international debut in Geneva. However, China was frustrated with the formation of 
SEATO and the likelihood of a potential ROC-US defence treaty which it viewed to be targeting 
directly at China. Coupled with the continuation of ROC commando raids and the danger of ―two 
Chinas‖ looming ahead, the PRC launched massive bombardments on the islands of Quemoy and 
Matsu on 3 September, thereby setting off the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. However, Beijing‘s 
overriding international concerns diluted the ambitious plans of its military commanders.  
 
In the first week of the crisis, while the US assessed that Beijing‘s intentions were limited and was 
thus not prepared to escalate the crisis by militarily engaging Beijing, Taiwan worked hard toward 
securing a defence treaty and procuring more US aid. From 10 September to October, the US 
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decided to pursue Operation Oracle, which aimed at introducing a UN resolution to the Security 
Council calling for ceasefire in the Taiwan Strait and hopefully a ―neutralization of these offshore 
islands,‖ but Taiwan resisted this stiffly so as to wrangle even more concessions from the US. By 
November, the US agreed to a defence treaty and this was signed on 2 December, much to 
Taiwan‘s satisfaction. In the wake of the First Taiwan Crisis, Beijing launched a battery of 
domestic and international propaganda efforts to justify its actions. Besides appealing to its 
domestic audience, China worked hard to present its case to the Communist bloc, Japan, neutralist 
countries (especially India and Burma) and Britain. Such efforts in the international arena were 
facilitated by the success of China‘s earlier attempts to break out of diplomatic isolation following 
the Korean War and could be seen as China‘s continuing quest for international recognition and 
participation. 
 
Ironically, China‘s bombardment presented Taiwan the opportunity to turn the crisis to its 
advantage, offering it the perfect excuse to obtain a defence treaty and procure more US aid. 
Notwithstanding the Quemoy bombardment, the PRC also pressed home its advantage as the 
injured party in a successful public relations blitzkrieg domestically and internationally. In contrast, 
the US fought a rearguard battle against worsening world opinion and deteriorating domestic 
sentiments. Nevertheless, the records showed that Eisenhower‘s decision on 12 September 1954 
against any military action regarding the offshore islands proved to be consistent with the view 
that he had of China since 1953. In retrospect and paradoxically, the First Taiwan Strait Crisis 
could also be seen to have presented the context for both Beijing and Washington to take another 
step in the framework of tacit communication, which was first discernible during the negotiations 
at the Geneva Conference. This was so because Washington‘s UN approach to the First Taiwan 
Strait Crisis was made possible mainly due to Beijing‘s limited belligerency. Through a wide array 
of international contacts, Beijing had conveyed its political concerns about the Taiwan problem 
and its peaceful intention. At this stage, while Washington had not found an adequate way to 
respond to Beijing‘s peace feelers directly, its attempt to use the UN Security Council to engage 
Beijing could be viewed as a move in tacit communication. What actions the US, China and 
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Taiwan took and how Sino-US relations developed from January to April 1955 will be the topic of 






Chapter 5: The First Taiwan Strait Crisis: From Yijiangshan to Bandung 
 
On 18 January 1955, the PRC upped the ante in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis by recovering the 
obscure Nationalist-controlled Yijiangshan islands, two hundred miles north of Taiwan, as a 
prelude to occupying the neighbouring Dachen islands. Recognizing the hopelessness of defending 
Dachen, Eisenhower persuaded Chiang to give them up in return for a clear commitment from the 
US. On 28 January 1955, the US Congress responded by passing the Formosa Resolution which 
stated that the US President would aid in Taiwan‘s defence (including Penghu and ―related 
positions) against any aggression. The 40,000 Nationalist troops on Dachen then evacuated on 8-
11 February.  To reinforce the commitment of the US to the defence of Taiwan, Eisenhower in a 
news conference on 16 March threatened the use of nuclear weapons. PRC premier Zhou Enlai 
announced on 23 April, at the first Afro-Asian Conference (18-24 April 1955) in Bandung, 
Indonesia, that China was not averse to negotiating with the US over the Taiwan Strait Crisis. 
Zhou‘s conciliatory gesture was quickly accepted by the US over virulent protests by the ROC.  
 
Existing scholarship stressed this later phase of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis as one of escalation 
of conflicts in Sino-US relations, marked by the Yijiangshan campaign, the Formosa Resolution 
and Eisenhower‘s nuclear threat.1 However, the process of reconciliation was not adequately 
highlighted. With the deployment of incremental signaling, the US was prepared to negotiate; the 
only problem was how to do so without a loss of prestige. Existing scholarship also paid 
insufficient attention to Beijing‘s courting of neutralist elements in Asia. Moreover, how the 
PRC‘s overseas emissaries analyzed the crisis was not given due recognition. In addition, the 
availability of new Taiwanese sources gave an invaluable perspective to the hitherto US-centric 
perspective of the making of the Formosa Resolution.  
 
                                                 
1 On existing scholarship, see Footnote 1 of Chapter 4. For shorter accounts, see Li Xiaobing, ―PLA Attacks and the 
Amphibious Operations During the Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954-55 and the 1958,‖ in Chinese War Fighting, ed. Mark 
A. Ryan, et. al. (NY: ME Sharpe, 2003), 143-172; Michael M. Sheng, ―Mao and China‘s Relations with Superpowers in 




This chapter continues the reexamination of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, from January to April 
1955. It argues that a ritualized pattern of diplomacy emerged in spite of the belligerent rhetoric 
hurled around. This built upon the framework of tacit communication that was discernible between 
the US and the PRC since the Geneva Conference and continued despite the outbreak of the Crisis 
from July to December 1954. From January to April 1955, good intelligence possessed by Beijing 
and Washington made sure no undue escalation resulted. Ample signaling by the US and the PRC 
ensured that each moved towards the Bandung Conference as a way to tacitly resolve the Crisis. 
While Washington learnt just how deeply Beijing was averse toward any notion of ―two Chinas,‖ 
Beijing appreciated the effectiveness of third-party negotiators in plodding Washington toward 
direct negotiations. The Bandung Conference became a choice forum for signaling the formal 
winding down of the Crisis: while Washington finally accepted the PRC‘s ―right to liberate 
Formosa‖ in principle, Beijing obliquely reassured the world it preferred peaceful means for that 
end.   
 
This chapter will explore the above themes in three main sections. The first section, focusing on 
developments in January and February, will analyze why China launched the Yijiangshan 
campaign, how the US and ROC responded, and what attempts were made by the US and China in 
their search for mediators to resolve the crisis. The second section, focusing on developments from 
February to March, will examine how the relationship between public posturing of rhetoric 
belligerency and tacit understanding and agreement evolved in Sino-US relations. It will also 
explore the emergence of America‘s New Look nuclear deterrence doctrine and how this was 
viewed by the PRC. The third section, focusing on developments from March to April, will 
investigate how Washington and Beijing demonstrated flexibility as they inched toward Bandung 
with the intention to tacitly resolve the Taiwan Strait Crisis, thereby paving the way for Sino-US 




1. January to February: Casting about for Solutions  
Although China initially vacillated on capturing the Yijiangshan and Dachen islands, its concern 
with the looming specter of ―two Chinas‖ led it to proceed with its military actions. Such a concern 
also resulted in China strongly rejecting the proposed NZ UN resolution and disregarding the US 
nuclear threat. In the wake of the Yijiangshan campaign, the US was cautious, persuading Taiwan 
to evacuate Dachen and pushing Britain to press ahead with Oracle (NZ UN resolution). At the 
same time, Eisenhower sought to placate potential unhappiness from Congress and the American 
public concerned about American military entanglement in the Taiwan Strait by presenting the 
Formosa Resolution as a ―virtuous‖ American act in accordance with American ―tradition.‖ The 
US also tacitly accepted the PRC‘s international standing, recognized the inevitability of another 
diplomatic engagement with China, and hoped that by proposing Oracle, this would not only 
salvage the US international standing and support the ROC‘s UN position, but would also signal to 
China the US willingness to talk. In their search for mediators to resolve the crisis, the US 
continued to press for Oracle while Beijing preferred prodding the US with third-party emissaries 
with calls for direct negotiations.  
1.1 The PRC & Yijiangshan  
Following the bombardment of Quemoy, Mao attempted to balance the chortling for action by his 
belligerent military commanders with the PRC‘s new reasonable image on the international scene. 
He postponed the military actions time and again, leading General Zhang Aiping to sarcastically 
recommend to Beijing on 16 December to abandon the entire operation.
2
 Even the final permission 
for capturing Yijiangshan was the result of a personal appeal by Zhang to the Politburo on 18 
January 1955. Zhang did not disappoint Mao; Yijiangshan was swiftly captured. The US 
subsequently aided the KMT to evacuate Dachen on 8-11 February. According to Admiral Xiao 
Jinguang, commander of the Chinese communist navy, the entire Zhejiang sea coast was then 
                                                 
2 Ye Fei‘s 3 September 1954 bombardment of Quemoy signaled the start of the Dachen campaign. Mao subsequently 
appeared uncertain whether to proceed with the original plan to seize the Yijiangshan and Dachen islands, much to the 
frustration of Zhejiang front commanders. Li, Chinese Army, 141; Mao to Peng, Su Yu, 11 December 1954, in JGMWG, 
627; Zhang Sheng, 189. 
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secured, with KMT-controlled islands reduced from twenty-two to fourteen.
3
 However, Mao noted: 
―This is undoubtedly a military victory, but from the political angle, we still need to further 
observe and consider.‖4  
 
What finally prompted the PRC to recover the Yijiangshan and Dachen islands was its increasing 
concern over the specter of ―two Chinas.‖ On 5 January 1955, British chargé d'affaires Humphrey 
Trevelyan conveyed two messages to Beijing: first, the ROC-US Mutual Defence Treaty would 
constrain Chiang‘s counter-offensive activities; second, the PRC must ―consider the facts of 
reality‖ especially since ―there can be no hope that the US would lift the protection they had 
extended over Taiwan.‖5 This potential territorial quid pro quo leading to ―two Chinas‖ alarmed 
Beijing. Similar to Washington, Beijing had by late-1954 discounted Chiang‘s improbable fangong. 
The concern was on how the ROC-US Defence Treaty might ―legalize the occupation of Taiwan 
and Pescadores.‖ However, Zhou did extend an olive branch: ―Countries which are willing to build 
normal relations with us, willing to peacefully co-exist with us, and give up hostile intentions, we 
will reciprocate by extending our hands. This does not exclude the US.‖6 However, Zhou‘s 
message was lost amid the hot rhetoric of accusing Whitehall of perpetuating an ―Eastern Munich‖ 




Mao‘s suspicions were further fanned by a 15 January warning from China‘s London chargé.  It 
seemed that Caccia‘s November 1954 hint of a quid pro quo had begun to take shape. First, Britain 
might venture to recognize the ―independence of Taiwan.‖ Next, the loose alliance of SEATO 
might be made firmer. PRC‘s diplomats speculated that Korea, Japan and Taiwan would be pulled 
into this security arrangement. To gain Beijing‘s acquiescence, the US ―would not object the entry 
                                                 
3 Xiao Jinguang 肖劲光, Xiao Jinguang Huiyilu 肖劲光回忆录 [Memoirs of Xiao Jinguang](Beijing: Jiefangjun 
chubanshe, 1988),126. 
4 Zhang Sheng, 188-194. 
5 Trevelyan had an earful from Zhou on 5 January 1955, although he characterized it as a ―good tempered quarrel.‖ 
Trevelyan, Worlds Apart, 137. 
6 The Chinese records showed that the usually debonair premier displayed considerable ire with the British lack of 
trustworthiness. ―Jianjue fandui zhizhao liangge zhongguo de yingmou,‖坚决反对制造‗两个中国‘的阴谋 [Resolutely 
opposed to the ‗Two Chinas‘ conspiracy] Zhou with Trevelyan, Record of conversation, 5 Jan 1955, in ZEWW, 94-105. 
7 ―Munich‖ represented how Britain‘s appeasement of Hitler served to whet Germany‘s appetite for territorial expansion, 
culminating in the outbreak of World War II. Winston Churchill viewed this episode as ―a total and unmitigated 




of the PRC into the UN.‖8 Therefore, Beijing might be confronted with having to choose between 
admission into the UN and the realization of ―Two Chinas.‖ Eden reinforced Beijing‘s fear by 
publicly stating in late-January the ―differences in status of the offshore islands and Taiwan.‖ The 
British appeared to be persuading ―the ROC-US to give up the offshore islands in exchange for 
PRC‘s acquiescence in some sort of independent status for Taiwan.‖ This scheme would maintain 
the ―prestige‖ of the US while Washington disentangled from the Taiwan Strait morass. Britain 
would advocate a ―temporary ceasefire‖ for ―Chiang‘s troops to evacuate from Dachen‖ and then 
highlight the successful evacuation of Dachen as a solution to Quemoy and Matsu. But to Beijing, 
this act would disastrously finalize the ―ceasefire line.‖9   
 
Meanwhile, Beijing had learnt about the configurations behind the proposed NZ UN resolution. 
Beijing‘s back-channels to London extended beyond informal Whitehall sources as two left-wing 
Labour politicians, Harold Davies and William N. Warbey, allegedly fed ―insider‖ information to 
the Chinese chargé on 26 January. According to Davies and Warbey, the UN gambit was depicted 
as a desperate but win-win measure to resolve the US dilemma. If Beijing bit the bait, the US 
would seize the initiative and present the PRC‘s acceptance of the UN resolution as a success. 
Should Beijing balk at the NZ resolution, the US could push the responsibility to the PRC and 
reclaim the moral high ground. Having been thus warned, Beijing was even more adamant not to 
be jockeyed into accepting the NZ resolution.
10
 Eisenhower‘s 24 January calls for a Formosa 
Resolution were interpreted by Beijing as a threat: ―You must either accept our occupation of your 
territory or fight.‖11 When Trevelyan approached Zhou on 28 January regarding the NZ 
Resolution, it became the ―bleakest interview I ever had with Chou.‖ Zhou, in ―his most emotional 
and bitter mood,‖ denounced the US maneuver as getting ―the UN‘s cover for aggression against 
                                                 
8 The reported concerned a ―secret attachment‖ to the ROC-US Mutual Defence Treaty. Beijing‘s attention was not on 
Washington‘s protection over the offshore islands which was a given; it feared a much bigger conspiracy – the 
realization of ―two Chinas and the long-term occupation of Taiwan.‖ Chinese Embassy at Britain to MFA, telegram, 
no.510, 15 January 1955, serial no. 110-00276-06, AMFA. 
9 This insight was presented a month ahead of Eden‘s 28 February approach. Chinese Embassy at Britain to MFA, 
telegram, no. 879, 27 January 1955, serial no. 110-00276-06, AMFA. 
10 The Chinese report did not question the credibility of Davies and Warbey. Chinese Embassy at Britain to MFA, 
telegram, no. 961, 29 January 1955, serial no. 110-00276-06, AMFA. 




China.‖ Privately, Trevelyan admitted that the US motives were just that: ―To put the Chinese 
government in the dock.‖12 
 
To warn the hawks in the US, Mao boldly disregarded the US nuclear threat. Mao told the new 
Finnish Ambassador Carl-Johan Sundstrom: ―We have two principles: first, we don‘t want war; 
second, we will strike back resolutely if anyone invades us.‖ When Sundstrom cautioned that 
several hydrogen bombs would annihilate China, Mao retorted: ―The United States cannot 
annihilate the Chinese nation with its small stack of atom bombs.‖13 Three days later, Zhou 
publicly thanked the Soviet Union for passing atomic energy knowledge to the PRC and he 
accused the US of using atomic warfare to threaten the PRC over the Taiwan issue: ―On the one 
hand we must oppose atomic weapons, but on the other hand, we should master atomic energy. If 
the imperialists dare to provoke us, they will only destroy themselves.‖14 
 
1.2 The US and Taiwan: The Formosa Resolution 
The US accepted the loss of Yijiangshan and Dachen. Despite the harping of the ROC and Radford 
about Dachen‘s military value, Dulles ―thinks that is a lot of hooey and bunk.‖15 The 
administration wanted to avoid transforming Dachen into another Dien Bien Phu. Instead, 
Washington was more concerned that the ROC force might be carried away with retaliation. The 
relevant policy statement in the newly amended NSC 5441 stated: ―Do not agree to GRC [Taiwan] 
offensive actions against Mainland Communist China, except under circumstances approved by 
the President.‖16 Despite desperate pleas by the ROC Foreign Minister George Yeh, Eisenhower 
                                                 
12 The NZ resolution died in its crib in the face of Beijing‘s resolution objection. Zhou claimed that the resolution 
seemed to suggest that Chinese territories guaranteed under ―the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Agreement and other 
international documents were waste paper.‖ See Trevelyan, Worlds Apart, 141-144; ―Mr. Trevelyan's conversation with 
Chou Enlai on Jan 28, 1955,‖ Memo, Department of State, DDRS; Dutton, Anthony Eden, 353. 
13 ―The Atomic Bomb cannot scare the Chinese people,‖ Mao with Finnish Ambassador Carl-Johan Sundstrom, 
summary of conversation, 28 January 1955, in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 5 (Peking: Foreign Language 
Press, 1977), 152-153. (hereafter cited as SW) 
14 ―Guanyu heping liyong yuanzineng de wenti,‖关于和平利用原子能的问题 [Regarding the problems of peaceful 
usage of atomic energy] Zhou‘s speech to the State Council, 31 Jan 1954, in ZEJW, 357-363. 
15 Allen Dulles reported to Dulles on 12 January that the Nationalists were handling the impending loss of Yijiangshan 
very ―badly.‖ But both the Dulles brothers viewed the loss as ―not of great value.‖ Telephone call from Allen Dulles, 12 
Jan 1955, Telephone Conversation Series, box 3, telephone conv. - general Jan 3 1955 - Feb 18 1955 (4), JFD papers, 
DDEL. 
16 On 13 January, Radford‘s recommendation for additional F-86 planes for the KMT to run an ―an effective air patrol 




only cautiously decided ―to draw the line‖ with a Congressional resolution after the fall of 
Yijiangshan.
17
 Dulles explained to key policy makers that the President had decided on a more 
―positive action and eliminate the fuzziness as to what the US would or would not do in the 
area.‖18   
  
Caution in the Taiwan Strait was the watchword in Washington. The US limitations were exposed 
when the Seventh Fleet avoided its usual patrol route through the contentious area once the 
communist bombardment started.
19
 To convince Taipei to evacuate Dachen, Dulles chose to 
emphasize the possibility of ―war with China‖ as a selling point. Dulles‘ bold talk about attacking 
the mainland sounded soothingly like Chiang‘s ―counter-offensive.‖20 Moreover, Dulles played 
loosely with the term the ―security of Quemoy area.‖ ―Security‖ was explained as ―either US 
forces or Chinese forces would be empowered to attack a build-up on the mainland which seemed 
to be aimed at Quemoy, or Formosa and the Pescadores.‖ The addition of ―Chinese forces‖ 




Yet upon close scrutiny, this episode was a classic case of the asymmetry in concerns between a 
patron and its client. While Taipei‘s main concern was the loss of its dwindling territories, the US 
was piqued by the strategic dilemma caused by the offshore islands to its New Look nuclear 
deterrence doctrine that emphasized ―massive retaliatory power.‖ For example, US attacks became 
restricted to ―points on the mainland behind Quemoy in order to destroy any Communist build-up 
for invading Formosa and Pescadores‖ and Dulles had to clarify that Matsu would not be protected. 
                                                 
17 On 18 January, Yeh tried unsuccessfully to inveigle Washington along three lines: international prestige, 
psychological defeat and communist tide. Record of conversation, George Yeh K. C. and Admiral Radford, 18 January 
1955, serial no. 002080106035005, CKS papers, AH.           
18 Dulles elaborated to Eisenhower: ―… we should assist in the evacuation of the Tachens, but … declare that we will 
assist in holding Quemoy and possibly the Matsus ...‖ Eisenhower, Mandate, 466; Conference with Dulles, 19 Jan 1955 
(4:45-7pm), Memo, White House, DDRS. 
19 Yeh‘s plea for the Seventh Fleet ―to continue patrolling the Dachen area‖ to ―forestall Communist attacks‖ was 
rejected by Dulles. Notes of conversation, George Yeh K. C. and John Foster Dulles, 12:30 pm, 19 January 1955, serial 
no.002080106035005, CKS papers, AH.           
20 Notes of conversation, George Yeh K. C. and John Foster Dulles, 3:45 pm, 19 January 1955, serial 
no.002080106035005, CKS papers, AH. 
21 Memorandum of conversation, George Yeh K. C. and John Foster Dulles, 19 January 1955, serial 
no.002080106035005, CKS papers, AH. 
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Quemoy‘s guarantee was given, ―pending some kind of action by the United Nations.‖22 To further 
encourage Chiang to withdraw from Dachen, Robertson emphasized the secret reassurances in the 
ROC-US Mutual Security Treaty: ―When Communist China attacked Quemoy and Matsu, the US 
would be involved in war, assisting in the defence of Taiwan and the Pescadores.‖ Discernibly 
pleased, Yeh and Koo praised that ―Dulles possesses an extraordinary degree of empathy and 
perception, as does Robertson.‖23 
 
However, to ensure the British would still push Oracle through, the US obfuscated the extent of 
their assurances to the ROC. On 21 January, Dulles stated carefully to British Ambassador Makins 
that ―it was agreed that there would be no statement publicly made regarding the intentions of the 
US with respect to Quemoy and the Matsu Islands.‖ Nothing was said about US private assurances 
to Taipei.
24
 But an hour later, Dulles reassured Yeh ―that the US would be prepared to assist in the 
defence of Matsu as well as Quemoy. However, no public declaration would be made at present in 
this respect.‖25 It is small wonder then that the British ambassador would overreach himself by 
concluding erroneously to Eden that there was ―no additional private or public commitment to the 
Chinese Nationalists.‖26        
 
Besides winning over the ROC and Britain to US intentions, Eisenhower had to actively manage 
potential rumblings from Congress. He allowed occasional strident protests from Senator 
Knowland so long as Knowland was not urging ―specific drastic action, which in fact, the 
administration would not be disposed to take.‖27 In this hour of need, the White House skillfully 
                                                 
22 Gordon H. Chang made a similar case about the fuzziness of US promises. Dulles had declared bleakly: ―Even if the 
United States were at war with Communist China, it would not try to defend these islands under the same 
circumstances.‖ See Friends and Enemies, 124;  Memorandum of conversation, George Yeh K. C. and John Foster 
Dulles, 19 January 1955, serial no.002080106035005, CKS papers, AH; ―The Evolution of Foreign Policy,‖ 12 Jan 
1954, in Department of State Bulletin, no. 761 (25 Jan 1954), 108; ―Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal 
Year 1955‖, January 21, 1954, in PPPUS (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight David 
Eisenhower, 1953-1960), vol.2 (1954), 117. 
23 Minutes of meeting, George Yeh and Wellington Koo with Walter Robertson, 21 January 1955, serial no. 
002080106034004, CKS papers, AH.       
24 Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, 21 January 1955 (1030hrs) in FRUS, Vol.2 (1955-1957), 97. 
25 Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, 21 January 1955 (1145hrs) in FRUS, Vol.2 (1955-1957), 100. 
26 My interpretation departs from Rosemary Foot. See ―The Search for a Modus Vivendi: Anglo-American Relations and 
China Policy in the Eisenhower Era,‖ in The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960, 155. 
27 Issues revolving ―recognition, UN seat, trade or like subjects‖ dissatisfied Knowland, but ―he did not press for any 
drastic action.‖ ―Memo of conversation with Knowland,‖ 17 Jan 1955, General Correspondence & Memoranda Series, 
box 1, Memos of conversation - General J through K (2), JFD papers, DDEL; Eisenhower‘s adroit handling of the Senate 
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tapped onto friendly senators, dutifully informing them the advantages of ―regrouping‖ of 
Chiang‘s forces to defensible positions and reinforcing it with a Congressional resolution.28  
 
The attention which Eisenhower gave to courting America for the Formosa Resolution was 
instructive. Robert Cutler, White House Special Assistant, indicated how Eisenhower was eager to 
tap upon the ―psychological effect upon world opinion of a Congressional authorization.‖29 The 
Formosa Resolution was an attempt to reaffirm basic American values and educate the public 
about US global responsibilities. Eisenhower dropped any reference about protecting Quemoy and 
Matsu, and Cutler noted that the ringing request for endorsement of the President‘s actions in the 
Taiwan Strait was crafted because ―[Congress] don‘t want to admit that in a Cold War there are 
many situations that are neither war nor peace.‖30  
 
First, Eisenhower established that the Resolution was for a ―just and honorable peace,‖ a theme 
frequently repeated in the nation‘s history. Eisenhower stressed the ―purely defensive character‖ of 
the US actions, reinforcing the myth of US non-aggression toward other nations. In keeping with 
the tradition of US wariness of a large standing army, Eisenhower added that the authority given 
by Congress would be ―temporary‖ and in no way was this ―a new policy‖ nor an enlargement of 
―its defensive obligations.‖ Second, Eisenhower drew upon the time-honored ―unity and 
determination‖ of America in confronting ―provocative political‖ and ―aggressive‖ actions. 
Formosa became an emblem of the US duty ―to preserve the vital stake of the free world.‖ The 
trope of wanton communist aggression was contrasted with the ―gallant few who fought bravely 
for days against overwhelming odds.‖ Hence, the brave but weak ROC needed the ―assistance‖ of 
the US. Third, the Resolution was presented as a lesson in US constitutional history, especially 
Presidential prerogatives. In the aftermath of the Bricker Amendment which was introduced in 
                                                                                                                                                   
and House leaders was highlighted in Fred Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 57-99. 
28 Anna Kasten Nelson, ―John Foster Dulles and the Bipartisan Congress,‖ Political Science Quarterly 102, no. 1 (Spring 
1987), 53. 
29 Cutler recounted how Eisenhower made the State Department go through ten drafts of the special message to 
Congress. Even for the tenth draft, thirty-seven corrections were made on the twelve-page document. Robert Cutler, No 
Time for Rest (Boson: Little Brown and Company, 1965), 323. 
30 Telephone call to the President, 24 January 1955, Telephone Conversation Series, box 10, Telephone Conv - White 
House Nov 1 1954–Feb 18 1955 (1), JFD papers, DDEL. 
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January 1953 to curb the US presidency‘s latitude in signing international treaties but was not 
passed eventually, Eisenhower was reasserting the boundaries of his ―constitutional powers.‖31 
While he had the powers to act, Eisenhower flattered Congress by extending the mandate of 
authority to them. Finally, in this brave new world of US leadership, Eisenhower stressed that 
armed force had to be used ―promptly and effectively‖ to ―make clear the unified and serious 
intentions of our Government.‖ This need for speed was also extended to the issue of the 
ratification of the Sino-US Mutual Defence Treaty.
32
    
 
Although the Formosa Resolution was passed with a good majority, the demands of the senators 
were more circumscribed.
33
 Senators were worried about the US being militarily entangled in the 
Taiwan Strait and numerous concerns were raised about how ―action might be interpreted in the 
Far East that we will attack the mainland.‖ Dulles reassured the Senate that ―action would be taken 
in Washington, not in the field, unless there were an emergency.‖34 Dulles also ensured that the US 
military would be reined in as tightly as possible.
35
 Allen Dulles too felt that the situation in the 




Chiang, however, was incensed with Eisenhower for not stating the defence of the offshore 
islands. He refused to budge from Dachen ―until [US] position regarding Quemoy and Matsu had 
been clarified.‖37 White House was piqued as the ―fellow over there was asking too much.‖38 But 
Eisenhower remained firmly against making public US protection of the offshore islands. First, 
                                                 
31 Grant, ―The Bricker Amendment Controversy,‖ 577. 
32 Special Message to the Congress by President Eisenhower on United States Policy for the Defence of Formosa, 24 
January 1955, in The Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1961: A Documentary History, ed. Robert L. Branyan & 
Lawrence H. Larsen (NY: Random House, 1971),748-751.  
33 With the censure of Senator McCarthy confirmed by 2 December 1954, the ugly specter of McCarthyism and anti-
communism had run its full destructive course. Gary W. Reichard, Politics as Usual: The Age of Truman and 
Eisenhower (Illinois: Harlan Davison, 1988), 107; Jeff Broadwater, Eisenhower & the Anti-Communist Crusade (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 192. 
34 Telephone call to Senator George, 26 Jan 1955, 1:12 pm, Telephone Conversation Series, box 3, telephone conv. - 
general Jan 3 1955 - Feb 18 1955 (2); Telephone call to Mr Wilcox, 26 Jan 1955, 12:53 pm, Telephone Conversation 
Series, box 3, telephone conv. - general Jan 3 1955 - Feb 18 1955 (2), JFD papers, DDEL. 
35 Secretary of Air Force Harold Talbott was instructed to ―get hold‖ of Radford about the ―resumption of the kind of 
activities which had been conducted in 1952,‖ essentially Seventh Fleet routine patrols of the Taiwan Strait. Telephone 
call from Secretary Talbott, 26 Jan 1955, 2:26 pm, Telephone Conversation Series, box 3, telephone conv. - general Jan 
3 1955 - Feb 18 1955 (2), JFD papers, DDEL. 
36 Telephone call to Allen Dulles at AWD request, 7 Feb 1955, Telephone Conversation Series, box 3, telephone conv. - 
general Jan 3 1955 - Feb 18 1955 (1), JFD papers, DDEL. 
37 Memorandum of a Conversation, 30 Jan 1955 (6:30pm), in FRUS (1955-57) vol. 2, 174. 
38 Memo, Department of State, 30 Jan 1955, DDRS. 
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Washington did not wish to embarrass London. Second, Eisenhower acknowledged that the US 
played Chiang out but reasoned that ―we should not tie ourselves down in what was only one 
incident of the great over-all struggle of freedom against Communist expansion.‖39  This pattern of 
reasoning formed the leitmotiv of Eisenhower‘s method of staunchly guarding the US against 
over-reaction when confronted with communist provocations.
40
   
 
With the Formosa Resolution at hand, Taipei was puzzled by the enduring persistence of the US in 
following through with Oracle. Taipei demanded reassurances that Washington was ―opposed to 
admitting Communist China into the UN and the realization of a ‗two-China‘ situation.‖41 In truth, 
the US had grudgingly acknowledged that another diplomatic engagement with Communist China 
was inevitable. Robertson clarified: ―We have to accord Communist China similar treatment as we 
gave them over the UN-sponsored Korean War armistice negotiations.‖ This explained the 
doggedness of the US to engage China via Oracle. Robertson accepted the communist rejection of 
Oracle as a ―foregone conclusion‖ but hoped that this would send a strong signal to Beijing of the 
US willingness to talk.
42
   
 
This tacit acceptance of the PRC‘s standing was reflected in an OCB report, despite the discomfort 
shown by Washington toward the PRC‘s world position.43 Yet, at stake for all parties was how to 
extricate from the crisis with their ―national prestige‖ intact. The OCB astutely perceived the 
dilemma Beijing confronted in the ROC-US defence treaty, the ―difficult choice of backing down 
on their ―liberation‖ of Formosa campaign or running serious risk of war with the US.‖ The 
political intention of the bombardment of the offshore islands appeared to be manufacturing a 
                                                 
39 194th Meeting of NSC, 29 April, 1954, NSC Series, box 5, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
40 ―We must be the judge of the military situation that draws us in,‖ stressed the President, ―whether in Quemoy or 
elsewhere.‖ Memorandum of a Conversation, 30 Jan 1955 (6:30pm), in FRUS (1955-57) vol. 2, 175. 
41 Yeh asserted that the US ―must explicitly state [this] in the Security Council meetings.‖ Minutes of meeting, George 
Yeh and Wellington Koo with Walter Robertson, 27 January 1955, serial no. 002080106034004, CKS papers, AH; 
Conference with Dulles, 19 Jan 1955 (4:45pm), Memo, White House, DDRS. 
42 Minutes of meeting, George Yeh and Wellington Koo with Walter Robertson, 27 January 1955, serial no. 
002080106034004, CKS papers, AH.       
43 ―The Geneva Conference signalized Communist China‘s emergence, after a period of relative quiescence, into the 
arena of international affairs. This was followed by a marked effort to acquire prestige and internal acceptance, which 
had been pursued with vigor, persistence, flexibility, and considerable success.‖ Progress report on NSC 146/2 "United 
States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Formosa and The Nationalist Government (22 June 1954-31 
Dec 1954)," OCB, White House, 25 Jan 1955, DDRS. 
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―success which can be presented to the public as victories, thus saving face for the régime and 
compensating somewhat for the régime‘s inability to deliver on its promises to ‗liberate‘ 
Formosa.‖ 44 On the other hand, the OCB perceived Taipei‘s international standing as increasingly 
undermined by Beijing‘s charm offensive. The ROC‘s position in the UN was becoming untenable 
and pressure seemed likely to come from ―our allies and from certain sectors of American public.‖ 
Moreover, the PRC‘s ―campaign of attrition‖ via attacks on Dachen targeted the KMT‘s lack of 
―moral capacity to resist.‖45 Hence, the evacuation from Dachen was addressed as a chance for the 
ROC to ―regroup and reform.‖ Washington‘s recourse to the UN was also a gambit to salvage its 
international standing and to buttress the ROC‘s UN position.46 
1.3 The US and the PRC: The Search for Mediators  
a. UN Secretary-General Hammarskjold  
UN Secretary-General Hammarskjold was the first candidate in the search for mediators by the US 
and the PRC to resolve the crisis in the Taiwan Strait. To counter the NZ Resolution advocated by 
the US, Beijing flagged the US airmen who were detained in China prior to the launch of the 
Yijiangshan campaign. They were US military personnel captured on the charge of spying for the 
US, although Washington denied these allegations. Hammarskjold‘s visit to the PRC on 5-10 
January provided a good opening for negotiations. However, to the chagrin of the US, 
Hammarskjold reported that ―Chou is relating the question of the flyers to the whole complex of 
questions which he guesses is regularization of the whole situation.‖47 Indeed, Zhou talked about 
―harmonizing the tense situation‖ in the Taiwan Strait on 6 January. The next day Zhou stressed 
the ―Geneva spirit of 1954‖ and pointed out that the US was ―only interested in making hay out of 
the spy case [airmen POWs] in order to distract the world‘s attention from the hostile and invasive 
                                                 
44 The OCB observed that the danger for the ROC was ―repeating the pattern of defeat on mainland‖ and for the US the 
potential loss of its ―national prestige.‖ For the Chinese Communists, gaining a few remote offshore islands meant 
improving ―their military position with respect to Formosa and gain in national prestige.‖ Progress report on NSC 146/2 
"United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Formosa and The Nationalist Government (22 June 
1954-31 Dec 1954)," OCB, White House, 25 Jan 1955, DDRS. 
45 Progress report on NSC 146/2 "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Formosa and The 
Nationalist Government (22 June 1954-31 Dec 1954)," OCB, White House, 25 Jan 1955, DDRS. 
46 Conference with Dulles, 19 Jan 1955 (4:45pm), Memo, White House, DDRS. 
47 Telephone call from Amb Lodge, 7 Jan 1955, Telephone Conversation Series, box 3, telephone conv. - general Jan 3 
1955 - Feb 18 1955 (4), JFD papers, DDEL. 
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intentions of the Sino-US Mutual Defence Treaty.‖48 Indeed, vilifying the PRC was the foremost 
objective, according to Lodge: 
Assuming the mission fails … a resolution in the UN might be a good thing. It 
would be one of disgust and contempt that these people [PRC] should have acted 
this way in view of the request of 47 countries … Then it could be whispered in 
the corridors we would be willing to have a bilateral talk and then if things go 
through, we would have the resolution stricken.
49
 
Hence, the purpose of evoking the UN via Oracle and roping in Hammarskjold on the airmen issue 
was for the US to gain a fig leaf in casting the Chinese Communists in bad light.
50
 This was 
achieved when Zhou Enlai openly denounced the Formosa Resolution and inevitably assumed ―the 
burden of preventing a peaceful settlement,‖ much to the delight of Dulles.51  
 
However, the US found Hammarskjold to have taken his job too seriously.
52
 He urged for the 
coordination of actions aimed at providing ―momentum‖ for the negotiations over the prisoners 
and defended that it was only ―natural‖ that his talks with the Chinese further discussed ―this 
whole issue to peace.‖53 Washington was frustrated that Hammarskjold had ranged beyond ―the 
simple issue‖ of the detained prisoners.54 Hammarskjold‘s initiatives paradoxically caused the US 
to be hoisted with its own petard. Now the US appeared to be the obdurate party and Dulles 
bemoaned to a subordinate that ―we are in a mess.‖55 Dulles was so ―mad‖ that ―he does not know 
what to say to H.‖56  
 
                                                 
48 5 Jan – 10 Jan, ZENP, Vol 1., 438-439. 
49 Telephone call from Amb Lodge, 7 Jan 1955, 3:58pm, Telephone Conversation Series, box 3, telephone conv. - 
general Jan 3 1955 - Feb 18 1955 (4), JFD papers, DDEL. 
50 Trevelyan. Worlds Apar, 141-142. 
51 Telephone Call to Mr Robertson, 24 Jan 1954, Telephone Conversation Series, box 3, telephone conv. - general Jan 3 
1955 - Feb 18 1955 (3), JFD papers, DDEL. 
52 For an overview of Hammarskjold‘s method, see Peter Wallensteen, ―Dag Hammarskjold and the Psychology of 
Conflict Diplomacy,‖ in Diplomacy and Psychology: Prevention of Armed Conflicts after the Cold War, ed. Tommy 
Garling, et al. (Marshall Cavendish, 2006), 15-42. 
53 But Washington did not leave the Secretary-General any bargaining chip as issues were ―handled and settled without 
any consultation with the negotiator himself.‖ Hammarskjold to Dulles, 27 Jan 1955, in FRUS, Vol.2 (1955-1957), 149-
151. 
54 Dulles to Hammarskjold, 28 Jan 1955, in FRUS, Vol.2 (1955-1957), 160. 
55 Telephone call from M.C. Cardle, 28 Jan 1955, 12:31pm, Telephone Conversation Series, box 3, telephone conv. - 
general Jan 3 1955 - Feb 18 1955 (2), JFD papers, DDEL. 
56 Lodge agreed, saying that he ―thinks he [Hammarskjold] is way over his head. He has delusions of grandeur.‖ 
Telephone call to Amb Lodge, 28 Jan 1955, 2: 29pm, Telephone Conversation Series, box 3, telephone conv. - general 
Jan 3 1955 - Feb 18 1955 (2), JFD papers, DDEL. 
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In contrast, Zhou adroitly used Hammarskjold to air the PRC‘s grievances. Apart from restating 
that the Taiwan Strait Crisis was an internal affair and the PRC did not have a seat in the UN, the 
main thrust in Beijing‘s first official letter to the UN on 3 February was peace: ―All genuine 
international efforts to ease and to eliminate the tension created by the US in this area and other 
areas of the Far East will receive the support of the PRC.‖57 Zhou elaborated on the ―easing of 
tension‖ to Hammarskjold in another 5 February letter. Zhou‘s offer in this follow-up letter was 
strikingly similar to the one Zhou would announce in Bandung three months later: ―China would 
not refuse to negotiate with the USA on this question. If the USA has the slightest wish to 
negotiate they should accept direct negotiations and give up their war threats.‖58 
 
 ―Genuine international efforts‖ also emerged. London was no longer rooting for Oracle. An 
emergency British cabinet meeting came down in favour of mediation by Nehru. Others in Britain 
were clamoring for a ―Geneva type of conference where the Soviet Union, India, Britain and 
France would invite the PRC, the US and the ROC to attend.‖59 The Soviet calls for a ten-nation 
conference attracted interest. News that the Colombo powers (India, Ceylon, Indonesia and 
Pakistan) were offering to mediate also surfaced. Even the Commonwealth Prime Ministers‘ 
Conference to be held on 31 Janurary-8 February had on its agenda the resolution of the Taiwan 
Strait Crisis.
60
 Zhou reinforced the momentum by stating in another meeting with Swedish 
Ambassador Hugo Wistrand on 9 February: ―If the US wishes to ease the tensions in the Taiwan 
Strait, the US needs to negotiate with China face-to-face .... But if the US refuses to talk to us 
directly and continue in making war threats, what can we do?‖61 
 
The PRC‘s conciliatory message was, however, lost on the US. Eisenhower reacted sharply in 
private: ―It is awfully difficult to remain calm under these situations. Sometimes I think that it 
                                                 
57 See Zhou Enlai to Dag Hammarskjold, letter, 3 February 1955, serial no. 113-00224-01, AMFA. 
58 Swedish Ambassador Hugo Wistrand relayed this message. Lodge to State Department, telegram, 6 February 1955 
(2300hrs), FRUS, Vol.2 (1955-1957), 232. 
59 In the immediate pandemonium which ensued, almost no one paid attention to Zhou‘s elaboration. Britain reportedly 
panicked and expected the communists to swamp across the Taiwan Strait any time. Chinese Embassy at Britain to 
MFA, telegram, no. 205, 4 February 1955, serial no. 110-00276-06, AMFA. 
60 The Colombo powers indicated that they wished to work toward installing the PRC in the UN. They proposed that 
Taiwan be placed under trusteeship guaranteed by a group of willing nations. Chinese Embassy at Britain to MFA, 
telegram, no. 205, 4 February 1955, serial no. 110-00276-06, AMFA. 
61 Zhou Enlai Dashi Benmo, 620-621. 
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would be best all around to go after them right now without letting they pick their time and place 
of their own choosing.‖62 Dulles, on the other hand, resented Eden for wanting ―to back out of the 
whole business.‖63 Washington was also worried that Hammarskjold ―would make a report‖ in the 
UN.
64
 The US made it clear to Hammarskjold that he was not to take ―personal excursions with 
Chou‖ but Hammarskjold ignored it completely.65 Dulles was increasingly exasperated with 
Hammarskjold‘s forbearance with the Chinese Communists and considered most troubling 
Hammarskjold‘s ―belief that Chou is a reasonable human being.‖66  
b. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers‟ Conference (31 Janurary-8 February)  
Following the failure of Hammarskjold‘s efforts at mediation, the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers‘ Conference became a major proxy for the debates on the Taiwan issue. Both Beijing 
and Washington jockeyed behind the scenes to make their presence felt. Lester Pearson, the 
Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, reassured Dulles that ―they hope they may be 
able to remove some of the exaggerated fears.‖67 On the other hand, Ceylon and India provided 
Beijing critical information about developments in the Commonwealth Conference. One Indian 
source confided that Britain urgently requested India to ―pull its chestnuts out from the fire.‖ 
Nehru carefully remained non-committal toward the British request, citing ―he had not conjured up 
a plan yet.‖68  
 
For Washington, one unhappy outcome at the Conference was the unanimous agreement that 
Oracle was dead and ―no further UN action‖ was contemplated. Dulles noted that there was ―a lot 
                                                 
62 James Hagerty‘s Diary, 3 Feburary 1955, in Editorial Note 77, FRUS, Vol.2 (1955-1957), 202.  
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64 Telephone call from Amb Lodge, 7 Feb 1955, 5:48pm Telephone Conversation Series, box 3, telephone conv. - 
general Jan 3 1955 - Feb 18 1955 (1), JFD papers, DDEL. 
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68 One India source noted that the Taiwan Strait Crisis was ―vigorously debated‖ in the conference. Chinese Embassy at 
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of anti-American feeling‖ over in London on the China issue.69 Churchill wrote to Eisenhower on 
15 February that by giving up the offshore islands, the US would avoid ―the occasion of an 
incident which would place the US before the dilemma of either standing by while their allies were 
butchered or becoming embroiled in a war for no strategic or political purpose.‖70 On the other 
hand, Beijing observed that the Commonwealth Conference avoided giving affront to the 
Americans. The main obstacle was that the US was leery of any scheme which required a 
withdrawal from the offshore islands, without reinforcing the ROC military forces in Taiwan. The 
US was also hoping to avoid diplomatic negotiation with the Chinese Communists, while 
―maintaining the current standoff status for another five to ten years.‖71  
 
Trevelyan elaborated to Huan Xiang the stalemate proposal: ―If the present conditions for a 
temporal peace could be achieved [or even extended], in another fifty years time, the PRC would 
become stronger.‖ He declared that the US was agreeable to such an idea.72 Indeed Dulles repeated 
in analogous terms to Eden on 22 July during the Geneva Summit:  
Already in Formosa the army was changing character. It being more and more 
composed of young Formosans who did not want to return to the mainland and if 
that developed the offshore islands would matter less and in another two or three 




However, Beijing reinforced its foothold on Asia‘s anti-colonial nationalism. The Indians saw the 
PRC‘s action in the Taiwan Strait as striking a blow against the West for the East. The post-
colonial reaction against Western ―bullying and threatening tactics‖ was strong in India. Just as 
Nehru scored points for Asia in a wholly ―white‖ conference, the PRC was perceived as 
demonstrating similar verve militarily. One unnamed Indian defence attaché spoke glowingly of 
the PRC‘s actions in the Taiwan Strait as ―filling the Asia people with pride and elation.‖ This 
outspoken Indian defence attaché even boldly suggested that the PRC should ―fully prepare to 
                                                 
69 Telephone Conversation with Ambassador Lodge, 16 Feb 1955, Telephone Conversation Series, box 3, telephone 
conv. - general Jan 3 1955 - Feb 18 1955 (1), JFD papers, DDEL. 
70 Churchill to Eisenhower, 15 Feb 1955, in Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence, 194. 
71 Chinese Embassy at Britain to MFA, telegram, no. 205, 4 February 1955; Chinese Embassy at Britain to MFA, 
telegram, no. 239, 5 February 1955, serial no. 110-00276-06, AMFA. 
72 Chinese Embassy at Britain to MFA, telegram, no. 407, 9 February 1955, serial no. 110-00276-06, AMFA. 
73 Record of conversation, 22 July 1955, PREM 11/879, AOBD.  
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finish it once and for all.‖74 Beijing also became aware of how much the Americans ―dislike Nehru 
thoroughly and did not wish to let him be their front man.‖75 Eisenhower had also explicitly told 
Eden how much he detested Krishna Menon and ―had no use for his methods.‖76 Initially Beijing 
hesitated over Nehru‘s ―weak character‖ based on some wild rumours but then reasoned that it 
could also pressure the malleable Nehru.
77





Nehru was a genuine voice of Asian interests during the Commonwealth Conference. Macmillan 
recalled that Nehru‘s opening speech was ―very anti-American and pro-Chinese in sentiment.‖79 
Lester Pearson was less charitable.
80
 When Nehru made known his sympathy for China, Pearson 
depicted that as a purblind posture: 
Nehru was quite bitter about American policy, and resented, as an Asian, their 
bullying and threatening tactics. He obviously doesn't feel the same resentment 




While no immediate solution to the Taiwan Strait Crisis emerged, the Commonwealth Conference 
provided a platform to moderate a common ground for Washington and Beijing. In contrast, the 
Soviet proposal for a Ten-Nation Conference was rejected and proposals to send UN observers to 
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81 5 February 1955, Diary of Secretary of State for External Affairs, no. 241, L.B.P./Vol. 19, DCER Vol. 21 (1955). 
82 Reinforced by the appearance of a tacit Communist allowance in the Dachen area, the British thought that the offshore 
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2. February to March: Burgeoning Stabilization of the Taiwan Strait Crisis 
Although efforts at mediation between the US and the PRC did not produce immediate results, 
there did emerge a burgeoning stabilization of the Taiwan Strait Crisis. This came about as the 
PRC and the US gradually came to establish a relationship of public posturing of rhetoric 
belligerency on one hand and tacit understanding and agreement on the other. Nonetheless, the 
aggressive rhetoric projected by Washington backed by America‘s New Look nuclear deterrence 
doctrine that emphasized ―massive retaliatory power‖ and ―more bang for buck‖ did raise concerns 
among America‘s allies and also led to scholarship interpreting Eisenhower‘s issuance of nuclear 
threat on 16 March as an act that escalated the Crisis. However, in retrospect, as the Eisenhower 
administration was extremely cautious in reality, such US actions can be better interpreted as 
attempts to justify to American officials and the public the ―conventional‖ nature of America‘s 
New Look nuclear deterrence doctrine. In this regard, the PRC had good intelligence and was 
unruffled by the US atomic threat; instead it was more concerned about an Australian proposal for 
a Commonwealth ―guarantee‖ of Taiwan.83  
2.1 The PRC and the US: Staging a Theatrical Impasse  
Significantly, Beijing had grasped the utility of staging intricate public posturing while issuing 
private reassurances in international relations. The PRC‘s public denunciation of ―two Chinas‖ 
would be coupled with a tacit understanding for peace in the Taiwan Strait. Such a position would 
be similarly presented by the US: an orchestrated demonstration of overt US belligerence and a 
covert US acknowledgement of a stalemate. This diplomatic ritual was understood by the Chinese 
Communists in explicitly theatrical terms as a ruse to avoid ―losing the Free World‘s face.‖ On one 
hand, the US ―red face‖ would declare openly that they would not retreat in the face of communist 
threats. On the other hand, the ―white face‖ of Britain and India would secretly represent the US 
interests by seeking a tacit agreement with the Chinese communists for a resolution of the Taiwan 
Strait Crisis. Through this staging of a crisis impasse, the standing of the US and the PRC with 
their corresponding constituents and fraternal countries would be reinforced. Therefore, while both 
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the US and China could go on to openly denounce each other in the context of the bipolar world, 
they would ensure that their rhetoric remained as just that.
84
   
 
For instance, various statements of Dulles and the released communiqué of the first SEATO 
Council meeting held in Bangkok on 23-25 February 1955 explicitly expressed the need to 
―combat the subversive activities of international Communism.‖85 Dulles had also cabled 
Eisenhower that the ―existence of an anti-Communist potential north [Korea] and on Formosa 
deters possible Chinese aggression against Southeast Asia.‖86 However, as Eden was loath for 
SEATO to be a platform purely for the purpose of lambasting the Chinese over the Taiwan Strait 
Crisis,
87
 Washington reluctantly relented.
88
 ―If the Chinese Communists,‖ Dulles stated, ―while 
retaining their claims to Formosa, would give assurances that they would not seek a verdict by 
force, then the situation would be different.‖89 That being the case, Eden felt they should sound out 
the Chinese Communists. At least the effort would stand the US and Britain ―in better public and 
moral position‖ even if the chances were nil.90 
 
For the record, Zhou fumed against the ―hostile military alliance‖ of the SEATO, casting dissent at 
the Western alliance by declaring that: ―It seems that the British will only agree to whatever 
wrongs the US commits; this is scarcely a commendable act in Asia.‖ Against London‘s 
tergiversation over the ―legally undefined status‖ of the offshore islands and Taiwan, Zhou 
condemned it as ―a dagger plunged into the heart of the Chinese.‖91 Zhou further derided Eden‘s 
idea of a ―PRC private assurance‖ on 28 February, branding the proposal a ―dirty deal‖ –
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requesting Beijing ―to give up Taiwan for the coastal islands.‖92 Clearly, the PRC must protect the 
―sovereign rights‖ it possessed. Eden‘s compromise plan was thus entirely inimical to the leitmotif 




While Beijing vehemently rejected the notion of a ―PRC private assurance,‖ what Zhou had done 
from January to February was to delineate clearly the boundaries of discussion. One, through 
proxies such as Britain and Hammarskjöld, the PRC communicated its fear of ―Two Chinas.‖ 
Hence, any quid pro quo leading to that would be out of the question. Two, the PRC also directly 
ventilated its displeasure over SEATO. Three, Beijing had reluctantly recognized the constraints of 
the ROC-US Defence Treaty on Chiang. 
 
The repetitious ritualistic accusations of Dulles and Zhou had by February reached the liminal 
stage where each party was socialized to the other‘s actions. Despite Dulles‘ hot rhetoric, 
Washington now sought ―reassurances.‖ In turn, Beijing responded with requests for direct 
negotiations. This demonstrated that the advantages of ―tacit‖ maneuvers so highly regarded by the 
British and belatedly acknowledged by the US were accepted by Beijing. Moreover, the 
effectiveness of badgering Washington with prominent third-party proxies such as Hammarskjöld 
was duly noted by Beijing.   
    
2.2 The US and Atomic Weapons: Theatrical Belligerency, Incremental Signaling 
The aggressive rhetoric projected by Washington during the Taiwan Strait Crisis raised 
apprehension among America‘s allies over its Taiwan policy. The US diplomats were instructed 
that ―the United States intends to keep Formosa and the Pescadores in friendly hands, even at the 
risk of war.‖ The ROC forces were described as ―capable of offensive action on their own‖ and 
hence the ROC ―presents a challenge to Communist domination of the Asian mainland and to 
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Communist control of the thirteen million overseas Chinese.‖ 94 All these served to portray a 
certain air of unreality when the US vouched for the ROC as ―an alternative to the Communist 
regime.‖95  
 
Coupled with Dulles‘ alarmist report to the NSC on 10 March and Eisenhower‘s issuance of 
nuclear threat on 16 March, conventional accounts have cited this week in March as one that 
witnessed an escalation of the Crisis. In Dulles‘ report, Zhou‘s rejection of Eden made the 
situation ―critical and acute.‖ He further claimed that the ―Communists probably will go on, and 
there will perhaps be no definite answer until the United States decided to ‗shoot off a gun‘ in the 
area.‖ Dulles then reasoned that the US ―may have to demonstrate our position by deeds [atomic 
weapons] rather than by words.‖96 However, a close scrutiny of the records belied Dulles‘ declared 
pessimism. One, nowhere did Dulles admit that a war was imminent. Two, Dulles had inflated 
Beijing‘s long-term aim of recovering Taiwan as immediate. Three, Dulles had called for potential 
US actions to be delayed ―until after the ratification of the London-Paris agreements [on rearming 
Germany and ushering it into NATO].‖ Four, Dulles had stressed to Chiang ―the long-term future 
of Formosa rather than the prospect of any early return to the mainland,‖ adding that the ―dilemma 
and the danger of the current situation… however, could conceivably change in, say, a year‘s 
time.‖ 97  
 
As such, the theatrical belligerency – playing up a heightened sense of crisis than that warranted 
by the Taiwan Strait Crisis – could better be interpreted as an attempt to justify to American 
officials and the public the ―conventional‖ nature of America‘s New Look nuclear deterrence 
doctrine that emphasized ―massive retaliatory power‖ and ―more bang for buck.‖ Eisenhower, in a 
16 March press conference, declared that atomic weapons were just common ―bullet[s].‖ Dulles 
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had, on the day before, also mentioned about the use of ―some tactical small atomic weapons‖ 
should there be a general war in the Far East.
98
 Following this, Vice-President Nixon announced 
on television that ―tactical atomic weapons are now conventional.‖99 Dulles‘ main thrust seemed to 
center upon educating the US and creating ―a better public climate‖ for the use of atomic weapons. 
The military, averred Dulles, had ―convinced him that atomic weapons were the only effective 
weapons which the United States could use against a variety of mainland targets, particularly 
against Chinese Communist airfields which they would use to attack Formosa ….‖ Therefore, it 
was imperative that ―we urgently educate our own and world opinion as to the necessity for the 
tactical use of atomic weapons.‖100  
 
Dulles further wanted the US actions in the Taiwan Strait to square with the current NSC 5501 
(Basic National Security Policy) on US nuclear policy:  
… the United States cannot afford to preclude itself from using nuclear weapons 
even in a local situation, if such use will bring the aggression to a swift and 
positive cessation, and if, on a balance of political and military consideration, such 
use will best advance US security interests. 
The US should not just talk the talk, but walk the talk. Or else, ―we might wake up one day and 
discover that we were inhibited in the use of these weapons by a negative public opinion.‖101 In 
reality, however, the US was extremely cautious. ―We are doing everything possible,‖ 
Undersecretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr. informed Dulles, ―except openly engaging in the 
operation.‖ Hoover insisted that there would be ―no shooting.‖102   
 
The lack of danger in the Taiwan Strait allowed Eisenhower to toy with rhetorical belligerency. 
His personal emissary, Colonel A.J. Goodpaster, reported in mid-March that the risk of a 
Communist attack on the offshore islands was minimal. Commander of U.S. Pacific Command 
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Admiral Felix Stump also gave an optimistic assessment, reporting that the artillery threat to 
Matsu and Quemoy was ―harassing but not critical.‖ The Chinese communists would not be able to 
cut off the offshore islands‘ supplies. As China‘s airfields were not fully developed, Stump 
believed that the PRC would also not be able to deploy their air force efficiently.
103
 So confident 
was Stump that he even waved off the necessity of striking ―Chicom build-up prior to an invasion 
attempt.‖104  
 
This explains the sanguine diary entry, where Eisenhower wrote that ―hostilities are not so 
imminent as are indicated by the forebodings of a number of my associates.‖ Eisenhower blamed 
the jitteriness on ―a number of articles in the papers‖ which wildly predicted that there would be 
―hostilities within a month.‖ With good intelligence, the president could afford to wax 
philosophically about leadership in times of crises: ―I have so often been through these periods of 
strain that I have become accustomed to the fact that most of the calamities that we anticipate 
really never occur.‖105 
 
At the same time, an internal State Department paper soberly recommended incremental signaling 
to the PRC. The US should make ―deployments of US forces to the area to reinforce the deterrent 
of our verbal warnings.‖ There were several advantages. One, such signaling would not be ―unduly 
alarming [to] the American people or accentuating the fears of our allies that reckless US actions 
might result in a general war.‖ Two, signaling conveyed the image that ―moderate and prudent 
steps [were] taken as the ‗last clear chance‘ to restrain Chinese communist attacks.‖ Three, 
signaling could stress ―the peaceful intentions of the US; reaffirmation of the US intention not to 
fight unless the Communists attack, and prior, quiet explanation to our allies the purpose and 
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However, in the realm of public opinion, Eisenhower‘s calculated belligerency backfired 
immediately.
107
 When Wilson hinted publicly ―that he knew something about a bomb that was 
more horrible than the H-bomb,‖ this comment alarmed allies and fuelled speculation about the 
outcome of the Taiwan Strait. To worsen matters, Wilson proclaimed that ―the loss or retention of 
Quemoy and Matsu would make little difference in the long run.‖ This second comment halved 
any chance the White House had in convincing Chiang to evacuate the offshore islands.
108
 
Prominent Americans were loudly critical too. Lewis W. Douglas, former US ambassador to 
Britain, questioned the claim made by Dulles that the Chinese Communists would invade Taiwan 




The fear of an ―Oriental war‖ also resonated deeply in the American national psyche, not 
surprising since American GIs had faced off three Asian armies within a decade. This seemingly 
undistinguishable mass of Asian enemies provoked a variety of contradictory emotional 
responses.
110
 Douglas beseeched the president to reconsider the Taiwan Strait Crisis: ―[I] hope 
very deeply and with great urgency that we will not become entangled in either an Oriental war, or 
something much more horrible and frightfully destructive solely because of two little islands 
which we have no right to defend.‖111 However, the fabled fanaticism of the Oriental enemy also 
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prompted ready calls for atomic attack. This atomic discourse centered on four themes. One, the 
―Oriental‖ enemy seemed to be no more than microbes, as reflected in Admiral Radford‘s memo to 
Dulles on 7 April 1954, stating that ―Pentagon has been making an estimate of whether atomic 
weapons could be used to clean up the Viet Minh in the Dien Bien Phu area.‖112 Two, the 
discussion centered on cost efficiency, with Radford arguing that ―we could not handle the military 
situation in the Far East, particularly as regards aircraft, unless we could employ atomic 
weapons.‖113 Three, usage was dictated by a concern for the continuing relevance of US atomic 
doctrine. Dulles worried that the US ―would have to face up to the question whether its military 
program was or was not in fact designed to permit the use of atomic weapons.‖114 Finally, Former 
Truman advisor Bernard M. Baruch urged the administration to ―stand firm in China,‖ that ―he 
would not have us hesitate to use atomic weapons if the need arose.‖115   
 
Nonetheless, Washington did consider its actions vis-à-vis Asian sensitivities. The enormity of 
such atomic recommendations was not lost on Eisenhower who complained during Dien Bien Phu: 
―You boys must be crazy. We can‘t use those awful things against Asians for the second time in 
less than ten years. My God.‖116 From another perspective, Senator Alexander Smith stressed the 
concept of ―face‖ for their Asian enemies:117 ―If under these conditions, the UN took over and 
demilitarized the islands, so far as both sides are concerned, ‗face‘ might be saved for both sides, 
leaving the status quo as it was before.‖118 A more prevalent reaction was to leave those heathen 
masses to boil in their own oil. Wilson flagged the fear of a confrontation with the ―other‖ during a 
September 1954 meeting: ―Wars with China are traditionally hard to stop … Communist China 
could accept substantial attrition of their forces and therefore force us to expand the war.‖ 
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Face: An Updated Face-Negotiation Theory,‖ in Theorizing About Intercultural Communication, ed. William B. 
Gudykunst (London; Sage Publications, 2005), 71-92. 
118 But the concept of ―face‖ paled in view of the stronger Chinese trepidation over perceived national disintegration. 
The offshore islands had coalesced into a larger issue of national unity. Senator Alexander H. Smith to Dulles, 7 April 
1955, General Correspondence & Memoranda Series,box 3,strictly confidential - Q -S (3) , JFD papers, DDEL. 
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Nevertheless, that ―Quemoy is not our ship‖ but the US was stuck with it bothered Eisenhower to 
no end. Conservative middlebrow Americans had also constantly urged him to drop the offshore 
islands on racial ground: ―What do we care what happen to those yellow people out there?‖119  
2.3 The PRC and the US Atomic Threat: Full of Sound and Fury 
In one of the biggest twists of the 1955 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Eisenhower‘s nuclear threats were 
treated by the PRC almost like an afterthought. Chinese chargé Huan Xiang‘s 23 March London 
report concluded that despite Eisenhower‘s public atomic threats, Washington was ―extremely 
uncertain,‖ and he thus considered the atomic threats as a lot of hot air, ―full of sound and fury.‖ 
To Huan, its main purpose was to ―bluff‖ the PRC into giving tacit assurances over Taiwan for the 
offshore islands since the US would not evacuate the offshore islands without a quid pro quo from 
the Chinese Communists. But Chiang had consistently declared publicly that they would not budge 
from the offshore islands, undoubtedly to preempt any ―deals.‖  
 
In addition, Huan noted that the recent SEATO Bangkok conference had only further revealed the 
division between the US and Britain. Britain‘s attention was on the security of Malaya while the 
US was drawn to the Far East. Eden had dug himself further in opposing the US tactics in the 
Taiwan Strait.
120
 Huan‘s arguments seemed to indicate a preference for diplomatic resolution since 
the nuclear threat was a masquerade. Huan‘s report also gave ample credence to Mao‘s assertion 
that nuclear threats were ―paper tigers.‖121 In detailing the contest between the doves and the 
hawks in Washington, Huan noted that the doves stressed the irreparable damage to the US 
relationship with its allies should the US unilaterally use atomic weapons. Given that the PRC 
lacked the means to launch an invasion of Taiwan in the next three to five years, the doves 
preferred to defuse the powder keg by seeking a diplomatic solution, and even if the PRC refused 
to entertain diplomatic resolution, the US should ―play by the ear.‖ Eisenhower was persuaded by 
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the doves‘ arguments, concurred Huan.122  
 
Reassured that the US atomic threats were ―hot air,‖ Beijing was instead more alarmed over an 
Australian proposal for a Commonwealth ―guarantee‖ of Taiwan. Prime Minister Robert G. 
Menzies had proposed another way of resolving the Taiwan crisis during his visit to the US on 14 
March. To ensure that Chiang would retreat from the offshore islands, Menzies suggested a 
guarantee by Australia, New Zealand and Britain for Taiwan‘s safety. The US could then 
reciprocate by supporting ANZAM‘s strategic plan of defending Malaya from potential communist 
invasion from the south of Thailand.
123
 With the failure of Eden‘s proposal, Huan noted that more 
of the US allies were pressing the US to compromise by withdrawing from the offshore islands. 
Bereft of options, they were willing to consider Menzies‘ ―guarantee‖ proposal. Huan reported that 
the ―doves‖ were favourably disposed towards a ―guarantee‖ because they found the policy of 
―ambiguity‖ unsatisfactory.124 However, the British were adamantly against such a scheme, as it 
would ―put an end to any possibility of negotiations or even tacit agreement with the PRC.‖125  
 
Similarly for Huan, maintaining room to maneuver was paramount for Beijing.
126
 He surmised that 
both the doves and hawks in Washington shared the view that Taiwan ought to be firmly under the 
US protection. While they wished for an evacuation from Quemoy and Matsu, they differed over 
the means of the ROC retraction.
127
 In other words, the US would never withdraw to the terms 
demanded by the communists. Huan hence concluded that unless Beijing was willing to force the 




                                                 
122 The doves in the White House pointed out that while pulling out of the offshore islands might lead to the collapse of 
the ROC‘s morale, it was not the end of the world. The hawks believed that surrendering the offshore islands now would 
only make the PRC‘s conquest of Taiwan a matter of time; preempting the Chinese Communist aggression sooner was 
thus better than later. 
123 For details, see David Lee, ―Australia and Anglo-American Disagreement over the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1945-55,‖ 
The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Jan 1995): 116. 
124 The ―hawks‖ were moving to more belligerent threats, with wild rumours abounding that a US atomic attack would 
take place in mid-April or after the Bandung Conference. Chester J. Patch, Jr. & Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, rev. ed. (Lawrence, University of Kansas Press, 1991), 102. 
125 David Lee, ―Australia and Anglo-American Disagreement,‖ 118.  
126 Chinese Embassy at Britain to MFA, telegram, no.1142, 29 March 1955, serial no. 110-00276-07, AMFA. 
127 Chinese Embassy at Britain to MFA, telegram, no.931, 23 March 1955, serial no. 110-00276-08, AMFA. 
128 Chinese Embassy at Britain to MFA, telegram, no.1142, 29 March 1955, serial no. 110-00276-07, AMFA. 
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3. March to April: The Road to Bandung 
Both Washington and Beijing demonstrated flexibility as they inched toward Bandung with the 
intention to tacitly resolve the Taiwan Strait Crisis. Persuaded by London to give up Oracle and to 
move toward Bandung, Washington then took measures to court Asian governments so as to 
safeguard US interests at the Bandung Conference (18-24 April), which ironically was for the 
purpose of forming a body of non-aligned Third-World Afro-Asian nations. Toward this end, the 
US also displayed its ―moderateness‖ to its allies. While the US hoped to also win over Taipei by 
persuading it to consider the offshore islands as ―outposts, not citadels,‖ this was rebuffed by 
Chiang. At the same time, helped by the ―quiet diplomacy‖ of UN Secretary-General 
Hammarskjöld, the US and the PRC were making progress on the Taiwan Strait issue. Following 
the PRC‘s conciliatory gesture on 23 April in Bandung, the US proceeded to persuade the ROC 
and the China Lobby of the desirability of participating in the forthcoming Sino-US negotiations to 
be held in Geneva in August, while the PRC harbored unrealistically high hopes for the 
negotiations. 
3.1 The US:  “To bring our viewpoint to the attention of free Asia” 
London refused to back Oracle once Beijing resolutely rejected presenting its case to the Security 
Council.
129
 Insistence on Oracle, according to Eden, would only ―look simply as though we were 
trying to guarantee Chiang‘s position in these islands.‖ Such a move before the Bandung 
Conference would only ―worsen‖ the standing of the US and Britain ―by alienating the Indians, 
Burmese and others whose views may not be without influence in Peking.‖130 Washington initially 
grumbled at the common racial element shared by the participants in the forthcoming Conference 
and anticipated that the communists would exploit this.
131
 Robertson noted that comparisons would 
be made between the SEATO Bangkok Conference ―with mostly whites and a few Asian people‖ 
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and the Bandung Conference which ―would be practically all coloured.‖132   
 
However, Eden argued that Washington should make Bandung work for its interests by roping in 
the Asians. Asian leaders, Eden stated, were ―likely to be more effective in deterring the Chinese 
than anything we can say in the Security Council, which they have discounted already.‖133 
Similarly, Hammarskjöld claimed Washington should resolve the detained US airmen issue 
through Bandung as ―it is quite possible that U Nu or Nehru would raise this matter with Chou at 
Bandung.‖134 Eisenhower concurred by pointing out to the NSC on 31 March that all the talk about 
―precision atomic weapons‖ against Chinese cities stemmed from the fact that ―we are 
underestimating the sanity of the Chinese Communists.‖135 The predominant US strength, 
observed the President, ―should surely give them pause before they undertook a resort to military 
measures to seize the offshore islands in defiance of the United States.‖136 
 
The US mission was how to present itself in the best possible light. ―We are trying to bring our 
viewpoint to the attention of free Asian governments since there appears to be little doubt that the 
Chinese Communists will speak about US aggression on Formosa in the Bandung Conference,‖ 
ventured Dulles and ―[o]ur Asian friends would be given a good briefing.‖137 Belatedly, Dulles had 
come round to Eden‘s view of the importance of ―appeal[ing] particularly to the Asians.‖138 
Eisenhower ordered that care be taken to put a strict curfew on ROC airstrikes on China‘s 
airfields.
139
 When Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Robert B. Carney wildly speculated to the 
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press that 15 April would be the day of the outbreak of hostilities, Eisenhower ―exploded‖ and 
demanded Radford and Wilson to ―tell Carney to stop talking.‖140 
 
Once set upon the path of Bandung, Dulles maneuvered energetically behind the scenes. He 
perceived the crushing weight of Third-World opinions as the main obstacle. The Taiwan Strait 
crisis had the potential to be manipulated by the Chinese Communists into ―a pan-Asian movement 
which would be by its very nature and concept anti-Western.‖141 Dulles set an extremely low bar 
for success. He even gave General Carlos P. Romulo, the Philippines representative, the carrot to 
entice Beijing: ―If the Communists were to refrain from such announcements [of recovering 
Taiwan by force] and were to announce they had no intention of attacking Taiwan, at the same 
time agreeing to a cessation of all hostilities, our position with respect to Quemoy and Matsu 
would be subjected to change.‖142 Eisenhower ―was in complete agreement‖ with Dulles‘ Bandung 
gambit and the US pressed its embassies in Cairo, Baghdad, Tehran, Karachi, Bangkok, Jakarta, 




3.2 The US and the ROC: Persuading the Junior Partner 
Washington hoped to win over Taipei by adopting a velvet approach. The OCB urged the US to 
pay more attention to what its ally was saying. The report recommended ―thorough diplomatic 
exploration of common programs of action, close observation of trends in GRC thinking,‖ and 
Chiang‘s quixotic fangong plans were now defined as ―a force of opportunity.‖ The softer 
rhetorical line was: 
We will impress upon them on our belief that the GRC, at some indeterminate 
future date, may be able to resume political control over part or all of the 
mainland, but that this restoration will have to be brought about by: (1) internal 
developments in Communist China making restoration possible through the 
GRC‘s own efforts; or (2) the outbreak of major hostilities creating a situation 
favourable to restoration; and through its unilateral military initiative.
144
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Using kid gloves on Taipei was essential to Eisenhower‘s proposal of making the offshore islands 
into ―outposts, not citadels.‖ The primary aim was to minimize the US exposure to any fallout 
should the offshore islands fall to the PRC. The secondary aim was to regain the initiative from the 
communists as the Bandung Conference might swing either way even as the US allies were being 
prepared.
145
 This major approach was noted by Beijing a week later, that the White House had 




Eisenhower indicated that the ―desirable solution‖ would be for Chiang to ―voluntarily evacuate 
Quemoy and Matsu‖ and ―entrench himself on Formosa, await internal developments on the 
mainland, and provide a constant military and psychological threat to the Chicom régime.‖ The US 
was willing to make up for Chiang‘s loss of the offshore islands with material aid or with the 
inducement of one US division and an air wing to persuade Chiang. Eisenhower wanted someone 
―who had Chiang‘s confidence, attempt to convince him of the US sincerity of purpose, and the 
desirability‖ of leaving the offshore islands.147 Thus it was from this understanding that the White 
House added a little spin to it by naming it as ―outposts, not citadels.‖148  
 
Another plan was a coastal-wide ―maritime zone‖ proposal [navy blockade] should Chiang decide 
to embark upon a ―voluntary evacuation from the offshore islands or their capture after serving as 
out-posts.‖ However, all goals and plans hinged upon Chiang. Eisenhower could not force Chiang 
to do anything as the generalissimo‘s ―greatest asset in his present situation is US public 
opinion.‖149 Although the futile task of convincing was given to Radford and Robertson, Dulles 
                                                 
145 Apparently, the ―danger of defeat, of drawing US into war, of world disapproval of US action‖ made the ―outposts‖ 
idea attractive. Memo of Conference with the President (1 April 1955), 4 April 1955, ACW Diary Series, box 5, ACW 
Diary April 1955 (6), Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
146 Huan noted that the US had demanded its military commanders to seek approval from Washington before making any 
belligerent move in the Taiwan Strait, interpreting this as a blow to the hawks in the US administration. Chinese 
Embassy at Britain to MFA, telegram, no.18, 13 April 1955, serial no. 110-00276-10, AMFA. 
147 Even from the military perspective, for a lack of clear objectives and impossible geographical position, the defence of 
the offshore islands was found to be repugnant. Memorandum from Hoover to Dulles, White House Meeting, 1 April 
1955, FRUS 1955-57, Vol 2, 440-41. 
148 Record of Conversation of Dulles with Eisenhower, 4 April 1955, in FRUS 1955-57, Vol 2, 444. 
149 Eisenhower admitted that the US policy paper for Chiang lacked ―a good enough out for Chiang.‖ Furthermore, ―he 
did not wish to force Chiang into anything for which the US would then be responsible.‖ Telephone call to the President, 
8 April 1955, Telephone Conversation Series, box 10, Telephone Conv - White House Mar 7 1954 -- Aug 29 1955 (3), 
JFD papers, DDEL; Memo of Conference with the President – Hoover & Adm. Carney (22 April 1955), 25 April 1955, 
ACW Diary Series, box 6, ACW Diary April 1955 (3), Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
 173 
 
admitted that ―it is impractical to expect to sit down with the gentleman and have him end where 
we want him to.‖ Chiang immediately rebuffed all proposals.150  
3.3 Hammarskjöld’s Quiet Diplomacy and China  
The interactions between the US and the PRC, however bellicose rhetorically, had established a 
ritualized pattern of diplomacy. Hammarskjöld highlighted this as he reflected on his 
communication with Zhou over the detained US airmen:  
As long as Mr Chou En-lai maintains the channel that was established as the result 
of our Peking conversations, we should continue to use it for exercising the 
maximum inner pressure, attainable by ―quiet‖ diplomacy, till we are convinced 
that all the possibilities of achieving our goal have been exhausted.
151
 
Dulles, scornful of Hammarskjöld‘s naïveté and optimism, had to concede it was the only way 
forward given the restrictions involved domestically and internationally.
152
 Washington was stuck 
with Hammarskjold‘s reports of Zhou‘s good faith and Dulles admitted to Secretary Humphrey 
that ―he was trying to work out some formula on China business – we are in a dilemma.‖153 
Although Dulles was focused on the plight of the US airmen, events would point toward using a 
similar kind of diplomacy with the PRC vis-à-vis the Taiwan problem. ―Inner pressure‖ and ―quiet 
diplomacy‖ thus became features of an emerging pattern of communication in Sino-US relations.  
 
Hammarskjöld explained that a meeting with Chinese Ambassador Geng Biao had the advantage 
of speed and less ―distortion‖ and claimed that the Chinese had progressed to the ―how‖ stage of 
releasing the US airmen. But Hammarskjöld‘s cultural sensitivity toward Geng was not 
highlighted by the US diplomats. Being more concerned with the release of the US airmen than 
establishing lasting communication with the Chinese Communists, a US report blandly stated: 
―ChiCom Amb asked SYG [Secretary-General] how he, SYG, would handle release of airmen if 
he were in Chou‘s position.‖ Herein lay the difference in the approaches of Hammarskjöld‘s subtle 
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―quiet diplomacy‖ and the US public legalistic denunciation of the PRC in the UN late in January 
1955.
154
     
 
Hammarskjöld adroitly established empathy by effusively praising the ―excellent tradition‖ of 
Chinese laws and approved of the ―customary‖ practice of the PRC‘s laws where the early release 
of the airmen would be based on their good conduct. In addition, Hammarskjöld told Geng that he 
had always put himself in the shoes of his interlocutors and understood why Zhou had to turn 
down the UN invitation to resolve the Taiwan problem. Hammarskjöld then emphasized the 
immense international prestige the release of the airmen would garner for the PRC. As the PRC 
had already experienced this positive aspect during the Bandung Conference and since there was 
no talk of ―appearing weak‖ or loss of prestige, Hammarskjöld suggested that the PRC could 
capitalize on this momentum. 
 
Hammarskjöld‘s deft approach and ―silent diplomacy‖ overwhelmed the Chinese embassy in 
Stockholm.
155
 ―Hammarskjöld‘s nonessential digressions were numerous and unceasing,‖ 
complained the Chinese embassy, and ―Ambassador Geng Biao had to put up with this by listening 
intently without much comments.‖ The Chinese diplomats noted the clear intentions of the UN 
Secretary–General: ―If we do not release the US airmen earlier, he would be put in a tight spot.‖ 
The release of the airmen was thus transformed into an issue of Hammarskjöld‘s personal prestige 
or ―face.‖156 While the PRC had no qualms rejecting the US demands, it had to think carefully 
about Hammarskjöld‘s sensitive efforts. Zhou had told Hammarskjöld in January that ―he 
definitely wanted the possibility of releasing the prisoners but it must be in such a way as not to 
make him lose face in Asia.‖157 Now Hammarskjöld highlighted the prestige which the PRC would 
gain from the humanitarian act and turned the ―face‖ issue by placing his in the Chinese lap. 
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Indeed, Beijing had specifically instructed Geng to be ―reasonable‖ as Hammarskjöld was ―not 
representing the US and the UN.‖158 Hence, releasing the airmen would enhance the PRC‘s 
relationship with Hammarskjöld and put the PRC on a moral high ground. When the PRC released 
the eleven airmen in August, it stated that ―they were being released in order to maintain 
friendship‖ with Hammarskjöld, and it also hoped that ―contacts with Hammarskjöld would 
continue.‖159   
 
By April, Beijing was satisfied that it had secured the Zhejiang coastline and the Taiwan issue was 
prominently featured. However, as the specter of ―two Chinas‖ was still lingering, as seen in 
Menzies‘ ―Commonwealth guarantee‖ proposal despite the death of Oracle,160 Beijing concurred 
that it would be better not to press Chiang too much lest the generalissimo threw in the towel.
161
 A 
conciliatory approach at the upcoming Bandung Conference would present immense advantages 
and Zhou thus announced on 23 April to the astonished Asian delegates that:  
As to the relations between China and the United States, the Chinese people do 
not want to have war with the United States. We are willing to settle international 
disputes by peaceful means. If those of you here would like to facilitate the 
settlement of disputes between the United States and China by peaceful means, it 
would be most beneficial to the relaxation of tension in the Far East and also to the 
postponement and prevention of a world war.
162
 
3.4 The US and the PRC: Post-Crisis Expectations 
Zhou‘s dramatic 23 April offer eased the White House out of a horrible dilemma.163 Dulles 
admitted to Senator Walter George that the KMT would ―feel bitterly‖ about the US intentions to 
go ahead with the talks with the Communists ―without the Nationalists.‖ But Washington had 
come round to ―accept their [PRC] right to liberate Formosa‖ but ―it should not be prosecuted by 
force.‖ Senator George insisted that the US reserved every right to ―talk with them [PRC].‖ Since 
the Communists and the KMT could not ―sit down together,‖ the US just had to function as the 
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―go-between.‖164 On 26 April, Dulles announced to the press the possibility of a bilateral 
negotiation with the Chinese Communists on the issue of ―a cease-fire in the [Taiwan Strait].‖165  
 
To retain favorable Congress support for the Formosa Resolution, Dulles was not above inflating 
the crisis. Dulles maintained in a conversation with Senator Knowland that ―the picture as it is now 
unfolding is much more disturbing than before.‖ He claimed that with improved air 
reconnaissance, ―the US was sure of the Chinese Communist belligerent intentions.‖166 However, 
Dulles‘ calculated embellishment produced complications. Senator Hickenlooper thought that the 
Taiwan Strait Crisis would have the US ―blown out of the Orient‖ and protested to Dulles that 
―they have not demonstrated good faith and we know their objectives.‖ Dulles reasoned that ―our 
Asian friends getting the proposal at Bandung out of Chou … think they did quite a job for us. 
They felt we ought to at least be willing to discuss a ceasefire.‖167 The White House thus realized 





To persuade the GOP, Dulles played up the importance of the Asian opinion – an old British 
argument. He noted that the image of the US would be irrevocably damaged if it was perceived as 
launching a ―preventive war‖ as ―Asian opinion‖ would be alienated. At stake was also the support 
of US allies, especially when they had backed the US and ―pitched in and done a job which led 
Chou to follow a pacific rather than belligerent course.‖ Dulles also reinterpreted the US-ROC 
Security Treaty, claiming that it gave Washington the ultimate right to secure a ceasefire so long as 
                                                 
164 George would even go as far as accepting a ―de facto ceasefire and abandonment of military force while we are 
talking.‖ Telephone call to Senator George, 25 April 1955, 4:46pm, Telephone Conversation Series, box 3, telephone 
conv. - general mar 7 - apr 29 1955 (1), JFD papers, DDEL. 
165 This was a significant climb down from the initial 23 April State Department press release that the Chinese 
Communists should ―clear the air‖ by releasing all American prisoners first and to accept the ―invitation‖ issued by the 
Security Council of the UN. News Conference statement by Dulles, 26 April 1958, Department of State Bulletin (May 9 
1955), 754-755. (hereafter cited as DSB); ―Chinese Communist intentions in the Formosa Area,‖ press release 226, 23 
April 1955, DSB (May 2 1955), 738; DBS (May 2 1955), 756-759. 
166 Telephone call from Senator Knowland, 18 April 1955, Telephone Conversation Series, box 3, telephone conv. - 
general mar 7 - apr 29 1955 (1), JFD papers, DDEL. 
167 Telephone call from Senator Hickenlooper, 27 April 1955, 10:53am, Telephone Conversation Series, box 3, 
telephone conv. - general Mar 7 - Apr 29 1955 (1), JFD papers, DDEL. 
168 Senator Knowland dismissed the work of US allies in Bandung as a ―pow-wow‖ sellout. Telephone call from Senator 
Knowland, 27 April, 2:18pm, Telephone Conversation Series, box 3, telephone conv. - general Mar 7-Apr 29 1955 (1), 
JFD papers, DDEL. 
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the US did not tamper with ―those rights behind the backs of the Nationalists.‖169 Congress 
belatedly realized that the President was given a blank cheque via the Formosa Resolution. Months 
of waiting had proven the original premise of an impending Chinese Communist attack to be false. 
Senator Homer E. Capehart was totally befuddled by the lack of Chinese action and demanded: 
―Then what the **** is it all about?‖ Capehart‘s reaction was consistent with the anti-climactic 




Beijing harbored high expectations for the Sino-US negotiations to be held in Geneva in August. A 
sense of an impending breakthrough was heightened by Zhou‘s success in the Bandung 
Conference. The Chinese Communists were expecting significant moves by the US at the 
negotiations. Such a mood could be detected in the London chargé‘s optimistic forecast of the 
Geneva negotiations. It expected the Americans to assist Chiang in evacuating the offshore islands 
or officially announce that the US-ROC Mutual Defence Treaty would not include the islands. It 
also thought that the US would reassert the Treaty but might hint that fangong would be over. The 
US was also expected not to oppose the entry of the PRC into the UN or oppose France‘s 
recognition of the PRC.
171
 In reciprocation for such gestures, the London chargé‘s report predicted 
that the US demands would not be paltry. The PRC might have to openly declare that the Taiwan 
problem be resolved peacefully and a line drawn in the Taiwan Strait separating Taiwan from the 
PRC. The US might also demand that areas surrounding the Taiwan Strait not be militarized and 
the release of all American ―spies‖ detained in the PRC.  
 
In retrospect, the Chinese diplomats overestimated the distance which the US would go to 
accommodate China. Washington was not in the mood for any reciprocation except for a ceasefire. 
Dulles had no intention of allowing the PRC into the UN, let alone recognizing it. Moreover, with 
                                                 
169 The modus operandi of Dulles in dealing with difficult Republican senators vis-à-vis Communist China was always 
to give the worst-case scenario. Dulles also claimed the treaty gave US rights over ROC foreign policy vis-à-vis the 
PRC. ―Memo of conversation with Knowland, Hickenlooper and Alex Smith,‖ 27 April 1955, General Correspondence 
& Memoranda Series, box 1, Memos of conversation - General J through K (2), JFD papers, DDEL. 
170 Telephone call from Senator Capehart, 29 April 1955, Telephone Conversation Series, box 3, telephone conv. - 
general Mar 7 - Apr 29 1955 (1), JFD papers, DDEL. 
171 However, the US would resist giving up the ROC. Britain, in a bid to stall for more time, would push for the Taiwan 
problem to be handled by the UN. 
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the China Lobby still a potent force in the Congress, it was unlikely that the US could coerce 
Chiang to evacuate the offshore islands. In their euphoria, Beijing neglected the limitations of tacit 
accommodation. The perplexed Chinese Communists found it disquieting that the British were 
strangely sullen about the eventual outcome of the upcoming negotiations, not realizing that the 
aforementioned reasons had cast a pall over British expectations. The morose British cited the 
―lack of common ground‖ between the PRC and the US as the main stumbling block. The best 
they could hope for was a de facto ceasefire where the US would strive for ―disentanglement‖ 





January to February 1955 witnessed several developments in the Taiwan Strait Crisis. Although 
China initially vacillated on capturing the Yijiangshan and Dachen islands, its concern with the 
looming specter of ―two Chinas‖ led it to proceed with its military actions. Such a concern also 
resulted in China strongly rejecting the proposed NZ UN resolution and disregarding the US 
nuclear threat. In the wake of the Yijiangshan campaign, the US was cautious, persuading Taiwan 
to evacuate Dachen and pushing Britain to press ahead with Oracle (NZ UN resolution). At the 
same time, Eisenhower sought to placate potential unhappiness from Congress and the American 
public concerned about American military entanglement in the Taiwan Strait by presenting the 
Formosa Resolution as a ―virtuous‖ American act in accordance with American ―tradition.‖ The 
US also tacitly accepted the PRC‘s international standing, recognized the inevitability of another 
diplomatic engagement with China, and hoped that by proposing Oracle, this would not only 
salvage the US international standing and support the ROC‘s UN position, but would also signal to 
China the US willingness to talk. In their search for mediators to resolve the crisis, the US 
continued to press for Oracle while Beijing preferred prodding the US with third-party emissaries 
with calls for direct negotiations. These emissaries included UN Secretary-General Hammarskjold, 
Nehru and U Nu.  
 
                                                 
172 Chinese Embassy in Britain to MFA, telegram, 30 April 1955, serial no. 110-00276-06, AMFA. 
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Although efforts at mediation between the US and the PRC did not lead to an immediate solution, 
there did emerge a burgeoning stabilization of the Taiwan Strait Crisis in February and March. 
This came about as the PRC and the US gradually came to establish a relationship of public 
posturing of rhetoric belligerency on one hand and tacit understanding and agreement on the other. 
Nonetheless, the aggressive rhetoric projected by Washington and the emergence of America‘s 
New Look nuclear deterrence doctrine that emphasized ―massive retaliatory power‖ and ―more 
bang for buck‖ did raise concerns among America‘s allies and also led to scholarship interpreting 
Eisenhower‘s issuance of nuclear threat on 16 March as an act that escalated the Crisis. However, 
in retrospect, as the Eisenhower administration was extremely cautious in reality, such US actions 
can be better interpreted as attempts to justify to American officials and the public the 
―conventional‖ nature of America‘s New Look nuclear deterrence doctrine. In this regard, the PRC 
had good intelligence and was unruffled by the US atomic threat; instead it was more concerned 
about an Australian proposal for a Commonwealth ―guarantee‖ of Taiwan.  
 
In March and April, both Washington and Beijing demonstrated flexibility as they inched toward 
Bandung with the intention to tacitly resolve the Taiwan Strait Crisis. Persuaded by London to 
give up Oracle and to move toward Bandung, Washington then took measures to court Asian 
governments so as to safeguard US interests at the Bandung Conference (18-24 April). Toward 
this end, the US also displayed its ―moderateness‖ to its allies. While the US hoped to also win 
over Taipei by persuading it to consider the offshore islands as ―outposts, not citadels,‖ this was 
rebuffed by Chiang. At the same time, helped by the ―quiet diplomacy‖ of UN Secretary-General 
Hammarskjöld, the US and the PRC were making progress on the Taiwan Strait issue. Following 
the PRC‘s conciliatory gesture on 23 April in Bandung, the US proceeded to persuade the ROC 
and the China Lobby of the desirability of participating in the forthcoming Sino-US negotiations to 
be held in Geneva in August. In anticipation of the talks, the PRC, however, harbored 




On the whole, January to April 1955 saw interesting developments in the Taiwan Strait Crisis. 
Despite the hot rhetoric bandied, the crisis presented an opportune opening for the US and the PRC 
to size each other up. Both countries learnt the extent of one another‘s limitations and engaged in a 
ritualized belligerent diplomacy. Eisenhower‘s theatrical belligerency stemmed from his firm 
grasp of the Taiwan situation. Despite Washington‘s hot rhetoric, subtle signaling to Beijing was 
the preferred mode of communication. Similarly, Beijing understood the value of public posturing 
coupled with tacit agreements. While there can be no ―private compromises,‖ tacit understandings 
not to overstep boundaries were not rejected. By April 1955, both parties had reached the liminal 
stage where the belligerents were socialized with each other‘s maneuvers.  Ironically, it took a 
neutral figure such as Hammarskjold to make explicit the process of tacit accommodation that was 
emerging in Sino-US relations: he accurately perceived the emergence of a ritualized pattern of 
diplomacy where ―inner pressure‖ and ―quiet‖ diplomacy would define the contours of Sino-US 
relations from this point onwards. This period further highlighted the cultural commonalities and 
historical ties shared by the PRC and the ROC on issues of nationalism and sovereignty, which led 
to their outright rejection of any attempt at ―Two Chinas.‖ In addition, the First Taiwan Strait 
Crisis flagged several future developments, which will be covered in the next few chapters. First, 
Eisenhower would use similar rhetorical tropes to justify the US policies elsewhere but find that 
blank cheques would not be issued indiscriminately the second round.  Second, the limitations of 
direct negotiations arising from tacit accommodation would become more obvious. Third, the 
same historical-cultural baggage shared by the PRC and the ROC would compel the two erstwhile 
enemies to seek each other out through back-channels. How some of these themes unfolded from 






Chapter 6: The Inter-crises Period (May 1955-1957) – Sustaining Linkages 
 
Zhou‘s conciliatory gesture on 23 April 1955 at the Bandung Conference marked the end of the 
First Taiwan Crisis which began on 3 September 1954. While the outbreak of the Second Taiwan 
Strait Crisis on 23 August 1958 will be explored in the next chapter, this chapter will examine the 
sustaining linkages in the US-PRC-ROC relations that occurred between May 1955 and December 
1957. It will examine four areas: the Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks (August 1955-December 
1957), the ROC-PRC secret back-channels (1955-1957), the May 1957 Taiwan Riots, and the 
ROC and its fangong mission (1955-1957). What were the major developments in these four areas 
and their significance for the US-PRC-ROC relations?  
 
Existing scholarship on this inter-crises period emphasized the tensions in the negotiations 
between the PRC and the US. Xia Yafeng
 has examined well Beijing‘s perceptions while Steven 
M. Goldstein has provided Washington‘s perspective.1 This chapter supports their findings, noting 
the limitations of tacit accommodation, as well as the long-term significance of the Sino-US 
Ambassadorial Talks. On the PRC-ROC relations, what is lacking is a systematic examination of 
their secret contacts. Qing Simei‘s latest attempt is excellent but only discusses this obscure 
episode from Beijing‘s perspective at great length.2 This chapter will discuss as well the hitherto 
much neglected Taipei‘s concerns and reactions towards the Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks, and 
elaborate on the May 1957 Taiwan Riots and the changing configurations of the ROC‘s fangong 
mission. Building on existing scholarship and the latest sources available, this chapter will thus 
offer a structured and coherent treatment of the inter-crises period.   
 
The lull period between the two Taiwan Strait Crises witnessed important developments for the 
US-PRC-ROC relations. Cultural perceptions and discourses had symbiotic interactions with state 
                                                 
1 Xia Yafeng, Negotiating with the Enemy: US-China Talks During the Cold War, 1949-1972 (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2006), 105; Steven M. Goldstein, ―Dialogue of the Deaf? The Sino-American Ambassadorial-Level 
Talks, 1955-1970,‖ in Reexamining the Cold War US China Diplomacy 1954-1972, ed. Robert S. Ross & Jiang 
Changbin (Cam., MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2001), 200-237. 
2 Qing Simei, From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity and US-China Diplomacy 1945-1960 (Cam., MA: 
Harvard Univ. Press, 2007), 283- 287. 
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signaling and diplomatic maneuvers, and over time such ritualized interactions were avenues for 
Taipei, Beijing and Washington to assess each other. The first section will discuss how the Sino-
US Ambassadorial Talks came about, what its limitations were, what the long-term significance of 
the talks was for Sino-US relations, and how the ROC viewed the talks. Although the results of the 
Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks were exceedingly modest, this diplomatic ―substitute‖ constituted 
an important milestone as both parties moved more concretely from tacit communication to tacit 
accommodation, a trend that would develop further from 1958 onwards.  
 
The second section will examine how the ROC-PRC secret back-channels evolved, how the US 
failed to recognize the possibility of such secret contacts, and how Taipei carefully maneuvered 
between alerting Washington and maintaining links with Beijing. The ROC-PRC secret back-
channels demonstrated the importance of historical and cultural perceptions between belligerents 
and allies and would again be featured in the 1958 crisis. The third section, focusing on the 1957 
Taiwan Riots and demonstrating the complexities in relations between Taiwanese and Americans, 
will explore how Americans were prejudiced in their views of the riots, what Taiwanese 
resentments against Americans were, and what functions ritualistic apologies performed in 
resolving the issues. The riots demonstrated the complex dimensions of the US-ROC relations in 
terms of their cultural fault lines and mutual pragmatic concerns, a theme that would constantly 
emerge in the US-ROC relations. The fourth section, focusing on how the Taiwan Strait Crisis was 
played out in the rendering of the fangong mission in Taiwanese society and politics from 1955 to 
1957, will explore the roles played by political indoctrination and popular culture, the total control 
of the army by the KMT party, the waning of the fangong vision as manifested in the ritualistic 
aspects of military planning and the transformation of the fangong mission for domestic goals.  
 
1. The Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks (August 1955-December 1957) 
Zhou‘s Bandung opening was followed by other initiatives to prompt the US toward bilateral 
negotiations and Eisenhower decided on 11 July to proceed with the Sino-US ambassadorial talks 
to be held in Geneva from August 1955 to December 1957. Although the bilateral talks 
 183 
 
represented progress from a framework of tacit communication toward Sino-US tacit 
accommodation, the limitations of such an accommodation became apparent during the 
negotiations to discuss the issues of US airmen and the Taiwan Strait and different expectations 
led to inconclusive results by the end of 1957. Nonetheless, even though the 1955-1957 Sino-US 
ambassadorial talks could not resolve the issues, its long-term consequences were noteworthy as it 
paved the way for the holding of future Sino-US ambassadorial talks, which became one of the 
main communication channels in subsequent Sino-US relations. This positive overtone of the 
Sino-US ambassadorial talks riled the ROC, which further viewed it as the harbinger of a potential 
disaster that could lead to its declining international standing and deteriorating US-ROC relations. 
To express its unhappiness and frustration, the KMT blatantly conducted raids on China in the 
midst of the talks in August 1955.  
 
1.1 The Road to Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks  
In the aftermath of the Korean War, a number of US citizens were still detained in China. During 
the 1954 Geneva Conference, Beijing had signaled that a ―new stage‖ in Sino-US relations was in 
order. The PRC ambassador Wang Bingnan offered ―to strike a deal on normalization, which 
would involve release of [US] prisoners and meeting of all conditions we [Washington] had set.‖ 
Sensitive to hostile domestic conditions, Dulles rejected it. But Undersecretary of State Bedell 
Smith pragmatically counseled for Sino-US talks if the US wanted its prisoners back. What 
followed the initial four 1954 meetings in Geneva was a system of intricate signaling. Beijing 
kick-started the process again by sentencing thirteen US airmen to lengthy prison sentences in 
November 1954. In response, the US flagged in April 1955 its desire to negotiate by allowing 
Chinese technicians, who were detained in the US for fear of a leakage of scientific know-how to 




To hasten the process, Beijing applied pressure on the US. Zhou‘s dramatic peace announcement 
                                                 
3 See John H. Holdridge (a career officer in the State Department from the Eisenhower to Reagan presidency), ―Sino-US 
Contacts During the Freeze,‖ in Marshall Green, et al., War & Peace with China: First-hand Experiences in the Foreign 
Service of the United States (Maryland: Dacor Press, 1994), 99; Paul Kreisberg‘s interview; Edwin W. Martin‘s 
interview in Tucker, China Confidential, 94-95; U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power: The Memoirs of an 
American Diplomat (NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984), 236-237. 
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in Bandung put Dulles on the defensive. Zhou also flooded Washington with emissaries. Indian 
Ambassador to the UN, Krishna Menon, approached Washington on 14 March 1955 to be ―the go-
between.‖ However, Washington saw this as excessive Indian interference.4 To Washington‘s 
chagrin, a Pakistani diplomat, Mir Khan, then suggested that an exchange of ―diplomatic notes‖ 
could seal the deal and pave the way for a ―personal meeting with Chou,‖ preferably in ―Karachi.‖5 
US Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge perceptively recognized that ―Chou will use Menon for 
nuisance value, he is not building up Menon as a go-between … Chou thinks his interests are best 
served by direct talks with the United States.‖6 Dulles viewed such channels as ―a typical Chinese 
trick – they will take whoever has the most to offer – which negotiator is most successful.‖7  
 
Eisenhower was willing to accept the Chinese offer. In a meeting with Menon and Indian 
Ambassador G.L. Metha, Eisenhower underscored the burden of American public opinion: ―… 
there are certain things that are just making the American public opinion boil, it is very difficult for 
us to negotiate in the way that we could otherwise ….‖ Eisenhower thus argued for the PRC to 
foster a ―better atmosphere‖ and even delineated some pointers for a successful negotiation. The 
Chinese Communists must not publicly declare that they ―are right in holding our people 
unlawfully‖; it would also be ruinous for the US if it was made known that ―they are trying to 
negotiate with what we try pushing [release of POWs which the US had always declared to be 
non-negotiable].‖ So taken was Eisenhower with his projection of reasonableness that he alluded 
to the myth of the special relationship between China and America: 
… we‘ve got a great record of fixing friendship with the Chinese people. We have 
established hospitals, tried to help them establish schools … I lived in the Far East 
[the Philippines] four-and-a-half years, and I liked the Chinese – I like them 
tremendously.
8
   
                                                 
4 Xiong , Zhou Enlai Wanlong,  1-7. 
5 Lodge to Dulles, Memo, 4 May 1955, Telephone Conversation Series, box 4, Telephone Conv. - General May 2 1955 – 
Aug 31 1955 (8), JFD papers, DDEL. 
6 Lodge to Dulles, 9 June 1955, General Correspondence & Memoranda Series, box 2, strictly confidential - L (2), JFD 
papers, DDEL. 
7 Allen Dulles told his brother: ―The Chicoms want to talk and negotiate in secret with someone like Cooper and Bohlen 
… They want to work out a release and as if they were doing it in a generous way.‖ Telephone call from Allen Dulles, 1 
July 1955, Telephone Conversation Series\box 4\Telephone Conv. - General May 2 1955–Aug 31 1955 (4), JFD papers, 
DDEL. 
8 Eisenhower expounded on the ―basic principle … we do not arrogate to ourselves the right to determine the fate of any 
other people.‖ ―Interview with H. V. Krishna Menon, Indian Representative to the United Nations,‖ 14 June 1955, ACW 




Washington‘s sanguineness also stemmed from its assessment that the communist threat toward 
Taiwan was ebbing. It hoped that Beijing could ―accept tacitly if not explicitly a renunciation of 
the use of force in pressing their claim [on] Taiwan.‖9 The US recognized that engagement with 
Beijing had its advantages. One, the PRC was feeling the weight of world opinion as its increasing 
world prominence would work against its militancy. Two, keeping the Chinese Communists at the 
negotiation table meant keeping the Taiwan Strait free of hostilities. Three, the PRC would not be 
provoked into perceiving that Washington was embarking on a permanent occupation of the 
offshore islands.  
 
However, Beijing‘s initiatives prompted Washington to perceive that the PRC wanted to 
undermine Taiwan by negotiating with the US based on ―the widespread desire for peace in the Far 
East.‖ The lack of understanding on the nationalist impulse of the PRC‘s international outlook also 
led it to speculate erroneously that Beijing might use ―the ‗two-China‘ concept.‖ But while the 
PRC was cautiously edging toward a tacit accommodation with the US, events would show that 
flagging the ―two-China‖ concept was an anathema to the Communists as much as it was to the 
Nationalists. Still, the OCB was clear that the US could not back out from negotiating with the 
PRC as this ―would lose us much good will and might allow the Chinese Communists to place the 
onus for their breach of the peace in the offshore islands on us.‖10 With Beijing‘s additional 
gesture of releasing four US airmen on 30 May, Washington agreed on 11 July for Sino-US 
ambassadorial talks in Geneva to proceed.
11
   
 
1.2 The Limitations of Tacit Accommodation 
The issue of the imprisonment of US citizens in China was ensnared by vastly different cultural 
                                                 
9 ―The current situation,‖ reported the Far Eastern Bureau, ―appears to embody little immediate and direct threat to our 
fundamental strategic objective with respect to Taiwan: that of keeping it from the Chinese Communists.‖ The Bureau 
even dismissed the possibility of communist subversion, as ―these efforts are not likely to succeed in the foreseeable 
future.‖ Memo, [Paper regarding U.S. policy to defend Taiwan against a possible Chinese Communist takeover], Bureau 
of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, 23 May 1955. DDRS 
10 This OCB report states that ―US involvement is highly unlikely‖ even if the ROC should request for help in the face of 
a PRC war of attrition against the offshore islands. ―Progress report on NSC 5503, U.S. policy toward Formosa and the 
government of the Republic of China, including detailed development of major actions (1 Jan 1955-14 July 1955),‖ 
Memo (Draft 2), OCB, White House,  Jul 26, 1955, DDRS, CK3100114782. 
11 Johnson, Right Hand, 237; Wang, Zhong Mei huitan, 31. 
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perceptions. Dulles took the high road of moral principles, insisting that if the PRC ―wanted to 
begin to gain respect as decent people, they would let the prisoners go.‖ He also accused the PRC 
of using the POWs as collateral for ―blackmail purposes.‖12   
 
Some of the detained US personnel, such as CIA operatives John T. Downey and Richard George 
Fecteau, were involved in aerial spying operations in China.
13
 In December 1954, Eisenhower 
admitted that ―it seems probable the plane landed in such circumstances they can say they are not 
prisoners of war.‖ Dulles noted that it would be ―a terrible situation‖ should the PRC marshal more 
evidence to humiliate the US. For the White House the key was damage control. Dulles then 
resolved to shove the blame to the Chinese Communists: 
The essential thing said the Sec. is they agreed by the Armistice to return all 
prisoners of war. They have acted in a deceitful way. They supposedly gave all 
names at Geneva but didn‘t give the names of the civilians. The Pres. can say it 




Only after weeks of laborious negotiation did both parties achieve on 10 September 1955 the 
―Agreed Announcements.‖ Detained citizens were allowed to ―expeditiously exercise their rights 
to return‖ and both parties were to examine ―other practical matters at issue.‖15 While Washington 
expected the remaining 19 detained US citizens to be released, Beijing held them on to advance 
other issues. Ambassador Kenneth T. Young elucidated US chagrin toward this methodical ―ritual‖ 
of Beijing: ―Chinese imperial practice had used individuals and prisoners for political bargaining 
and as hostages. It was thus no break with China‘s historical method of dealing with ‗barbarian‘ 
nations for Peking to use Americans in China as hostages in its maneuvering with Washington.‖16  
 
However, the use of political hostages could also be seen to indicate Beijing‘s weaker position, a 
finding established by scholar Alfred D. Wilhelm in his interviews with Chinese officials. One 
                                                 
12 ―Memo of conversation with Menon,‖ 15 June 1955, General Correspondence & Memoranda Series, box 1, Memos of 
conversation - General L through M (4), JFD papers, DDEL. 
13 Memo of a Conversation, Department of State, 7 Jan 1955, in FRUS, vol 2 (1955-57), 6-7. 
14 The White House was also displeased that one of the captured airmen, Colonel John K. Arnold, was ―doing that and 
told everything [to the Chinese Communists].‖ Telephone Call to the President, 1 Dec 1954, Telephone Conversation 
Series, box 10, Telephone Conv - White House Nov 1 1954–Feb 18 1955 (2), JFD papers, DDEL. 
15 Holdridge, ―Sino-US Contacts,‖ 100. 
16 Young, Negotiating with the Chinese, 63-64. 
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Chinese interviewee admitted: ―We were afraid that if we release all the Americans, the United 
States would break off the negotiations.‖ A lack of trust in the powerful ―imperialistic‖ US hence 
prompted Beijing to use the only leverage it possessed. Another Chinese interviewee alluded to the 
situation in Geneva as Wanbi Guizhao 完璧归赵 [Returning the jade intact to Zhao]. In this 
Chinese historical anecdote, Zhao emissary Lin Xiangru in 283 BC threatened to shatter Zhao‘s 
―gift‖ – the treasure jade – at the Duke of Qin‘s feet, unless certain conditions were met. Lin used 
this drastic measure to force the powerful Duke of Qin to honor his word to the weaker Zhao. 





The second issue to flounder in the sea of Chinese nationalism was Taiwan. US negotiator Alexis 
Johnson speculated in his memoirs that had the problem of Taiwan being postponed temporarily 
for other ―easier issues,‖ Sino-US negotiations might have been more profitable. Wang Bingnan 
reflected that the issue boiled down to Chinese nationalism as the negotiations with the Americans 
were also staged for the domestic Chinese audience:  
We had to adopt adversarial tactics in our negotiations. This would boost the 
Chinese people‘s confidence and dampen the Americans‘ arrogance. Before 
liberation, the Chinese people had long endured humiliation from the West. Now 
the newly independent China must no longer demonstrate any weakness. This is a 
strong feeling prevalent among Chinese.  
Therefore, Wang loudly accused the Americans of creating the ―two-China‖ conspiracy on 8 
October 1955 when Johnson proposed renouncing the use of force in the Taiwan Strait.
18
 Beijing 
would only concede to its 27 October 1955 formula: ―The PRC and the USA agreed that they 
should settle disputes between their two countries by peaceful means without resorting to the threat 
or the use of force.‖ State Department staff John Holdridge remembered Dulles ―personally 
inserted the phrase ‗including the dispute in the Taiwan Strait‘ after Wang‘s wording,‖ but Beijing 




                                                 
17 The account was from the Shiji [Records of the Grand Historian]. At the end of 1957, six Americans were still 
incarcerated in the PRC. Alfred D. Wilhelm, The Chinese at the Negotiating Table (Washington, DC: National Defense 
University Press, 1994), 54-56, 193; Young, Negotiating with the Chinese, 58. 
18 Johnson, Right Hand, 251-54; Wang, Zhong Mei huitan, 57-59. 
19 Johnson, Right Hand, 254; Holdridge, ―Sino-US Contacts,‖ 100. 
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If Beijing was driven by nationalistic impulses, the Americans were no less encumbered by 
domestic considerations. Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning Robert Bowie recalled that as 
Eisenhower wished to preserve freedom in foreign policy from the congressional rightwing, any 
open gesture to Beijing ―was simply going to bring down a lot of trouble on him and wasn‘t worth 
it.‖20 Eisenhower had received ―various remarks of certain people saying they would resign, etc, if 
the President recognized Red China.‖21 The Eisenhower administration had to convince the 
Republican National Committee meeting in November 1955 that negotiating with Beijing was not 
a sellout of the ROC. Lodge stressed that the conduct of Eisenhower‘s diplomacy could be 
summarized as ―Suaviter In Modo, Fortiter In Re‖ (Flexible in Method, Strong in Substance).22  
 
With the issues of the US prisoners and Taiwan making little headway, such other issues as trade 
embargoes and Zhou-Dulles ministerial talks were stalled. After a year of thrusts and parries, Zhou 
braced himself for a long haul: ―If dragging on serves our interests, we would not mind. If there 
are disadvantages to dragging on, we can stop it any time. This is our view vis-à-vis the Sino-US 
negotiations.‖23 Behind the scenes, Zhou instructed the PRC Foreign Ministry ―to come up with 
ideas and methods to seize all opportunities for the advancement of the negotiations.‖ Wang 
admitted that the invitation to US journalists in August 1956 and the cultural exchange in October 




Nonetheless, the Taiwan Strait conflict had been comfortably ritualized via the Sino-US 
negotiations. The physical front of the Taiwan Strait, according to Radford, would ―stay the way it 
is for the time being. It is to the Communists‘ advantage not to stir it up … On the other hand, they 
                                                 
20 Robert Bowie‘s interview, in Tucker, China Confidential, 149. 
21 Eisenhower reassured Senator Karl E. Mundt that ―there is no feeling on his part that this matter should even be given 
consideration.‖ Memo of Conference with the President and Senator Karl E. Mundt (12 May 1955), 18 May 1955, ACW 
Diary Series, box 5, ACW Diary May 1955 (3), Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
22 Lodge emphasized that: ―We not only have sacrificed nothing of substance; we have also not become involved in a 
Far-eastern war.‖ Lodge, Speech,  Republican National Committee meeting, 30 November 1955, General 
Correspondence & Memoranda Series, box 2, strictly confidential - L (2), JFD papers, DDEL. 
23 Zhou with BK Nehru, record of conversation, 14 June 1956, ZENP, vol.1, 588. 
24 On the issue of journalists being allowed in the PRC, Dulles consulted Senator Knowland, who was surprisingly 
liberal. Dulles denied the charge by Nehru that the US shared the blame in the standoff between the PRC and the US. 
―Memo of conversation with Nehru,‖ 16 December 1956, General Correspondence & Memoranda Series, box 1, Memos 
of conversation - General N through R (1), JFD papers, DDEL; ―Memo of conversation with Knowland,‖ 1 July 1957, 




are going to keep sporadic firings etc. that will make the Nationalists issue press releases and 
thereby keep it before the world.‖ Meanwhile, the US continued to press the ROC to reduce the 
garrison on the offshore islands, which the ―Gimo [Chiang] will think it over.‖25  
 
By 12 December 1957, at the 73
rd
 meeting, the US attempted to ―downgrade‖ the level of the talks. 
While Dulles recognized that the talks served ―as a slight additional preventive to armed attack by 
the Chinese Communists,‖ the only issue that the US wished to discuss was the ―renunciation of 
force and release of Americans.‖ Hence, he believed that a ―considerable recess‖ in the talks was 
in order. As the sole purpose was just to ―drop messages‖ to Beijing and ward off the extremes of 
US public opinion, talks conducted at lower levels would serve US purposes just as well. 
However, Washington would learn the hard way that for Beijing the ritualistic form and manner of 




1.3 Long-Term Consequences 
Although the Johnson-Wang ambassadorial talks could not resolve the issues of US prisoners and 
Taiwan, its long-term consequences were noteworthy as it paved the way for the holding of future 
Sino-US ambassadorial contacts. As noted by Ambassador Kenneth T. Young: ―If the most 
powerful country and the most populous country in the world could not have a normal diplomatic 
relationship, they would have to invent a substitute.‖27 Being such a substitute, the Sino-US 





When Chiang Kai-shek contemplated taking advantage of the domestic discontent in China to 
stage a comeback in the aftermath of the disastrous Great Leap Forward, Wang Bingnan queried 
his counterpart, Ambassador John M. Cabot, about Washington‘s intentions in view of the ROC‘s 
                                                 
25 Telephone call to Adm Radford, 20 Jan 1956, Telephone Conversation Series, box 5, memoranda of tel conv general 
May 1 1956 to june 29 1956 (3), JFD papers, DDEL; Wang, Zhong Mei huitan, 62-65. 
26 See Steven M. Goldstein, ―Dialogue of the Deaf?‖ 235; Edwin E. Martin‘s interview, in Tucker, China Confidential, 
99; ―Memo of conversation with Professor David N. Rowe,‖ 18 May 1957, General Correspondence & Memoranda 
Series, box 1, Memos of conversation - General N through R (2), JFD papers, DDEL;  
27 Kenneth T. Young, ―American Dealings with Peking,‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 45, no. 1, (Oct 1966), 77. 
28 Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy, 105. 
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belligerent posturing. President John F. Kennedy communicated unequivocally in 1962 via the 
Cabot-Wang conduit that the US would not support any of Chiang‘s fangong initiatives.29 At the 
height of the US involvement in Vietnam, Assistant Secretary of East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
William P. Bundy also revealed that President Lyndon B. Johnson had assured Beijing through the 
ambassadorial talks that US ―bore no hostility toward China‖; Washington even reassured Beijing 
that the aim was not the destruction of ―the Hanoi régime.‖ In December 1963, Assistant Secretary 
of State Roger Hilsman too wrote that accommodation with the PRC was necessary as Communist 
China was in no way ―passing‖ from the scene and in 1967, Johnson‘s advisors called for a 
―posture of quiet reasonableness‖ towards Beijing.30 Finally, the long-time PRC diplomat Luo 
Yisu recalled how in 1979 Ambassador Wang had personally invited all three former ambassadors 
Johnson, Jacob Beam and Cabot to visit the PRC.
31
 Wang rationalized that while in the past the 
former enemies had adhered to the principle of geshi qizhu 各事其主[each person has his own 
ruler to follow], now that rapprochement had been achieved, ―old friends‖ could be activated to 
further advance Sino-US relations.
32
 Johnson recalled that Wang extended his invitation, stressing 
―we respect you.‖33 
 
                                                 
29 Appreciative of Washington‘s candor, Zhou Enlai indicated in October 1962 that Beijing was prepared for such 
ambassadorial talks to ―continue for another seven years.‖ But Gordon H. Chang contends that Kennedy was disturbed 
by China‘s new atomic ability and sought Khrushchev‘s aid in a pre-emptive ―surprise attack on China.‖ The main piece 
of evidence was a 15 July 1963 cable from Kennedy to Ambassador Harriman which read: ―You should try to elicit 
Khrushchev‘s view of means of limiting or preventing Chinese nuclear development and his willingness either to take 
Soviet action or accept US action aimed in this direction.‖ However, historians such as Nancy B. Tucker and Waldo 
Heinrichs questioned Chang‘s interpretation. As a member of Kennedy‘s inner circle, McGeorge Bundy denied this 
possibility. James C. Thomson, former aide to the Secretary of State (Far Eastern Affairs), even ridiculed Chang‘s notion 
of a secret plan hatched by Kennedy to destroy China‘s nuclear facilities. See Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, ―Continuing 
Controversies in the Literature of US-China Relations Since 1945,‖ in Pacific Passage, ed. Warren I. Cohen (NY: 
Columbia Univ. Press, 1996), 226; Tucker, ―No Common Ground: American-Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1948-1972,‖ 
Diplomatic History 16, no.2 (Spring 1992): 319-324; James C. Thomson, ―Whose side are we on?‖ The New York 
Review of Books, (29 July 1990): 25; Chang, Friends and Enemies, 224-227 & 247-250; Kenneth T. Young, Diplomacy 
and Power and Washington-Peking Dealings: 1953-67 (Chicago: University of Chicago Center for Policy Study, 1967), 
17; Wang, Zhong Mei huitan,  90; FRUS (1961-1963), Vol. 22, 234, n. 2. 
30 Holdridge, ―Sino-US Contacts During the Freeze,‖ 103; Cohen, America‟s Response to China, 191; Victor S. 
Kaufman, Confronting Communism, 198. 
31 American scholar Eugene P. Trani remarked in 1984 that China‘s ―old friends‖ method was a stark contrast to the 
Russian approach: ―By comparison, departures from China are sad, and often Americans leave with the feeling that new 
friendships will last many years.‖ See Donald E. Davis and Eugene P. Trani, Distorted Mirrors: Americans and their 
relations with Russia and China in the Twentieth Century (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2009), XXV. 
32 Taiwanese scholar Shih Chih-yu perceptively underscored the strong linkages between interpersonal relations and 
international relations of the PRC. See Shih Chih-yu, ―Pedagogy of Chinese Diplomacy,‖ in Reform, Identity & Chinese 
Foreign Policy (Taipei: Vanguard Institute for Policy Studies, 2000), 171. 
33 Luo Yisu 骆亦粟, ―Wang Bingnan yu Xin Zhongguo waijiao‖ 王炳南与新中国外交 [Wang Bingnan and new 
China‘s Diplomacy], Ban nian chao 百年潮, no. 2 (2006), 47; Wilhelm, Chinese at the Negotiating,  58; Johnson, Right 
Hand of Power, 265; Wang, Zhong Mei huitan, 85. 
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1.4 The Unhappiness of the ROC  
It was precisely this positive overtone of the Sino-US ambassadorial talks that riled the ROC. 
Taipei‘s deep uneasiness with the Geneva ambassadorial talks was noted by Ambassador Karl L. 
Rankin, who sympathetically reported that to Taipei the alleged ―missing ingredient‖ in the talks 
was the American firm refusal to openly support the ROC‘s fangong mission; this led to the 
ROC‘s profound ―sense of frustration.‖34 Taipei also detested the ambiguous US refrain for 
patience. ―By working together,‖ counseled Washington, ―they can survive, to live in freedom, and 
that the international communist conspiracy is doomed to eventual extinction.‖ The ROC found 
such reassurances ―of little value if the prospective victim lacks confidence in the efficiency of 
such help or faces the likelihood of annihilation in the process.‖35 
 
Taipei further viewed the Sino-US ambassadorial talks as the harbinger of a potential disaster that 
could lead to deteriorating US-ROC relations. Especially worrying would be the US departure 
from ―firm confrontation to tacit accommodation‖ with Beijing. Taipei stoutly argued against any 
compromise with the PRC. One, relaxation of trade embargoes against China would accrue to 
Beijing ―political and other advantages,‖ but ―with no compensating gain for the supporters of the 
US strategy.‖  Two, the UN would be weakened if a ―powerful and unrepentant aggressor‖ gained 
entry. Three, naïve US reporters visiting the PRC could only report Potemkin villages as Beijing 
would stage-manage ―the situation to their own advantage.‖36    
  
Other than strident haranguing, Taipei also stressed the sentimental notion of the ―uniqueness‖ of 
Sino-US relations, and from Rankin‘s despatch the US ambassador seemed to have bought heavily 
into this rhetoric. By selectively using a few pseudo-historic anecdotes, Rankin posited that 
                                                 
34 Rankin painted a dire picture of the vulnerability of Taiwan compared to China‘s immense strength. Given the 
negative prognosis, Taipei saw six negative outcomes which ranged from ―GRC disintegration‖ to outright ―nuclear war 
in Asia.‖ For another copy of the ―missing ingredient‖ thesis, see McConaughy (Office of Chinese Affairs) to Robertson 
(Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs), memo, 16 April 1957, FRUS (1955-57), vol. 3, 519. 
35 According to Rankin, the relations between Taipei and Washington could be further strengthened. Although Rankin 
also observed that the PRC had no wish to initiate an ―unlimited war‖ or want to have ―direct American intervention,‖ 
Rankin‘s commitment to the ROC could be seen in various despatches endorsing Taipei‘s position. See Rankin to State 
Department, ―The Missing Ingredient in US Policy toward China,‖ Foreign Service Despatch no. 423, 28 March 1957, 
serial no.002080106032003, CKS papers, AH. 
36 As ―tacit accommodation‖ implied that Washington might pressure Chiang to accept the ―two-China‖ solution, Rankin 
warned Washington against such an inclination. Rankin to State Department, ―A Review of US Policy Toward China,‖ 
Foreign Service Despatch no. 461, 25 April 1957, serial no.002080106032004, CKS papers, AH. 
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Washington had always ―supported territorial integrity of China.‖ The fundamental in Sino-US 
relations was ―essentially simple and unchanging‖ for there was no question that ―the US feels a 
deep loyalty to Free China,‖ and vice versa. In contrast, Rankin reported that the ―Peiping 
government‖ clearly did not fit into this time-honored pattern. The Communist victory in China 
was only possible with ―Soviet support,‖ and since the Korean War Communist China had shown 
itself ―a loyal member of the international communist conspiracy.‖ This ―ruthless and predatory … 
police state‖ could only have the support of ―the usual small fraction of the population.‖ Beijing‘s 
operative tentacles of subversion ―operates throughout Asia.‖ Therefore, ―no rational US policy 
can be based upon the prospect of such a change in the foreseeable future.‖37 In such a manner, 
Rankin‘s report echoed the latent unhappiness and paranoia of Taipei‘s leadership.  
 
Even prior to the onset of the Geneva ambassadorial talks, Washington recognized how the ROC‘s 
international stature would take a blow as the US moved towards negotiations with Beijing. The 
US was aware how every gain that the PRC made in such international meetings as the Geneva 
Conference and the Bandung Conference would mean a decline in the international prestige of the 
ROC. As a State Department report noted, ―there is a discernible trend towards disregard of the 
importance of the GRC as a political entity‖ and a ―declining faith‖ among overseas Chinese about 
Chiang‘s return to Mainland China which added to ―the growth of influences making for 
stagnation of the forces on Taiwan.‖38 The US also knew that the ROC had little support 
internationally. Britain was more interested in the measures that Washington would take to 
persuade Chiang to be ―more flexible.‖39 In view of such sentiments, it was thus not surprising that 
Chiang reacted vehemently in a meeting with Radford and Robertson in April 1955. In his diaries 
                                                 
37 Rankin‘s despatch displayed the hold Chiang had on his ―trusted‖ American friends and how effectively he turned 
these Americans into mouthpieces of his régime. See Rankin to State Department, ―A Review of US Policy Toward 
China,‖ Foreign Service Despatch no. 461, 25 April 1957, serial no.002080106032004, CKS papers, AH. 
38 Memo, [Paper regarding U.S. policy to defend Taiwan against a possible Chinese Communist takeover], Bureau of Far 
Eastern Affairs, Department of State, 23 May 1955. DDRS. 
39 Eden informed Eisenhower that ―the British people as a whole look on the offshore islands as belonging to Red China, 
and consider that we are foolish to be supporting Chiang even indirectly in possession of those areas.‖ Eisenhower 
explained the symbolism of the offshore islands in terms of three levels. One, the fundamental symbolic meaning of the 
offshore islands to ―Chiang‘s army on Formosa.‖ Two, the ―importance of Chiang to ―other émigré Chinese in the many 
countries of Southeast Asia.‖ Three, US steadfastness in the Taiwan Strait to boost the confidence of non-communist 
countries in Asia. Dulles to Macmillan, telegram, no. 132, 8 July 1955, in FRUS, vol. 2 (1955-57), 641; Eisenhower with 
Eden (17 July 1955), Memo of conversation, 19 July 1955, ACW Diary Series, box 6, ACW Diary July 1955 (3), Ann 
Whitman File, DDEL. 
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Chiang described the erstwhile faithful Robertson as a ―son of a bitch.‖40 He further declared to 
Radford and Robertson:   
He had agreed to evacuate Tachens but he will defend Quemoy-Matsu with or 
without US help … He is fully aware of the danger of Chicom buildup but is 
prepared to take risk of receiving full onslaught of attack rather than give up two 




In the midst of the Geneva negotiation in August 1955, the KMT blatantly conducted raids on 
China. Allen Dulles thought that ―it was timed to coincide with the Geneva business.‖ The 
intention of transferring the responsibility for para-military operations to the Defense Department 
was to stem such unauthorized operations. Allen Dulles informed the Secretary of State that the 
CIA ―would not be informed‖ of any further operation.42 The following year, to keep the US 
further off guard, the ROC requested for a ―violent revolution on the mainland‖ – Hungarian- 
style.
43
 All in all, Taipei‘s frustration and paranoia with Washington would be played out in two 
areas: secret negotiations with Beijing and the 1957 Taiwan Riots.  
 
2. ROC-PRC Secret Back-Channels (1955-1957) 
While the CIA had intelligence about possible secret contacts between the ROC and the PRC, it 
doubted the veracity of such information and was persuaded by Chiang Ching-kuo of the 
steadfastness of the ROC. Although the ROC participated in the back-channels, it was intensely 
wary of the PRC and carefully maneuvered between alerting Washington and maintaining links 
with Beijing. Albeit hostile rhetoric, common historical and cultural ties explained how Taipei and 
Beijing could maintain the links, however briefly, out of patriotism that warring brothers should 
unite to thwart a foreigner from allegedly achieving ―two Chinas.‖ Such secret back-channels 
would feature importantly again during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958. However, this 
was a point which the Eisenhower Administration failed to fathom.   
                                                 
40 Chiang Diaries, Hoover, 25-29 April 1955, box 51, folder 11, cited in Taylor, The Generalissimo,  682, n.125. 
41 Robertson to Dulles, telegram, no. 4, 25 April 1955, in FRUS, vol. 2 (1955-57), 511. 
42 Memo of Telephone Conversation with Allen Dulles, 18 August 1955, Telephone Conversation Series, box 4, 
Telephone Conv. - General May 2 1955–Aug 31 1955 (2), JFD papers, DDEL. 
43 The Americans reacted by bureaucratic inertia in the face of such an outlandish request. They mulled over ―changes in 
their proposed reply‖ and the answer to Chiang ―was buried in the Secretariat for a week.‖ Telephone call to William J. 
Sebald (Deputy Asst Secretary for Far Eastern Affrairs), 15 May 1956, Telephone Conversation Series, box 5, 




2.1 Washington’s Hazy Knowledge of Taipei-Beijing Secret Links 
Washington was hazily aware of the contacts between the ROC and the PRC. A 2007 declassified 
CIA intelligence report listed that from the mid-1950s, Beijing had sent numerous secret letters to 
Taipei requesting for negotiations for an eventual reunification. But the CIA sanguinely concluded 
that Taipei did not reply: ―The GRC ignored these approaches, viewing the proposals as 
counterfeit and the letters themselves as instruments of psychological warfare.‖  The report found 
the information given by the head of the ROC intelligence services and Chiang Kai-shek‘s son, 
Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK), reliable because ―of his personal opposition to any contacts with 
Peking‖ and his ―sensitivity to possible US suspicions.‖  However, the CIA admitted that its 
―evidence is tenuous‖ and ―firm only on occasion,‖ and further stated that ―Chiang Ching-kuo is 
the source of all the credible information made available by the GRC about private overtures from 
the Communist side.‖44  
 
CCK was portrayed as an ingénue open to ―enticement‖ from ―disreputable,‖ ―self-initiated 
schemes of pro-Communist ‗operators‘ in Hong Kong.‖ However, when Time reported a rumour 
on 16 January 1956 that Hong Kong journalist Cao Juren was Chiang Ching-kuo‘s secret emissary 
to Beijing, the CIA simply rejected this because CCK denied it. While a better case could be made 
that the alleged emissary Cao Juren only entered the PRC on 1 July 1956, even the weight of 
rumour did nothing to deter the CIA‘s dismissal. Although ―US diplomatic officers in Taipei and 
HK were urged periodically to evaluate the possibility that GRC-Peking negotiations were about to 
occur, or were already in progress,‖ whatever purported evidence presented were dismissed as 
―preposterous‖ and the report concluded sympathetically that ―GRC sensitivity to the impact of the 
rumors was real.‖45 Curiously, the CIA accurately established that the CCK-Cao relationship dated 
                                                 
44 ―Peking-Taipei Contacts: The Question of a Possible ‗Chinese Solution‘,‖ RSS No. 0055/71, POLO Doc. 34, 
December 1971 [Declassified May 2007], Intelligence Report, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. 
http://www.cia.foia.gov [accessed 23 November 2008], i-iii, 5, 8. 
45 On the eve of President Richard Nixon‘s Sino-US rapprochement, the CIA was tasked to document the extent of 
covert Chinese communication. The report was purportedly informed by four types of sources, the first being news 
reports of rumors, the second being what the ROC revealed to the US at the point of KMT-Communist contact. The third 
type were what Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK) repeated to the analysts of the report in 1971 and the last type were 
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back to 1938 when Cao worked as the chief editor for CCK‘s newspaper, Xingan Nanbao. 
Although Cao left after five years, CCK reportedly commented that ―[o]nly Cao understands me.‖ 
The CIA report quoted Zhou Enlai, who said ―Chiang Ching-kuo would trust no one representing 
Peking if he would not trust Tsao Chu-jen.‖ Cao even flaunted his relationship with CCK by 
publishing a celebrated biography of CCK in 1948. Despite all these evidence, the CIA appeared 




Indeed, CCK embarked upon an ingenious campaign of misinformation against Washington. The 
CIA was led to believe that the Communist ―peace gestures‖ were full of ―improvisation and a 
desultory quality‖ which lacked ―urgency‖ and ―planning.‖ American and Chinese sources 
revealed that CCK showered the US intelligence with inconsequential letters from the PRC to 
mask the significant approaches Taipei made to Beijing. The biggest gap in the CIA report was 
Sung Yi-shan‘s visit to Beijing in mid-April 1957. As Chiang Kai-shek‘s representative, Sung had 
secret talks with Zhou Enlai over the possibility of an autonomous Taiwan under Chiang‘s rule. 
Zhou had promised the following terms: negotiations for the reunification of China; high 
autonomous status for Taiwan; Chiang could send his representatives to Beijing but the PRC 
would not interfere with Chiang‘s rule in Taiwan; and the US troops must leave Taiwan. Sung 
even detailed his visit to Beijing with a 15,000-word glowing report to the ―disgusted‖ Chiang.47  
 
On the other hand, CCK used selective release of letters to further establish his bona fide anti-
communist reputation. According to the CIA report, Cao‘s first three letters (August-December 
1955) were shown to the Americans and CCK sweetened the disclosure with another Cao‘s alleged 
March 1957 letter which even showed ―six possible conditions for a Peking-GRC accommodation‖ 
                                                                                                                                                   
―constructive inputs from many offices in the CIA.‖  See POLO Doc. 34, December 1971, iii, 5, 11-12. For Chiang 
Ching-kuo‘s denial, see ―Formosa: An End to Rumors,‖ Time (16 Jan 1956). 
46 See POLO Doc. 34, December 1971, iv, 3-4, 8; Mao Lei and Fang Xiaofang, Guogong liangdang tanpan tongshi 国共
两党谈判通史  [A complete account of CCP and KMT negotiations](Lanzhou: Lanzhou Daxue chubanshe, 1996), 641-
646, 650; Cao Juren 曹聚仁, Jiang Jinguo lun 蒋经国论 [Chiang Ching-kuo: A Discourse] (Shanghai: Shanghai Lianhe 
Huabaoshe, 1948; reprint, Taipei: Yiqiaochubanshe, 1997). 
47 POLO Doc. 34, December 1971, iii; Tong, Fengyu Sishinian, 274; Wang Yongqin 王永钦, Tongyi zhi lu: Liangan 
guangxi wushinian da shiji 统一之路: 两岸关系五十年大事记 [Road to Unification](Guangzhou: Guangdong remin 
chubanshe, 1999), 49; Zheng Jian 郑剑 , Gudao Canmeng: Guomintang zai Taiwan de rizi li 孤岛残梦: 国民党在台湾
的日子里 [Solidarity and Despair: The KMT on Taiwan] (Beijing: Qunzhong chubanshe, 1997), 370-372. 
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(which were variations of Sung‘s conditions).48 At the same time, the outline of Mao‘s offer was 
publicly revealed in Cao‘s popular travelogue, Beixing Xiaoyu 北行小语, published in June 
1957.
49
 What CCK hid from Washington was that Cao‘s repeated trips to Beijing from May 1957 
onwards were requested by Taipei. Covert protocols were established where Cao was handled by a 
Hong Kong contact, Wang Chi-tzu, who was also a ROC emissary. More importantly, CCK 
replied at length to Cao on Taiwan‘s domestic situation, the US-ROC relations and even what the 
―old man‖ (Chiang Kai-shek) felt about the communist overtures.50  
 
2.2 Taipei’s Wariness of Beijing 
Chiang Ching-kuo‘s messages to Cao in the 1950s displayed an intense wariness of Beijing. But 
Taipei did not seek to close the channel. The heir apparent did not shy away from commenting on 
the Taiwan Riots (May 1957), reduction of offshore islands garrisons, and economic difficulties. 
One oral message communicated in the second week of August 1957 reflected the somber mood of 
CCK in the aftermath of the Taiwan Riots. Rioters had raided the US embassy, burst the safe box 
and passed the contents to relevant Taiwan authorities; to his dismay, CCK learnt that the US was 
―trying to prevent power from being passed to CCK hands‖ and allegedly planned to have CCK 
―go on a sabbatical in the States for three years‖ so that a ―Hu Shih-led‖ opposition could take 
root.
51
 Elsewhere, CCK revealed how the US wanted the ROC soldiers off Quemoy and Matsu. 
His father patriotically opposed this and stated that the ―security of Quemoy, Matsu and Taiwan 
should be considered together.‖ CCK also revealed that the ROC was experiencing serious 
economic difficulties: ―The US only treated the symptoms, and not the root causes.‖ In explaining 
                                                 
48 POLO Doc. 34, December 1971, 10-12. 
49 Cao reported that Mao met him briefly and the consensus in Beijing was that Chiang Kai-shek could retain his tianxia 
天下[authority/ power]. Beijing was willing to even ―invest‖ in the development of Taiwan. Elsewhere, Cao added that 
Beijing recognized the ―historical contributions‖ of Chiang and Mao had ―calmed down‖ to await the time when he 
could ―shake the hands‖ of his former enemy. Recently, Beijing has released excerpts of Mao‘s offer and the contents 
were largely similar to Cao‘s account. See Cao Juren 曹聚仁, Beixing xiaoyu 北行小语 [A brief account of my northern 
travels] (Jiulong: Sanyu tushu wenju gongsi, 1957), 197, 201-202; See, Mao with Cao Juren, record of conversation, 4 
October 1956, in Jin (ed), Zhou Enlai Zhuan 2nd ed. vol 2., 1298-1299. 
50 Cao Jingxing‘s interview, in Wu Juan 吴娟 et al., ―Liangan mishi Cao Juren‖ 两岸密使曹聚仁 [Cao Juren: the Secret 
emissary], ShiDai Zhoubao 时代周报 [Time Weekly], 28 Sept 2009, C06; Ding Quanlin 丁全昭, Cao Juren: Weisheng 
youbi yue ru dao 曹聚仁: 微生有笔月如刀 [Cao Juren: A literati‘s life](Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 1999), 
154. 
51 Marshall Green claimed that the scattered papers were ―false documents.‖ What were the false documents doing in the 
US embassy? Were they strategically placed to be discovered by the mob? Green did not elaborate. See Marshall 
Green‘s interview, in China Confidential, 141. 
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the slow pace of the ROC‘s response to the PRC‘s overtures, CCK rationalized that ―the 
Taiwanese population is uninterested in ‗counter-offensive‘ and suspicious of ‗negotiations.‘ 
Hence, this created a mood of delay and hesitation.‖52   
 
CCK adroitly cultivated Beijing‘s interest with candid details of the problematic ROC-US 
relations. On the other hand, he signaled that the KMT under Chiang still patriotically adhered to 
the concept of ―One China.‖ Implicit in the message was that Beijing could do worse without the 
Chiangs around.
53
 Indeed, Mao had begun to mull over the idea of leaving the Chiangs on Taiwan, 
telling the Czechs on 22 March 1957: 
The United States is trying to bring Chiang Kai-shek down. It has been cultivating 
a group of people to replace him. Now we need to help Chiang to oppose the US. 
For the question is: Which is better, Chiang or the pro-American forces fostered 
by the United States? Which is more desirable, that Taiwan remains under the 




However, Taipei balked at any further step. While the PRC launched another nation-wide purge, 
the Anti-Rightist Movement, and Zhou Enlai pled in Cao‘s 19 July message, ―please do not be 
swayed by any news or rumors and changed the original agreed upon plans [to negotiate],‖ CCK 
knew better. Around 8 August, CCK informed Cao that ―there are no changes to the general 
scheme of plan, but things would have to be pushed to November.‖ He cautioned that one should 
―wait for the dust to settle.‖ CCK claimed to have his hands full trying to contain the domestic 
situation in Taiwan and thus ―he would find it difficult to come to Hong Kong; all communication 
would be through brother W (Wang Chi-tzu).‖ Nevertheless, CCK reassured Cao that the 
                                                 
52 Years later, CCK‘s confidential secretary Jiao Renhe told Cao Jingxing (Cao‘s third son) that CCK left little written 
materials. The secret messages via the Cao Juren conduit were no exception. CCK‘s messages to Cao were delivered 
orally by Wang Chi-tzu and Cao recorded these in his notebooks. All these materials were given by the younger Cao Yi 
to Li Wei in the 1990s. See Li Wei 李伟 Cao Junren Zhuan 曹聚仁传[A Biography of Cao Juren] (Zhenzhou: Henan 
renmin chubanshe, 2004),295-307; Wu Juan, ―Liangan mishi Cao Juren,‖ C06. 
53 The US received similar doses of such world weariness from Chiang Ching-kuo: that he was tired of carrying out all 
the ―unpleasant tasks‖ for his father as a ―lackey‖ and hence, would like to give up his responsibilities. Such complaints 
were meant to counter US pressure. This bargaining method has been termed the ―Chinese wife syndrome‖ as the 
stereotyped Chinese wife would threaten her husband with suicide if her demands were not met. See Taipei to Dulles, 23 
Mar 1958, RG 59, box 3937, NARA, cited in Laura Tyson Li, Madame Chiang Kai-shek: China‟s Eternal First Lady 
(NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006), 366; Richard H. Solomon, Chinese Negotiating Behaviour: Pursuing Interest 
through „Old Friends‟ (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 43. 
54 Mao to Czech delegation, record of conversation, 22 March 1957, MD, 222. 
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Generalissimo had no intention of terminating the conduit.
55
 On 23 September, in response to 
Cao‘s urging for a faster response, CCK again counseled patience. Cao argued in exasperation that 
even in China, ―no one really expects the Nationalist Army to launch a counter-offensive.‖ CCK 
retorted: ―Truly if negotiations were to be successful, it would be best if the ―old man‖ is still 
around [whose prestige would dampen any opposition].‖ The question was not if there would be 
negotiations, but who to send? Apparently, Chiang Kai-shek was still sore about Sung Yi-shan‘s 
alleged ―conversion to communism‖ and was adamant that the ROC should not appear too eager 
for negotiations. Finally, CCK again stated that decision on all related matters would be further 




In retrospect, CCK was carefully maneuvering between alerting Washington and maintaining links 
with Beijing. All of CCK‘s messages to Beijing carefully avoided giving a commitment for direct 
negotiations. The contents of the messages were also not sensational, as much of the information 
given by CCK was readily available in the newspapers. If they were leaked, they could be easily 
explained away. More significantly, CCK played up his image of a fierce anti-communist crusader, 
albeit an obedient junior partner of the Americans.
57
 The paternalistic assertion of CIA that CCK 
was a loyal vassal was striking. Washington could barely fathom the possibility that common 
historical and cultural ties could bind the KMT and the CCP. Former US Ambassador to Britain 
Lewis W. Douglas presciently noted the nature of the Chinese civil war, cautioning Eisenhower: 
… there would be a far greater risk that one day we would wake up in the morning 
                                                 
55 Even Cheng Siyuan, a close confidant of exiled KMT leader Li Zongren, who visited Beijing in late April 1956 on a 
fact-finding mission, was alarmed by the Anti-Rightist Movement and advised Li to ―put on hold his plans for returning 
to China.‖ See Cheng Siyuan 程思远, Wo de huiyi 我的回忆[My reminiscences] (Beijing: Huayi chubanshe, 1994), 
250-251; Li Li 李立, Guomingtang qianfu Taiwan: Cong Jiangshi fuzi dao lianzhan Ma yinjiu 国民党沉浮在台湾: 从蒋
氏父子到连战马英九[The KMT fortunes in Taiwan: From the Chiang Family to Lianzhan and Mao Yinjiu] (Beijing: 
Taihai chubanshe, 2008), 203; Wang Guangyuan 王光远,  Jiang Jieshi zai Taiwan 蒋介石在台湾  [Chiang Kai-shek in 
Taiwan] (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 2008), 178. 
56 CCK later explained that the domestic Taiwanese opposition cries against ―Chiang family authoritarianism‖ were 
getting strident. These were propelled by the twin fears of war and the shape of peace to come. CCK divulged that there 
were plans for a Sino-Korean-Japanese coalition [for counter-attack], but others were unconvinced that China could be 
defeated. Besides, the Japanese demanded too high a price for their participation. CKS maintained disdainfully that such 
futile plans were American in origin. ―If one cannot even protect Taiwan [let alone a tripartite coalition],‖ he sighed, 
―how can one face the people?‖ see, Chen Dunde 陈敦德, Mao Zedong yu Jiang Jieshi de zuihou jiaoshou 毛泽东与蒋
介石的最后交手 [The last contest between Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek] (Taipei: Fengyun chubanshe, 2002), 
278; Wang, Jiang Jieshi zai Taiwan, 179. 
57 John A. Lacey recalled his impression of CCK as ―a thick-necked Gauleiter, a strong armed man, not one that I would 
particularly like to associate with.‖ Walter Jenkins perceived CCK as ―a very, very clever man.‖ Lindsey Grant saw 
CCK as ―nobody‘s fool.‖ See China Confidential, 120, 133 & 137.  
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and find arrangements had been made between Chiang or his successor in 
Formosa and the mainland… Would we then try to drive them off on the pure 
grounds of strategic necessity?
58
 
The ROC-PRC secret back-channels demonstrated that Douglas‘ prediction was partly correct.  
This aspect was important and indeed possible because of common history and cultural beliefs that 
warring brothers should unite, however briefly, out of patriotism to thwart a foreigner from 
allegedly achieving ―two Chinas.‖ Such secret back-channels would feature importantly again 
during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958.  
 
3. The May 1957 Taiwan Riots (Liu Tzu-jan Incident) 
The May 1957 Taiwan Riots provided a case study of the latent cultural fault lines between Taipei 
and Washington. It showed how many Americans were prejudiced against Taipei, leading to 
shoddy investigative work, purloined justice and sensational reporting. It also presented insights on 
Taiwanese fractured cultural and nationalistic resentments against Americans. The many identities 
and ―deaths‖ of the protagonist of the riots, Liu Tzu-jan, further highlighted the complexities in 
relations between Taiwanese and Americans. In the aftermath of the riots, the nuances and roles of 
ritualized apologies stood out. Chiang Kai-shek‘s symbolic public apology and the report of the 
Executive Yuan tenuously straddled the domestic demands for justice while upholding the 
international needs of the state. The speed at which Washington accepted Taipei‘s apologies also 
signaled the burgeoning maturity and tenacity of the ROC-US relations.   
 
3.1 US Prejudiced Views of the 1957 Taiwan Riots  
The facts of the case were seemingly simple. Liu Tzu-jan, a Taiwanese ―33 year-old laborer,‖ was 
caught peeping at Clara, the wife of M/Sgt. Robert G. Reynolds, when she was bathing on 20 
March 1957 at Reynolds‘ home in Yang Ming Shan. The sergeant immediately confronted Liu 
who then tried to attack Reynolds with ―a club.‖ Reynolds killed Liu with two shots ―in self-
defense.‖ On 23 May 1957 Reynolds was acquitted of voluntary manslaughter of Liu by the eight-
man jury of the US military court martial. During this acquittal, it was reported that ―American 
                                                 
58 Lewis W. Douglas to Dulles, 26 March 1955, General Correspondence & Memoranda Series, box 2, Strictly 
Confidential - c- d (3), JFD papers, DDEL. 
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spectators applauded the verdict‖ while ―Chinese shook their heads in disbelief‖ and ―[n]ationalist 
Chinese cursed American soldiers today in a wave of anti-American sentiment.‖ On the following 
day, Chinese mobs wrecked the US embassy and USIS HQ, before order was restored by KMT 
troops in the evening.
59
   
 
American accounts of the riots were sensational. Some exaggerated the number of rioters. The 
New York Times reported a mob of 1,500 on 24 May; a day after it became 3,000 and later in the 
same paper it had ―grown to 20,000 or 30,000.‖ The Los Angeles Times carried a bold headline 
that screamed: ―Formosa Mob of 5,000 storms US embassy.‖60 The attempt to paint the riots as a 
centrally planned Nationalist effort was seen in such comments as ―[o]ddly, nothing had been 
stolen from the shambles of the Embassy‖ and the shouts of students leaders to ―[d]estroy, but 
don‘t steal.‖61 Such US reporting assumed that a Chinese mob would loot; no credit was given to a 
mob which was possibly aroused by righteous anger at an unfair acquittal. 
 
Other conspiracy theories abounded. Chiang himself was reportedly ―composed and calm.‖ In 
addition, ―Chinese Nationalist officials demanded that President Chiang Kai-shek revoke the 
present diplomatic immunity bestowed on US soldiers.‖62 Such circumstantial evidences were held 
up as proof of Taipei‘s role. Keyes Beech of the Washington Post pointed out that it was 
inconceivable that a ―tightly controlled island … a police state‖ would have riots. He also cited 
that ―several spoke English‖ and the ―police made no determined effort… [despite having] two 
armoured cars equipped with 37 mm and machine guns.‖ The Los Angeles Times speculated that 
―the underlying cause might well be the restiveness of the Nationalist Chinese over being virtually 
imprisoned on the island.‖63  
                                                 
59 ―ACQUITAL IRKS TAIWAN,‖ New York Times, May 24, 1957, 10; ―Acquittal of GI Irks Formosans,‖ The 
Washington Post, 24 May 1957, A4. 
60 ―U.S. Flag Trampled By Rioters in Taiwan,‖ New York Times, May 24, 1957, 1; ―ANTI-U.S. RIOTERS IN TAIPEI 
CURBED BY CHIANG TROOPS,‖ New York Times, May 25, 1957, 1; ―American Flag Torn Down,‖ 
Los Angeles Times, May 24, 1957, 1. 
61 Robert Trumbull, ―Calm is Restored after Taipei Riot,‖ NYT, 26 May 1957, 1. 
62 ―US Flag Ripped in Taiwan Riots,‖ New York Times, May 24, 1957, 10. 
63 James Reston of the New York Times too believed that the riots were ―a protest against the frustrations of an 
increasingly isolated life.‖ As such, the ―inevitability of trouble‖ arose ―when allies seem to promise more than they 
deliver and seem to pretend that they are pursuing the same objectives when they are not.‖ James Reston, ―The U.S. and 




One major theme centered on the imagery of an ungrateful ROC brute. Beech wrote that the 
Americans ―listen with controlled anger at Chinese apologies.‖ Beech felt that the apologies had a 
―hollow ring coming from a regime which owes its very existence to American support and would 
collapse without it.‖64 Some US commentators were surprised with the extent of ―anti-white 
feelings, [and] xenophobia‖ displayed. An element of regret surfaced: ―We have been assured that 
this is a gilt-edged investment in the refusal to have anything to do with the mainland government 
in Peking.‖65 Most thought that it was money down the drain. The New York Times quickly offered 
the quantitative side of the relationship: ―$770,000,000.‖66 Drew Pearson crassly put it down as an 
unwarranted ―outburst of anti-Americanism on the island kept going by American Troops and 
American Dollars.‖67 Slowly, a few saw the disconnection between the amount of aid dispensed 
and the quality of friendship gained. The Wall Street Journal put it succinctly: ―This bitterness is 
inevitable; the presence of soldiers smacks of occupation.‖ The aid provided was revealed by the 
Washington Post as ―symbolizing the past sins of the white man lording it over the Asians‖ and 
depriving them of their ―national sovereignty.‖68  
 
Some urged for a relook at US foreign policy and foreign aid.
69
 Columnist Walter Lippmann 
underscored the bankruptcy of the China Policy. As Eisenhower in 1955 ―made it clear that the US 
would not permit Chiang to attempt an invasion…it broke the back of our China policy. It 
deprived the Chinese in Formosa of any hope that they could return to the mainland…‖ Lippmann 
also questioned the utility of US intransigence towards China. The policies ―are psychological. 
                                                 
64 He also reported how one furious American who was attacked said that the Chinese not only ―bit the hand that fed 
them, but they kicked us in the shins and hit us over the head.‖ Keyes Beech, ―Formosan Riot . . . .‖ The Washington 
Post, May 28, 1957, A19. 
65 ―Humpty Dumpty,‖ The Washington Post, May 25, 1957, A12. 
66 Four days later, the Wall Street Journal editorial carefully reasoned that ―indefinitely spending some $3 billion a year 
on military aid and maintaining troops in 72 nations is an untenable proposition.‖ ―Our Furious Friends,‖ Wall Street 
Journal, May 28, 1957, 12; ―Aid to Date, $770,000,000,‖ New York Times, May 25, 1957, 3. 
67 Pearson verged upon hyperbole in declaring that the attacks inflicted one of the ―most vicious attacks on Americans in 
our 178 years of history.‖ Drew Pearson, ―Formosa Rioting Reddens Faces,‖ The Washington Post, May 28, 1957, D13. 
68 The next day, echoing Dulles‘ interview on 29 May, the Washington Post noted that despite having ―poured some 
$2.75 billion in military and economic aid… no one loves an occupation force.‖ ―The Formosa Folly,‖ The Washington 
Post, May 29, 1957, A12; The Los Angeles Times observed similarly: ―There is no doubt the presence of foreign armed 
forces in any country is a source of friction under the best of circumstances and raises questions of the utmost difficulty.‖ 
―Close Decision in Sergeant's Case,‖ Los Angeles Times, Jun 5, 1957, B4. 
69 Reston observed that ―[a]bsolute dependence upon and dedication to Chiang Kai-shek to the complete exclusion of 
any eventual accommodation and settlement with the Chinese government on the main land is monumental folly.‖ ―The 
Formosa Folly,‖ The Washington Post, May 29, 1957, A12. 
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The purpose of the restriction is to make the overseas Chinese feel that the entire world…is the 
enemy of Red China.‖70 Others ascribed the resentment of the Chinese to matériel jealousy. Walter 
Trohan of the Chicago Daily Tribune noted that: ―Americans live in luxury compared with local 
peoples … Americans abroad frequently demand and get special privileges … They tend to 
become arrogant.‖71 This hubris of the Americans could be observed from the comments made by 
Secretary of Defence Wilson, who casually commented that ―the Chinese Nationalists will 
continue to be reliable because they have nowhere else to go‖72 A former ambassador to India, 
Chester Bowles, advised that ―[r]espect and understanding for other peoples of the world‖ would 
have prevented the riots and it was important to provide ―a chance for the Taiwanese in Formosa 
to have a voice in their own future.‖73 
 
Overcoming the initial shock, the US commentators began to look for deeper causes such as the 
clash of cultures. Trohan pointed to the different perceptions of law while leaving his readers with 
no ambiguity which was superior: ―Peeping isn‘t anything of a crime in China [sic], and there is 
thus a conflict in legal concepts at the bottom of the protest.‖74 Another writer wrote that: ―In the 
Oriental a much stronger feeling exists that in a case of litigation a compromise should result, if 
only for face-saving reasons.‖75 Behind such reasoned explanations lurked prejudice and racial 
superiority. African-American writer, Dean G. Hancock, pointed out that the US was suffering 
from the backlash of its racist foreign policy: ―We know of no other parallel where a nation has 
done so much and is respected so little.‖ Hancock caustically added that ―[o]ur great nation is 
learning, much to its chagrin, that acquitting a white man in slaying a Chinaman is not the same as 
acquitting a white man in slaying a defenseless Negro.‖76 Roger Darling, a former Foreign Service 
                                                 
70 Walter Lippmann, ―Today and Tomorrow,‖ The Washington Post, May 30, 1957, A17. 
71 Roger Darling, a former Foreign Service officer, further observed that there was an ―unleashing of resentment against 
those who have the things we don‘t have.‖ Roger Darling, ―Oriental Riots,‖ The Washington Post, Jun 8, 1957, A 6; 
Walter Trohan, ―Riots in Nationalist China Reveal Flaws in Methods of Selling the American Way,‖ Chicago Daily 
Tribune, Jun 2, 1957, A15. 
72 ―The Formosa Folly,‖ The Washington Post, May 29, 1957, A12. 
73 ―Formosa Riots Point Up U.S. Problem, Says Bowles,‖ The Hartford Courant, May 28, 1957, 10. 
74 But Trohan was honest enough to admit that ―while the US has turned over the trial of American soldiers to so many 
foreign courts, it has not seen fit to do so in Formosa.‖ Trohan, ―Riots in Nationalist China,‖ A15. 
75 Willian Henry Chamberlin,  ―Inevitable Friction,‖ Wall Street Journal, Jun 5, 1957, 12 
76 Dean Gordon B. Hancock, ―Between The Lines ..,‖ Los Angeles Sentinel, Jun 6, 1957, A6. 
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officer, reiterated similarly, seeing how Reynolds‘ acquittal had ―aroused the suspicion that most 
Westerners felt they are better or more valuable than an Oriental.‖77  
 
3.2 The “Many Deaths” of Liu Tzu-jan 
None of the US editorials bothered to reexamine the cause célèbre of Liu Tzu-jan‘s death. Why 
the Chinese were so agitated was simply dismissed. The oral testimony of Reynolds vilifying Liu 
as a ―peeping Tom,‖ ―prowler,‖ and ―laborer‖ was held as gospel truth. No news services deviated 
from this description as their focus was on the horror of the riots.
78
 However, in the official report 
by the ROC Executive Yuan, it emerged that Liu was an employee of the elite Geming Shijian 
Yanjiuyuan 革命实践研究院 [Institute of Revolutionary Practice], which was located at Yang 
Ming Shan.
79
 He was a married government employee who happened to stay at the institute‘s 
hostel located near Reynolds‘ home.  
 
However, Reynolds‘ testimony dominated. The US investigators obtained no testimony from Clara 
Reynolds, whose modesty was allegedly outraged. The fact that Liu‘s ―club‖ was not found meant 
that Clara Reynolds‘ evidence became all the more important. All that the investigators found was 
hardly ―a club,‖ but a ―finger-thick 2-feet long cherry tree branch‖ which was not even found at 
the scene but at a bamboo forest quite a distance away. Instead, the defence concentrated on the 
irrelevant ―heroics‖ of Reynolds in the Korean War to the sympathetic rump jury.80 The ballistics 
of the bullet trajectories indicated that the distance fired was ―no more than three centimeters.‖ Liu 
apparently knew Reynolds well enough to be so close. Finally, the first shot was already fatal; Liu 
could no longer supposedly swing his cherry stick. Yet Reynolds still fired the second shot, which 
appeared to be a ―finishing off shot.‖ Reynolds‘ guilt was seen in Dulles‘ admission that ―he does 
not understand how [Reynolds] got acquitted.‖ That the US military court martial could find 
                                                 
77 Roger Darling, ―Oriental Riots,‖ The Washington Post, Jun 8, 1957, A 6. 
78 ―Formosa Riot Figure Returns to U.S.,‖ Los Angeles Times , May 27, 1957, 3. 
79 Geming Shijian Yanjiuyuan was also known as the Academy for the Study of Carrying out Revolution. It was a KMT 
cadre training school for those who wished to be in the top rungs of the government or the party. See Ramon H. Myers, 
―Towards an Enlightened Authoritarian Polity: The Kuomintang Central Reform Committee on Taiwan, 1950-1952,‖ 
Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 18, no. 59 (March 2009): 191. 
80 Only eight members of the twelve-men jury turned up. All were white. Qin Feng 秦风 ed., Suiyue Taiwan1900-2000
岁月台湾 [Taiwan through the ages], (Guiling: Guangxi Shifan danxue chubanshe, 2005), 72-75. 
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Reynolds innocent of voluntary manslaughter within four days of hearing only served to highlight 




Another identity of Liu was established by Washington. Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs 
Walter P. McConaughy wrote that Liu was a ―clerk at the KMT political school.‖ McConaughy 
reported allegations that Liu was dead because of some ―black-market operations‖ gone sour. After 
the first shot, Reynolds pursued the victim and finished Liu with a second shot. Although the 
Chinese Procurator‘s office had presented evidence that Reynolds killed Liu ―with malice and not 
in self-defence‖ on 16 April, the MAAG dismissed it.82 Other evidence revealed that Liu was ―a 
colonel in the intelligence organization headed by Chiang Ching-kuo.‖  US Embassy Information 
Officer James Moceri revealed that Liu was ―shot in the back.‖ Moceri also supported the 
allegations of ―illegal activity.‖ Although there were suggestions of compensation for Liu‘s widow, 
apologies and a guilty verdict, ―the military present rejected it in the most vehement terms, draping 
themselves in the honor of the American flag and the military code of justice.‖83  
 
Chiang Kai-shek viewed the riots seriously. According to Chiang‘s bodyguard, Weng Yuan, 
Chiang was ―consumed with fury.‖ Chiang lambasted Taipei Garrison Commander Huang Chen-
wu: ―How can you allow such a big incident? Why did you not control the emotions of the 
populace and forbid the crowd from rioting. Now the Americans are offended, how are we going 
to placate them?‖84 In Washington, ROC Ambassador Hollington Tong received a call from 
Foreign Minister George Yeh on 24 May, with strict instructions ―not to incite or provoke‖ public 
opinion, which meant that Tong was not to express outrage or incredulity at the verdict. Tong was 
                                                 
81 Dulles with Eisenhower, Memo of telephone conversation, 24 May 1957 (8:35am), FRUS (1955-57), vol. 3, 528; Yü 
Hung-chün to CKS, ―对台北不幸事件处理经过报告” [Dui taibei buxin shijian chuli jinguo baogao], 14 June 1957, 
serial no. 002080106035008, CKS papers, AH. 
82 McConaughy to Robertson, Memo, 24 May 1957, FRUS (1955-57), vol. 3, 524-525. According to another source, 
―Reynolds had for a long time hired Liu to smuggle controlled products like imported tobacco and liquor out of the 
Army Co-op to sell on the market, pocketing the profit; and later, due to a monetary dispute between the two of them, 
Reynolds shot Liu to death.‖ See Chang Shih-lun, "Life in the Mountains – The American Military Housing of 
Yangmingshan's Shantzuhou," Taiwan Panorama (Dec 2006). 
83 Interview with James Moceri, in China Confidential, 140. 
84 Weng Yuan 翁元, Wo Zai Jiangshi fizhi shenbian sishisannian 我在蒋氏父子身边四十三年 [Forty Three years by 
the side of the Chiang Family] (Beijing: Hua wen chubanshe, 2003), 72 
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also instructed to apologize to the Americans immediately and to summarize the reactions of 
various newspapers across the US for Chiang.
85
   
 
It was highly unlikely that the May riots were planned by Chiang and his entourage. Chiang was 
not about to jeopardize millions of dollars of US aid for some anonymous officer, even if the case 
highlighted the ―sensitive‖ extra-judiciary privileges enjoyed by US personnel in Taiwan. Chiang‘s 
only complaint was that ―an American court martial should not be held on Chinese soil‖ as ―it 
reminded everyone of extra-territoriality.‖86 Although all the US sources fingered the ROC 
authorities, their evidence were weak, ―fragmentary‖ and contradicting. Rankin accused the ROC 
police of failure ―in restraining the crowd,‖ but conceded that they protected the US staff.87 
McConaughy cited Chinese students hanging slogans as evidence that the riots were 
premeditated.
88
 However, the weight of evidence indicated that the ROC ground officials were 
simply responding to popular disgust with the American ―miscarriage of justice.‖ When the ROC 
Youth Corps were accused of inciting the riots, Chiang Ching-kuo retorted that they ―just 
happened to be there.‖89 Indeed, a ROC source was quoted: ―We must only take action we can 
explain to our people.‖90 To suggest that Chiang‘s dictatorial régime could exercise complete 
control over popular outrage and induced compliance by frustrated junior officers on the ground 




The rioting slogans gave insights on Taiwanese fractured cultural and nationalistic resentment 
against Americans. Resonating with the chants of the mob, dissatisfaction and anger were 
expressed in such slogans as ―Kick out the American Devils,‖ ―We want to see the representative 
of the barbarous Americans‖ and ―Beat him up! Kill him!‖ Other observers indicated that the issue 
of nationalism conflated with personal integrity and honor. Liu‘s widow, Ao T‘e-hua, wrote to the 
                                                 
85 George Yeh to Hollington Tong, telegram, 23 May 1957; Hollington Tong to George Yeh, telegram, 30 May 1957, 
serial no. 002080106035008, CKS papers, AH; Hollington K. Tong, Chiang Kai-shek‟s Teacher and Ambassador, ed. 
Walter C. Mih (Bloomington: Authorhouse, 2005), 214; 
86 Rankin with Chiang Kai-shek, Memo of conversation, 27 May 1957, FRUS (1955-57), vol. 3, 539. 
87 Rankin to State Department, telegram, 24 May 1957, FRUS (1955-57), Vol. 3, 527. 
88 McConaughy to Robertson, memo, 26 May 1957, FRUS (1955-57), Vol. 3, 534. 
89 Dulles to AmEmbassy (Taipei), 22 Mar 1958, RG 59, Box 3937, NARA, cited in Li, Madame Chiang Kai-shek, 366. 
90 Army attaché to Department of Army, telegram, 25 May 1957, FRUS (1955-57), Vol. 3, 530. 
91 My interpretation departs from Nancy Tucker, see Taiwan, Hong Kong and the United States, 92. 
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Chinese daily Lianhe Bao 联合报 precisely in those terms: ―Is it possible that American soldiers 
could indiscriminately kill people but a Chinese citizen‘s life is worth next to nothing?‖92 
Subsequent slogans adopted Ao‘s theme and appealed to Chinese not to accept the racist verdict of 
the Reynolds‘ case. The victim‘s cousin, Feng Yün-sheng, carried a placard which summed up the 
Taiwanese perspective of the case: ―The Killer-Reynolds is Innocent? Protest against the US Court 
Martial. Unfair, Unjust Decision!‖ Cold War rhetoric was also subverted and recycled, as seen in 
the slogan, ―Don‘t act like Russians,‖ which accused Americans of imperialistic ―barbarous‖ 
behavior.
93
     
  
What was the role of Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK)? Moceri speculated that CCK‘s ―wrecking squad‖ 
incited the crowd as a form of ―revenge‖ to ―teach a lesson the Americans could neither ignore nor 
forget.‖ Given that Liu was a senior member of his institute, this was conceivable. Chou Hung-t‘ao, 
a KMT central committee member, also alluded to CCK‘s hand: 
CCK‘s nationalist feelings and sense of justice are very strong. He is prone to use 
his influence for didactic ends. But the May 24 incident alerted him that problems 
had to be examined from all angles.  
Chou further reported that when the ROC military police asked CCK‘s Security Bureau for 
instructions during the riots, the Security Bureau curtly stated that the military police had no 
business with the riots at the embassy. They were instructed not to interfere, lest mistakes were 
committed. However, Dulles doubted that CCK started the riots ―though this charge had been 
made by a high KMT official‖; he thought that CCK was mostly guilty of standing aside and 
allowing ―the riot to run its course.‖94 
 
                                                 
92 Guo Chuanxi et al. 郭传玺 (ed), Zhongguo guomindang Taiwan sishinian shigang 中国国民党台湾四十年史纲 [A 
history of the KMT 40 years in Taiwan] (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1993), 177. 
93 While the Americans interpreted the popular slogan, ―Don‘t take anything,‖ as evidence that the riots were a 
coordinated exercise, one could also explain it as a warning that everything in the embassy was so vile and corrupt that it 
was not worth looting. Information on slogans were obtained from the following reports: ―American Flag Torn Down,‖ 
Los Angeles Times, May 24, 1957, 1; ―D.C. Secretary Tells Of Formosa Riots,‖ The Washington Post, Jun 2, 1957, A5; 
Robert Trumbill, ―CALM IS RESTORED AFTER TAIPEI RIOT,‖ The New York Times, May 26, 1957, 1; Keyes Beech, 
―Formosan Riot . . . .‖ The Washington Post, May 28, 1957, A19; Yü Hung-chün to CKS, “对台北不幸事件处理经过
报告” [Dui taibei buxin shijian chuli jinguo baogao], 14 June 1957, serial no. 002080106035008, CKS papers, AH. 
94 Interview of James Moceri, in China Confidential, 140; Zhou Hongtao 周宏涛, Jiang gong yu wo: jianzhen zhonghua 
minguo guanjian bianju 蒋公与我:见证中华民国关键变局 [With Chiang: witnessing important events in the Republic 
of China] (Taipei: Tianxia yuanjian chuban gufeng youxian gongsi, 2003), 423 & 432; 325th NSC meeting, 27 May 
1957, FRUS (1955-57), Vol. 3, 541; McConaughy to Robertson, memo, 26 May 1957, FRUS (1955-57), Vol. 3, 534. 
 207 
 
In the end, the White House officially recognized that the Taiwan riots were spontaneous. Dulles 
expressed the official position on 29 May 1957, but the message seemed lost amid the 
handwringing by American public opinion: 
… we have no evidence to indicate [the Nationalist government] contributed 
toward [the riots]. Perhaps they were not as vigilant as they might have been to try 
to take measures to keep the situation under control. They may have miscalculated 
the explosive character of the situation ….95  
Dulles acknowledged the problems of a large US military presence. Ironically, to reinforce that the 
riots were spontaneous, Dulles resorted to another stereotype about the Chinese: ―Of course we 
know the Chinese are given to that sort of thing. We have had anti-foreign outbreaks in China for a 
long time … the Boxer outbreaks of 50 or 60 years ago … I regard it as indicating something that 
is very old-a sentiment which is deeply embedded in all people and particularly embedded in the 
Chinese people.‖96   
 
3.3 Ritualized Apologies  
The Taiwan riots also presented an interesting case study of the nuances and roles of ritualized 
apologies. The ROC government cabinet wanted to resign in the aftermath of the riots. George 
Yeh‘s official reply on the same day expressed ―profound sense of regret‖ and ―accept full 
responsibility for the losses.‖ The following day, Chiang again expressed ―profound regret‖ to 
Eisenhower and Dulles through Rankin and dismissed three senior officers related to the 
mismanagement of the riots. Then in a broadcast apology on 1 June, routinely reported by six news 
agencies and wired services, Chiang shouldered the entire blame: ―I must openly admit that my 
leadership has been at fault.‖ 97   
                                                 
95 ―The State Department's Record of Dulles' News Conference,‖ New York Times, May 30, 1957, 4. 
96 Nothing was said about the fact that US also had a long history of anti-foreign sentiments, particularly when they 
pertained to ―spontaneity‖: anti-Chinese riots (1877) and official Chinese Exclusion Acts (1882). Chang Ch‘ün to CKS, 
telegram, 21 July 1957, serial no. 002080106035008, CKS papers, AH; Michael H. Hunt, The Making of a Special 
Relationship: The United States and China to 1914 (NY: Columbia University Press, 1983), 73-79 & 86-114. 
97 Chiang sent 33,000 troops to promptly quell the riots. The three senior officers removed were: Maj. Gen. Lo Kan 
(Commissioner of Provincial Police), Lieut. Gen. Huang Chen-wu (Commander of Taipei Garrison) and Lieut. Gen. Lin 
Wei (Head of Military Police). See Spencer Moosa, ―Chiang's Troops Quell Anti-U.S. Riots in Taipei,‖ The Washington 
Post, May 25, 1957, 1; Robert Trumbull, ―CALM IS RESTORED AFTER TAIPEI RIOT,‖ The New York Times, May 
26, 1957, 1; Robert Trumbull, ―CHIANG EXPRESSES REGRET OVER RIOT,‖ New York Times, May 27, 1957, 1; 
Chang Ch‘ün to CKS, telegram, 26 May 1957, serial no. 002080106035008, CKS papers, AH;  外国通讯社及报线记者
于六月二日自台北发出有关总统六一文告专电内容” [Waiguo tongxunshe ji paoxian jizhe yu liuyue erri zi taipei 





American public opinion generally missed the symbolism of Chiang‘s gestures. Chiang classified 
the riots as condemnable acts and guochi (national humiliation) because the Americans had always 
treated China fairly and were not party to the humiliating Boxer Accords. The sixty-nine-year old 
patriarch was firm about where the ROC stood:  
I must make it clear again to our people that in carrying out our national policy 
against communism and Russian imperialism we must stand on the same side with 
the US, which is the leader of the democratic nations and that we cannot permit 
any opposition to this policy from within or without. 
If the reporters missed the nuances of guochi, the White House did not. The ROC ambassador to 
the US swiftly reported to Chiang that Eisenhower noted Chiang‘s gesture in a news conference 
with reporters on 5 June, with Eisenhower saying that ―Chiang had been very prompt in expressing 
regret for the incident and has shouldered a great deal of the blame himself.‖98  
 
The ROC Executive Yuan deftly navigated the minefield of nationalism, justice and guochi. Its 
report on 14 June 1957 had to reflect Chiang‘s apology but at the same time placate the populace. 
In doing so, the report displayed the tropes of a morality play, used to satisfy disparate audiences.
99
 
First it presented exhaustively the facts of the Liu Tze-jan incident, publishing hitherto unavailable 
information from the ROC investigation and pointing out the weakness of the US court martial‘s 
verdict. This rendering immediately established a rapport with the local readers. It then shifted 
gear to depict the randomness of the riots and stressed that the riots were not planned. Special 
emphasis was given to the heart-wrenching scene of Liu‘s faithful widow, Ao T‘e-hua, who stood 
for hours crying in front of the US embassy. These details established the human element in the 
riots and highlighted the themes of piety, forgone justice and the righteousness of the mob, moved 
by the wails of Ao.  
 
                                                 
98 Zhou, Jiang gong yu wo, 427; Greg MacGregor, ―Chiang Says Riots Arose From Fault In His Leadership,‖ The New 
York Times, Jun 2, 1957, 1; Hollington Tong to CKS, telegram, 6 June 1957, serial no. 002080106035008, CKS papers, 
AH. 
99 This insight of a morality play came from Reynaldo Clemena Ileto, Pasyon & Revolution: Popular Movements in the 
Philippines, 1840-1910 (Manila: Ateneo De Manila University Press, 1979). 
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Through such nuanced scripting, the Chinese readers were ―prepared‖ to accept the conclusion of 
the report, that ―we‖ understand why the riots happened and are ready to accept the remedy to 
repair the damage. The report declared that the ―interest of the nation and its honor had suffered a 
grievous blow,‖ but stressed the importance of ―national education‖ regarding an ―understanding 
of our national laws, importance of tolerance, rights, and knowledge of international relations.‖ It 
then explained the difficulties faced by the nation: ―Some questioned the extra-territorial rights of 
the Americans, but we are accepting US military aid.‖ It subsequently appealed to the nationalism 
of the populace, to understand that if the nation was to survive in its anti-communist fight, it had to 
tolerate the realities and inconveniences of accepting foreign aid. The report thus satisfied the 
public need to know the facts and established subtly the government‘s sympathies, but assuaged at 
the same time American feelings by rooting the ROC‘s stand firmly in its anti-communist 
crusade.
100
   
 
Nevertheless, a state of uneasy tension pervaded the ROC-US relations in the aftermath of the riots. 
One issue was the rumored US recognition of the PRC reported by the British press on 21 May 
1958. Given the intensity of the ill feelings over the riots, this rumour became virulent, and US 
Ambassador Everett Drumright had to vigorously deny such ―groundless speculations.‖ Although 
Drumright told Yeh that the reports were wrong, he admitted that he did not explicitly seek to 
reassure Taipei. The attention which the ROC paid to this faux pas demonstrated how sensitive it 
was to the possibility of American disgruntlement. Taipei also suspected that the US might want to 
drive home the point that American friendship should not be taken for granted.
101
 Yet, at the same 
time, the speed at which Washington accepted the ROC‘s apologies signaled the burgeoning 
maturity and tenacity of the ROC-US relations. Such multi-faceted dimensions of the ROC-US 
relations could again be discerned when one explores how the Taiwan Strait Crisis was played out 
in the rendering of the fangong mission in Taiwanese society and politics from 1955 to 1957. 
                                                 
100 Yü Hung-chün to CKS, “对台北不幸事件处理经过报告” [Dui taibei buxin shijian chuli jinguo baogao], 14 June 
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4. The ROC and the Fangong Mission  
Chiang continued preparation for the mission of fangong dalu (counter-offensive against the 
mainland) from 1955 to 1957. The outbreak of the Taiwan Strait Crisis further justified the need 
for political indoctrination. Such a call was also discernible in the popular culture. In emphasizing 
fangong, Chiang persisted in reinforcing total control of the army by the KMT party and at the 
same time paid attention to the welfare of the soldiers. Yet, although military planning for fangong 
continued in a ritualistic manner, changing domestic and international developments gradually led 
to the waning of such a vision. With defensive thinking quietly given precedence over the 
belligerency of counter-attack, the slogan of ―counter-offensive‖ became subverted into a more 
pedestrian domestic rallying cliché aimed at boosting morale, stabilizing and militarizing society, 
and disciplining a credible work force.  
 
4.1 Political, Cultural and Military Indoctrination 
In the wake of China‘s bombardment during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, Quemoy came to 
symbolize the political survival of Taiwan. In this context, the propagation of the Ten Precepts of 
Chiang Kai-shek‘s Military Thought during the bombardment of Quemoy presented an interesting 
case study of indoctrination, political rationalization and crisis management. The Ten Precepts 
were formulated for the ROC citizen-soldiers: 
1. The whole Army will unreservedly destroy the enemy 
2. Carefully tend to the battlefield, seriously train for war 
3. Conserve your strength, exalt in warfare 
4. Everyone to arms, totally destroy the enemy 
5. Be healthy, eat well 
6. Have solid, orderly, neat and accessible battlefield processes   
7. In battle, be ruthless and warlike 
8. Impregnable fortifications are the rule.   
9. Thrive and excel in war 
10. The Quemoy conflict would be a matter of life and death for all Chinese 
An examination of the central themes revealed the primary denominators of ―war‖ and ―all 
Chinese.‖ If Quemoy was a microcosm of the ROC‘s polity, then the precepts gave a fair indicator 
on the state of the society and the preoccupation of the leadership. According to a Quemoy 
political tract published in 1956, these military precepts of Chiang embodied the spirit of the 
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―party, government, military and the people combined.‖102 The author of this short tract, Feng Lun-
yi, highlighted that the ―impregnable‖ success of Quemoy and the inability of the PRC to conquer 
Quemoy stemmed from many factors. ―Close cooperation between the military and the 
population‖ and ―good work put in by the divisions‖ were important, but the ―critical element‖ was 
―President‘s [Chiang] military thought.‖ Military effectiveness and soldierly dedication must be 
guided by the correct political ideology so that ―the two [theory and practice] shall be one.‖103   
 
Besides political exhortation, Paul Cohen noted that the theme of woxin changdan (sleeping on 
thorns and tasting bile) was prevalent in the popular literature as well.
104
 In the preface of his book, 
Zhongxing Shihua (Historical accounts of National Resurgence), published during the First Taiwan 
Strait Crisis, Huang Dashou stated clearly the relevance and importance of his seven historical 
accounts for the prevailing national crisis: 
These were all events of epoch-making significance in Chinese history and … 
bear a close correspondence to our present situation … As long as we are prepared 
to endure hardship … how can we not be victorious in our struggle against the 
Communists and Russians? How can our guangfu dalu (recovery of the mainland) 
not be crowned with success? 
Support by the KMT régime was seen in the prefaces as important officials praised Huang‘s book 
as ―the best extra-curricular reading material for the youth of China.‖105 Echoing similar 
sentiments as Huang‘s book, Chen Wenquan‘s play, Guojian yu Xi Shi (King Guojian and the 
Beauty Xi Shi), which was completed in the midst of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, highlighted 
the importance of Confucian values for the national mission of fuguo (recovery of country). As 
Paul Cohen noted perceptively: ―The use of historical literature to convey political messages was 
                                                 
102 As the precepts were deemed applicable for both the defence of Quemoy and the larger impending goal of a 
―Mainland Counter-offensive,‖ the slogan, ―Annihilate the bandits, Protect Quemoy‖ came to portray the core concerns 
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bian], June 1956, serial no. 002080102100008, CKS papers, AH. 
104 Cohen, Speaking to History,  90. 
105 The identification of Chiang with the central theme of the book was also seen in the book‘s cover illustration. Chiang 
was drawn as a noble giant armed with a bright lantern of ―anti-communism‖ and a sword bestrode across the island of 




an age-old Chinese practice – it certainly wasn‘t invented by the Communists – and Chinese were 
accustomed to looking for such messages in much of what they read and viewed.‖106 
 
In emphasizing the fangong mission, Chiang also exercised total control of the military through 
Chiang Ching-kuo‘s directorship of the General Political Department of the Ministry of Defense 
and the adoption of the Soviet-style Political Commissar system. The KMT‘s control over the 
military via the commissar system vexed the US. The MAAG saw this as excessively wasteful, 
cumbersome and detrimental to command structures.
107
 Admiral Radford complained about such 
practices in the ROC navy to the ROC Foreign Minister George Yeh, noting that ―personnel 
changes in the Navy are controlled more by reports from the political officers than based on 
merit.‖ Moreover, since ―the political officer‘s reports are made secretly to the Political 
Department without reference to or consultations with the officer-in-command,‖ this would also 
―create fear in all ranks.‖ Yeh explained that considering past defections in the navy, ―we have to 
take greater caution in preventing any recurrence of defection, communist infiltration being what it 
is.‖108 The removal and arrest of the ROC Chief of Army, VMI graduate General Sun Li-jen, for 
alleged US-supported coup intentions further served to reinforce the need for a vigorous political 
commissar system.
109
   
 
Nevertheless, practical soldering issues were not forgotten as the Political Commissars were also 
tasked to look into the welfare of soldiers. Jay Taylor commented that the KMT régime effected a 
―revolution in the treatment of the common soldiers in the Chinese Nationalist army.‖110 Chiang 
personally oversaw material benefits and the welfare of his soldiers, and instructed the military top 
brass to look into designing an officers‘ retirement pension scheme and a ―savings provident fund‖ 
                                                 
106 Cohen, Speaking to History, 105. 
107 MAAG noted that it was ―unnecessary to have such an enormous Political Commissars department … It is also a 
contradiction to have an additional cadre training department over and above the normal military training department.‖ 
Cheng Chieh-min to CKS, “补充兵役与预备兵役计画‖ [Bucongbingyi yu yubeibingyi jihuashu], 1 June 1956, serial 
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for officers and soldiers to draw in times of ―emergencies.‖ Outstanding and loyal personnel were 
also encouraged to remain in the military. Well aware of the debilitating impact of military 
sycophants, Chiang further ordered the practice of ―staging military shows for visitors‖ to be 




4.2 Fangong Military Planning: The Waning of Vision 
Despite the pervasiveness of a ―counter-offensive culture,‖ the shaping of the ―counter-offensive‖ 
military strategy took on subtle aspects of incongruity that belied the total commitment of 
Chiang‘s loyal lieutenants. In June 1956, General Pang Mang-chi complained to Chiang that 
progress in the counter-offensive planning was ―less than ideal and appears to be slow‖ while with 
each passing year, the ―communists‘ power and defenses have become stronger.‖ What was left 
unsaid was the lethargy, largely self-inflicted, that had crept up upon the military staff responsible 
for counter-offensive planning. In all aspects, the counter-offensive spirit had slowly faded in 
urgency, despite the looming military threat posed by China. This paradox was due to two factors. 
One, China had established itself firmly politically and economically through the years. Western 
countries such as Great Britain had openly urged the US to ease trade restrictions with China. Two, 
as Taiwan embarked upon domestic development to boost counter-offensive efforts, the 
perpetuation of a war economy was no longer tenable. Being a recipient of American aid also 
meant that the ROC had to heed the US call to concentrate on economic development, and with 





Fading visions aside, another emerging feature of the ―counter-offensive‖ culture was the 
ritualistic rendering of contradictions in aspirations and means in such military planning reports as 
                                                 
111 CKS to Quemoy Defense Department & ROC 8th Army command post, written instructions, 1956, serial no. 
002080200352038, CKS papers, AH. Elsewhere, Chiang was concerned about officers-men relations. As the local 
draftees spoke the Mingnan dialect (common to coastal Fujian province) that was all but incomprehensible to most 
Northern KMT officers, all instruction booklets were required to be supported by Mandarin [國語] pronunciation guide 
in order to engender closer officers-men relations. CKS to General Pang Mang-chi, written instructions, 20 February 
1956, serial no.002080200352007,   CKS papers, AH.    
112 This was especially ―regrettable‖ for General Pang as he had submitted a plan, Guang Zuozhan Jihuaan ―光作战计划
案‖ [Reunification War Plans], as early as 1953. General Pang Mang-chi to CKS, “反攻大陆初期作战大纲之考案‖ 
[Fangong dalu chuqi zuozhan dagang zhi kaoan] (Secret), 30 June 1956, serial no. 002080102126009, CKS papers, AH.           
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General Pang‘s. First, the report would present a formulaic protest regarding the ―originality of the 
present plan.‖ Then there would be a date set for the ―counter-offensive,‖ in Pang‘s case, ―a 
projection of a future situation around June next year.‖  Such a promising start would then be 
eroded by increasing hints at the limitations of the ROC. This trope set the reader up for worse 
predictions, with the conclusion, as seen in Pang‘s report, that ―for an independent counter-
offensive slated for June next year, based on our present strength, it would be an extremely 
difficult mission.‖ The primary blame for such a conclusion would be pinned upon the 
intransigence of the US, whose ―limited assistance‖ was considered the bane of all promising ROC 
counter-offensive plans. In such a manner, Pang thus fulfilled his role as the loyal general dying to 
fulfill Chiang‘s vision, but whose plans were handicapped by the US. Blaming the US had long 
been a credible ploy, the KMT‘s version of the ―stabbed in the back‖ theory; as an article of faith, 
Chiang had privately always blamed President Truman for the ―loss‖ of China. In short, political 
exercises such as ―counter-offensive‖ planning could be seen to have functioned at many levels. 
By presenting a military strategy, General Pang was pledging personal allegiance to Chiang‘s 
vision but by stressing the importance of US aid, he could also fulfill his professional duties as a 
soldier in softly rubbishing Chiang‘s vision.113  
 
By 1957, the continuous exhortation of a ―counter-offensive‖ appeared to wear thin. In the 1957 
ROC military report to Chiang, under the section of ―Present Defence Policy,‖ there appeared to 
be a low-key demotion of ―mainland counter-offensive‖ to second place. Taking precedence was a 
realistic aim, which reflected an appreciation of local conditions, of ―preserving the integrity of the 
Taiwan base.‖ Although there still was the hallowed target of ―mainland counter-offensive,‖ the 
military only aimed at a modest ―expansion of mainland activities to create conducive conditions 
for ‗counter-offensive.‘‖ Elsewhere under the section of ―General Principles Guiding War 
Strategies,‖ there were similar indications of a precedence of defensive thinking over the 
belligerency of counter-attack. ―For the preservation of Quemoy, Matsu, Penghu and Taiwan,‖ 
declared the report, ―we must prepare for counter-offensive.‖ However, it continued: ―Should the 
                                                 
113 General Pang Mang-chi to CKS, “反攻大陆初期作战大纲之考案‖ [Fangong dalu chuqi zuozhan dagang zhi kaoan] 
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Communist bandits invade Quemoy and Matsu, the Nationalist army would destroy the invading 
enemies. We would observe closely for opportune international conditions and insurrection 
conditions on Mainland China. When conditions become ideal, we would invade Fukien, establish 
a base and launch our counter-offensive.‖  This cautionary pause for ideal international and local 
conditions seemed to deflate much wind from the ―counter-offensive‖ drive.114  
 
The coup de grâce was delivered on page twelve. In the sub-section on ―An Analysis of Possible 
Counter-offensive Opportunities,‖ the report stressed that independent action was out of the 
question as the ROC had ―not yet completed preparation and achieve conditions.‖ On joint military 
action with allied armies, it stated that the possibility was low. With the non-military and 
―diplomatic support‖ of allied nations, the possibility was higher although it stiffly noted that the 
ROC had ―always depended on itself.‖ The report tirelessly continued in another sub-section on 
―The Selection of Military Targets,‖ where it gave the shortest timeline of one to two years for a 
counter-attack on northern China, the preconditions being allied military aid and military bases in 
Japan and Korea. In the last option of an independent southern invasion, with or without allied 
support, it estimated a long grueling warfare of three to five years. Underscoring all the ―counter-
offensive‖ planning, the ROC blithely waved the Formosa Resolution, stating that most of the 
troops could be mustered for a wholesale counter-attack. This belied the defensive nature and the 





These planning rituals highlighted the tense negotiation of quixotic expectations, painful realistic 
appreciation and pure political expediencies. Paying lip service to Chiang‘s waning vision, the arm 
service chiefs echoed the impending ―counter-attack‖ in numerous strategic planning committees 
involving all levels of the ROC government. However, after a robust outburst of verbal ―counter-
attack,‖ there would always be a circumspect retraction on the ground that all had to depend on 
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―international circumstances‖ and one ―must be flexible to the situation.‖ In reality, the ―counter-
offensive‖ slogan had become subverted into a more pedestrian domestic rallying cliché aimed at 




Disdainful of the ROC‘s approach towards the military and all aspects of fangong, the US MAAG 
in Taiwan exerted considerable pressure on Taipei to reduce the number of divisions (up to ten), 
lest the maintenance of a standing army weakened the Taiwanese economy. In any case, the ROC 
treasury could not support the active divisions. The US dangled another carrot of $48 million in 
aid to help with the settlement of retired soldiers, before Chiang finally relented and shrewdly 
shifted the focus to the reserves.
117
 As a permanent standing army was not practical, a reserves 
system would ensure that Chiang have at his command the adequate force to launch a counter-
attack and at the same time leave the ROC‘s economy with enough operational manpower. The 
importance of the reserves was first highlighted in the ―Kai‖ Plans in 1953 and reinforced in the 
Chiang-Van Fleet talks in 1954.
118
 With the availability of funding, the ROC Reservist Command 
was created on 1 July 1955. A year later, MAAG issued a report on the state of the ROC‘s reserves 
system, criticizing the excessively large number of reserves, various tactical and administrative 
matters, and the political control imposed from the government. However, it conceded that the 
reserves system was operating smoothly and ―the training syllabi … were extremely close to the 
US model.‖119   
 
Closely tied to the issue of the reserves was the existence of a huge number of old KMT soldiers. 
In confronting the physical and political problems of settling the soldiers, Chiang Ching-kuo re-
                                                 
116 Wildly predicting the ―imminent collapse of the Soviet government,‖ the report then gleefully envisioned that ―the 
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used the ethos of fangong dalu to appeal to their patriotism. He addressed the ex-soldiers in 1956, 
stressing that their revolutionary torch would be carried forth by the younger generation: 
If we do not embark upon this business of retiring the older soldiers … we would 
be left with troops that are forty to fifty years old. How can we fight a war … ? 
Today the government is managing the retirement of our older soldiers in order to 
renew our ranks and strengthen our fighting prowess.
120
 
Retired soldiers were encouraged by easy credit to purchase land for farming, and private 
businesses were strongly encouraged to co-opt former KMT military and security officers into 
their management teams. Chiang Ching-kuo‘s Vocational Assistance Commission for Retired 
Servicemen (VAC) offered re-training and welfare services for retired soldiers and provided small 
amounts of seed money for those who wished to set up small businesses.
121
 Others were employed 
by state enterprises connected with the VAC, such as Retser Engineering Company, which was 
tasked to build the East-West Highway in 1956.
122
 The VAC also supported a huge military 
industrial complex. As the ROC insisted on being self-sufficient in the production of basic 
munitions, such companies were formed under the VAC, which also soaked up excess manpower 
from ex-service men. As the military expenditure was 13% of the ROC‘s GNP in 1960, VAC-
related companies were the main beneficiaries and VAC-backed industries constituted the biggest 




Americans were quick to note the effect of economic development on the ROC‘s military drive 
from as early as 1954. During their visits to Taiwan in 1954, General Van Fleet (special envoy of 
President Eisenhower) and Assistant Secretary of Defense McNeil made some sharp observations 
to Yeh about the attitudes of local-born Taiwanese towards the KMT government, remarking that 
―the locals seemed indifferent and impassive towards Chiang‘s counter-attack.‖ Yeh candidly 
quoted from the US ambassador to the Philippines, who had noted that ―while the ROC‘s officers 
welcomed the developments and improvements made in the armed services, they are doubtful that 
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the mainland Chinese would welcome the return of the KMT.‖ This ambassador reported that 
American officers he had spoken to were of the opinion that the locals ―were apathetic towards the 
defense of Taiwan, but most did not dare to oppose the ‗counter-attack‘ campaign.‖ These 
observations underscored two issues in Taiwan‘s polity. One, Chiang‘s counter-attack failed to 
resonate with the population at large. What was surprising was the degree of doubt that existed in 
1954 even among the ROC‘s officers who were mostly mainlanders. Two, the simmering 
resentment of the locals who were muted by the 1948 massacres had led to a stolid citizenry no 
more enthusiastic about Chiang‘s KMT than Mao‘s communism. ―Counter-attack‖ to the local-
born meant a fading project of the mainlanders. Yeh recommended better integration of the local-
born and more effective propaganda. However, even Yeh wryly noted that whether local-born 
Taiwanese could be counted on ―to take part in the counter-offensive, and to what degree they 
would contribute, is another question.‖124     
 
The ROC was also persuaded by its allies to place more emphasis on economic development than 
fangong. With the Mutual Defence Treaty at hand, observed the Japanese Ambassador Yoshizawa 
Kenkichi on 18 Feb 1955 in a meeting with Chiang Kai-shek, ―the security of the ROC is 
completely reassured.‖ However, as the US had no wish to ―start another war,‖ Chiang‘s ―counter-
attack‖ of the mainland would have to be painfully ―put off by a couple of years.‖ Instead of 
pining for the impossible, the ROC government should ―concentrate its energies on the economy 
so as to attain self-sufficiency.‖ Yoshizawa further advised Chiang that ―economic health would 
promote domestic security and fiscal growth.‖125  
 
Conclusion 
Zhou‘s conciliatory gesture at the Bandung Conference was followed by other initiatives to prompt 
the US toward bilateral negotiations and Eisenhower decided to proceed with the Sino-US 
ambassadorial talks to be held in Geneva. Although the bilateral talks represented progress from a 
                                                 
124 George Yeh to CKS, ―越南停战后中国外交及涉外事项所应考虑态度及办理事务”     [Yuenan tingzhan hou 
zhongguo waijiao ji shewai shixiang suoying kaolü taidu ji banli shiwu], 27 July 1954, serial no.002080106003009, CKS 
papers, AH. 
125 Minutes of meeting CKS with Japanese Ambassador Yoshizawa Kenkichi, 18 February 1955, serial 
no.002080106065020,   CKS papers, AH.           
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framework of tacit communication toward Sino-US tacit accommodation, the limitations of such 
an accommodation became apparent during the negotiations to discuss the issues of US airmen and 
the Taiwan Strait and different expectations led to inconclusive results by the end of 1957. 
Nonetheless, even though the 1955-1957 Sino-US ambassadorial talks could not resolve the issues, 
its long-term consequences were noteworthy as it paved the way for the holding of future Sino-US 
ambassadorial talks, which became one of the main communication channels in subsequent Sino-
US relations. This positive overtone of the Sino-US ambassadorial talks riled the ROC, which 
further viewed it as the harbinger of a potential disaster that could lead to its declining 
international standing and deteriorating US-ROC relations. To express its unhappiness and 
frustration, the KMT blatantly conducted raids on China in the midst of the talks in August 1955. 
Taipei‘s uneasiness and paranoia with Washington would also be played out in two areas: secret 
negotiations with Beijing and the 1957 Taiwan Riots. 
 
While the CIA had intelligence about possible secret contacts between the ROC and the PRC, it 
doubted the veracity of such information and was persuaded by Chiang Ching-kuo of the 
steadfastness of the ROC. Although the ROC participated in the back-channels, it was intensely 
wary of the PRC and carefully maneuvered between alerting Washington and maintaining links 
with Beijing. Albeit hostile rhetoric, common historical and cultural ties explained how Taipei and 
Beijing could maintain the links, however briefly, out of patriotism that warring brothers should 
unite to thwart a foreigner from allegedly achieving ―two Chinas.‖ Such secret back-channels 
would feature importantly again during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958. However, this 
was a point which the Eisenhower Administration failed to fathom.   
 
The 1957 Taiwan Riots provided a case study of the latent cultural fault lines between Taipei and 
Washington. It showed how many Americans were prejudiced in their views of the riots, leading to 
shoddy investigative work, purloined justice and sensational reporting. It also presented insights on 
Taiwanese fractured cultural and nationalistic resentments against Americans. The many identities 
and ―deaths‖ of the protagonist of the riots, Liu Tzu-jan, further highlighted the complexities in 
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relations between Taiwanese and Americans. In the aftermath of the riots, the nuances and roles of 
ritualized apologies stood out. Chiang Kai-shek‘s symbolic public apology and the report of the 
Executive Yuan tenuously straddled the domestic demands for justice while upholding the 
international needs of the state. The speed at which Washington accepted Taipei‘s apologies also 
signaled the burgeoning maturity and tenacity of the ROC-US relations. Such multi-faceted 
dimensions of the ROC-US relations could again be discerned when one explores how the Taiwan 
Strait Crisis was played out in the rendering of the fangong mission in Taiwanese society and 
politics from 1955 to 1957. 
 
Chiang continued preparation for the mission of fangong dalu (counter-offensive against the 
mainland) from 1955 to 1957. The outbreak of the Taiwan Strait Crisis further justified the need 
for political indoctrination. Such a call was also discernible in the popular culture. In emphasizing 
fangong, Chiang persisted in reinforcing total control of the army by the KMT party and at the 
same time paid attention to the welfare of the soldiers. Yet, although military planning for fangong 
continued in a ritualistic manner, changing domestic and international developments gradually led 
to the waning of such a vision. With defensive thinking quietly given precedence over the 
belligerency of counter-attack, the slogan of ―counter-offensive‖ became subverted into a more 
pedestrian domestic rallying cliché aimed at boosting morale, stabilizing and militarizing society, 
and disciplining a credible work force.  
   
In sum, the inter-crises period of 1955-1957 witnessed important developments for the US-PRC-
ROC relations. How all these developments played out in the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis will be 












Chapter 7: The Outbreak of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis 
 
After the Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks ceased in December 1957, further talks were suspended 
indefinitely. On 23 August 1958, the PRC again bombarded Quemoy and Matsu, igniting the 
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. However, the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis stood out for its swift 
resolution compared to the 1954-55 crisis. On 6 September, both Zhou and Dulles publicly 
announced possible peaceful measures and this led to the convening of the Sino-US negotiations in 
Warsaw from 15 September onwards. Although US Ambassador Jacob Beam and PRC 
Ambassador Wang Bingnan would adopt rigid positions for their respective governments, Beam 
did consider the talks useful as a conflict management ―lighting rod‖ even if it was not a vehicle 
for real negotiations.
1
 Meanwhile, Khrushchev‘s warnings via open letters to the US in support of 
the PRC on 7 September and 19 September were disregarded by Washington and ironically 




Conventional surveys of the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis have painted how the US had succeeded in 
forcing Beijing to back down with its deterrence strategy or other tactical means.
3
 Other accounts 
have depicted the Crisis as a function of Mao‘s ideological and domestic imperatives.4 In addition, 
two monographs on Soviet foreign policy have rightly highlighted the sharp political and 
ideological differences between the PRC and the Soviets.
5
 On these issues, three broad points 
could be made. One, simplistic assumptions about the effectiveness of US deterrence strategy are 
overwrought as Eisenhower displayed cautiousness and doubts with nuclear deterrence. Two, 
                                                 
1 Jacob D. Beam, Multiple Exposure: An American Ambassador‟s Unique Perspective on East-West Issue (NY: WW 
Norton & Company, 1978), 131. 
2 See Oleg Troyanosky, ―The Making of the Soviet Foreign Policy,‖ in Nikita Khrushchev, ed. William Taubman et al. 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 216; John R. Thomas, ―Soviet Behaviour in the Quemoy Crisis of 1958,‖ 
Orbis, vol 6, no. 1 (Spring 1962), 50-54; Lorenz M. Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World. 
Princeton: PUP, 2008), 102; "U.S. Rejects Soviet Note on Far East Situation," DSB (Oct 6, 1958), 530.  
3 George C. Eliades, ―Once More unto the Breach: Eisenhower, Dulles, and Public Opinion during the Offshore Islands 
Crisis of 1958,‖ The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, Vol 2, no. 4 (Winter 1993), 343-367; Eric Herring, 
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4 Melvin Gurtov & Byong-Moo Hwang, China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Bal.: Johns 
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although attention on the PRC‘s domestic imperatives is a useful corrective to US-centric 
accounts, over-emphasis on Mao‘s ideological motivations is inappropriate as Mao also considered 
state security perspectives and rationalized it in stark realpolitik terms.
6
 Three, reading the 
literature on Sino-Soviet relations together with memoirs of participants against the grain revealed 
that cultural differences too played a part in reinforcing the mistrust between these two allies. At 
the same time, tacit accommodation was again and more quickly reached in the 1958 Taiwan Strait 
Crisis. All parties had, over the past few years, gained a better understanding of each other‘s 
modus operandi. The ritualized language of crisis resolution while imperfect was good enough to 
make sure the Crisis never got out of hand. The physical military and diplomatic signaling given 
by both Beijing and Washington were well heeded and digested. Mao paid particular attention in 
amply alerting Washington of Beijing‘s limited aims and Eisenhower was explicit in reciprocating 
similar gestures. However, cultural divergences were not easily reconciled as even the Soviets, a 
fraternal ally, could run afoul of the PRC‘s cultural and nationalistic sensitivities. This chapter, 
focusing on developments from January to September 1958, will cover the first part in a critical 
reinterpretation of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. The second part, in the final months of the 
Crisis from late-September to December 1958, will be the subject of the next chapter.  
 
This chapter will explore the above themes in four main sections. The first section will analyze the 
positions of the ROC, US and PRC prior to the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, highlighting as well 
the main reasons for the PRC‘s 1958 bombardments on Quemoy and Matsu. The second section 
will investigate the degree of tacit understanding which governed the actions of Washington and 
Beijing in the immediate aftermath of the August bombardments by examining the actions of the 
US, the ROC and the PRC, followed by the tacit accommodation reached in early September. The 
third section will investigate how in the wake of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the PRC worked 
toward gaining international support for its actions. Sino-Soviet relations and China‘s courting of 
fraternal communist countries and neutralist nations will be analyzed. The fourth section, focusing 
on the US, will scrutinize how Washington‘s tacit accommodation with Beijing was guided by the 
                                                 
6 Garver, The Sino-American Alliance, 5-6; C. X. George Wei, review of Mao‟s China and the Cold War, by Chen Jian, 
Pacific Historical Review 71, no. 2 (May 2002), 346-347. 
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goal of diffusing tensions, how the US had to deal with an obdurate Taipei and in doing so how 
this demonstrated the ritualized maturity of the Sino-US crisis system, and how in the face of 
worsening international and American public opinion, Washington had to fall back again on the 
domino theory to rationalize its Taiwan policy. 
 
1. Preliminary Moves and Perceptions  
On the eve of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the ROC‘s harsh albeit flawed critique of the US 
was a reflection of its waning fangong mission and its complex relations with the US. Despite 
support to be rendered by the US as demonstrated in the ROC‘s war plans, the KMT mission had 
become more defensive than offensive. Inured by the PRC‘s maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait, 
Eisenhower decided against the nuclear option even before the outbreak of hostilities. Washington 
was also explicit about reining in Chiang Kai-shek and considered signaling more clearly to 
Beijing American intentions in Taiwan. Meanwhile tensions were building up in Sino-Soviet 
relations over a host of issues and Beijing viewed the Soviet Union‘s symbolic maneuvers in the 
Middle East and Soviet attitudes toward the US and the PRC with mounting distrust. China‘s 
decision to bombard Quemoy was cast in a mode of defiance against the timidity of the Soviets, 
together with China‘s concerns regarding the specter of US encirclement, perceived American 
intransigence and Taiwan‘s provocations.   
 
1.1 ROC’s Perceptions of US 
As Chiang Kai-shek‘s fangong dream became more remote, the ROC‘s misgivings with the US 
became shriller. When Eisenhower responded to Khrushchev‘s call for a test-ban of nuclear 
weapons on 28 April 1958, the ROC viewed such disarmament negotiations as major threats 
Although the ROC knew it was an ―intense competition to seize world opinion,‖ it noted that the 
US might still be taken in with Soviet slogans of ―peaceful coexistence‖ and ―constructive 
competition.‖ Above all, it worried about China. ―High-level talks might be an opportunity for 
Communist China,‖ cautioned Director of the ROC National Security Council Cheng Chieh-min, 
―to emerge in the international arena,‖ and he recommended that the ROC ―obstruct the progress 
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of such high-level talks.‖7 Cheng further cataloged for Chiang a list of US inadequacies in the face 
of Soviet encroachments. The US was seen as wavering in its anti-communist crusade in the 
various summits in Geneva, foolishly ruining its chances through ―myopic vacillations, self-
seeking and phlegmatic policies‖ via deterrence and containment.8 Cheng speculated that the ―very 
passive and negative war-making outlook‖ of the US could be traced ironically to American 
exceptionalism, supported by the US geographical insularity, the Monroe Doctrine and America‘s 
habitual isolationism. The US ―has never embarked upon an invasive strategy, threatening other 
countries,‖ and when it did engage in wars it was ―always the defensive type of resisting 
aggression.‖9 In the present Cold War, the US was depicted as lacking the ―aggressiveness‖ of the 
Soviets and unable to contain Soviet international communism. The Soviet Sputnik launch in 1957 
also shook the ROC‘s confidence badly.10 Cheng‘s report ended in an inane but apocalyptic 
manner: ―The final mistake would be for the US to neglect to use its advantages in military bases, 
bombers and naval power to the best effect in a life-and-death struggle against the Soviets.‖11  
 
The alleged US waning attention on Asia reflected the ROC‘s dissatisfactions. Cheng‘s report 
highlighted how Taiwan, a junior ally, had become ―holier than the pope‖ by subverting the US 
rhetoric on the dangers of Soviet encroachments. On one hand, images of inactivity, passiveness 
and muddle-headedness were used by Cheng to depict the US lack of military spirit and the report 
duplicated the acrimonious partisan debates of ―who lost China‖ of the early 1950s. On the other 
hand, the reluctance of the US to be closer to the ROC was attributed to a misguided America, 
                                                 
7 Cheng further complained that in the Indochina imbroglio, the Bandung Conference, and the Sino-US negotiations, the 
communists seemed to hold the upper hand. Ambrose, 447-454; Cheng Chieh-min to CKS, ―对召开高阶层会议之研究
”[Dui zhaokai gaojieceng huiyi zhi yanjiu], 28 May 1958, serial no. 002080106012005, CKS papers, AH. 
8 Events such as the East Germany uprising, Dien Bien Phu, Polish and Hungarian uprisings, Suez crisis, and Indonesia 
military unrest were cited as evidence that the US were very good with ―observing, but doing nothing.‖ Cheng Chieh-
min to CKS, ―对召开高阶层会议之研究”[Dui zhaokai gaojieceng huiyi zhi yanjiu], 28 May 1958, serial no. 
002080106012005, CKS papers, AH. 
9 Cheng totally ignored the Manifest Destiny (1845), the Mexican-American War (1846), the annexation of Hawaii 
(1898), the Spanish-American War (1898), the control of Panama (1903) and the spate of Dollar Diplomacy in the 
Caribbean (1910s). As for the alleged ―passive‖ war-making outlook, General George Patton‘s World War II feats and 
General Douglas MacArthur‘s daring amphibious Inchon landing were not given credit. See Hugh Brogan, The Penguin 
History of the USA 2nd ed (London, Penguin Books, 1999), 441-443. 
10 Cheng‘s criticism reflected the hysteria in US public opinion in the aftermath of Sputnik. But there was no missile gap 
as the US possessed overwhelming strength over the Soviets. The Sputnik affair was a bungled public relations fiasco, in 
which Eisenhower under-estimated the public hysteria. See Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower‟s New Look National Security 
Policy, 1953-61 (London, Macmillan Press, 1996), 212; Halberstam, The Fifties, 624-625. 
11 Cheng Chieh-min to CKS, “美俄战略的研究” [Meie zanlue de yanjiu], 6 June 1958, serial no. 002080106013008, 
CKS papers, AH. 
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rather than a US wary of the ROC‘s intentions. Cheng also implied that the US should be more 
appreciative of the ROC‘s contributions in America‘s global conflict with communism.  
 
However, evidence from the ROC‘s war plans demonstrated sustained US support. The ―Le-cheng 
Joint War Plans,‖ a joint ROC-US effort, indicated clearly that the US would protect Quemoy and 
Matsu. Despite the vagueness in the ROC-US Mutual Defence Treaty, the joint plans were 
predicated on the ―command of the US President.‖  The command structure was wholly American 
and the Chief of the Pacific Command (CINCPAC) would orchestrate the entire theater. 
Subordinate commands such as the US Pacific Army, Navy, Air Command, and Taiwan MAAG 
also had the protection of the Quemoy and Matsu in their mission statements. The ROC had also 
well established the low probability of a communist assault. Despite the PRC‘s public hostile 
proclamations, the ROC was aware of the difference between a determined PRC invasion and a 
cursory military probe. The Le-cheng report considered any communist attempt to launch an 
airborne or amphibious assault on any of the heavily fortified ROC-controlled offshore islands to 
be difficult, especially since the offshore islands acted as a trigger line and added ―aerial defensive 
depth to the defense of Taiwan.‖  
 
The report then presented the ROC‘s role in the defensive radar of the US Pacific forces. One, the 
offshore islands represented ―immense political and psychological importance for the entire free 
world,‖ acting as the bulwark to prevent the ―spread of communism throughout the East.‖  Two, 
the ROC condoned the usage of nuclear weapons but stressed that there must be mutual 
consultations. This also implied that while Chiang‘s queasiness over nuclear war had evaporated, 
he was no longer confident of fangong by conventional means. Such an observation underscored 
how Chiang‘s fangong had disappeared as the limited defensive nature of Le-cheng dictated 
―fangwei‖ which was mentioned no less than four times throughout the plans.12  
 
                                                 
12 “中美乐成联盟作战计划书修订报告” [Zhongmei lecheng lianmeng zuozhan jihuashu xiuding baogao], 1958, 
serial no. 002080106048013, CKS papers, AH. 
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1.2 US Perceptions: No Danger in the Strait 
Despite the prodding and misgivings of the ROC, the US had firm intelligence that the situation in 
the Taiwan Strait was not threatening. One, the PRC was hindered by its economy. In March 1958 
Ambassador Everett F. Drumright noted that the PRC needed up to 200 million dollars a year in 
foreign aid, but they could not look towards the miserly Soviet Union.
13
  Two, in early August, 
Allen Dulles reported that ―no Chinese-Communist ground build-up or movement of naval forces 
from Shanghai base had been detected.‖ Three, the tumult in the Strait was ironically caused by the 
ROC which ―overplayed and over-dramatized the situation for their own purposes.‖ Provocative 
ROC‘s ―attacks on Chinese Communist junks‖ had provided the PRC with the perfect excuse to 
engage ―reprisals in kind.‖  
 
In addition, Eisenhower was adamant to rein in the ―edgy‖ Chiang Kai-shek. ―Even with the 
Formosa Resolution,‖ warned Eisenhower, ―there would be no excuse for US intervention in the 
situation unless we concluded that Chinese Communist air activity was merely the preliminary to 
an attack on Formosa.‖14 When Dulles pressed the issue on 12 August that the fall of the heavily 
armed offshore islands would ―constitute an attack on Formosa‖ and at stake was the ―morale‖ of 
Formosa, Eisenhower rebuffed him by pointing out that the PRC was seriously short of ―shipping.‖ 
Eisenhower also made it clear that they would have to ―call the Congress back at once‖ for any 
significant ―fight on any scale at all‖ and strongly proposed giving clear warnings to the Chinese 




Washington had thus displayed much caution vis-à-vis the Taiwan Strait. One recently declassified 
memorandum (2005) of the 376
th
 NSC meeting demonstrated that two of its three sections offered 
non-nuclear options. Should the communists blockade the offshore islands, the US would merely 
                                                 
13 Drumright stated that the economic policies followed by the Chinese Communists were not gaining additional 
adherents among the Chinese population. The ROC, on the other hand, was reportedly ―itch[ing] to fight,‖ but was 
effectively neutered by possessing ―no sea or air lift‖ capabilities. ―Observations at the U.S. Southeastern Asia Chiefs of 
Mission meeting held from 3/14-3/17/58,‖ Memo, Mar 28, 1958, Gerard Smith Series, box 1, Material from Gerard C. 
Smith's Files 1958 (4), JFD Papers, DDEL. 
14 375th Meeting of NSC, 7 Aug 1955, NSC Series, box 10, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
15 Memorandum of Conference with President (12 August 1958), 14 August 1958, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject 
Series, State Dept Sub Series, box 3, State Department - 1958 (May-August) (5), White House Office, DDEL. 
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provide ―logistical support required by the Nationalist forces.‖ Instead of the existing policy of 
strategic ambiguity to ―keep 'em guessing,‖ the alternative of a ―flat statement‖ was suggested to 
better serve ―as an additional deterrent to any Communist effort to upset the status quo‖ and boost 
the ―morale question in Nationalist China.‖  Even the nuclear option was raised with a question as 
to ―whether the US response to the Communist attack necessarily involved a requirement to use 
nuclear weapons.‖  
 
In contrast to Washington‘s cautious tone, the attached extracts of the Joint State-Defence study, 
―US & Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1961,‖ were belligerent. Once 
an attack on the offshore islands was initiated, the US ―must include decision on the use of nuclear 
weapons.‖ The policy stated that a ―selective and meticulously controlled‖ nuclear attack would be 
launched on targets ―within a radius of 500 miles from the scene of action, plus those targets, 
wherever located which are being used to stage attacks, including the Shanghai-Hangchow-
Nanking and Canton complexes.‖ However, as Beijing would see the US attack as bent on 
―destroy[ing] their regime,‖ instead of deterrence, there would be a ―general war.‖ Similarly, 
CIA‘s intelligence (SNIE 100-7-58) grimly observed that Beijing would most probably ―respond 
in kind... against US bases in the area selected [Japan and South Korea].‖16 Chairman of JCS 
General Nathan F. Twining strongly vouched for the nuclear option. If there was a major assault 
on the islands, ―the use of small nuclear weapons against nearby airfields in Communist China 
should be authorized.‖ Twining presented the JCS views in a closed meeting between Eisenhower 
and senior officials on 14 August. He also recommended that the policy of ―keeping them 
guessing‖ be applied equally to the KMT forces since they ―may start something on their own‖ 
should they know that the US would defend them. Acting Secretary of State Herter recalled that 
the JCS had recommended that the nuclear bombs would ―also go up as far as Shanghai, deep into 
the Chinese Communist mainland.‖   
 
Eisenhower, however, communicated his distaste for nuclear weapons clearly: 
                                                 
16 ―Briefing note for the 376th NSC meeting on 8/14/58,‖ memo, NSC, 13 August 1958, DDRS. 
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 … we should be very careful, if there were an overt act against the offshore 
islands on the part of the Chinese Communists, that we do not take instantaneous 
action which would spread the hostilities. This would be of great concern to the 
Soviets because Communist China is their greatest ally.  
Eisenhower stated that the US would ―do what is necessary‖ if the assault was targeted at Taiwan. 
However, the offshore islands ―are certainly not stepping stones to Taiwan.‖ Then he turned to his 
oft-quoted belief, warning the group gathered that ―such action, however, would be all-out war and 
not limited war.‖ But Eisenhower ―did not think such an attack on Taiwan was probable.‖ Rather, 
―how to deal with [the] very difficult psychological problem‖ of persuading Chiang to give up the 
offshore islands, was the main concern.
17
 Eisenhower put the blame solely on Chiang‘s 
―intransigence‖ and complained at how Chiang had out-maneuvered the US in overturning its 
1953 NSC policy against committing to the offshore islands. As early as 1956, Chiang had adroitly 
circumvented the limitations of the Formosa Resolution by claiming that ―he cannot hold out in 
Taiwan if the offshore islands are lost, and he has put 100,000 people on those islands.‖18 
 
Once the President stood his ground, everyone sought other solutions out of the quagmire. First, it 
was proposed that the US should abandon the ―keeping them guessing‖ policy as ambiguity had 
prolonged the duration of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. Paradoxically, George Yeh, now the ROC 
ambassador, approved of this and suggested that ―the US might make a formal statement that a 
Chinese Communist attack on the offshore islands would be a grave threat to peace in that area.‖ 
Second, the meeting turned to the practical issue of breaking any communist blockade of the 
offshore islands since this could avoid the atrophy of Chiang's offshore island garrison while 
demonstrating steadfast US commitment. The US would help in this case with ―better equipment‖ 
as Eisenhower rightly noted that ―this was possibly a war of nerves and that the Chinese 
Communists may be seeing how far they can go if we do not react.‖19   
 
                                                 
17 The CIA‘s analysis supported Eisenhower‘s contention: ―There was still no concrete evidence of a Communist 
Chinese plan to attack the offshore islands.‖ See 376th Meeting of NSC, 14 Aug 1958, NSC Series, box 10, Ann 
Whitman File, DDEL. 
18 See ―Memo for the record,‖  26 March 1956, General Correspondence & Memoranda Series, box 1, Memos of 
conversation - General N through R (1), JFD papers, DDEL. 
19 ―Summary of the Principal points made in the discussion of the Taiwan Strait situation at the meeting in the President's 
office following the [376th] NSC meeting on 14 August 1958,‖ NSC Series, box 10, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
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1.3 Beijing’s Mounting Distrust of the Soviets and Developments Leading to the 
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis 
Meanwhile, tensions were building up in the Soviet camp as well. The Soviets spoke of the 
dangers of nuclear warfare, advocated peaceful co-existence with the US and were generally non-
committal about Mao‘s agricultural collectivization.20 With the launch of the Soviet Sputnik 
satellite, Mao advocated a communist bloc energetically led by the Soviet Union and in November 
1957, Mao spoke in Moscow openly of the ―East Wind prevailing over the West Wind.‖ To Mao, 
US provocations such as constructing B-52 nuclear bomber runways in January 1957 and placing 
nuclear-tipped Matador missiles on 2 May 1958 in Taiwan had to be firmly dealt with.
21
 Soviet‘s 
rhetoric about peaceful co-existence with the US only served to deepen further Mao‘s ambivalence 
about Khrushchev.  
 
Beijing was also highly dissatisfied with the Soviets‘ handling of the Middle East crisis. Under the 
banner of the Eisenhower Doctrine enunciated in 1957, the US Marines landed in Lebanon on 15 
July 1958 in reaction to Lebanese rebellions and the unstable post-coup Iraq.
22
 It seemed to Mao 
that the Eisenhower Doctrine, which pledged US aid to any Middle East country threatened by 
communism, could be duplicated in East Asia. However, to Mao‘s intense frustration, Khrushchev 
chose not to arm the Iraqis.
23
 Instead, after plodding for a month, Khrushchev decided to revive the 
summitry idea he had proposed the year before, taking up the softer option of talking in the UN 
Security Council.
24
 Moreover, the US appeared infuriatingly tardy in responding to China‘s 
demands for the resumption of ambassadorial talks and the ROC continued with its onslaught of 
commando raids.
25
 In a show of defiance, the Chinese Politburo on 17 July 1958 agreed to proceed 
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22 Iraq had just undergone a revolution following a coup on 14 July 1958. Overnight, the Hashemite monarchy collapsed 
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The Chinese embassy in Moscow was highly critical of Soviet actions, as noted in its report on 23 
July: ―They show fear and vacillation in confronting the international storm … significantly 
different from our struggle approach.‖ It added that these unsatisfactory Soviet actions stemmed 
from a failure to appreciate how the ―East Wind has prevailed over the West Wind,‖ the ―power of 
the people‘s will,‖ and ―the gangsterism nature of the US.‖ Major Soviet officials were also faulted 
for being too cautious.
27
 News of Khrushchev‘s move to settle the Middle East crisis in the UN 
Security Council further alarmed the Chinese. ―Not only will such an approach not establish 
peace,‖ reported the Chinese embassy on 24 July, ―it would embolden the enemy to enlarge their 
conquests.‖ It warned that Soviet actions were not helping the indigenous people in their anti-
imperialist struggle in the Middle East. The Chinese embassy then urged Beijing to ―use any 
means necessary to exchange views with the Soviets, especially before the Soviet leaders head for 
the UN Security Council.‖ 28   
 
The Middle East farce had further proven Zhou Enlai‘s 1957 assessment of the Khrushchev 
leadership to be ―extremely conceited, blinded by lust for gain, lacking farsightedness, and 
knowing little the ways of the world.‖ In international affairs, ―they appear to lack confidence and 
suffer from inner fears and thus tend to employ the tactics of dissembling or threats in handling 
foreign affairs or relations with other brotherly parties.‖29 To Beijing‘s ire, the Soviets persisted in 
verbal sparring with the US in the UN.
30
 Mao conflated Soviet‘s timid actions in the Middle East 
with the Soviet reluctance to support Chinese request on 15 July for help in building up the 
                                                 
26 Peng Dehuai Nianpu 彭德怀年谱 [Chronology of Peng Dehuai], Wang Yan 王焰 ed. (Beijing: Remin Chubanshe, 
1998), 691. 
27 See Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union to MFA, telegram, no. 758, 23 July 1958, serial no. 107-00297-02, AMFA. 
28 During the 1940s, Mao had identified the ―vast intermediate zone‖ between the US and the Soviet Union as the arena 
for revolutionary struggle. Crucial to this struggle were the indigenous communists in the intermediate zone. By evoking 
Mao‘s ―intermediate zone‖ thesis, the Chinese embassy‘s warnings thus had a good chance of getting the Chairman‘s 
attention. See Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union  to MFA, telegram, no. 782, 24 July 1958, serial no. 107-00297-02, 
AMFA; Chen Jian, ―China and the Bandung Conference: Changing Perceptions and Representations,‖ in Bandung 
Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order, ed. Tan See Seng and Amitav 
Acharya (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), 133.  
29 Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and the Central Leadership, ―My observations on the Soviet Union,‖ 24 January 1957, 
trans. in CWIHPB 6/7 (Winter 1995-96), 154. 






  To compound the misperception, Mao was convinced that the Soviets were 




The main points of contention in Khrushchev‘s urgent trip to Beijing on 31 July 1958 arose from 
Soviet suggestions of a joint fleet and the setting up of a Soviet long-wave radio station in China. 
Mao was reportedly very sensitive to any suggestion impinging on China‘s sovereignty. Specters 
of Soviet control over China‘s waters and communications systems plagued Mao‘s mind: ―We will 
not go for a joint fleet and even if it means denial to use the atom bomb, submarines, and naval 
fleet, we will survive for ten thousand years … you may have all the Chinese coastal areas and we 
shall give up the navy and go back to the mountains to carry out a guerilla war.‖33 Khrushchev was 
completely stumped by this outburst. It was obvious that Mao‘s extreme sensitivity, Khrushchev‘s 




With regards to the Taiwan Strait Crisis, Mao‘s ruminations after Khrushchev‘s departure were a 
gold mine of information. Mao told his personal doctor Li Zhisui: 
I told him [Khrushchev] that whether or not we attack Taiwan is our own domestic 
affair … He wants to improve relations with the United States? Good we‘ll 
congratulate him with our guns … Maybe we can get the United States to drop an 
atomic bomb on Fujian … Let‘s see what Khrushchev says then [about peaceful 
co-existence]. Some of our comrades don‘t understand the situation. They want us 
to cross the sea and take over Taiwan. I don‘t agree. Let‘s leave Taiwan alone. 
Taiwan keeps the pressure on us. It helps maintain our internal unity. Once the 




                                                 
31 See Embassy in Holland to MFA, Telegram, no. 309, 8 August 1958, serial no. 110-00799-02, AMFA. 
32 In a heated moment, Mao thundered at the Soviet ambassador Pavel F. Yudin: ―Why did you raise the question of 
half-half ownership [navy]? This is a political issue.‖ Mao with Yudin, record of conversation, 22 July 1958, MD, 255; 
Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, ed. Strobe Talbott (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974), 258. 
33 Li, Xin Zhongguo Lingxiu, 170; Chen Xiaolu, ―Chen Yi and China‘s Diplomacy,‖ in Toward a History of Chinese 
Communist Foreign Relations 1920s-1960s: Personalities and Interpretive Approaches, ed. Michael H. Hunt and Niu 
Jun (Washington, D.C.: WWICS, 1995), 96. 
34 Zhang, Yaoci 张耀祠, Zhang Yaoci huiyilu: Zai Mao zhuxi shenbian de rizi 张耀祠回忆录：在毛主席身边的日子 
[The Memoirs of Zhang Yaoci: The Days at Chairman Mao‘s side] (Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang chubanshe, 2008), 
161-165; William Taubman, ―Khrushchev vs Mao: A preliminary sketch of the role of personality in the Sino-Soviet 
Split,‖ CWIHPB 8/9 (1997), 243-248.  
35 Li Zhisui‘s memoirs elaborated on the clash of personalities and Mao‘s paranoia at Soviet control. Historians were 
generally leery of Mao‘s personal physician‘s sensationalistic account.  But compared with Li Yueran‘s account, Li 
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Khrushchev‘s anxiety to relax tensions with the US rubbed Mao the wrong way.36 In Mao‘s 
suspicious eyes, a joint fleet and a Soviet long-wave station in China could easily become Soviet 
instruments of control should the PRC provoke the US. Likewise, Soviet interest in the PRC‘s 
Taiwan policy was perceived as a manifestation of Soviet dread that the Chinese would jeopardize 
Soviet-US relations. Even the Soviet disdain for Mao‘s people‘s communes was considered to 
have arisen from fears that China‘s social innovations would amplify revolutionary tendencies in 
undeveloped countries, which again would antagonize the West. To Mao, the Soviets were 
unsupportive of the achievements of China‘s Great Leap Forward and China‘s leadership in the 
Third World.
37
   
 
Besides Beijing‘s mounting distrust of the Soviets, other developments in August reinforced 
Beijing‘s 17 July decision to bombard Quemoy. Dulles‘ 28 June 1957 speech about the impending 
passing of Mao‘s régime was repeated on 11 August 1958 by the US Department of State. At the 
same time Chiang Kai-shek had increased the troops holding Matsu and Quemoy to 100,000, twice 
the number in 1955, and broadcast in August that he would return to Mainland China.
38
 To head 
off this specter of US encirclement the PRC again opened up the artillery barrages on Quemoy and 




2. From Crisis to Tacit Accommodation 
Right from the start of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, both Washington and Beijing exercised 
remarkable restraint. Eisenhower was calm and Dulles hailed the experiences gained in 1955 as 
fundamental to the tacit accommodation reached in the immediate aftermath of the Crisis. Taipei, 
steeped in the nuances of the communist moves, again successfully made use of the Crisis to press 
                                                 
36 At that time, Mao‘s attempts to stiffen the Soviet resolve in international matters were resented. On hindsight, 
Khrushchev accurately concluded that such warmongering talk was dished out as Mao ―obviously regarded me as a 
coward.‖ Khrushchev Remembers, Vol.1, ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston, Little Brown, 1971; Reprint, London, Penguin 
Books, 1977), 500. 
37 Stanley Karnow argued for a domestic perspective. The constant presence of the Taiwan problem kept Mao in a pre-
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increasing dissatisfaction with the retreat from first line decision-making position since the Eight National Congress 
(September 1956), Taiwan splendidly supplied him with the additional ammunition to be at the forefront again. For an 
incisive analysis of the politicking behind the Eight National Congress, see Mao and China: Inside China‟s Cultural 
Revolution (NY: Penguin Books, 1972), 86. 
38 Jiang, The United States and China, 150. 
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for more US aid, and this benefited the ROC military establishment in particular. The PRC‘s 
actions were cautious and deliberate right from the beginning, seeing the bombardments as a 
―military probe‖ designed to ―give the US a hard time.‖ Dulles‘ offer of tacit accommodation on 4 
September was swiftly accepted by Zhou on 6 September. While Beijing was using the Crisis to 
amass support for its domestic agenda of the Great Leap Forward, US public opinion missed the 
nuances of the Sino-US tacit accommodation and Eisenhower had to reach out to the public to 
―reverse the poll,‖ a development that Taipei met with dour circumspection. 
 
2.1 Eisenhower’s Calm and Dulles’ Uncertainty  
The PRC shelled Quemoy and Matsu intensively for only five days, 23-27 August. The US 
military maneuvers were cautious. While the US signaled loudly to the PRC of its commitment to 
Taiwan, it avoided provoking China. The US military command on Taiwan was only ordered to 
―reinforce US air defense forces on Taiwan‖ and to ―prepare to escort and protect Chinat to 
resupply ships.‖ Additional defensive military supplies were moved quickly to Taiwan. To 





The ROC was aggrieved by such caution and Chiang vented his frustration on Drumright by 
launching ―into an intense, prolonged discussion of the present situation of Off Shore Islands.‖ 
Drumright reported that the agitated Generalissimo ―was in fact so obsessed with it and so intent 
on pleading for our help to cope with it that the significance of help we were offering seemed lost 
on him.‖ Other ROC leaders such as Premier Cheng Cheng implored for public ―warnings‖ from 
the US against the PRC. The US certainly had its hands full pacifying Chiang who ―was most 
concerned to get our assurances.‖41  
 
                                                 
40 JCS to CINPAC and COM Taiwan DEFCOM, JCS 947046, Cable, Department of Defense, Aug 25, 1958, DDRS. 
41 Chiang saw the PRC‘s tactic as ―creeping interdiction of Kinmen … if Reds could keep up combined shelling, 
bombing and sea action as at present, Islands would be soon cut off.‖ See Drumright to Dulles, 26 August 1958 (10pm), 
Telegram 230, Office of e Staff Secretary, Subject Series, State Dept Sub Series, box 3, State Department - 1958 (May-
August) (6), White House Office, DDEL. 
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Neither the agony over the usage of nuclear weapons nor the magnitude of the current crisis 
plagued Eisenhower. By 1 September, Eisenhower was determined to walk the path of peace. 
Dulles, on the other hand, enjoyed no such certitude. When Dulles complained that he lacked vital 
information to make an informed decision, Eisenhower disagreed and asserted that ―we had quite a 
little information‖ and Eisenhower only expressed ―some annoyance over what he considered to be 
Chiang‘s pressure to get us involved.‖42 
 
Dulles‘ uncertainty stemmed from his rigid determination to square US national security nuclear 
policy with the crisis at hand. On one hand, Dulles complained to Twining ―there was no use of 
having a lot of stuff and never being able to use it.‖ Twining agreed, citing that for the Taiwan 
Strait ―it was not the place to use conventional ones.‖ On the other hand, Dulles quickly 
backtracked by citing Undersecretary of State Christian Herter who ―thought you could knock out 
[Communists] gun emplacements with conventional weapons.‖ Twining considered that to be ―a 
slow process.‖43 Dulles‘ constant mulling over the nuclear option alarmed others.44 Gerard Smith, 
the Assistant Secretary of State, intervened by pointing out just how dangerous the military chiefs‘ 
recommendations were.
45
 One, nuclear strikes would not be ―limited to a few airfields‖ as Smith 
warned that Twining had recommended that the US ―shoot our wad.‖ Moreover no consideration 
was given to the possibility of counter-strikes by the communists leading to the ―destruction of 
Formosa.‖ ―If we use nuclear weapons to defend Quemoy and Matsu,‖ stated Smith, ―we would be 
involved in the most unpopular war with the most unpopular weapons.‖ In response, Dulles 
evoked the US loss of prestige should the offshore islands be lost and highlighted the huge 
                                                 
42 But Eisenhower allowed Dulles to have more time (three days) to come up with his findings. See Memo of telephone 
conversation with the President, 1 Sept 1958, 7:30pm, Telephone Conversation Series, box 13, memoranda of tel. conv - 
W H Aug 1, 1958 to Dec 5 1958 (3), JFD papers, DDEL. 
43 Telephone call to General Twining, 2 September 1958, 8:48 am, Telephone Conversation Series, box 9, memoranda of 
tel conv - Gen Aug 1 1958 to Oct 31 1958 (4), JFD papers, DDEL. 
44 Later, Dulles melodramatically announced to the White House Chief of Staff Sherman Adams that ―things looked 
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(Newport RI), 2 Sept 1958, 3:18pm, Telephone Conversation Series, box 13, memoranda of tel. conv - W H Aug 1, 1958 
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45 Smith noted that in war game planning in May 1958, up to ―1 million civilian casualties in Taiwan‖ would be the 
result of US nuclear bombing the PRC. Observations on Sierra Briefing, 1 May 1958, Gerard Smith Series, box 1, 
Material from Gerard C. Smith's Files 1958 (3), JFD Papers 1, DDEL. 
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problem of augmenting ―flexible forces‖ if nuclear weapons were not used. Dulles was thus 
embroiled in circular arguments with answers to an almost non-existent problem.  
 
Undersecretary of State Herter disagreed with Dulles‘ dire prognosis. He felt ―optimistic‖ and 
regarded ―the situation … to be improving.‖46 Herter received support from the Chief of Army 
General Maxwell D. Taylor and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, who both 
―estimated that an amphibious assault on Quemoy, supported by artillery fire from the mainland 
and even by moderately heavy bombing, could initially, and successfully, be repelled by the 
Chinese Nationalists, assisted by US forces, with conventional weapons.‖ To them, the real issue 
for the US was the danger of the US being ―labeled the aggressor.‖ The JCS also cautioned that 
―we must be careful to shoot only in clear self-defense.‖47 The 3 September Joint State-JCS-
Defence estimation reflected this dilemma. The report was replete with tired warnings about the 
―serious repercussions‖ in the best tradition of the domino rhetoric but quickly noted that a firm 
reassertion of US commitment by warnings ―perhaps using nuclear weapons‖ would quickly deter 
the communists ―as in 1955.‖ Given the existence of other means whereby the US could easily 
deter the communists with little cost and risk, such as maintaining naval supplies to the offshore 
islands which it was accomplishing with good effect, the nuclear option was all but abandoned. 
The report also warned of creeping momentum where ―more extensive use of nuclear weapons and 
even risk of general war‖ could result once the nuclear usage taboo was breached.48     
 
The fiction of the Communist threat allowed Eisenhower fast access to Congressional support. 
Dulles told Senator Knowland that the present crisis ―was fully as serious as the papers report.‖ 
Nothing was said about Dulles‘ intended offer to negotiate with the Communists the following 
day. When Knowland expressed skepticism of the supposed communists‘ buildup, Dulles 
acknowledged that there was ―no evidence of an assault being prepared,‖ but insisted that they 
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―were seriously determined to try to take the islands which he thought they would stage as soon as 
they were confident we would lay off.‖49  
 
2.2 The ROC Military Establishment and the Crisis 
The US did respond rapidly to the ROC‘s pleas. Chief of Taiwan MAAG Maj. Gen. Leander L. 
Doan detailed to the ROC Army Chief Gen. Peng Meng-chi the amount of hardware that would 
flow to the ROC. Such speed was possible due to the Standing Operational Procedures (SOP) 
established in the aftermath of the previous crisis. As the ROC persisted in maintaining large 
garrisons on the offshore islands, the US had to rush supplies to ―reinforce the offshore islands‘ 
seven divisions of firepower.‖ Arrangements were made to ship immediately twelve additional 8-
inch howitzers from Okinawa and other overseas US bases, besides transferring other howitzers 
from Taiwan. Even the ―NIKE missile battalions could arrive in three days.‖ The crisis also 
prompted the quickening of training of the 155-mm howitzer crew and the establishment of 




Ironically, the ROC military was confident of maintaining the supply lines to the offshore islands. 
In a secret report to President Chiang on 3 September, at the height of the communist 
bombardments, the ROC navy estimated that in a month of uninterrupted shipping of supplies to 
the offshore islands using a combination of local and US vessels, it could achieve 8, 240 tonnes. In 
an emergency, with six US vessels, it could deliver 900 tonnes in three days. This optimism flew 
in the face of the initial dire depictions of limited supplies in the offshore islands cited by ROC 
diplomats to the White House. Moreover, the ROC knew the Communist bombardments were 
limited and purposefully off-target. Despite the initial hostilities, only three ROC ships were sunk. 
In addition, the ROC navy and the US navy had already caught on early that American ships were 
                                                 
49 Dulles feigned ignorance about what ―the President was thinking.‖ He evoked the 1948 Berlin Blockade and admitted 
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50 Maj. Gen. Leander L. Doan to Gen. Pang Mang-chi, letter (Secret), 3 September 1958, serial no. 002080106051010, 
CKS papers, AH. 
 238 
 
not targeted by the communists. At the tactical level the US was not obtuse to Mao‘s signaling via 




2.3 Mao’s Caution and Limited Aims 
Mao‘s moves in the Taiwan Strait were cautious and deliberate. At the Military Commission 
meeting on 18 July, Mao listed two goals for the attack on Quemoy: punishing the KMT and 
supporting the Arabs. His method of using artillery bombardments would be limited to three 
months.
52
 Indeed, Mao delayed the scheduled bombardments with a message on 27 July that he 
had ―lost sleep‖ over the decision: ―Moves made on the impulse may not gain the right results. I 
am guilty of this, sometimes I inadvertently miscalculate.‖53 When the moment for the final 
decision came, Mao summoned Ye Fei, the frontline commander on 20 August, to fly thousands of 
miles to the Beidaihe resort in the Liaoning-Hebei border for consultations. When Ye Fei finished 
his presentation, Mao asked: ―Is it possible to avoid hitting the Americans?‖54 
 
Mao micro-managed every aspect of the bombardments. Although Defence Minister Peng Dehuai 
was perplexed by Mao‘s vacillations, he dutifully conveyed Mao‘s instructions during the 6 
August Military Commission meeting: PRC planes must not cross the sea line in pursuit of stray 
enemy planes even when enemy bombers had attacked the mainland, and PRC defensive actions 
were limited to the coastal waters of twelve miles.
55
 On 18 August, Mao gave more stringent 
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(Princeton: PUP, 2008), 99; Ye Fei, Zhengzhan Jishi, 350. 
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orders that planes must not even cross the Quemoy-Matsu line should the ROC planes attack.
56
  
Subsequent instructions from the Military Commission read: ―As the fight against the offshore 
islands is a highly complex international struggle, its impact is far-reaching. Hence, all actions 
must adhere to the principle of unity and no initiative will be entertained.‖57 
  
The Quemoy bombardments were a ―military probe‖ designed to ―give the US a hard time.‖ Mao 
candidly admitted this to the Politburo colleagues in the evening after the first salvo. Mao alleged 
that as Admiral Burke had boasted on 6 August that the US troops ―are prepared any time to take 
on the Taiwan Strait,‖ his bombardments would erase that claim. Contrary to common perceptions, 
Mao anticipated that his move would ―provoke an international upheaval.‖ On 25 August, Mao 
further explained that his calculated probe was done to see if the ROC-US Mutual Defence Treaty 
would sanction actions a la US Lebanon landings. By 4 September, Mao concluded in a Politburo 
meeting that the goals of the ―Quemoy military probe had been accomplished.‖58  Liu Shaoqi and 
Deng Xiaoping also elucidated in early October the tacit accommodation accomplished by the 
Quemoy actions: 
Both parties are deducing each other‘s intentions in Warsaw and Quemoy. Now 
both parties have gained a better understanding of one another‘s goals. The 
Americans know that we do not wish to liberate Taiwan presently, and we do not 
wish to clash with them … both sides display considerable caution … Our military 
probe is correct as it forces the US to reconsider its role …59 
 
2.4 Dulles’ Newport Offer 
The tacit accommodation highlighted by Liu and Deng was reflected also in Dulles‘ Newport 
speech on 4 September, which was the olive branch for Beijing. All Dulles was seeking, as told to 
British representative Lord Samuel Hood, was just some ―assurances which seemed reasonably 
dependable that the Chinese Communists would not attempt to take these islands by force.‖ Dulles 
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noted that with such assurances a de facto ―demilitarization‖ would be accomplished. This episode 
accounted for the quaint communist maneuver to maintain symbolic shelling of the islands 




Zhou Enlai swiftly accepted Dulles‘ Newport offer on 6 September. Dulles was relieved and 
pointed out: ―We had them to stop a war out there, and we cannot do other than welcome them 
now.‖ While the US would take the same position that the US would not ―prejudice the position of 
the Chinats‖ the reality was, as pointed out by Robertson, ―we could not fail to welcome 
resumption of talks; we would have no support anywhere.‖61 Eisenhower decisively ―wanted to 
add something in the way of a concrete and definite acceptance of Chou En-lai‘s offer to 
negotiate.‖ At the same time Eisenhower demanded that ―US air attack against mainland targets 
could be ordered only upon his approval‖ so as to remove any possibility of mishap.62 Dulles 
distinctively acknowledged the process and lessons of peace garnered from the First Taiwan Strait 
Crisis. It was quickly established, following the hard-won 1955 formula, that ―such renunciation of 
force need not involve renouncing claims or the pursuit of policies by peaceful means.‖63 In his 
conversation with Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, Dulles underscored this important schema 
for peace and told MacArthur: ―It looks like he [Zhou Enlai] was resuming a bit the same position 
as in 1955.‖ MacArthur agreed with Dulles‘ analysis, indicating that ―he remembered after 
Bandung; this could be a favorable development.‖64  
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This optimism was supported by a body of evidence. First, Beijing seemed more interested in the 
domestic mobilization value of the crisis to the Great Leap Forward.
 
The British Chargé in Beijing 
reported that ―mammoth demonstrations‖ were organized against US activities in Lebanon in July 
and the ROC‘s declaration of alert on 25 July added fuel to the ―vituperative demonstrations.‖65 In 
August Mao visited rural areas in ―Shantung province and Tientsin‖ to encourage progression of 
the Great Leap Forward.
66
 From the beginning of September, the PRC intensified reporting the 
Taiwan Strait Crisis to its domestic audience.
67
 Beijing‘s mass mobilization on 6 September was 
aimed at deflecting perceived PRC‘s eagerness at negotiation while whipping up support for 
domestic social change. The British Chargé noted ―the press has since been completely taken up 
with reports of mass demonstrations throughout the country in support of Chou En-lai‘s 
statement.‖ So concerned was the PRC with any possibility that critics would latch on its 
capitulation to the enemy that more strident slogans such as ―China will certainly liberate Quemoy 
and Matsu, and will certainly liberate Taiwan‖ appeared.68 In late-September, Vice-Foreign 
Minister Zhang Wentian revealed that ―they are using the situation to mobilize the local militias in 
an attempt to turn it into a nation-wide campaign.‖69 
 
Paradoxically, US public opinion missed the nuances of the Sino-US tacit accommodation.
70
  As a 
result, Dulles had a ―pretty tough going‖ during the 9 September news conference.71 Eisenhower 
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Mao Zedong 1958 nian Henan nongchun shicha jishi 八月的足迹: 毛泽东 1958 年河南农村视察纪实 [Footsteps in 
August: Mao Zedong ‗s agriculture investigation in Henan] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2001), 215. 
67 Telephone call to Mr [Hugh S.] Cummings, 9 Sept 1958, Telephone Conversation Series, box 9, memoranda of tel 
conv - Gen Aug 1 1958 to Oct 31 1958 (4), JFD papers, DDEL. 
68 A.D. Wislon to FO, Peking telegram no. 592, 10 Sept 1958, FO371/133350, CPR, 230. 
69 The provocations of the US also had a ―very useful function‖ for ―the liberation movements in Latin America, Africa 
and Asia.‖ See Record of Conversation between Vice-Foreign Minister Zhang Wentian and the Soviet Chargé d‘affaires, 
Bulgarian, Albanian, Czech, Hungarian and Polish ambassadors, no. 569, 21 Sept 1958, serial no. 109-00822-08, 
AMFA. 
70 Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge was similarly confused by the US abrupt turnaround in attitude toward the PRC, 
demonstrating how ingrained the perception of PRC‘s belligerency was. Given all the Joint Chiefs‘ hot air about the 
necessity of atomic bombing, now it seemed that the communists would not be attacking Formosa any time soon and 
even Quemoy‘s conquest could be deflected by a firm US verbal commitment. See ―Memo of conversation with 
Ambassador Lodge,‖ 19 Sept 1958, General Correspondence & Memoranda Series, box 1, Memos of conversation - 
General L through M (1), JFD papers, DDEL. 
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thus had to reach out to the public to ―reverse the poll.‖72 Eisenhower‘s 11 September national 
broadcast speech was a tour de force about duty, honor, and keeping one‘s powder keg dry, 
explicitly flagging the myth of US foreign policy: ―Traditionally this country and its government 
have always been passionately devoted to peace with honor, as they are now. We shall never resort 
to force in settlement of differences except when compelled to do so to defend against aggression 
and to protect our vital interests.‖73 Having paid rhetoric duty to time-honored values, the 
President then went on about the desirability of negotiations with the Chinese Communists: 
We know by hard experiences that the Chinese Communist leaders are indeed 
militant and aggressive. But we cannot believe that they would now persist in a 
course of military aggression which would threaten world peace … We believe 
that diplomacy can and should find a way out … arrangements are urgently 




Taipei dourly noted the turn toward accommodation in Eisenhower‘s speech. ―Negotiation‖ was 
mentioned no less than six times in the speech. Moreover, Eisenhower made it clear that 
―negotiations and conciliation should never be abandoned in favor of force and strife.‖ The ROC 
promptly pointed out the discrepancy between Eisenhower‘s rhetoric and actions. Taipei noted 
favorably that the US had viewed the Taiwan Strait Crisis as ―a premeditated aggression 
engineered by both the Soviet Union and Chinese Communists.‖ However, Taipei sternly 
―question[ed] the wisdom of entering into negotiations with the Communist aggressors.‖ While 
noting that the US had reassured the ROC of not being ―a party to any arrangements which would 
prejudice our rights,‖ the ROC asserted that it had the obligation to ―defend its own legitimate 
rights and interests.‖75  
                                                                                                                                                   
71 Empathizing with Dulles‘ brush with the ―antagonistic‖ press, Eisenhower claimed that such hysteria was similar to 
that ―from Manchuria in 1931 and from Munich.‖ See Telephone call to the President at Newport, 9 September 1958, 
12:49pm, Telephone Conversation Series, box 13, memoranda of tel. conv - W H Aug 1, 1958 to Dec 5 1958 (3), JFD 
papers, DDEL. 
72 The private poll, which Eisenhower had asked for to gauge the US public reaction to the Taiwan Strait crisis, ―shook 
the Pres.‖ See Telephone call from the President, 10 September 1958, 5:15pm, Telephone Conversation Series, box 13, 
memoranda of tel. conv - W H Aug 1, 1958 to Dec 5 1958 (3), JFD papers, DDEL. 
73 Telephone call to the President, 11 September 1958, 10:57am, Telephone Conversation Series\box 13\memoranda of 
tel. conv - W H Aug 1, 1958 to Dec 5 1958 (3), JFD papers, DDEL. 
74 ―Radio and Television Report to the American People Regarding the Situation in the Formosa Strait,‖ September 11th, 
1958, in PPPUS (1959), 694-698.  
75 Drumright happily reported to Washington that the ROC was comforted by Eisenhower‘s speech for its ―stabilizing 
effect.‖ However, he under-estimated the depth of the ROC‘s apprehension. See Drumright to Dulles, telegram 379, 12 
September 1958 (8 pm), Dulles-Herter Series, box 10, Dulles - September, 1958 (2), Ann Whitman File, DDEL; ROC 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government Information Office, Press Statement by Foreign Minister Huang Shao-ku, 12 




3. Evolution of PRC International Posture (I) 
In the wake of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the PRC worked toward gaining international 
support for its actions. Beijing was eager for Soviet endorsement but chafed at perceived Soviet 
condescendence. Subterranean cultural and historical currents deeply coloured Mao‘s approach to 
the Soviets, who were subsequently taken aback by Mao‘s actions. In the international arena 
Beijing had deliberately adopted ambiguity to disguise its limited aims. Mao‘s actions received 
resounding symbolic support from fraternal countries, shielding Beijing from Soviet criticisms. 
Such an approval by fraternal states further raises the question of whether Mao and the PRC 
represented the sole example of ―aggressive stance‖ in this period of international communism, as 
presented in conventional scholarship. At the same time, Beijing had to compete for neutralist 
international support as the US had also adopted a reasonable posture. However, Beijing carefully 
guarded all approaches of its diplomacy and wanted no third-party intervention. Such attention to 
international diplomacy was possible because of Beijing‘s confident grasp of US intentions. 
 
3.1 Soviet “Open Support” 
Khrushchev‘s desperation to placate Mao‘s ruffled sensitivities formed the crucial context to the 
alleged Soviet support Beijing had for the Taiwan issue.
76
 In a thirty-page report by Mikhail 
Zimyanin who was a Soviet Foreign Ministry Far Eastern Head, all indications pointed that the 
Soviets were informed in the strongest terms that the PRC was intending to ―bring Taiwan back 
under China‘s jurisdiction.‖77 The latest Chinese sources support this interpretation. The most 
significant revelation is the telegram of the Chinese embassy in Ulan Bator (Mongolia) Beijing on 
10 September stating: ―The Soviet Chargé and councilors claimed that if the US imperialists 
attempt to initiate a war with China, the Soviets will not stand aside but will aid the Chinese 
                                                 
76 Chen Xiaolu, son of the PRC Foreign Minister Chen Yi, revealed that ―the Chinese leadership was satisfied to have 
the Soviets‘ open support on the Taiwan Strait Crisis.‖ Chen, ―Chen Yi and China‘s Diplomacy,‖ 96. 
77 According to Khrushchev, the Soviets promised and delivered more military equipment in early August. However, 
when they offered fighter units, they were immediately rebuffed by the suspicious Chinese. See Khrushchev Remembers 
vol. 2, 262;  Mark Kramer, ―The USSR Foreign Ministry‘s Appraisal of Sino-Soviet Relations on the Eve of the Split, 
September 1959,‖ CWIHPB 6/7 (Winter 95/96): 170-185; Khrushchev, Memoirs , Vol. 3, 443.  
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people to their utmost ability.‖ More crucially, ―the plan to liberate Taiwan had been decided 
during the Khrushchev-Mao meeting.‖78   
 
How can one then reconcile this with the subsequent Soviet shock at the Quemoy bombardments? 
On 3 October, Soviet chargé d‘affaires S. F. Antonov indirectly hinted to Minister Chen Yi that the 
timing of the crisis was a shock to the Soviet leadership. Khrushchev had warned the diplomatic 
staff to be extra vigilant to prevent unnecessary shocks: ―If another unexpected incident crops up, 
it would be their fault for shoddy work.‖ Antonov told Chen Yi regretfully that Soviet diplomats 
would have to ―step up their intelligence work.‖79 Much later, during a hostile July 1963 Sino-
Soviet consultation, Soviet Central Committee Member Yuri Andropov repeated the charge that 
Moscow was presented with a fiat accompli:  
In 1958, the Chinese side did not inform us in a timely fashion about its intentions 
to carry out the shelling of the coastal islands in the Taiwan Strait which was 




Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko‘s hasty 6 September visit to Beijing spoke volumes 
about the alarm felt by Moscow, and Mikhail Kapitsa, who interpreted for Gromyko, repeated 
similar complaints in his memoirs.
81
 In turn Zhou and Mao explicitly reassured Gromyko with 
three points. One, there would not be an invasion of Taiwan. Two, the Quemoy action was purely 
                                                 
78 This evidence demonstrated the extent which the Soviets were told of the PRC position on Taiwan. Soviet support for 
the PRC was repeated in another official letter on 27 September. Such evidence complemented Shen Zhihua‘s contention 
that ―China really had not consulted with nor informed the Soviet Union its intention before the Quemoy 
bombardments.‖ ―解放台湾的计划赫鲁晓夫和毛主席会谈时已经决定.‖ See Embassy in Mongolia to MFA, 
Telegram, no. 411, 10 September 1958 (1657hrs), serial no. 106-00122-02, AMFA; CC CPSU to CC CPC, ―USSR‘s 
Readiness to Provide Assistance to the PRC in the event of an attack on it from the side of the USA or Japan,‖ 27 
September 1958, Information and Documentation Administration, First Far Eastern Department, USSR Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Sbornik Dokumentov SSSR-KNR (1949-1983), Documents and Materials, Pt 1 (1949-63) (Moscow: 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1985), 231-33, reproduced in CWIHPB 6/7 (Winter 1995-96), 225-226; Shen Zhihua 沈志
华, ―Yijiu wuba nian paoji jinmen qian zhongguo shifou gaozhi sulian,‖ 一九五八年炮击金门前中国是否告知苏联
[Whether China had informed the Soviet Union before the Quemoy Bombardment in 1958] 中共党史研究 no. 3 (2004), 
35-40.  
79 Record of Conversation between Minister Chen Yi with the Soviet chargé d‘affaires S. F. Antonov, no. 595, 3 Oct, 
serial no. 109-00833-03, AMFA. 
80 Androprov‘s charge was backed by Chinese records. Mao belatedly admitted to Khrushchev: ―At that time, we did not 
inform you because we had not made up our mind. We did not expect the bombardments to lead to such an upheaval. We 
had only wished to bombard for a while and had not anticipated that [the US] would project so much troops and sea 
power.‖ See Yuri Androprov‘s speech, 13 July, in ―Stenograph: Meeting of the Delegation of the Communist Party of 
the SU and the CCP, Moscow, 5-20 July 1963,‖ CWIHPB 10 (1998), 181; Mao with Khrushchev, record of conversation, 
30 September 1959, Pang & Jin (ed.), Mao Zedong Zhuan, 855. 
81 Czeslaw Tubilewicz, ―Taiwan and the Soviet Bloc, 1949-1991,‖ Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, no. 
4 (2005), 22. 
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a ―punishment‖ of the KMT. Three, Beijing would not involve the Soviets in this quagmire, a 
proposition that sounded just as startling:  
Mao: If the US invades, we will use the method of luring them, letting them deep 
in. We are prepared to forego the coastal areas. After we let them in, that dog 
would be hammered once the door is shut. Let them be mired in the ocean of our 
People‘s War. Then they would be destroyed.  
Gromyko: I cannot make a judgment about this strategy, but one must consider 
that we are now in the era of the atomic bomb. 
Mao: What‘s so frightening about the atomic bomb? We do not have it now, but 
we‘ll have one in the future. We don‘t have one, but you have. Our policy is to 
assume complete responsibility for this war. Unlike the KMT, we will not drag 
Soviet Union into water. Still, this issue is not the problem at the present moment. 
Now we will not attack Taiwan, the US, and we will not provoke a world war. 
Please convey this to Khrushchev ….82 
  
To Beijing, casual information for the Soviets was an adequate substitute for detailed intentions, 
strategic aims, and tactical procedures such as timing and objectives.
83
 Within here lay the crux of 
the impasse.
84
 As a sovereign country, the days of the PRC obediently informing its Soviet partner 
every detail as in the Korean War was over. With Khrushchev whom Mao had limited esteem, the 
PRC‘s limited operation was deemed an ―internal affair.‖ The Soviet embassy in Beijing 
recognized that Chinese pride now stood in the way of fraternal commitments: ―Our Chinese 
friends started to show excessive sensitivity toward the problems of sovereignty and independence 
of their country, [and] reservations on measures that used to be taken by both our countries.‖85  
 
                                                 
82 Gromyko‘s sensationalized account is also seen in his claim that Mao had allegedly declared: ―Only when the 
Americans are right in the central provinces should you give them everything [nuclear weapons] you‘ve got.‖ Andrei 
Gromyko, Memories: From Stalin to Gorbachev (London: Arrow Books, 1989), 323; Yan Mingfu was an interpreter 
during the conversations, see 阎明复, ―1958 nian paoji jinmen yu Geluomike mimi fanghua,‖1958 年炮击金门与葛罗
米柯秘密访华 [1958 bombardment of Quemoy and Gromyko‘s secret visit to China], Bannian Chao 百年潮 (March 
2006), 18. 
83 During the third day of the Mao-Khrushchev summit (2 August 1958), Mao declared that ―our policy was not to give 
up one inch of our territory.‖ Mao admitted publicly on 30 November 1958 that he did not mention to Khrushchev the 
―problem of the Taiwan situation.‖ (其实会上没有谈一句台湾局势问题) see, Wu Lengxi 吴冷西, Shinian Lunzhan: 
Zhongsu guanxi huiyilu 十年论战:中苏关系回忆录 [Ten years of debate: Reminiscence of Sino-Soviet Relations] 
(Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1999), 172; Speech at Cooperatives directors general meeting (Wuhan), 30 
Nov 1958, Wansui(1969), 254. 
84 In the face of Khrushchev‘s protest in October 1959, Mao defended that the PRC had given the Soviet adequate 
consultation. Khrushchev correctly protested: ―You reported not about your policy on this problem, but merely about 
some measures.‖ Memorandum of Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, Beijing, 2 October 1959, in 
CWIHPB 12/13 (Fall-Winter 2001), 265; Yan Mingfu, ―1958 nian paoji jinmen,‖ 20. 
85 Cited in Vladislav Zubok & Constantine Pleshakov, Inside Kremlin‟s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cam, 
Mass., Harvard University Press, 1996), 223.  
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Khrushchev ironically tried to present a united front. Subsequent Soviet warnings to Washington 
and Tokyo were the result of Khrushchev‘s communist commitment.86 On 16 September, 
Khrushchev offered Chinese Ambassador Liu Xiao bombers and interceptors to gain airpower over 
the Taiwan Strait.
87
 Given such firm reassurances, Khrushchev was hence puzzled why the 
Chinese stopped short of their declaratory aim of liberating the offshore islands and Taiwan.
88
 In 
reality, Mao was more interested in defending the principle of recovering Taiwan and venting his 
frustrations over the Soviet foreign policy.
89
 Since the Chinese rhetoric was not backed by action, 
this embarrassed Khrushchev internationally. From that point onwards, Khrushchev advised 




3.2 Projection into the International Arena  
In the international arena Beijing deliberately adopted ambiguity to disguise its limited aims. On 
31 August the CCP Central Committee issued detailed instructions on the Taiwan Strait Crisis to 
all Chinese diplomats. Whether the PLA would ―land and overrun‖ the offshore islands would 
remain undefined. However, they must firmly assert three political points. One, the ―liberation and 
unification‖ was a national ―historical mission‖ as the PRC did not wish anyone to question its 
―sacred‖ and ―righteous task‖ nor hazard a deadline on the accomplishment of the mission. Two, 
the bombardments were a ―punishment‖ for all the ROC‘s harassments and provocations. Three, 
                                                 
86 In an 8 September telegram, the Chinese embassy in the Soviet Union lauded Khrushchev‘s letter to Eisenhower as a 
―serious warning to the imperialists and a strong encouragement to the Chinese people.‖ See Chinese embassy in the 
Soviet Union to MFA, Telegram, 8 September 1958, serial no. 109-01211-03, AMFA; Record of Conversation between 
Minister Chen Yi and the Soviet Councilor N. G. Sudarikov, no. 560, 15 Sept 1958, serial no. 111-00267-01, AMFA; 
my interpretation is supported by Vladislav M. Zubok, ―Khrushchev‘s Nuclear Promise to Beijing During the 1958 
Crisis,‖ CWIHPB 6/7 (Winter 95-96), 218.  
87 Liu Xiao 刘晓, ―Chu shi Sulian,‖ 出使苏联 [My ambassadorship in the Soviet Union] in Wo de Dashi shengya 我的
大使生涯 [Our ambassadorial careers] (Nanjing: Jiangsu renming chubanshe, 1993), 36-38; John Wilson Lewis & Xue 
Litai, China‟s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1994), 16. 
88 Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Vol. 3, 442-443; A. Doak Barnett, ―The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: The Sino-Soviet 
Dimension,‖ Problems of Communism XXV (Jul-Ang 1976): 38-39. 
89 My observations corroborate with the conclusions of a Russian historian Viktor Usov, see Czeslaw Tubilewicz, 
―Taiwan and the Soviet Union During the Cold War: Enemies or Ambiguous Friends?‖ Cold War History Vol 5, no. 1 
(Feb 2005), 78; Dai Chaowu, ―The Impact of the Bombardment of Jinmen in 1958 upon Sino-Soviet Relations,‖ Social 
Sciences in China, Vol 26, no. 2 (Summer 2005), 138. 
90 One reporter presciently noted that the Chinese communist ―tough policies are making the Kremlin uneasy.‖ 
Elsewhere, the CIA accurately noted that Soviet actions in the Middle East were condemned by Beijing. See  Embassy in 
Holland to MFA, Telegram, no. 309, 8 August 1958, serial no. 110-00799-02, AMFA; 375th Meeting of NSC, 7 Aug 
1955, NSC Series, box 10, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
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the master culprit was the US, who should withdraw its troops from Taiwan and the offshore 




The PRC communicated directly its political aims to fraternal countries, highlighting four areas 
where there would be no negotiation: the ―One China‖ policy; stopping aggression from the US; a 
state of perpetual civil war with the Nationalists; and grounds for a Sino-US ―ceasefire.‖ 92 
However, Beijing was much muted in rhetoric. To Bulgarian Ambassador General Petar Pavlov 
Panchevski, Zhou downplayed the Taiwan Strait Crisis as Zhou also perceived the US intense 
reluctance to fight over the offshore islands: ―… the situation is really not so tense. The US is 
making use of the tense situation to scare people. Although we are willing to relieve the tensions, 
we are also not afraid of them.‖ Significantly, Zhou‘s statement was the first admission to a 




Beijing did not waste time on US allies such as Britain and Japan. Circumspection governed its 
instructions to its embassies outside the communist bloc: ―… we do not need to overtly request 
international organizations to support our Taiwan Strait situation but if they voluntarily wish to 
support the PRC people‘s struggle by telegrams, we can agree.‖ 94 Although Beijing identified 
Britain and Japan as co-conspirators in the US ―ceasefire,‖ they were to be spared from the 




For neutralist countries, Beijing had yet another posture. The PRC recognized that the ―fear of 
war‖ had ―prompted in some a blind adherence to peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait.‖ 
                                                 
91 Chinese diplomats would ―only say that so long as the Chiang gang continues to stay in Taiwan and the offshore 
islands, the PRC‘s military action would not stop.‖ The US bore the primary responsibility for the ―tense situation‖ in 
the Strait as it had marshaled ―armed threats‖ against China. ―关于目前台湾局势对外宣传问题给驻外使馆的指示电‖ 
[Guanyu muqian Taiwan jushi duiwai xuanchuan wenti gei zhu waishi de zhishi dian], no. 100, 2 Sept 1958, serial no. 
102-0006-03 and MFA to Chinese Embassies, Telegram, no.100, 2 September 1958, serial no. 110-00421-01,  AMFA. 
92 MFA to Chinese Embassies at Czechoslovakia, United Arab Republic, East Germany, Hungrary, telegram, no. 1338, 
20 September 1958, serial no. 110-0421-01, AMFA. 
93 Record of Conversation between Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and the Bulgarian Ambassador Petar Pavlov Panchevski, 
3 Sept 1958, serial no. 109-00856-13, AMFA. 
94 MFA to Chinese Embassies, telegram, no. 1222, N.D., serial no. 110-00421-01, AMFA. 
95 ―If we can win such groups or meetings to pass resolutions supporting our country, we should duly fight for it. But if 




Toward such countries, the PRC advocated the soft approach: ―According to different 
circumstances one must use suitable persuasions to let them understand that to reduce the tension 
in the Taiwan Strait, the US must withdraw and stop interfering with the domestic politics of the 
PRC.‖96 Beijing‘s bottom line was to guard against attempts to bring the conflict settlement to the 
UN or being pressured internationally for a peaceful settlement.
97
    
 
3.3 Strong Fraternal Support 
The PRC received strong communist fraternal support for its Taiwan Strait actions. This critical 
element is amiss from existing scholarship on the PRC‘s foreign relations. On 4 September, the 
Mongolian Foreign Ministry informed the PRC that its military delegation would like to find out in 
their coming visit to the PRC ―if there is anything the Mongolian People‘s Army could do to 
support China.‖98 Fraternal countries also pressed Moscow to take a more active role in aiding the 
PRC. The North Korean ambassador emphasized the importance of the recovery of China‘s 
territory. The Hungarian and Czech ambassadors expressed that the recovery of Taiwan was ―a 
joint enterprise for all fraternal countries.‖ The 10 September Mongolian official statement said it 
best: ―The US provocative actions against our great fraternal brother China are against the world‘s 
peace- loving people. This also meant that their provocations are against the Mongolian people.‖ 




In the prevailing jingoistic mood, the PRC was ironically put in an onerous position. The Chinese 
embassy in Hanoi was swamped by ―enthusiastic‖ inquiries. Some bolder Vietnamese comrades 
even questioned the timing of the bombardments, making it clear that it should have been done 
earlier. Yet, such sound and fury seemed directed more inwardly at the Vietnamese body politic, 
                                                 
96 MFA to Chinese Embassies in Czechoslovakia, United Arab Republic, East Germany, Hungrary, telegram, no. 1338, 
20 September 1958, serial no. 110-0421-01, AMFA. 
97 MFA to Chinese Embassies, telegram, no. 1222, N.D., serial no. 110-00421-01, AMFA. 
98 Mongolia‘s newspaper, the Mongolian Pravda, urged perseverance on 3 September: ―Quemoy, Matsu and Taiwan are 
part of China and cannot be separated … the Mongolian people staunchly support the Chinese people‘s righteous 
struggle.‖ Embassy in Mongolia to MFA, Telegram, no.199, 5 September 1958, serial no. 106-00122-02, AMFA. 
99 Embassy in Mongolia to MFA, Telegram, no. 411, 10 September 1958, serial no. 106-00122-02, AMFA.   
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drumming support for its ultimate unification with the South.
100
 In a 10 September official 
statement, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong cleverly tied the Taiwan Strait Crisis with 
the US interference in South Vietnam.
101
 When the clouds of a Sino-US war passed in mid-
September, this prompted even bigger rituals of Sino-Vietnamese fraternity. The Vietnamese 
organized a 50,000-strong mass rally, which the Chinese embassy enthusiastically reported was the 
―most popular‖ rally in living memory. Foreign embassies personnel from Indonesia, North Korea, 
Soviet Union, Poland, Romania, Hungary, and other countries were also present.
102
   
 
Fraternal support shielded Beijing from Soviet criticisms. Beijing maintained such support for its 
independent foreign policy through regular briefing sessions conducted by senior PRC officials. 
Beijing also used a variety of themes to stiffen the resolve of the Soviet bloc. Vice-Foreign 
Minister Zhang Wentian averred that the crisis was not without its benefits since the US would 
face the ―opposition of the world,‖ especially ―the opposition to US imperialism.‖ Zhang then 
repeated Mao‘s ―noose‖ analogy: the Taiwan crisis had been transformed into a noose around the 
US neck from which there would no easy release. Left unsaid was the implication that the crisis 
would not be allowed to get out of hand. The PRC also tried to show that the US threats were all 
hollow: ―Don‘t be alarmed by its bared teeth and sharp claws, … be steadfast and determined, [the 
US] really has no other means, hence we call it the paper tiger.‖ 103 Elsewhere, Vice-Foreign 
Minister Ji Pengfei had admitted the US cautious tacit acquiescence, seen in the American 
calculation of China‘s three miles of territorial waters from Quemoy, not from the mainland.104    
                                                 
100 For the Vietnamese, China‘s Taiwan Strait Crisis was like a carnival and a media circus, with the Vietnamese News 
Division permitting the Chinese Xinhua news agency to interview prominent Vietnamese communists. The PRC had 
earlier rejected Hanoi‘s calls for ―Southern Revolution‖ [reunification with South Vietnam] during the summer of 1958. 
Hence, the diligence given by the Vietnamese comrades on the importance of the recovery of Quemoy was a back-
handed commentary on the partitioning of Vietnam at the 17th parallel on June 1954. See Chinese Embassy in Hanoi to 
MFA, telegram, no. 129, 2 September 1958, serial no. 106-00443-09, AMFA; Chen Jian, ―China and the Vietnam 
Wars,‖ 162. 
101 Two days earlier, Pham Van Dong had announced total support for Zhou Enlai‘s official stand. Dong drew attention 
to the similar circumstances of South Vietnam and demanded that ―the US cease all activities in South Vietnam.‖ See 
Chinese Embassy in Hanoi to MFA, telegram, no. 523, 11 September 1958, serial no. 106-00443-09, AMFA.   
102 Some Vietnamese combat veterans even declared in the rally that they were willing to ―fight together hand-in-hand 
with their Chinese comrades.‖ Important Vietnamese communists were present too. See Chinese Embassy in Hanoi to 
MFA, telegram, no. 1009, 21 September 1958, serial no. 106-00443-09, AMFA 
103 See Record of Conversation between Vice-Foreign Minister Zhang Wentian and the Soviet Chargé d‘affaires, 
Bulgarian, Albanian, Czech, Hungarian and Polish ambassadors, no. 569, 21 Sept 1958, serial no. 109-00822-08, 
AMFA. 
104 But he quickly established the insincerity of the US by pointing out that the US had ―no intention in carrying out 




Conventional scholarship has stressed the belligerency of the PRC in comparison to the cautious 
moves of the Soviet Union.
105
 However, the above analysis has demonstrated that Mao‘s actions 
had elicited strong fraternal ritualized support. As such belligerent attitudes of the Communist 
countries went against Moscow‘s advocacy of peaceful co-existence, this raises the question 
whether Mao and the PRC represented the sole example of ―aggressive stance‖ in this period of 
international communism.  
 
3.4 Competition for Neutralist Support  
Toward neutralist Asian countries, Beijing adopted adroit rhetoric and pressure. On 30 August, 
Vice-Foreign Minister Zhang Wentian informed the Indian Ambassador that friendly Asian 
countries had a role to play, asserting that Asian countries should recognize, ―object and oppose 
the US conspiratorial attempts to create tension in the Far East.‖ Although Zhang was pugnacious 
in stating the PRC‘s hallowed mission of recovering the offshore islands and Taiwan, this was 
presented as more of a matter of ―policy and determination‖ than actual occupation of territory.106 
In response, Afro-Asian countries in the UN were reportedly singing the same tune as Beijing.
107
   
The PRC‘s ritualized script of the Taiwan Strait Crisis involved conflating its historical role of 
being the perennial victim with creative embellishments. Zhang had a sanitized version of events 
for the Indian Ambassador: ―On 23 August, Chiang Kai-shek‘s clique was sending supplies to 
Quemoy. To give cover to the supply ships, the Quemoy commander fired upon us. Hence, we 
returned fire. That is how things developed.‖ Zhang trivialized the trigger event and proceeded to 
condemn such disproportionate US belligerent reactions as sending two aircraft carrier battle 
groups to the Taiwan Strait.
108
  
                                                                                                                                                   
―unprecedented.‖  Record of Conversation between Vice-Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei and the Romanian, E. Germany, 
North Korean, Mongolian and North Vietnamese ambassadors, no. 566, 21 Sept 1958, serial no. 109-00822-07, AMFA. 
105 Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside Kremlin‟s Cold War, 221. 
106 Beijing unequivocally informed the world that the bombardments were not a prelude to an invasion of Taiwan. 
Record of Conversation between Vice-Foreign Minister Zhang and the Indian Ambassador, no. 535, 30 August 1958, 
serial no. 111-00266-01, AMFA. 
107 Chinese Embassy in Soviet Union to MFA, telegram , no. 589, 13 September 1958, serial no. 111-00267-01, AMFA. 
108 Zhang noted the aerial exercises on 29 August off Taiwan‘s coast and a combined military exercise scheduled in 
September. He also noted that senior US military leaders had converged in Taiwan for consultation. See Record of 





To distant and presumably ignorant allies, Beijing affected a tough posture, as seen in Chen Yi‘s 
conversation with the United Arab Republic ambassador: ―For the sake of our safety and the 
freedom of shipping, we must liberate Quemoy and Matsu … We have already blockaded the 
Strait, and controlled access to Quemoy and Matsu. We will force the Nationalists‘ 80,000 army 
troops to retreat or surrender.‖ However, Chen Yi‘s verbal overkill was quickly punctured by the 
ambassador who asked if reports that the US had already broken the blockade were true. Chen Yi 
then switched to defending the principle of ―liberation of Taiwan‖ and the offshore islands and 
backpedaled at the end of his conversation: ―One cannot just achieve one‘s goal [liberation of 
offshore islands or Taiwan] by today or tomorrow.‖109 
 
The cynical tailoring of the PRC diplomatic pitch to different countries demonstrated a shrewd 
realpolitik outlook of international relations. The inflation of the crisis to Middle East allies made 
for good propaganda at little cost and should distant allies display more astuteness than warranted, 
the belligerent rhetoric would be dropped.
110
 For critical Communist-bloc countries and other 
neutralist Asian allies, Beijing reverted to the ―reasonable‖ stance. Zhou carefully hinted in the 
letters to Sihanouk and Krishna Menon that the PRC was concerned more with the ―sacred and 
inviolable‖ principle that the PRC had every right to recover Taiwan and the offshore islands than 




However, to Beijing‘s rue, the US demonstrated adroit handling of Afro-Asian nations as well. 
Dulles showed a high degree of flexibility and reasonableness toward the SEATO ambassadors on 
4 September, and hoped that Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines would relay the peace message 
                                                 
109 Record of Conversation between Vice Premier Chen Yi and the United Arab Republic Ambassador, no. 577, 21 Sept 
1958 (1600hrs), serial no. 107-00103-21, AMFA. 
110 Subsequent telegrams to the Chinese embassies in the UAR and Iraq avoided mentioning Chen Yi‘s embarrassing 
initial position of ―we must liberate Quemoy and Matsu‖. MFA (Asia-Afro Division) to Chinese Embassies in the UAR 
and Iraq, Telegram, no. 1490, 23 Sept 1958, serial no. 107-00173-12, AMFA 
111 The central theme was: ―China has always suggested that Sino-US talks should be used to resolve peacefully the 
differences over the Taiwan area without resorting to threats or force.‖ Zhou however rejected the concept of ―ceasefire‖ 
as the ―PRC and the US were not at war.‖ The bombardments of the offshore islands were simply an episode of ―armed 
punishment of the Nationalists‘ harassing activities‖ in the ―long civil war‖ between the Communists and the 
Nationalists, which would not ―threaten the Far East and world peace.‖ See Prime Minister Zhou Enlai to Krishna 
Menon, letter, 21 September 1958, serial no. 105-00375-01; Prime Minister Zhou Enlai to King Norodom Sihanouk, 
letter, 26 September 1958, serial no. 106-00129-01; AMFA. 
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to the other countries in the UN. A Ceylonese source reported: ―If China‘s military maneuvers are 
restricted to the offshore islands and not towards conquering Taiwan, Dulles hoped to use a 
peaceful solution to resolve the Taiwan Strait Crisis.‖ Dulles offered four suggestions. One, the 
UN would be invited to handle the situation. Two, the PRC and the ROC would hold talks. Three, 
Sino-US talks should also start. Four, India or the Soviet Union could be the third-party arbitrator. 
Dulles‘ moves succeeded in deflecting negative world opinion of the US temporarily.112  
 
On 18 September, Dulles publicly requested in the UN that Sino-US talks be continued on the 
condition that the Chinese communists held a ceasefire in the Taiwan Strait. In turn, the US 
promised to further discuss ―cessation of provocations against Mainland China.‖ Privately, Zhou 
could hardly mask his anger from the Soviets on just how ludicrous the US demands were.
113
 
Nevertheless, Beijing‘s reacted circumspectly in public. Referring to the Afro-Asian countries, 
Zhou conceded that as these countries had requested for a ceasefire and for Chiang to withdraw 
from the offshore islands, the PRC would adopt a three-pronged approach to resolve the conflict: 
participate in negotiations in Warsaw, gather support among sympathetic UN members in New 
York and continue barrages upon Quemoy.
114
 Beijing‘s tolerance for a tacit ceasefire was based on 
a good understanding of US intentions. In an address to the communist ambassadors, Vice- 
Foreign Minister Zhang Wentian noted that ―the US had no desire to provoke a huge war‖ since 
the bulk of the US flotilla in the Taiwan Strait operated outside the twelve miles of territorial 
waters stipulated by Beijing. Zhang also demonstrated remarkable clarity on the constraints faced 
by the US: ―The US was concerned of the consequences of its aid to Chiang, but not aiding the 
ROC was not a viable option for the US either.‖ Such ―contradictions‖ thus led the US to reinforce 
its garrisons in Taiwan but engage in negotiations with the PRC simultaneously. 
                                                 
112 Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union to MFA, telegram , no. 589, 13 September 1958, serial no. 111-00267-01, 
AMFA. 
113 Beijing saw his as a case of bad faith as all the Americans could promise was a discussion of the issue without 
offering an immediate ―cessation of provocations.‖ Zhou explained to Antonov: ―Since our first meeting with the US 
when we presented our draft accord, the American probably unexpectedly came to a wrong perception … Thinking that 
we are in a hurry to reach a peace agreement, the US once again demand a ceasefire from us.‖ Memorandum on the 
Situation in the Taiwan Strait, no. 1381, 21 Sept 1958, serial no. 109-00822-10, AMFA; Foster Dulles, ―Problems of 
Peace and Progress,‖ opening session of the 13th UN General Assembly, New York, Sept. 18, 1958), DSB (Oct 6, 
1958), 525-530. 
114 Record of Conversation between Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and the Soviet Chargé d‘affaires S. F. Antonov, no. 563, 




Moreover, international opinions on the Taiwan Strait Crisis appeared to be shifting. Initially, the 
US militant actions had few supporters. But the US peace offensive via Eisenhower‘s 11 
September speech and Dulles‘ 18 September speech in the UN changed the international dynamics. 
Zhang acknowledged: ―Some are blinded by the peaceful gestures into thinking that it would really 
resolve the crisis.‖ Therefore, Beijing would prudently support the Warsaw negotiations because 
―while there would be acts of war, there would also be peaceful processes.‖ The KMT on the 
offshore islands would also have to be pounded, but the Chinese Communists ―would not strike the 
Americans, if they did not attempt an invasion.‖ Regarding the long term, Zhang concurred that 
this zone of contest and period of probing would be around for a ―considerable time.‖115 
 
4. The US: Figuring Out a Decent Way 
The US was aware of the moderate stance of the PRC and perceived the negotiations in Warsaw 
with an end to diffusing tensions. Having achieved understanding with Beijing on that score, 
Washington, however, was still stuck with an obdurate Taipei. Historical and cultural factors again 
intervened to obstruct any successful persuasion of Chiang. To gain more time to persuade Chiang, 
the US explored various possibilities to extend talks with the PRC, demonstrating the ritualized 
maturity of the Sino-US crisis system. Nonetheless, Sino-US tacit accommodation could not 
provide an antidote to the increasing public relations woes of the US, reflected in the growing 
criticisms the US drew from international and American public opinion concerned about a 
potential outbreak of war and nuclear fallout.  
 
4.1 US Perceptions of PRC’s Moderation 
The symbolism of Taiwan for the PRC was understood by the US. In a British intelligence extract 
read by both Dulles and Eisenhower, it was made clear that the PRC wanted to reclaim its ―great 
                                                 
115 Zhang contended that the military grandstanding, the desire for negotiations and the unstated adherence of the twelve-
mile limit were evidence that ―superficially the US acts tough, but it is actually very soft.‖ He added that the Americans 
feared that KMT actions would ―drag the US into troubled waters.‖ US militant actions were also unpopular: Japan was 
hesitant, Britain was leery of showing too much support, and the Philippines‘ suggestion to include Taiwan in SEATO 
was dropped. Record of Conversation between Vice-Foreign Minister Zhang Wentian and the Soviet Chargé d‘affaires, 




power status.‖ Part of the equation was to have economic development. To gear the population to 
this formidable task, ―stimulus of external crises‖ had to be used. However, ―the Chinese domestic 
policy requires crises rather than wars.‖ The bottom line for the Chinese Communists was to at 
least have a ―diplomatic victory to show their people.‖116 The moderation of the PRC‘s 
bombardments was duly noted. Dulles gathered that in Quemoy although ―civilian casualties are 
tremendous…the military damage is small.‖  He observed gratefully that ―they could do more 
against Quemoy from the air than they have.‖ With the US aiding in resupplying the offshore 
islands, the danger for the US was ―Chiang going off on his own.‖117 But the US military, as 
Herter reported, were still privately ―set in their minds if anything is going to happen it will be of a 
nuclear character.‖ Herter stated that the US forward observers in Quemoy sent a report that was 
―a little more moderate‖ than what the brass in Pentagon composed.118  
 
This time round it was the US that was eager for the negotiations in Warsaw, although Dulles 
referred to ―Mao‘s statement and the importance he attaches to the talks‖ to point out that the PRC 
was just as anxious.
119
 Dulles reminded Robertson that Eisenhower had ―said he would go 
anywhere in search of peace.‖ In terms of the selection of venues or emissaries, the US would 
bend backward to accommodate the communists.
120
 Dulles ―did not want to risk the talks on which 





                                                 
116 ―Excerpt of Personal Assessment by British Charge, Peiping (9 Sept 1958),‖Dulles to Eisenhower, 12 September 
1958, Dulles-Herter Series, box 10, Dulles - September, 1958 (2), Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
117 Telephone call with Gov. Herter, 18 September 1958, 8:47 am,  Telephone Conversation Series, box 9, memoranda of 
tel conv - Gen Aug 1 1958 to Oct 31 1958 (3), JFD papers, DDEL. 
118 Telephone call to Gov. Herter, 19 September 1958, 8:54 am,  Telephone Conversation Series, box 9, memoranda of 
tel conv - Gen Aug 1 1958 to Oct 31 1958 (3), JFD papers, DDEL. 
119 The US hoped that moderate moves would deter Beijing from demanding more nuclear capability from the Soviets. 
The Soviets also hoped to delay the Chinese Communists for ―as long as possible‖ but it was only a matter of time 
before the PRC would acquire it on their own efforts. OCB staff Col. Edwin F. Black advocated using the Soviets to 
restrain the Chinese. See Telephone call to President at Newport, 6 September 1958, 3:41pm, Telephone Conversation 
Series, box 13, memoranda of tel. conv - W H Aug 1, 1958 to Dec 5 1958 (3), JFD papers, DDEL; Col. Edwin F. Black, 
OCB Staff Representative, to Mr. Marshall Green, State Dept., Memorandum, Department of Defense, Sep 17, 1958. 
DDRS. 
120 Dulles further advised: ―You have to keep some fragment of public opinion with you. We are in a desperate place in 
that position.‖ This change of posture was captured by Kenneth T. Young who at that time was the Director of Southeast 
Asian Affairs of the State Department. See Diplomacy and Power, 19. 
121 Telephone call from Mr Robertson, 13 September 1958, 12:40pm,  Telephone Conversation Series, box 9, 
memoranda of tel conv - Gen Aug 1 1958 to Oct 31 1958 (3), JFD papers, DDEL 
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4.2 US Package Deal in Exchange for the Fangong Mission? 
Once the talks with Beijing started in Warsaw on 15 September, Washington turned to Taipei. 
Eisenhower was initially buoyant that the US could ―figure out a decent way‖ to convince Chiang 
about a ―package deal for a status quo for a few years to give internal forces a chance.‖122 The US 
embarked upon several steps to persuade Chiang. One, the JCS was tasked to reconsider the value 
of the offshore islands to support Eisenhower‘s argument to turn them into outposts. Two, Dulles‘ 
formula, the ―demilitarization of the islands,‖ would be pursued.123 Three, physical maneuverings 
of the US fleets would take into consideration the ROC‘s sentiments. To the PRC, the US would 
―ease up on those activities at least for a few days‖ but at the same time ―this should not be down 
abruptly so as to alarm the Chinese Nationalist Government.‖124 Yet another way would be to 
tempt Chiang with enhanced amphibious capability. Eisenhower would contend that Chiang ―must 
remain mobile to take advantage of any change to reoccupy the mainland‖ and ―amphibious boats 
would make him really mobile.‖ This would also keep the generalissimo busy with ―activity, and 
training duties‖ and Eisenhower was prepared to even include ―parachute training.‖125 
 
However, negotiating the fine line between restraining Chiang and not snubbing fangong was 
trying.
126
 Presidential Special Assistant Gordon Gray argued for pointing to the ROC the absurdity 
of fangong and the negative value of the offshore islands to the US international standing. To his 
credit, Eisenhower displayed understanding of the utility of fangong and told Gray that ―as long as 
the first possibility [disintegration of the CCP on mainland China] existed it was important to 
                                                 
122 For the US, it would be an opportunity to ―get out of that damn place where we are caught.‖ Indeed, Eisenhower and 
Dulles candidly claimed that ―they don‘t know what they [ROC] have been doing [on the offshore islands].‖ Telephone 
call to President at Newport, 6 September 1958, 3:41pm, Telephone Conversation Series, box 13, memoranda of tel. 
conv - W H Aug 1, 1958 to Dec 5 1958 (3), JFD papers, DDEL. 
123 Dulles wondered how he could ―get Chiang Kai-shek to disengage with fatal implications on Formosa.‖ Still the US 
negotiators were to pursue this line, ―short of bringing about the collapse of the government in Formosa.‖ See 
Memorandum, 11 Sept 1958, General Correspondence & Memoranda Series, box 1, Memos of conversation - General L 
through M (3), JFD papers, DDEL. 
124 Eisenhower with Dulles, Memo of Conversation, 11 September 1958, Special Assistants Chronological Series, Box 
13, Greene - Boster Chronological Sept (2), JFD Papers, DDEL. 
125 Fiscally, Eisenhower argued, ―we could do all that training for less than keeping a reinforced 7th fleet there.‖ See 
Telephone call from the President, 16 September 1958, 8 am, Telephone Conversation Series, box 13, memoranda of tel. 
conv - W H Aug 1, 1958 to Dec 5 1958 (3), JFD papers, DDEL. 
126 Various thumbscrews applied on the ROC ―to convert Chiang to flexibility‖ appeared in vain. Dulles complained that 
―we are working everyday – [George] Yeh is here and they talk everyday.‖ See Telephone call to the President in 
Newport, 22 September 1958, 8:59am, Telephone Conversation Series, box 13, memoranda of tel. conv - W H Aug 1, 
1958 to Dec 5 1958 (2); Telephone call from the President, 17 September 1958, 9:04am, Telephone Conversation Series, 
box 13, memoranda of tel. conv – W H Aug 1, 1958 to Dec 5 1958 (3), JFD papers, DDEL. 
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maintain the morale of Chiang and his people.‖ Moreover, as a ―symbol of the Free world‖ Taiwan 
and the offshore islands were linked.
127
 While Eisenhower understood the symbolism of the 
offshore islands, he increasingly resented it, as seen in his insistence to Dulles ―that we have to do 
something; we have to sell someone something or we shall be accused of desertion of ally or 
bringing war, neither of which is acceptable.‖128 
 
Yet, the stark political realities of the ROC‘s existence rebelled against Eisenhower‘s proposals. 
As Chiang had invested much in building the guochi (national humiliation) symbolism of the 
offshore islands, evident by all the wuwang zaiju (Forget not the time at Ju) granite inscriptions in 
Quemoy, he could not treat the offshore islands as outposts to be abandoned at will and stop the 
morale boosting paramilitary raids on China.
129
 For Chiang, the ignominy of being driven to the 
Formosa redoubt in 1949 as permitted by Truman‘s White Paper seemed to be repeated in 
Eisenhower‘s seemingly rational proposals. Chiang‘s anger with his American ally resided in the 
American insensitivity in trampling over the value of fangong symbolism in the ROC‘s body 




So desperate was the US that Eisenhower revisited the idea of having a ―high-powered negotiator 
in Taiwan.‖ Herter quoted the failure of the 1955 Radford-Robertson conversations and warned 
that ―history is repeating itself.‖131 However, Eisenhower saw it as a problem of sending the right 
emissary and complained that Radford and Robertson ―did not hold an open mind on the 
                                                 
127 Eisenhower also revealed his disagreements with Dulles‘ handling of the Taiwan Strait Crisis before 6 September: 
―He [Eisenhower] did agree with the view that some honorable way out of the Off-shore Islands dilemma was desirable. 
In this he indicated that perhaps his views as to methods were somewhat at variance with the Secretary of State‘s.‖ 
Gordon Gray with Eisenhower, Memorandum, 12 Sep 1958, Off of the Sp Asst for Nat Sec Affairs, Special Asst Series, 
Presidential Subseries, box 3, Meetings with the President—1958 (3), White House Office, DDEL. 
128 Dulles warned that the offshore islands ―are all that are left of what was China and he [Chiang] hates to give up 
anything.‖ Eisenhower found this repeated nationalistic and cultural impasse intolerable. Telephone call from the 
President, 16 September 1958, 8 am, Telephone Conversation Series, box 13, memoranda of tel. conv - W H Aug 1, 
1958 to Dec 5 1958 (3), JFD papers, DDEL. 
129 Li Xiaofen, et al. 李筱峰, 及其他, “Jiuwei de fuhao – cong ‘zhenzhi biaoyu’ tu kan liang jiang zhenzhi,” 久违
的符号 – 从 ‘政治标语’ 图像看两蒋政治 [Symbols of ages past – Looking at Jiang politics through political 
slogans], Taiwan shiliao yanjiu 台湾史料研究 [Taiwan Historical Materials studies], no. 27 (Aug 2006), 13-16. 
130 Dulles admitted that the US adamant requests could ―jeopardize good relations between us and the Chinats and also 
undermine the authority and prestige of the Nationalist Government on Taiwan.‖ See ―Memo of conversation with 
Ambassador Lodge,‖ 19 Sept 1958, General Correspondence & Memoranda Series, box 1, Memos of conversation - 
General L through M (1), JFD papers, DDEL. 
131 Telephone call to Gov. Herter, 16 September 1958, 9 am,  Telephone Conversation Series, box 9, memoranda of tel 
conv - Gen Aug 1 1958 to Oct 31 1958 (3), JFD papers, DDEL. 
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problem.‖132 He had in mind John McCloy, whom Eisenhower had much admired for his wartime 
work, to persuade Chiang, but McCloy declined.
133
 As half-hearted emissaries would not work, the 
inference was that Dulles might have to do the convincing this time. 
 
4.3 Ritualized Maturity of the Crisis System 
To gain more time to persuade Chiang, the US looked to Warsaw. ―The big thing,‖ as Dulles put it, 
―we hope for is if we keep a strong front it [the present Taiwan Strait Crisis ] will subside as before 
and his [Ambassador Beam‘s] report indicates there may be a basis for that.‖ The negotiation was 
a cog in the process of diffusing tensions. Dulles indicated to Herter that he ―would not look at it 
as a meeting to finalize our position or do anything dramatic but just reaffirm and throw in a few 
new hookers.‖ As for the ―new hookers‖ which Dulles recommended, these were some points for 




Another avenue to gain diplomatic breathing space was to pile options upon the PRC. Dulles 
encouraged Australia‘s resurrection of the idea of international guarantees of Taiwan,135 as he 
claimed that proposals submitted by the Soviets and the Americans did not seem ―acceptable to the 
other.‖136 Dulles also eagerly explored other mediatory efforts. Remembered the effects of a 
multiple-pronged approach in resolving the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, he approached 
Hammarskjold with the request that ―there might come a time when some ‗cushion‘ was desirable 
and perhaps the United Nations could provide it.‖ However, the Secretary-General was reluctant. 
As the Sino-US ambassadorial talks had already started, Hammarskjold did not wish to undercut 
                                                 
132 Secretary Ann Whitman wrote in her diary that the implication was that the duo ―secretly agreed with Chiang.‖ See, 
Diary Notes, 26 September 1958, ACW Diary Series, box 10, September, 1958 ACW DIARY, Ann Whitman File, 
DDEL. 
133 McCloy evoked the failure of the Marshall‘s mission and refused to budge. See John J. McCloy to Dulles, 27 Sept 
1958, Dulles-Herter Series, box 10, Dulles - September, 1958 (1), Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
134 These include citing that ―the Chinese would not be quarreling about it [Offshore islands] if it were not for us 
[defeating the Japanese and freeing Formosa]‖ or ―it was our military effort and sacrifice that gives the Chinese 
something to quarrel about.‖ The main aim was to ―keep it going.‖ Telephone call to Gov. Herter, 19 September 1958, 
12:57pm,  Telephone Conversation Series, box 9, memoranda of tel conv - Gen Aug 1 1958 to Oct 31 1958 (3), JFD 
papers, DDEL. 
135 In the previous attempts, Australia‘s proposal was halted by British lack of enthusiasm and Chiang‘s rigorous 
protests. Dulles seemed interested but Chiang again proved obdurate. See ―Memo of conversation with Foreign Minister 
Casey,‖ 18 Sept 1958, General Correspondence & Memoranda Series, box 1, Memos of Conversation - General - A 
through D (3), JFD papers, DDEL. 
136 See ―Memo of conversation with Australian ambassador,‖ 21 Sept 1958, General Correspondence & Memoranda 
Series, box 1, Memos of Conversation - General - A through D (2), JFD papers, DDEL. 
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the effort and would only promise ―some sort of a ‗United Nations presence‘ in the situation which 
would not require him to plunge into the matter.‖137 In sum, the ritualized maturity of a Sino-US 
crisis system was at hand. Dulles was prepared to ―go on forever‖ with the ―Ambassadorial talks 
[which] could be prolonged.‖ The US even aired the prospect of ―higher-level talks.‖138  
 
4.4 US Public Relations Nightmare 
Although the reasonable posture of the US during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis had garnered it 
some international support, trouble soon came from international and American public opinion 
concerned about a potential outbreak of war and nuclear fallout. The Soviets had publicly 
lamented in the UN that the US did not ―listen to the voice of reason‖ and had thereby created the 
possibility of a ―real danger of war.‖139 This influenced the mood in the UN, with Ambassador 
Lodge telling Dulles that ―it was the roughest one we ever had. The Quemoy Thing dominated 
everything. No one made a speech on our side.‖140 The ritualized negotiations with the PRC, with 
no immediate ―positive outcomes,‖ gave no succor to US public relations woes either. ―Two-thirds 
of the world, and 60% of US opinion,‖ lamented Eisenhower, ―opposes the course which we have 





                                                 
137 While Hammarskjold had previously mediated on humanitarian grounds to aid the return of the US airmen 
imprisoned in the PRC, the Taiwan Strait issue was political and the PRC and ROC had repeatedly stated that this was an 
internal affair. See ―Memo of Conversation with Hammarskjold,‖ 26 Sept 1958, General Correspondence & Memoranda 
Series, box 1, Memos of conversation - General E through I (2), JFD papers, DDEL. 
138 However, what this meant was not clear since, when Eisenhower was asked this by the British, he changed the topic 
to matters of ―intelligence cooperation between the UK and the US with reference to the general position in the Far East, 
the significance of the Chinese communities in different states, etc.‖ See ―Memo of conversation with Ambassador 
Caccia,‖ 22 Sept 1958, General Correspondence & Memoranda Series, box 1, Memos of Conversation - General - A 
through D (3), JFD papers, DDEL. 
139 Thomas, ―Soviet Policy,‖ 61. 
140 Telephone call to Amb Lodge, 23 September 1958, 6:39pm, Telephone Conversation Series, box 9, memoranda of tel 
conv - Gen Aug 1 1958 to Oct 31 1958 (3), JFD papers, DDEL. 
141 Dulles with Eisenhower, Memo of Conversation, 23 Sept 1958, Special Assistants Chronological Series, Box 13, 
Greene - Boster Chronological Sept (1), JFD Papers, DDEL. 
142 Even Allen Dulles found the crescendo of public opposition to the White House‘s posture in the Taiwan Strait 
alarming. The situation was made worse by public protests by former officials from the Truman administration such as 
Dean Acheson and Thomas K. Finletter ,who claimed ―we don‘t need it [Formosa] for defence purposes.‖ See Telephone 
call to Mr Robertson, 25 September 1958, 8:44 am, Telephone Conversation Series, box 9, memoranda of tel conv - Gen 
Aug 1 1958 to Oct 31 1958 (3); Memo (Allen Dulles), 25 September 1958, Telephone Conversation Series, box 9, 
memoranda of tel conv - Gen Aug 1 1958 to Oct 31 1958 (3), JFD papers, DDEL. 
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Chiang‘s antics were complicating matters.143 Dulles remonstrated to senior State Department 
official Arthur H. Dean that additional pressure on the ROC could be counterproductive. 
Remembering the 1957 Taiwan Riots, Dulles averred that there could be ―a violent outbreak of 
anti-American sentiment‖ and we ―would be forced out of Formosa.‖ Eisenhower thought that the 
dilemma ―from a military viewpoint‖ was simply ―awful.‖ Moreover, tacit understandings with 
Beijing could not be made public. ―Of course we don‘t want to fight for them [offshore islands],‖ 
lamented Dulles to Nixon, ―but the problem cannot be simplified in that way.‖ Beijing‘s staunch 
refusal to trade the offshore islands to ―stop the fighting‖ aggravated matters. Dulles admitted that 
these sensitive issues were ―hard to say‖ publicly. Moreover the PRC insisted on harping on the 
―issue of US aggression against China‖ in the UN and even the issue of ―ceasefire‖ could not be 
raised. The only consolation was that the PRC ―continue to take that 1955 line.‖  Dulles was 
trapped between stubborn Taipei and an enemy that was obtuse to horse trading.  
 
Conclusion 
On the eve of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the ROC‘s harsh albeit flawed critique of the US 
was a reflection of its waning fangong mission and its complex relations with the US. Despite 
support to be rendered by the US as demonstrated in the ROC‘s war plans, the KMT mission had 
become more defensive than offensive. Inured by the PRC‘s maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait, 
Eisenhower decided against the nuclear option even before the outbreak of hostilities. Washington 
was also explicit about reining in Chiang Kai-shek and considered signaling more clearly to 
Beijing American intentions in Taiwan. Meanwhile tensions were building up in Sino-Soviet 
relations over a host of issues and Beijing viewed the Soviet Union‘s symbolic maneuvers in the 
Middle East and Soviet attitudes toward the US and the PRC with mounting distrust. China‘s 
decision to bombard Quemoy was cast in a mode of defiance against the timidity of the Soviets, 
together with China‘s concerns regarding the specter of US encirclement, perceived American 
intransigence and Taiwan‘s provocations. 
                                                 
143 Eisenhower grumbled that ―there seemed to be no way to persuade Chiang to redirect the focus of his leadership, in a 
way which would enable him to re-group his military forces into more sensible positions.‖ Dulles with Eisenhower, 
Memo of Conversation, 23 Sept 1958, Special Assistants Chronological Series, Box 13, Greene - Boster Chronological 




Right from the start of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, both Washington and Beijing exercised 
remarkable restraint. Eisenhower was calm and Dulles hailed the experiences gained in 1955 as 
fundamental to the tacit accommodation reached in the immediate aftermath of the Crisis. Taipei, 
steeped in the nuances of the communist moves, again successfully made use of the Crisis to press 
for more US aid, and this benefited the ROC military establishment in particular. The PRC‘s 
actions were cautious and deliberate right from the beginning, seeing the bombardments as a 
―military probe‖ designed to ―give the US a hard time.‖ Dulles‘ offer of tacit accommodation on 4 
September was swiftly accepted by Zhou on 6 September. While Beijing was using the Crisis to 
amass support for its domestic agenda of the Great Leap Forward, US public opinion missed the 
nuances of the Sino-US tacit accommodation and Eisenhower had to reach out to the public to 
―reverse the poll,‖ a development that Taipei met with dour circumspection.   
 
In the wake of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the PRC worked toward gaining international 
support for its actions. Beijing was eager for Soviet endorsement but chafed at perceived Soviet 
condescendence. Subterranean cultural and historical currents deeply coloured Mao‘s approach to 
the Soviets, who were subsequently taken aback by Mao‘s actions. In the international arena 
Beijing had deliberately adopted ambiguity to disguise its limited aims. Mao‘s actions received 
resounding symbolic support from fraternal countries, shielding Beijing from Soviet criticisms. 
Such an approval by fraternal states further raises the question of whether Mao and the PRC 
represented the sole example of ―aggressive stance‖ in this period of international communism, as 
presented in conventional scholarship. At the same time, Beijing had to compete for neutralist 
international support as the US had also adopted a reasonable posture. However, Beijing carefully 
guarded all approaches of its diplomacy and wanted no third-party intervention. Such attention to 
international diplomacy was possible because of Beijing‘s confident grasp of US intentions. 
 
The US was aware of the moderate stance of the PRC and perceived the negotiations in Warsaw 
with an end to diffusing tensions. Having achieved understanding with Beijing on that score, 
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Washington, however, was still stuck with an obdurate Taipei. Historical and cultural factors again 
intervened to obstruct any successful persuasion of Chiang. To gain more time to persuade Chiang, 
the US explored various possibilities to extend talks with the PRC, demonstrating the ritualized 
maturity of the Sino-US crisis system. Nonetheless, Sino-US tacit accommodation could not 
provide an antidote to the increasing public relations woes of the US, reflected in the growing 
criticisms the US drew from international and American public opinion concerned about a 
potential outbreak of war and nuclear fallout.  
 
This chapter has thus analyzed how and why the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis broke out in late- 
August 1958 and how and why a much quicker Sino-US tacit accommodation was reached in early 
September. With regards to strategies employed by each party in the crisis, all fingered the lessons 
of the previous encounter. How the PRC, the US and the ROC related to each other and in the 
international arena in the final months of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis from late-September to 







Chapter 8: The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis: Resolution and Aftermath 
 
Following the outbreak of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis on 23 August 1958, Zhou and Dulles 
publicly announced on 6 September possible peaceful measures and this led to the convening of 
the Sino-US negotiations in Warsaw from 15 September onwards. Both the US and the PRC 
claimed credit for the resolution of the quandary, but on different grounds. The Chinese expressed 
their satisfaction with the ―lesson,‖ the artillery bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu, while 
Washington reaffirmed its faith in nuclear deterrence. Chiang Kai-shek proclaimed peaceably that 
the wisdom of Sun Yat-sen's Sanminzhuyi (Three Principles of the People) would henceforth guide 
the ROC‘s effort in reclaiming Mainland China and launched the next phase of Taiwan‘s economic 
policy. The speed of the conflict resolution and the different explanations offered beg more 
questions than answers. 
 
Once Zhou accepted Washington‘s offer of restarting the negotiations in Warsaw, the Second 
Taiwan Strait Crisis seemingly retreated in urgency. Indeed existing scholarship neglected the 
behind-the-scene maneuvering by all three parties to consolidate the peace.
1
 Beijing‘s relations 
with Asian neutralist countries were also a glaring omission. Three recent studies on Taiwan Strait 
relations, however, did stress two important aspects: two of the studies highlighted the PRC-ROC 
back-channels in facilitating the winding down of the crisis, while the third emphasized the 
domestic imperatives of the crisis for the political dynamics of Quemoy.
2
 This chapter, focusing on 
developments from late-September to December 1958, wraps up the reinterpretation of the Second 
Taiwan Strait Crisis. Building on recent insights and new sources, it argues that Beijing 
paradoxically found its friendship and prestige with Asian neutralists a hindrance to its tacit 
understanding with Washington, as the neutralist countries were overly eager to be Beijing‘s 
                                                 
1 Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1990), 183-200; Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic 
Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 194-241; Appu K. Soman, 
Double-Edged Sword: Nuclear Diplomacy in Unequal Conflict: The United States and China, 1950-1958 (Westport: 
Praeger, 2000), 165-211. 
2 Qing Simei, From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity and US-China Diplomacy 1945-1960 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2007), 283-285; Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for 
Modern China (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2009), 493; Michael Szonyi, Cold War Island: Quemoy on the 
Front Line (Cambridge: CUP, 2008), 64-78. 
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mediator. In the meantime, Beijing and Washington had consolidated their tacit accommodation, 
recognizing clearly each other‘s moderate and ritualized stances. However, unbeknown to the 
Americans, Taipei and Beijing once again engaged in secret communication. In the aftermath of 
the Crisis, Taiwan also eagerly tapped the myth of victory in the Taiwan Strait for its nation-
building. While Beijing and Washington were satisfied with the tacit peace at hand, both noted that 
the future battle for the hearts and minds of Asians would not be ebbing.   
 
This chapter will explore the above themes in four main sections. The first section will analyze 
how and why the PRC closely guarded its tacit accommodation with the Americans and dismissed 
third-party proposals. The second section will investigate the readiness of the US to wind down the 
Crisis, the pressure the US exerted on the ROC, the response of the ROC, and the growing Sino-
US tacit accommodation as each party demonstrated a clear understanding of the other‘s moderate 
and ritualized posture. The third section will investigate why the PRC and the ROC again engaged 
in secret back-channels from August to October 1958, which could be seen as an expanded follow-
up of the first PRC-ROC secret back-channels that took place from 1955 to 1957 (as discussed in 
Chapter Six). The fourth section will assess the positions of the three protagonists in the aftermath 
of the Crisis, taking into consideration the meanings that they attached to and the lessons that they 
drew from the Crisis.  
 
1. Evolution of PRC International Posture (II) 
Beijing closely guarded its tacit accommodation with the Americans, considering such an 
approach to possess many advantages. It dismissed third-party proposals from Britain, the Soviets 
and neutralist Asian countries, viewing most of them as dangerously close to the detested ―two- 
China‖ solution. As Chiang had played the nationalist card, Beijing could not do less. Yet the 
biggest heartburn for China came from such neutralist Asian countries as Indonesia, Burma and 
India which had showered Beijing with uninvited offers. Paradoxically, this came about from 
Beijing‘s earlier successful diplomatic encounters with these nations. Beijing then used the vague 




1.1 Uninvited Third-Party Arbitrators 
Beijing knew the US actively sought an ―honorable exit.‖ First there was the gagging of Chiang 
with no more ―mainland counter-offensives.‖ Dulles‘ speech on 25 September in New York to 
prominent American businessmen about the importance of peace in the Taiwan Strait, and British 
Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd‘s speech in the UN on the same day abhorring violence in 
conflict resolution were good indicators.
3
 Apart from its own intentions, US actions were also 
partly due to ―immense pressure‖ from the British. Chinese chargé d‘affaires in Britain, Huan 
Xiang, reported to the Chinese Politburo that Britain ―advised the US to retreat from 
brinkmanship, blocked the US from risking a war over the Offshore islands, requested that Chiang 
be restrained, and pleaded vigorously for the Warsaw negotiations to be continued.‖ Under the 
Anglo-US peace offensive, the pressure of international opinion was effectively diverted onto the 
PRC. Therefore, Beijing should remain silent instead of making any counter-productive hostile 
military move, and benefit from the US retreat under British pressure. As the British ―wisely 
believe‖ that the offshore islands belonged to the PRC, they could be encouraged to ―lead other 
allied countries to pressure the US to change its attitude.‖4 ―Honorable exit‖ meant accepting the 
British logic of tacit accommodation and flexibility was the key. Whitehall had argued that: ―It 
was not necessary to have a ceasefire first before negotiations.‖ A piecemeal approach had the 
advantage of leaving the unfeasible to another day and this aspect had already been achieved when 
the US and PRC sat down for the Warsaw negotiations on 15 September.  
 
However, Beijing was troubled by other aspects of the ―honorable exit.‖ One, the British wanted 
the issue of the offshore islands to be separated from the Taiwan problem. Two, Britain hoped that 
Chiang could evacuate the offshore islands without the PRC-US hammering ―out the terms of 
agreement during negotiations‖ as this partial evacuation could demonstrate the good faith of the 
                                                 
3 Foster Dulles, ―Challenge to Peace in the Far East,‖ Speech, Far East-America Council of Commerce and Industry, 
Inc., New York, Sept 25, 1958, DSB (October 13, 1958), 561-566. 
4 Britain reportedly planned to be the arbitrator of the hostilities, should the Warsaw negotiations fail. If the British chose 
instead to ―use a third country to arbitrate,‖ Huan Xiang ―boldly‖ suggested that the PRC could counter-propose for 




US. Three, Britain suggested that a legalistic approach to the offshore islands be dropped as it 
would be better to have a ―tacit‖ understanding from both Chinese parties ―not to have troops 
stationed, not to have defensive measures, to achieve a de facto neutralization and demilitarization 
of the offshore islands.‖ Since Chiang had patriotically rejected evacuation of the offshore islands 
and any UN involvement, Beijing could hardly do less. As Chiang had used the ―nationalism‖ 
card, any move contrary to ―one China‖ would be damning to the PRC‘s international standing 
too. Hence, the PRC‘s subsequent approach was a direct refutation of the ―negative‖ aspects of the 
Anglo-US ―honorable exit.‖ Beijing maintained that the issue of the offshore islands could not be 
separated from Taiwan. Beijing‘s temporal ceasefire announcement on 6 October was made to 
annul any need for the KMT evacuation, thereby dissipating any US attempt to use evacuation as a 
bargaining chip. Beijing‘s version of ―tacit‖ understanding involved continuing Warsaw 
negotiations and leaving Chiang the offshore islands, dashing the US hope for ―neutralization and 
demilitarization.‖   
 
Beijing was wary that a de facto neutralization and demilitarization of the offshore islands would 
be attempted in other ways. Britain was contemplating a Five-Power summit. This was analogous 
to the odious Soviet Ten-Power summit as both proposals envisioned a gathering of great powers 
to resolve the Crisis. The British were also weakening to the US demands of submitting the Crisis 
to the UN. As Beijing vigorously opposed these alternatives, Mao then urgently contacted Taipei 
via secret conduits in October: he wanted to prevent the ―two-China conspiracy‖ in all its forms.5  
 
1.2 Rebuffing All Soviet Proposals 
Since the July 1958 altercation with Khrushchev, Mao perceived all Soviet proposals with 
jaundiced eyes. Striving to be in the PRC‘s good books again, Gromyko rejected Lloyd‘s 23 
September approach. Lloyd wanted the Soviets to work on Beijing, while he concentrated on 
Washington. Gromyko stoutly dismissed Lloyd with the official PRC‘s position and complained to 
                                                 
5 See Chinese Embassy in Britain to MFA, telegram, no. 1274, 27 September 1958, serial no. 110-00421-05, AMFA. 
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the Chinese that the British were trying hard to probe possible areas of mutual compromise.
6
 
Belatedly, the Soviets proposed a world leaders‘ summit on the Taiwan Strait Crisis. Receiving 
intelligence that the US was contemplating delivering an ultimatum to the Chinese, the Soviets 
claimed that the summit would expose the ―real culprit for the crisis,‖ reveal the ―nature of US 
imperialism‖ and ―isolate the Americans.‖  Soviet‘s proposal sounded hollow, as Beijing was 





The Chinese rebuffed the Soviets on 28 September, stating that they ―need not suggest any specific 
plan‖ and should there be countries which had peace requests they should be ―directed to the 
Chinese Government.‖ As for the Soviet Ten-Nation Summit, it was deemed ―too early‖ as it 
lacked ―realistic conditions.‖ Moreover, such a summit was bound to be open to ―misperceptions 
that we are in a rush‖ to settle. In a swipe at the Soviet unhealthy fixation on settling the Crisis, the 
Chinese stressed that ―we are not in a hurry‖ and ―delays‖ by the US were beneficial.8  
 
Zhou elaborated to Antonov China‘s approach toward the offshore islands: 
There is a big attack, a medium attack, and a small attack, but we do not aim to 
obliterate them at once. While we would blockade Quemoy, we would not 
completely seal it. Chiang Kai-shek‘s LSTs still would be able to dock. At dusk, 
air dropping aid onto the islands is also possible. Our artilleries fire a bit during 
the day and at night, at times we hit the east for a while, and then the west. We 
only wish to create difficulties for them, but not to extinguish their hopes. In this 
way, the Americans‘ hand would not be forced, but Chiang could howl loudly. As 
the time goes by, the world would gradually realize that there would not be a war 
here.  
                                                 
6 This was the first draft of the British four points: one, ceasefire in the Taiwan Strait. Two, evacuation of the Nationalist 
troops from the offshore islands. Three, ROC‘s administrative rights over the islands. Four, transformation of the islands 
into a neutral zone. The Soviet councilor passed the verbatim record of the Gromyko-Lloyd conversation to Beijing, 
showing the Soviets adopting the ―correct‖ position. See Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union to MFA, telegram , no. 
1242, 26 September 1958, serial no. 111-00267-01; Record of conversation between Division Director Wang Yutian 
with Soviet Councilor N. G. Sudarikov, no. 594, 29 September (1700 hrs), serial no. 111-00267-01, AMFA 
7 An alleged US ultimatum would box in the Soviets. Bound by ideological loyalties, the Soviet bloc would expect 
Moscow to go beyond vitriolic condemnations. A summit would deflect that danger, while buying the Soviets 
international publicity at little cost. See Memorandum from the Soviet Union to Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, no. 545, 27 
Sept 1958, serial no. 109-00833-02, AMFA 
8 Responding to Khrushchev‘s offer of a third letter to Eisenhower suggesting a ―ten-nation summit,‖ Zhou gently 
declined the offer. As the US was ―desperate for a Soviet solution,‖ it would have pounced onto the idea of a summit and 
this would be ―disadvantageous‖ to the Chinese. Memorandum from Soviet Chargé d‘affaires S. F. Antonov to Minister 
Chen Yi, 3 Oct 1958, serial no. 109-00833-03, AMFA. See also Memorandum vis-à-vis the Soviet proposal for a Ten-
Nation Summit on the Taiwan Problem, no. 548, 28 Sept 1958; Record of conversation between Division Director Wang 
Yutian with Soviet Councilor N. G. Sudarikov, no. 622, 10 October, serial no. 111-00267-01, AMFA. 
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Beijing concluded that such tacit communication possessed more advantages. Zhou even 
highlighted the areas which the Nationalists and the Communists had common grounds, noting 




1.3 Disquiet Relations with Neutralist Asian Countries  
Beijing had difficulty with neutralist Asian responses to the Taiwan Strait Crisis. One, the PRC 
was alarmed how neutralist Asians could be susceptible to US propaganda. Beijing had observed 
that Indonesian President Sukarno was captivated by American attention during his trip to the US 
in May-June 1956. Sukarno had even ―innocently‖ suggested a ―two-China policy in the UN‖ 
during his visit to the PRC in September-October 1956.
10
 Paradoxically, the US was similarly 
griping about how easily neutralist countries were susceptible to communist influence. 
 
Two, neutralist Asian nations had sprung upon Beijing uninvited diplomatic initiatives that did not 
fit the intricacies of the Chinese strategic maneuvering. The Burmese Foreign Minister had told a 
Romanian diplomat that Chiang should evacuate the offshore islands to ―preserve the peace in 
Asia,‖ leaving ―the Taiwan problem to be discussed later.‖ When the shocked Chinese ambassador 
found out on 25 September that the enthusiastic Burmese had decided to inform the US of its 
position, he could only insist weakly that ―the US is making use of the Warsaw negotiations to 
create a ‗ceasefire‘ fallacy to cover up its aggressive intentions.‖11  
 
Three, Beijing was very suspicious of any neutralist country leaning toward Washington. All signs 
in 1958 indicated that India was in the US pocket.
12
 Visiting India in January 1958, US Army 
                                                 
9 Mao repeated the theme of ―common ground with the KMT‖ in the Politburo meeting on 4 Oct. See Record of 
Conversation between Prime Minister Zhou Enlai with the Soviet Chargé d‘affaires S. F. Antonov, no. 591, 27 Sept 
1958 (1700hrs), serial no. 109-00833-02, AMFA; Wu, Yi Mao Zhuxi, 78. 
10 ―Hence when he [Sukarno] reached the UN [in New York],‖ complained Zhang to the Soviets, ―he became 
wrongheaded about the ceasefire question.‖ Record of Conversation between Vice-Minister Zhang and the Soviet 
Chargé d‘affaires S. F. Antonov, no. 568, 21 Sept 1958, serial no. 111-00267-01, AMFA; Ganis Harsono, Recollections 
of an Indonesian Diplomat in the Sukarno Era (St. Lucia: University of Queensland, 1977), 163. 
11 Chinese Embassy in Burma to MFA, telegram, no. 1003, 22 Sept 1958 and no.1178, 25 Sept 1958, serial no. 105-
00359-03, AMFA 
12 Beijing gave short shrift to India‘s huge economic woes and dismissed in May 1958 that India was ―seduced by small 
favors and little advantages‖ presented by the US. Even when Beijing realized the depth of India‘s economic disaster in 
August, suspicions in Sino-India relations remained. See Memorandum of Conversation, Under Secretary Dillion with 
BK Nehru, 16 July 1958, in FRUS, South and Southeast Asia, Vol. XV (1958-1960), 443; B.K. Nehru, Nice Guys Finish 
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Chief General Maxwell D. Taylor had officially offered to ―modernize the Indian Army.‖ The 
Chinese embassy reported that the US loan to India in 1958 amounted to US$225 million and the 
US was now more flexible on the Kashmir issue whereas it had rendered implicit support to 
Pakistan. The Indians were reportedly reciprocating by adopting a ―hands-off‖ attitude to Sino-US 
conflicts and disarmament talks. Wary of ―offending the Americans,‖ they were also reluctant 
toward having another neutralist conference in Belgrade. India was playing off the great powers 
against each other and benefiting from the windfall of US and Soviet aid.
13
   
 
By October, the momentum among Western allies to abandon Chiang gathered speed. Lloyd 
openly proposed that the PRC could have a ceasefire just enough to let the Nationalists evacuate 
the offshore islands.
14
 Rejecting the British initiative, Beijing explicitly instructed Ambassador 
Wang Bingnan, the PRC representative in the Warsaw negotiations, to keep the negotiations going. 
Should Warsaw fail, the stakes were high as Britain would intervene as an arbitrator or the US 
would pull in the UN.
15
 The Soviets fully backed Beijing: if Moscow could not have its Ten- 




More importantly, Beijing was confident that the US understood several major points. One, ―we do 
not wish to fight a war.‖  Two, ―we will not liberate Taiwan immediately.‖ Three, ―the US does 
not wish to fight with us over Quemoy.‖ Four, ―the US is trying to persuade Chiang to leave the 
islands so as to extricate itself from this area.‖ In view of the above considerations, China decided 
that it would be ―more advantageous to leave Chiang on Quemoy.‖ Zhou ruminated:  
                                                                                                                                                   
Second (New Delhi, 1997), 280; Junqing Tongbao [Military Intelligence Bulletin], no. 97, distribution no. 329, 8 May 
1958, serial no. 105-00892-02, AMFA; Junqing Tongbao [Military Intelligence Bulletin], no. 206, distribution no. 765, 
11 September 1958, serial no. 105-00892-02, AMFA. 
13 Junqing Tongbao [Military Intelligence Bulletin], no. 87, distribution no. 297, 8 May 1958, serial no. 105-00892-02; 
Chinese Embassy at India to MFA , telegram, no. 270, 11 March 1958; no. 178, 31 March 1958, serial no. 105-00892-
01, AMFA.  
14 Lloyd‘s idea offended both the PRC‘s sense of sovereignty and its idealistic and cultural concept of international 
alliance. One, as Beijing regarded the offshore islands to rightly belong to the PRC, holding the offshore islands in 
abeyance was abhorrent.  Two, although Beijing had no great love for Chiang, to witness such skullduggery targeted at 
Taipei strained even Zhou‘s communist sensibilities. Furthermore, Lloyd‘s offer implied that the ungodly Red Chinese 
would gleefully accept this kind of deals without scruples. MFA to Chinese Embassy at India, telegram, no. 105, 3 
October 1958, serial no. 110-00421-01, AMFA. 
15 See MFA to Wang Bingnan in Warsaw, telegram, no. 285, 7 October 1958, serial no. 110-00421-01, AMFA. 
16 The Soviets opposed vigorously any attempt to present the Taiwan problem at the 13th session of the UN. They 
parroted the Chinese argument that the Taiwan Strait was an ―internal affair‖ and felt that the UN would be an uneven 
playing field as many countries were on the US side. Memorandum from Soviet Chargé d‘affaires S. F. Antonov to 
Minister Chen Yi, 3 Oct 1958, serial no. 109-00833-03, AMFA. 
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Even as we demand that the US leave, and have confrontations with them, it is 
beneficial for Chiang to remain on Quemoy. This can be used to educate everyone 
in the world, especially our fellow Chinese. The Americans wish to extricate 
themselves, but we refuse to let them. So when we wish to increase tension, we 
will pound them. When we wish to relax, we will loosen up … We can have 
talking while fighting … For the moment, we shall not recover these offshore 
islands. After five to seven years' time, we can recover these offshore islands, 




However, it was the friendly Afro-Asian countries that were causing Beijing major heartburn. 
Beijing received the stunning news that Indonesia, its strongest ally in Southeast Asia, had 
proposed in the UN on 2 October, seconded by Ceylon and Burma, for ―a need to resolve the Far 
East crisis peacefully.‖ The PRC viewed this as a public relations‘ disaster as such unwanted help 
would only lend credence to the US calls for a ―ceasefire,‖ when it was the PRC‘s official position 




On 4 October, the sponsoring countries for the Indonesian proposal had grown to an alarming eight. 
This prompted Beijing to act on the Indonesians. On 5 October, Minister Chen Yi turned down the 
offer by the Afro-Asian community to make an additional UN statement on the Taiwan Strait 
Crisis. Krishna Menon‘s subsequent offer to address the UN was also rejected by Zhou, who 
suspected US machinations behind Menon‘s offer.19 
 
The perplexity of this unintended situation was reflected in a rare critical directive from the CCP 
Central Committee: ―… the US is concocting another new conspiracy, stating that it is even 
willing to force Chiang Kai-shek‘s army off Quemoy and Matsu as a pre-requisite for any 
‗ceasefire‘ to take effect, thus establishing the ‗Two-China‘ outcome.‖ As the onus would be on 
Beijing to accept the offer, the Committee then decided to alert all diplomats that the erstwhile 
pro-PRC ―Afro-Asian countries would be used by the US to push for the issue to be settled in the 
                                                 
17 Record of Conversation between Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and the Soviet Chargé d‘affaires S. F. Antonov, no. 612, 
5 October 1958 (2400hrs), serial no. 109-00833-02, AMFA.   
18 MFA Asian-Afro Division‘s Report on the Indonesian official statement to the UN, 4 October 1958, serial no. 105-
00364-01, AMFA. 
19  To ensure the Cambodians would not partake in the peace frenzy, Beijing abruptly scaled down its belligerency. Even 
the time-honored Chinese demand for the ―withdrawal of US troops‖ was reduced to ―this must be accomplished by 
negotiations.‖ See Record of Conversation between Premier Zhou Enali with the Cambodian Ambassador, no. 600, 5 
Oct 1958, serial no. 106-00129-03, AMFA; Record of Conversation between Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and the Soviet 
Chargé d‘affaires S. F. Antonov, no. 612, 5 October 1958 (2400hrs), serial no. 109-00833-02, AMFA.   
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UN.‖ All diplomats must hence emphasize two points to thwart all such unwelcome suggestions 
and attention. One, the UN was not a viable recourse as ―the ongoing Warsaw negotiations are 
precisely undertaken to resolve outstanding Sino-US contentious issues.‖  Two, as the Taiwan 
Strait Crisis was an ―internal domestic affair,‖ one of the ten principles of the Bandung 
Conference, ―mutual non-interference in each other‘s affairs,‖ should be invoked.20  
 
Paradoxically then, Beijing became a victim of its own successful diplomatic encounters with 
neutralist Asian nations. Beijing‘s powerful propaganda since the Bandung Conference, that China 
was a reasonable power, was simply too attractive. Beijing was subsequently swamped by fraternal 
communist countries and neutral Afro-Asian politicians eager to be its spokesperson to clear up the 
―ambiguity‖ of the offshore islands. While Beijing had initially benefited from world opinion at 
the US expense, it now found itself bound by it, with Washington appearing more ―reasonable.‖21 
 
Beijing subsequently adopted a formula that would both placate the Afro-Asian chorus for peace 
and assuage any bruised ego resulting from the PRC‘s firm rejection of any intermediary. Mao‘s 6 
October abrupt ceasefire announcement was a pre-emptive strike against any incommodious 
unilateral move by friends or foes. The second step consisted of invoking the amorphous ―Spirit of 
Bandung.‖ Although the PRC was only interested in ―mutual non-interference in each other‘s 
affairs,‖ they soon discovered that Bandung meant different things to different people. Indonesia 
was effectively neutralized by Beijing‘s Bandung move. As the former host of the Bandung 
Conference, Indonesia was very proud of the ten principles established. When the PRC mentioned 
respecting the principles of Bandung, it sounded to Jakarta like praises for Indonesia‘s foreign 
policy achievements. According to the Indonesian papers, Foreign Minister Subandrio was 
reportedly pleased that the Warsaw negotiations were taking place and by virtue of Indonesia‘s 
proximity to the Strait, Subandrio claimed that the Crisis was a ―good opportunity‖ for Jakarta to 
                                                 
20 CCP Central Committee to All PRC Embassies and Representative Offices, 6 October 1958, serial no. 102-00006-06, 
AMFA.   
21 Allen Dulles reported the problems Beijing had with ―Afro-Asian resolution‖ on 13 October, but made no effort to 
exploit it. See 382nd Meeting of NSC, October 13, 1958, NSC Series, Box 10, Ann Whitman File 1, DDEL. 
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―bring the involved protagonists together.‖22 Fulfilling the Indonesian need for a role in world 
diplomacy, Zhou personally thanked Indonesia for voicing concern at ―US armed provocations and 
war threats‖ and stating that the PRC should have ―its rightful place in the UN.‖ Zhou also 
reiterated how important it was that ―the Indonesian Government holds that the US should follow 
the ten principles adopted by the Bandung Conference to settle the international dispute between 
China and the US in the Taiwan Strait.‖23 
 
2. Winding down the Crisis 
With good understanding of Beijing‘s moderate and ritualized stance, Washington was ready to 
wind down the crisis. More interested in reassuring Beijing than coddling Taipei, Washington 
exerted pressure on the ROC with a stream of rhetorical bombardments. In the face of the US 
pressure, Taipei sought to shore up the perimeter of the rationale, legitimacy and morality of the 
ROC-US relationship. It also used the Taiwan Strait Crisis as a media event to validate Taiwan‘s 
military prowess. Dulles‘ mission to Taipei on 21-23 October demonstrated how the US laid down 
the line on Taipei. Washington also subsequently understood and reciprocated Beijing‘s odd-day 
bombardment announcement, providing yet another example of Sino-US tacit accommodation. 
Nonetheless, there was a glaring blind spot in Washington‘s perceptions of the ROC-PRC relations 
as it continued to show its inability to fathom the implications arising from the shared historical 
and cultural ties of the KMT and the CCP. 
 
2.1 US Rhetorical Bombardments of the ROC 
Dulles was determined to soften up Chiang with a series of rhetorical bombardments, if he had to 
undertake the task of persuading Chiang. In response to a question on Chiang‘s fangong during a 
press conference on 30 September, Dulles said that ―I don't think that just by their own steam they 
                                                 
22 An Indonesian spokesperson told the reporters: ―The PRC‘s offer to negotiate with Taiwan reflects the spirit of the 
Ten Principles of the Bandung Conference and the UN Charter.‖ See Chinese Embassy in Indonesia to MFA, 
Memorandum, no. 616, 8 October 1958, serial no. 105-00864-01, AMFA 




are going to get there.‖24 Dulles even considered ―hypothetical and problematical‖ Chiang‘s 
frequent claim that the Chinese on mainland China would welcome Chiang should there be a 
revolution. The most explosive was Dulles‘ statement on ―de facto ceasefire‖:25 
If there were a cease-fire in the area which seemed to be reasonably dependable, I 
think it would be foolish to keep these large forces on these islands. We thought 
that it was rather foolish to put them there, and, as I say, if there were a cease-fire 
it would be our judgment, military judgment even, that it would not be wise or 




In another news conference two weeks later, Dulles labeled the ROC‘s actions as ―provocative of 
war or causes irritations, which would almost inevitably provoke violent reactions.‖27 Ambassador 
Drumright‘s 13 October telegram revealed a shaken generalissimo. Chiang explained that ―his 
fears were heightened by the most recent press conferences of the President and the Secretary of 
State and by persistent news reports that the US is advocating reduction of offshore defences, etc.‖ 




The US pressure on the ROC was ironically based on improved circumstances on the diplomatic 
and military fronts. In an internal memo, Dulles had come around to the position that ―a large area 
open for negotiation could be envisaged and that it was not just a question of a cease-fire and a 
return to the status quo ante.‖29 When the PRC further announced a ceasefire on 6 October for a 
week, the White House was certain that this marked the formal end of hostilities. Dulles credited 
this ―extraordinarily interesting development‖ to the Warsaw negotiations, but he reminded Nixon 
                                                 
24 This statement was intended to be a message to the PRC that the US was pushing all the buttons to get the ROC in 
line. Further questions on US aid vis-à-vis Chiang‘s sacred mission met with a definite rebuff: ―There is no commitment 
of any kind to aid in that.‖ Yet this ran contrary to what Eisenhower had said to Senator Alexander Smith that the ROC 
could function as a deterrent to any communist attack on Korea or Indochina and ―any attack on the mainland would be 
further north in the plains area.‖ In fact, all ROC‘s counter-attack plans were premised on US aid. See  J. N. Greene to 
Robertson, 2 Oct 1958, Special Assistants Chronological Series, Box 13, Greene - Boster Chronological Oct (3), JFD 
Papers, DDEL; Senator Alexander H. Smith to Dulles, 7 April 1955, General Correspondence & Memoranda Series, box 
3, strictly confidential - Q -S (3) , JFD papers, DDEL. 
25 Other statements were equally galling to the ROC. Dulles did not rule out completely meeting Zhou Enlai and he 
thought that the ―slower pace‖ of the ambassadorial negotiations ―will better serve the cause of peace.‖ See J. N. Greene 
to Reinhardt, 22 Sept 1958, Special Assistants Chronological Series, Box 13, Greene - Boster Chronological Sept (2), 
JFD Papers, DDEL. 
26 Nixon repeated Dulles‘ ―dependable ceasefire‖ in his speech on 2 October. Memo, 2 October 1958, Telephone 
Conversation Series, box 9, memoranda of tel conv - Gen Aug 1 1958 to Oct 31 1958 (2), JFD papers, DDEL; 
―Secretary Dulles' News Conference of September 30,‖ DSB (October 20, 1958), 597-602. 
27 ―Secretary Dulles' News Conference of October 14,‖ DSB (3 Nov 1958), 684. 
28 Drumright to State Department, telegram, no. 587, 13 October 1958, in FRUS Vol 19 (1958-60), 389. 
29 Memo for the record, J. N.Greene, 2 Oct 1958, Special Assistants Chronological Series, Box 13, Greene - Boster 
Chronological Oct (3), JFD Papers, DDEL. 
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that ―it is too early to gloat.‖30 Still, the Communist curious gestures fueled speculations that the 
ROC and the PRC might be making backroom deals. One journalist ventured to ask Dulles if 
―there been any indication that the garrison on Quemoy is possibly making any deal with the 
mainland?‖31 
 
Washington, however, ignored the common cultural and historical ties between the CCP and the 
KMT, with Dulles speculating that Beijing had ―decided the better line is to try at the moment to 
work on internal dissension in Taiwan – use guile for a while rather than brute force.‖ 32 Although 
he noted correctly that ―the emphasis is on the Chinese getting together and driving the Westerners 
out,‖ there was no follow-up on this insight.33 Indeed the perceived US attempts to create ―two 
Chinas‖ united the ―erstwhile enemies.‖ That both the ROC‘s stubbornness and the PRC‘s 
ceasefire were coordinated was denied by the US. Allen Dulles was satisfied with merely 
analyzing the communist letters sent to prominent KMT members in Taiwan. Although Drumright 
believed accurately that Beijing‘s approaches were ―designed to shunt US aside,‖ he accepted at 
face value Chiang‘s condemnations of ―Communist treachery.‖34 
 
Dulles recognized that the PRC‘s ―very good‖ gestures needed reciprocation but he was frustrated 
by Pentagon. Air Force Secretary James H. Douglas, Jr. had revealed to the press officially on 27 
September 1958 that the USAF was prepared to defend the offshore islands by nuclear weapons 
once the President gave the green light.
35
 Dulles told Lodge that ―the military have made bad 
statements and we don‘t want to get that atmosphere into it [Warsaw negotiations].‖ More 
                                                 
30 Telephone call from the Vice president, 7 October 1958, 3:32pm, Telephone Conversation Series, box 9, memoranda 
of tel conv - Gen Aug 1 1958 to Oct 31 1958 (2), JFD papers, DDEL. 
31 ―Secretary Dulles' News Conference of October 14,‖ DSB (3 Nov 1958), 682. 
32 Dulles then chose to grandly expound to an attentive Nixon his philosophy of war and peace: ―If the Democrats get 
control domestically we will have socialism and in foreign relations an appeasement that will leave the Soviets in control 
of practically all of Asia, Africa and the ME. The Sec said it is only by being tough and fighting hard that we have kept 
it.‖ Telephone call from the Vice-president, 7 October 1958, 3:32pm, Telephone Conversation Series, box 9, memoranda 
of tel conv - Gen Aug 1 1958 to Oct 31 1958 (2), JFD papers, DDEL. 
33 Ambassador Drumright reflected this gap in insight too, stating that ―Chiang will of course refuse to enter into any 
negotiations with Communists. It is clear Communists recognize this fact, but it is apparent from recent Peiping 
broadcasts that they hope to split Chiang and people through massive propaganda and psychological warfare.‖ 
Drumright to State Department, telegram, no. 587, 13 October 1958, in FRUS Vol 19 (1958-60), 390. 
34 Telephone call to Allen Dulles, 7 October 1958, 2:16pm, Telephone Conversation Series, box 9, memoranda of tel 
conv - Gen Aug 1 1958 to Oct 31 1958 (2), JFD papers, DDEL; Drumright to State Department, telegram, 6 October 
1958, FRUS (1958-60), vol. XIX, 331. 
35 Thomas, ―Soviet Policy,‖ 63. 
 274 
 
importantly, Dulles wanted the PRC to know that the US would not be ―interpreting it [ceasefire] 
as a sign of physical weakness – we hope they are respectful of world opinion which condemns the 
use of force.‖36  
 
Washington was further encouraged on 12 October by another two weeks of the PRC‘s ceasefire. 
One, there was no danger of the offshore islands falling. Two, Beijing‘s ―serious warnings‖ had 
been ritualized to such an extent that those thirty warnings were akin to providing the US a stream 
of feedback on permissible actions.
37
 In a significant turn, Dulles even ―choked off‖ any discussion 
of the use of nuclear weapons in limited war and Gerald Smith was greatly relieved that the White 
House had repudiated nuclear weapons.
38
 Allen Dulles noted that ―the longer the others keep the 
ceasefire going the better it is and the harder to start again.‖39 
 
2.2 The ROC-US against the “Evil Tide of Communism.” 
The ROC desperately sought to shore up the perimeter of the rationale, legitimacy and morality of 
the ROC-US relationship. In a Legislative Yuan‘s open letter to the US, Taipei reiterated that the 
Crisis was not instigated by Chiang, and emphasized the dichotomy between good and evil. The 
US was embarked on a ―sacred mission‖ against the ―evil tide of communism.‖ The Taiwan Strait 
Crisis was done ―at the instigation of Soviet Russia,‖ and the communist ―force of violence‖ was 
fortunately blocked by the ―cause of righteousness‖ of the US. In Taiwan‘s ―crusade against the 
Communist tyranny,‖ the very survival of the ROC depended on the US ―positive aid,‖ ―collective 
defense,‖ ―solidarity and common cause,‖ and ―uphold[ing] the lofty ideal of the UN Charter.‖ 
Taipei adopted such language with the US domestic audience in mind. The President of the 
Legislative Yuan, Chang Tao-fan, further declared: ―We wish to reassure our American friends 
                                                 
36 In addition, whether the UN would be featured in the peace process was secondary to the US. Dulles further offered to 
try to ―eliminate the provocations in the situation and have instructed Ambassador Beam to ask [Beijing] what they [the 
provocations] are.‖ See Telephone call to Amb. Lodge, 9 October 1958, Telephone Conversation Series, box 9, 
memoranda of tel conv - Gen Aug 1 1958 to Oct 31 1958 (2), JFD papers, DDEL. 
37 JCS (Office of the Director) to JCS, Memo, Situation Report 90, Department of Defense, Oct 13, 1958; JCS (Office of 
the Director) to JCS, Memo, Situation Report 92, Department of Defense, Oct 15, 1958, DDRS. 
38 Smith promised a study of limited war with conventional weapons based on the experiences of the Taiwan Strait 
Crises. See Memorandum for the File, 16 October 1958, Gerard Smith Series, box 1, Material from Gerard C. Smith's 
Files 1958 (1), Dulles John Foster Papers 1, DDEL. 
39 Dulles was also convinced that ―we will send some of our fleet away from the immediate area‖ to prolong the 
ceasefire. Telephone call from Allen Dulles, 14 October 1958, 8:58am, Telephone Conversation Series, box 9, 
memoranda of tel conv - Gen Aug 1 1958 to Oct 31 1958 (2), JFD papers, DDEL. 
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that we would never want our friends to go to war for us. We want to use our strength, at an 
opportune moment, to complete our sacred task of reclaiming the mainland.‖40 
  
Chiang shrewdly reinforced the rhetoric by placing a huge number of troops on the island, 
ostensibly as the bulwark against the PRC. This forced the Taiwan MAAG to send observers to 
explore how the US could increase the number of artillery guns. Washington estimated at least 
one-third of the total Nationalist troops were deployed. From the ROC records, the combined 
number of seriously wounded and dead soldiers (941) constituted 1.1% of the 85,545 troops 
garrisoned on the offshore islands. Chiang had thus nimbly secured a guarantee by locking in US 
support.  
 
Myth-making also became a top priority for the ROC‘s generals, who emphasized the significance 
of the Crisis. This consisted of first stating the unprecedented ―bravery‖ shown by the troops under 
artillery fire, followed by crediting this exemplary behavior to the ―Nationalist revolutionary 
military tradition and spirit,‖ and then hoping that such virtues could be ―popularized throughout 
the military.‖ Indeed when the ROC General Staff finished their tour of inspection of Quemoy, 
they wanted to use their reports as case studies for such institutes of higher learning as the National 
Defense University. In reality, the Nationalists could hold off the communist troops because Taipei 
had overpowering advanced weaponry. The Quemoy garrison already had a battalion of rocket 
troops, with their main arsenal consisting of AJAX 1 with a range of 25 miles and HERCULES 2 
with a range of 85 miles. AJAX could hit much of Fujian coastal areas while HERCULES 2 could 
reach deep into Fujian and also carry nuclear warheads. Besides these rocket teams, Eisenhower 
had also sent the US air defense 2
nd
 Battalion, the 71
st
 Regiment, to reinforce Taiwan. In view of 
the ROC‘s myth-making, the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis was thus not so much a crisis as a media 
event. This urgency in institutionalizing a ―model battle‖ can be partly explained by the paucity of 
                                                 
40 Chiang even paraphrased Churchill‘s 1941 February appeal. While Chiang had artlessly put it in 1952, ―Give us the 
tools and we will finish the job of re-conquering Red China‖; now Chiang cajoled, ―we just need weapons support for 
supplies, empathy and encouragement.‖ See ―A Policy Repudiated,‖ Time, 09 Feb. 1953, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,889611,00.html (accessed 27 Sept 2008); “立法院级致美国协防
台澎台湾地区三军将士慰劳书” [Lifayuan zhi meiguo xiefang taipeng taiwan diqu sanjun jiangshi weilao shu]10 
October 1958, serial no. 002080106048014, CKS papers, AH.     
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heroic myths for the formation of a ROC identity. One general had admitted that there were few 
incidents of ROC heroism since World War II.
41
    
 
2.3 Dulles’ Mission to Taipei (21-23 October) 
Eisenhower was adamant that Chiang should not use the offshore islands to hold the US hostage in 
the future. The ceasefire presented the perfect opportunity to pressure Chiang to reduce the 
offshore island garrisons in exchange for increased ―amphibious capability.‖ Eisenhower spelled 
out the conditions: ―Of course this would have to be a plan voluntarily adopted by him, during a 
period when there is no hostility ….‖42 But encouraged by the PRC‘s ceasefire, Dulles was edging 
towards a modus vivendi that could work for both the ROC and the PRC, and viewed as secondary 
the need to push Chiang off the offshore islands.
43
 Aware that Chiang was a tough nut to crack, he 
was prepared to appeal to Chiang‘s higher sense of purpose in the US-ROC alliance, to ―explain 
the political problems we face with our own people and the free world nations and make it clear 
[Chiang] has to do a few things which won‘t be very important but will enable us to carry our 
share.‖44  
 
In Taiwan, compromising with the US appeared to be a growing necessity. Chiang faced strong 
domestic yearnings for peace. ―Indications are that GRC officials are taking a realistic view of the 
future military situation,‖ reported the CINCPAC, ―and they still need assurance of continued US 
support and cooperation.‖ Militarily, the US had stepped down the alert level in the Taiwan Strait. 
US escorts had ceased since 6 October and the ROC learnt that the US Navy had been strictly 
ordered to cease ―any provocative action.‖ Odious suggestions were swirling in Washington of 
                                                 
41 Left unsaid, however, was how the KMT‘s ignominious military defeats on mainland China could be rationalized. Tsai 
Ming-yung to CKS, [“总统府四十七年第八次作战会谈纪录” [Zhongtongfu sishiqi nian dibaci zuozhan huitan jilu] 
(secret), 16 October 1958, serial no. 002080102050009, CKS papers, AH.     
42 Although Eisenhower suggested that George Yeh might ―skillfully present [this plan] to Chiang,‖ the President really 
wanted Dulles to handle the job. See Eisenhower to Dulles, Memo, 7 Oct 1958, Dulles-Herter Series, box 10, Dulles - 
October 1958, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
43 Diary Notes, 6 October 1958, ACW Diary Series, box 10, AWC DIARY - OCT 1958, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 
44 Given the failure of Secretary Neil H. McElroy‘s trip to Taipei on 13 October, Dulles remained ―the only one who can 
do it.‖ Telephone call from Allen Dulles, 14 October 1958, 8:58am, Telephone Conversation Series, box 9, memoranda 
of tel conv - Gen Aug 1 1958 to Oct 31 1958 (2), JFD papers; Telephone call to Allen Dulles, 17 Oct 1958, 9:08am, 
Telephone Conversation Series, box 9, memoranda of tel conv - Gen Aug 1 1958 to Oct 31 1958 (1), JFD papers, DDEL. 
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viable alternatives to Chiang.  The rhetoric was that ―Nationalist China consists of a lot more than 
Chiang and Mme. Chiang‖ or ―the Nationalist cause will not expire with Chiang.‖45     
 
Dulles‘ mission came at Chiang with an iron fist in a velvet glove. Dulles immediately proposed 
―some dramatic gestures from time to time to emphasize [Chiang‘s] desire for peace rather than for 
war,‖ and cast the future role of the ROC in cultural and psychological terms. ―GRC counter-
attacks against the mainland are not in the armed might of the GRC or in its offshore island 
positions,‖ specified Dulles, ―but rather of the minds and souls of the 600 million Chinese people 
on the mainland who hope and pray for delivery from their present bondage.‖ Dulles then 
elaborated how the ROC could demonstrate: 
Positive acts designed to dramatize the shift of effort to assure the survival of 
Chinese civilization. It should seek valid yet dramatic ways to cast itself in the role 
of the custodian of China‘s real greatness. There should be increasing emphasis on 
Chinese education, art and other aspects of Chinese culture.
 46
 
Chiang was strong-armed into accepting a Dulles-dictated communiqué after three days. Taipei 
had to foreswear ―the use of force‖ and used only Sanmin zhuyi in its fangong mission. Chiang 
reassured Eisenhower that the ROC would ―try not to abuse the trust and confidence that [the 
declaration] signifies.‖47 
 
Two days later, the US welcomed the PRC‘s odd-day bombardment announcement. Dulles 
concluded that this was ―psychological and designed to create the impression they are the masters 
                                                 
45 JCS (Office of the Director) to JCS, Memo, Situation Report 94, Department of Defense, Oct 17, 1958; JCS (Office of 
the Director) to JCS, Memo, Situation Report 95, Department of Defense, Oct 17, 1958; JCS (Office of the Director) to 
JCS, Memo, Situation Report 97, Department of Defense, Oct 20, 1958. DDRS; Booster to Zurbellen, 20 October 1958, 
Special Assistants Chronological Series, Box 13, Greene - Boster Chronological Oct (2), JFD Papers, DDEL. 
46 Dulles to Eisenhower, Telegram Dulte 2, 21 October 1958 (12:53pm), Dulles-Herter Series, box 10, Dulles - October 
1958, Ann Whitman File; Dulles‘ statement to Chiang, Dulte 4, 22 oct 1958 (4:17 am), Office of the Staff Secretary, 
Subject Series, State Dept Sub Series, box 3, State Department - September 1958 - January 1959 (2), White House 
Office; Dulles to State Department, telegram dulte 4, 22 Oct 1958 (5:51am), Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject 
Series, State Dept Sub Series, box 3, State Department - September 1958 - January 1959 (2), White House Office, 
DDEL. 
47 Dulles admitted that ―we had great difficulty in getting them to accept or at least publicly announce this important shift 
in emphasis.‖ Canadian Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker was ―considerably reassured.‖ See Lindsey Grant, 
interview, in China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations, 1945-1996, ed. Nancy Bernkopf 
Tucker (NY: Columbia University Press, 2001), 129; Dulles to Eisenhower, Telegram Dulte 7, 23 October 1958 (3pm), 
Dulles-Herter Series, box 10, Dulles - October 1958, Ann Whitman File; Dulles to State Department, telegram secto 14, 
23 Oct 1958 (4:30am),  Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, State Dept Sub Series, box 3, State Department - 
September 1958 - January 1959 (2), White House Office; “Memo of conversation with Prime Minister John G. 
Diefenbaker (Canada),‖ 28 Oct 1958, General Correspondence & Memoranda Series, box 1, Memos of Conversation - 
General - A Through D (4), JFD papers; Chiang Kai-shek to Eisenhower, 24 Oct 1958, Office of the Staff Secretary, 
international series, box 3, China (rep of ) (1) (Sept 58-apr 60), White House Office, DDEL. 
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etc.‖ He added that ―it will subside but they will use the Island to give vent to their anger – like 50-
100 lashes to someone who is unrepentant.‖ Dulles told General Goodpaster, President 
Eisenhower‘s Staff Secretary, that the PRC‘s antics confirmed his theory that the bombardments 
were a ―propaganda whipping boy.‖ Although this reading was imperfect – the PRC also wished to 
signal the connection Taiwan had with the mainland – it was good enough to preserve peace.48 US 
military intelligence also concluded that the possibility of the PRC ―deliberately risking hostilities‖ 
with the US was remote. Hence, the US was prepared to tacitly go further by stopping ―sea and air 





3. The Chinese Connection 
The dramatic Taipei-Beijing back-channel, evident in at least three visits by Cao Juren (Chiang 
Ching-kuo‘s secret emissary) to Beijing from August to October, demonstrated the common 
historical and cultural ties shared by the erstwhile belligerents. Through this established ritualized 
mode of communication, Taipei and Beijing tapped on nationalist concerns and maneuvered to 
thwart Washington and avoid the specter of ―two Chinas.‖ While Beijing also had in mind the 
planting of discord in the ROC-US relations and the trumpeting of its goodwill in contrast to the 
alleged neo-imperialism of the US, Taipei adroitly manipulated the channel to pressure the US to 
accede to its demands and succeeded in procuring more military aid even though it had to go along 
with the US request to soft-pedal the belligerent rhetoric of its fangong mission. 
 
3.1 The ROC-PRC Secret Back-Channels Enlarged 
Initially, Taipei had no substantive plan beyond preserving back-channel links with the PRC, and 
Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK) appeared to temporize in his January 1958 message to Cao Juren, his 
                                                 
48 Telephone call to Allen Dulles, 24 Oct 1958, 12:28pm, Telephone Conversation Series, box 9, memoranda of tel conv 
- Gen Aug 1 1958 to Oct 31 1958 (1), JFD papers; Telephone call from Gen. Goodpaster, 25 October 1958, 10:03am, 
Telephone Conversation Series, box 13, memoranda of tel. conv - W H Aug 1, 1958 to Dec 5 1958 (2), JFD papers, 
DDEL. 
49 Eisenhower also ordered that reconnaissance flights, whether by the ROC or the US, must be cleared by him on a 
flight-by-flight basis. JCS (Office of the Director) to JCS, Memo, Situation Report 105, Department of Defense, Oct 29, 
1958. DDRS; Eisenhower with Dulles, Memo of conversation, 30 October 1958, Special Assistants Chronological 
Series, Box 13, Greene - Boster Chronological Oct (1), JFD Papers, DDEL. 
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secret emissary to Beijing.
50
 As the momentum for Taipei-Beijing secret negotiations turned 
glacial, the US was lulled into complacency. Despite strong evidence to the contrary, the CIA 
concluded that all ―Tsao‘s approaches‖ were ―flatly rejected by the GRC,‖ asserting that: ―The 
Nationalists apparently not only rejected the idea of peace talks but resented the notion that they 
might consider seriously such a course.‖51 
 
However, Chiang Kai-shek activated the secret channel to Beijing at the height of the Taiwan 
Strait Crisis in September. The Chairman of the PRC National People‘s Congress, Qiao Shi, 
confirmed this in 1994. Chiang‘s message was ominous: as the communist barrages would cause 
the US to pressure Chiang to abandon the offshore islands, this could lead to the realization of the 
hated ―two-China‖ policy.52 In perfect synchrony, Cao responded in September with a message. 
According to the CIA report, Cao had passed to ―Chiang Ching-kuo, Vice Premier Huang Shao-
ku, and GRC Defense Minister Yu Ta-wei‖ this message: 
In these letters, he mentioned that he recently revisited the mainland and had had 
conversations with unnamed Chinese Communist leaders. To prove his credentials 
as Peking‘s representative, Tsao said he could ―guarantee‖ for one week, 
beginning 6 October 1958, the Communists would not shell GRC supply ships to 
the offshore islands that were unescorted by US warships.
53
  
Chiang was subtly signaling to the US that its inflexibility towards the ROC‘s demands could draw 
undesirable consequences. In this very letter which ―Chiang Ching-kuo showed…to US officials,‖ 
the PRC again stated very favourable conditions, which were even better than Cao‘s March 1957 
letter. Quemoy could ―become a trading center‖; KMT would ―remain an independent political 
party‖; Chiang would even retain control of ―military affairs on Taiwan.‖ Ostensibly, CCK swore 
                                                 
50 CCK vaguely declared that ―the general direction‖ would remain the same and Beijing ―should not worry.‖ See Wang 
Guangyuan, 192. 
51 The CIA report displayed a remarkable degree of cognitive dissonance. See POLO Doc. 34, December 1971, iv, 3-4, 8; 
Mao Lei & Fang Xiaofang, Guogong liangdang tanpan tongshi 国共两党谈判通史  [A complete account of CCP and 
KMT negotiations] (兰州：兰州大学出版社，1996), 641-646, 650; Cao Juren 曹聚仁, Jiang Jinguo lun 蒋经国论 
[Chiang Ching-kuo: A Discourse] (Shanghai: Shanghai Lianhe Huabaoshe, 1948; reprint, Taipei: Yiqiaochubanshe, 
1997). 
52 Taylor, The Generalissimo's Son, 247. 
53 Cao even announced the ceasefire on 5 October in Nanyang Shangbao (Singapore), a day ahead of the PRC‘s official 
announcement. See Ye Yonglie 叶永烈, Guogong Fengyun: Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi 国共风云毛泽东与蒋介石 
[CCP & KMT relations: Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek] (Urumqi: Xinjiang Renmin chubanshe, 2000), 615.  
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that ―the GRC leadership wanted to make certain that the US knew about these approaches lest 
Peking succeed in creating distrust between Washington and Taipei.‖54  
 
The Chinese sources listed no fewer than three visits by Cao Juren to Beijing. Luo Qingchang, 
chief of the PRC Prime Minister‘s Office, recalled: ―A few days before the 23 August 1958 
bombardments, Mao met Cao.‖ Luo remembered that Cao was supposedly instructed by Mao to 
―inform Chiang Ching-kuo of the bombardments.‖ In a comedy of errors, Cao failed to send the 
message across to Taiwan in time. In desperation, Cao hastily decided to publish the news of the 
bombardments in a Singapore newspaper Nanyang Shangbao under the ill-concealed pseudonym, 




Cao‘s one week ceasefire ―guarantee‖ and the additional offers to CCK were based on his second 
series of meetings with Mao and Zhou on 8 and 10 September. Zhou expressed nonchalance on the 
size of the ROC‘s garrison on the offshore islands and even opined that Chiang Kai-shek could use 
the ROC as ―bargaining chips‖ with the US. Zhou also contended that since ―the US could 
publicly have talks with us, why can‘t the KMT and the CCP have negotiations once again?‖56 
 
The third meeting took place on 13 October. Cao was placed on the backburner for two days, 
creating a feedback vacuum to make Chiang sweat. Mao spelled out his concern about deterring 
the US ―two-China‖ conspiracy: ―If Chiang and his son can resist the US, we can cooperate with 
them… We support the policy of letting Chiang keep Quemoy and Matsu … should Chiang retreat 
from Quemoy and Matsu, morale may plummet and collapse.‖ Mao reassured Chiang that Beijing 
only wished to isolate the US. The Warsaw negotiations would not consider the ―Taiwan problem‖ 
                                                 
54 POLO Doc. 34, December 1971, 15-16. 
55 Liu Zhe 柳哲, ―Luo Qingzhang huiyisuo: Zhou Enlai weiCao Juren qinni beiwen: Aiguo renshi Cao Juren xiansheng 
zhi mu,‖ 罗青长回忆说：周恩来为曹聚仁亲拟碑文：爱国人士曹聚仁先生之墓 [Luo Qing Zhang remembers] 
Zhonghua dushubao 中华读书报, 28 July 1999，http://www.gmw.cn/01ds/1999-
07/28/GB/ds%5E260%5E0%5EDS517.htm （accessed 25 November 2008); elsewhere, Cao Juren revealed his August 
1958 Beijing sojourn in the third volume of his travelogue, see Beihang sanyu 北行三语 [The third account of my 
northern travels] (Jiulong: Sanyu tushu wenju gongsi, 1960), 300. 
56 Zhou with Cao Juren, Record of Conversations, 8 & 10 Sept 1958, in ZENP, vol. 2, 168. 
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at all and ―Chiang does not need to be afraid that we may collaborate with the US to play him out.‖ 




Mao sent a reinforcement message to Taiwan in October via Zhang Shizhao, a member of the 
National People‘s Congress who had many KMT contacts. According to Tong Xiaopeng, the 
Deputy Secretary of the State Council, Mao, in Zhang‘s letter, offered the ROC two options. One, 
there would be no negotiation for the time being; instead, both parties could have limited contacts 
such as postal services, telecommunications, visits and even commercial flights. Two, Taiwan 
could retain its government, army, political parties, and all expenditure would be borne by the PRC 
government; in return, the PRC would only ask for Taiwan to be recognized as part of China. 
Otherwise, Mao specifically emphasized to Chiang the need to guard against the ―two-China‖ 
conspiracy of Dulles.
58
 Again, CCK showed the Americans only the portions he wanted them to 
see. The ―settlement terms‖ were not mentioned in the CIA report. CCK surreptitiously used 
Zhang Shizhao to verbalize what the ROC‘s displeasure with the US was, as seen in the alleged 
warning by Zhang to the ROC:  
The US would betray the Nationalists and [Zhang] alleged that the US had offered 
secretly in Warsaw to yield the offshore islands to Peking in exchange for a 
renunciation of Peking‘s claim to Taiwan. Chang [Shih-chao] said he had seen the 
―secret documents‖ about this in Peking and that Chiang Kai-shek was obviously 




There were other examples of Beijing‘s ―involvements‖ in Taipei‘s affairs. On 30 September, 
Zhou waved away the concerns of Indian Ambassador regarding Krishna Menon, who had been 
frantically maneuvering behind the scenes in the UN to prevent the Taiwan Strait Crisis from 
escalating. Unbeknown to the Indians, Beijing had decided to allow Chiang to remain on the 
offshore islands in order to prevent ―two Chinas.‖ Zhou sidestepped the practical issue of Chiang 
                                                 
57 Mao to Zhou, telegram, 11 Oct 1958, JGMWG, vol. 7, 449-450; Mao with Cao Juren, Record of conversation, 13 
October 1958, in Pang and Jin (ed.), Mao Zedong Zhuan, 881; Mao, Zhou with Cao, Record of conversations, 13, 15, 17 
Oct 1958, in ZENP, vol. 2, 183-182; Zhang Chunyin 张春英, Haisia liangan guangxi shi vol. 3 海峡两岸关系史 [A 
History of the Relations across the Taiwan Strait] (Fujian: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004), 680. 
58 Qing Simei, From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity and US-China Diplomacy 1945-1960 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2007), 283-284, 287; Liu Hong & Zhang Qinyong 刘红、郑庆勇, Guomindang zai Tai 50 
Nian 国民党在 50 台年[50 years of KMT‘s Taiwan] (Beijing: Jiuzhou Chubanshe, 2001), 45; Sheng Lijun, ―How the 
Die was cast against Taiwan,‖ The Straits Times, 9 July 2000; Tong, Fengyu Sishinian, 275. 
59 POLO Doc. 34, December 1971, 17-18. 
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evacuating the offshore islands to one of principles: the recognition of the PRC by the US. Upon 
achieving that, ―China and the US can sit down to discuss the withdrawal of the [KMT] troops.‖ 
While the US could have forced Chiang off the islands, recognizing the PRC at that point was 
politically impossible. This sleight-of-hand allowed Chiang to stay on the offshore islands 
indefinitely while allowing the communists to stick to the moral high ground of ―principles.‖60  
 
Zhou also demonstrated first-hand knowledge of the depth of Chiang‘s rage and frustration with 
the US. Engaging in schadenfreude at Chiang‘s predicament, Zhou explained to Antonov on 5 
October Chiang‘s various public counter-statements against Dulles‘ damaging press conference of 
30 September. As Dulles had openly criticized the foolishness of overly arming Quemoy, Chiang 
felt that the US had thoroughly ―let him down.‖ Chiang‘s reported livid sputtering that ―all other 
nations should not believe in the lies of the US‖ was thus authentic. Finding this turn of events 
―extremely amusing,‖ Zhou jocularly told Antonov that Dulles ―immediately wrote a letter to 
Chiang to explain and smoothen his nerves.‖  
 
The PRC also seized the opportunity to further provoke ―contradictions.‖ Zhou admitted that the 6 
October ceasefire announcement was meant to ―sow discord‖ between the ROC and the US. 
According to Zhou, surely the Americans would be suspecting: ―Why would the communists 
suddenly release their grip when Quemoy was within their reach? Could it be that Chiang Kai-shek 
had a tacit agreement with his enemies?‖ However, all was not lost for the generalissimo. Zhou 
mused: ―While [Chiang] might have a press conference to proclaim that one could not sit down 
with the communists for negotiations, in his heart he would secretly rejoice that this is one golden 
opportunity to bargain hard with the Americans … such is the usual practice of Chiang.‖61 
                                                 
60 In an ironic twist, ―the premier [Zhou] requested the [Indian] Ambassador to tell Menon not to worry.‖ Nonplussed, 
the Indian Ambassador sought to clarify matters: ―Based on the PRC‘s original policy, when the first step is completed 
… Chiang will withdraw from the offshore islands and the PRC will exercise its sovereignty over the islands; how then 
will the PRC go about in resolving the Taiwan problem?‖ MFA to Chinese Embassy at India, telegram, no. 105, 3 
October 1958, serial no. 110-00421-01, AMFA; the sanitized version concentrated on the US conspiracy of ―ceasefire.‖ 
See Zhou with Indian Ambassador G. Parthasarathi, record of conversation, 30 September 1958 (Evening), in ZENP, 
vol. 2, 176. 
61 Foreign Minister Chen Yi pointed to the history of distrust between Chiang and the US: ―The US has always suspected 
Chiang had contacts with the Communists, while Chiang never abandons the fear that the US would eventually sell him 
out.‖ Zhou pointed out the contradictions of Eisenhower proclaiming that the US would not back down in the face of 




Foreign Minister Chen Yi also accurately perceived Dulles‘ trip to Taiwan as one of coercion. 
Chen recounted to Antonov: ―During the meeting, they had bitter arguments. Dulles had demanded 
that Chiang refrained from attacking and harassing mainland China and troops be withdrawn from 
Quemoy and Matsu.‖ Chen Yi boasted that the bombardments allegedly made ―Chiang very happy 
as he now could point at the bombardments as an excuse that troop levels cannot be reduced.‖ 
Another reason for helping Chiang was the concern, mentioned four times in the record, that the 
US would replace Chiang for some other more ―pliant and loyal compradores such as Hu Shih, 
Sun Li-jen, Wu Kuo-chen, Liao Wen-yi, etc…‖ According to Chen, Chiang was gripped by 
paranoia as he ―personally felt that the US was looking for ways to get rid of him.‖62 For Chiang, 
his bedfellows for the moment turned out to be the communists. As Beijing viewed the US to be 
the ―number one Far East enemy,‖ it would ―side Chiang against the US.‖ Chen perceived that 
Chiang would settle for a compromise: ―In this way, Chiang might continue to negotiate with us, 
and on the other hand, continue to request for money from the US.‖63   
 
In sum, the PRC-ROC back-channel was possible because it was a well established ritualized 
mode of communication. Despite the dividing political ideologies and a vicious history of trying to 
annihilate each other for decades, both Beijing and Taipei adhered to the common cultural and 
historical complex which produced the nationalism that resonated among mainland and overseas 
Chinese. Three factors facilitated this. One, both sides were culturally and historically bound not to 
accept a potential separation of China as ―two Chinas‖ reminded them of the abhorrent images of 
foreign imperialists carving up late-nineteenth-century China. Two, both parties waved the flag of 
nationalism, each claiming that the recovery of the other‘s territory was a sacred and imminent 
                                                                                                                                                   
Conversation between Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and the Soviet Chargé d‘affaires S. F. Antonov, no. 612, 5 October 
1958 (2400hrs), serial no. 109-00833-02, AMFA.  
62 US Secretary of Defence Neil McElroy had suggested on 15 September 1958 to Eisenhower if ―there isn‘t someone 
else who could step into the position [of Chiang].‖ The President paused over the suggestion but rejected it. Ambrose, 
Eisenhower, 485. 
63 Dulles had even blamed the ROC for successfully deploying the ―Sidewinders‖ air-to-air missiles. The question of 
stationing troops on the offshore islands also came up as the ―communists had stopped the bombardments.‖ To help 
Chiang win his arguments with the Americans, ―we resumed our bombardments early,‖ quipped Chen. Summing up the 
Chinese communist perspective on the Taiwan Strait Crises, Chen described the US deployment of military muscles as 
―playing the piano,‖ as the US would never stay at one place for long: ―While the US may have avoided war from the 
brink, there will always be a next time.‖ Record of Conversation between Minister Chen Yi and the Soviet Chargé 
d‘affaires S. F. Antonov, no. 650, 29 Oct 1958 (1800hrs), serial no. 109-00829-16, AMFA. 
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mission, as neither party could bear the moral responsibility for causing the spiritual break-up of 
China. Three, there were precedents in CCP-KMT collaborations. On 25 January 1956, Mao had 
declared at the Supreme State Conference: ―The KMT and the CCP had collaborated twice; we are 
prepared to carry out a third collaboration.‖64 
 
This explained the near maudlin-like quality of Mao‘s three October messages to Taipei. The PRC 
diplomats were told explicitly to ram up the time-tested rhetoric of nationalism: ―Patriotic Chinese 
would never allow foreigners to be their representatives or retreat behind someone else‘s back … 
The affairs of the Chinese brook no interference from the Americans.‖ Beijing was also keen to 
highlight neo-imperialism, the anathema of the burgeoning Afro-Asian nationalism, arguing that 
the US-led neo-imperialism had no chance at all against the ―beginning new page of history where 
the surge of anti-imperialism brings an irresistible tide of change.‖ Situating the Taiwan Strait 
Crisis firmly in the anti-imperialist code, the PRC attempted to tap into the roiling turbulence of 
resentment against the US-led coalition, and promised that eventually the US would be ―kicked 
out‖ from the numerous overseas military bases it occupied, be them in the Taiwan Strait or the 
Middle East. In contrast, the PRC crowed about its successes in gaining ―the world‘s approbation 
for its humanitarian gestures in a temporary ceasefire in the Strait.‖65  
 
3.2 Chiang’s Paranoia 
Washington had to suffer the brunt of Chiang‘s paranoia. Madame Chiang was reportedly ―upset 
about the interpretation among the Chinese on the communiqué,‖ claiming that she had to ―make 
some statements about it as she goes around the country.‖ Robertson testily told Adm. Stump to 
inform Mme. Chiang that ―she can destroy all support for her government by making statements 
that would tend to discredit the communiqué.‖ Robertson pointed out that the joint communiqué 
was ―a great step forward which will strengthen her country and is already in terms of public 
                                                 
64 Tong, Fengyu Sishinian, 273. 
65 For Mao‘s messages on 6 Oct, 13 Oct and 25 Oct, in JGMWG, vol. 7, 439-441, 457-461,  468-470; 外交部发言人评
论要点” [Waijiaobu fayanren pinglun yaodian], draft, n.d. and “中华人民共和国外交部发言人谈话” [Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo Waijiaobu fayanren tanhua], 9 Oct 1958, serial no. 111-00152-01, AMFA. 
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support.‖ Unfazed, Chiang insisted that the ROC was duty-bound to aid and support the anti-
Communist activities on the mainland through ―all possible means and by all possible actions.‖66 
 
Chiang then badgered the US for reassurances. In a highly agitated note to Yeh, Chiang demanded 
the immediate delivery of the M14 light tanks that were promised by the MAAG Taiwan: ―Before 
Dulles‘ visit, the MAAG promised 3 battalions of M14 (156 tanks), but we have only obtained one 
battalion of tanks, short of 110.‖ Chiang reminded the ambassador to tell the White House that 
―the reduction of troops on Quemoy is ultimately linked to the US offer of military aid.‖ While 
Chiang was not someone ―who will quibble over some minute details [sic],‖ he stressed that the 




The offshore islands remained an albatross for the US. Despite a defence agreement to reduce the 
offshore island garrison, the ROC only made perfunctory gestures. At least one division was 
supposed to return to Taiwan but this reduction was cosmetic. As the US had increased the number 
of artillery pieces for the Taiwan garrison on the offshore island, a minimum of twelve pieces of 
M114 155mm howitzers and another 12 pieces of M1 240mm howitzers were slated for Quemoy. 
Matsu would receive a minimum of 4 M1 240mm howitzers and a battalion of M114 155mm 
howitzers. Even Lacrosse rockets were promised. An additional armored battalion and two 
battalions of infantry would be transformed into motorized armored infantry. Just how there could 




US military commanders were critical of Chiang‘s stratagem. Commander of Taiwan Defense 
Command Adm. Ronald N. Smoot proposed that the ROC should have a smaller technologically 
                                                 
66 Robertson pressured Ambassador George Yeh to relay the same line to Mdm Chiang. Telephone call to Mr Robertson, 
30 Oct 1958, 12:20pm, Telephone Conversation Series, box 9, memoranda of tel conv - Gen Aug 1 1958 to Oct 31 1958 
(1), JFD papers; Chiang Kai-shek to Eisenhower, 5 Nov 1958, Office of e Staff Secretary, international series, box 3, 
china (rep of ) (1) (sept 58-apr 60), White House Office, DDEL; Chiang‘s paranoia was well documentated by his 
bodyguards, see, Weng Yuan 翁元, Wo Zai Jiangshi fizhi shenbian sishisannian 我在蒋氏父子身边四十三年[Forty 
Three years by the side of the Chiang Family], (Beijing: Hua wen chubanshe, 2003),106-107. 
67 Chiang fumed that ―ironically, we get less military aid after the departure of Dulles.‖ He queried: ―Does this mean that 
there are changes in the US policy towards the ROC? Hence it is now considered a small matter?‖ CKS to George Yeh, 
telegram, 15 November 1958, serial no.002010400030007, CKS papers, AH. 
68 “王叔铭与杜安签署金门及马祖岛群之军事防御建议书” [Wangshuming yu andu qianshu jinmen ji mazu 
daoqun zhi junshi fangyu jianyishu], 17 November 1958, serial no. 002080106051011, CKS papers, AH.    
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advanced standing army. However, Smoot‘s advice was ill-conceived. As the latest technology 
was limited to what the US was willing to give, Chiang could only contribute manpower. This 
explained the ROC‘s obsession with large standing armies, making it unlikely that Chiang would 
surrender this leverage to manipulate the US. At the same time, however, Smoot prized good and 
effective relations with his ROC counterparts. More concerned about the positive publicity of the 
US aiding Taipei, he chose to underscore the ―valuable combined operational experience‖ which 
the Crisis gave to the ROC and the US. Undoubtedly, Smoot had the May 1957 Taiwan Riots in 
mind and he wished to forestall any unwarranted rumor of US neglect of Taiwan.
69
    
 
4. Aftermath of Crisis 
In the aftermath of the Crisis, the US reoriented its policy toward communism and promoted more 
actively ―spiritual values of the Free World‖ to counter the perceived increasing international 
appeal of communism. The ROC, in a similar manner, utilized the ―lessons‖ of Quemoy for its 
nation-building, extolling greater sacrifices and social cohesion. The PRC considered the Taiwan 
Strait Crisis to have been satisfactorily settled for a host of reasons. Having achieved tacit 
accommodation with the US, the PRC continued to monitor closely American attitudes and 
policies toward China and communism. While both the US and the PRC recognized the future 
struggles for the hearts and minds of Asians, Beijing was particularly accurate in foreseeing the 
proxy wars which would subsequently engulf Indochina. 
 
4.1The US: Spiritual Values of the Free World 
In the aftermath of the Taiwan Strait Crisis, the Eisenhower administration reoriented its policy 
toward communism. Prominence was given to ―spiritual values to which the free world is 
dedicated and which set them apart from the communist world.‖ Attempts were made to promote 
                                                 
69 One of the ways which the ROC monitored the commitment of the US was to innocuously request for ―a listing of 
major actions taken by the US to assist the GRC over the past few months.‖ Smoot responded that the ―effort did not 
commence on August 23rd … The emergency situation has merely provided an opportunity to demonstrate the high 
effectiveness of the forces which you have developed and the readiness and mobility of the US forces which were found 
to be needed in this situation.‖  See Vice-Admiral Ronald N. Smoot to Minister of Defence Yu Ta-wei, letter, 22 
November 1958, serial no. 002080106051016, CKS papers, AH.     
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―more potent‖ Western ideas and spiritual values. Ironically, the US perceived themselves as on 




The Communist economic model presented a viable development alternative. China‘s industrial 
development had captured the imagination of Third-World countries. As early as August 1955, T. 
S Repplier, president of the Advertising Council, had elucidated to Eisenhower the dilemmas of 
promoting Americana: ―We cannot be merely against Communism; we suffer from the lack of a 
positive crusade. We need to focus on a moralistic idea with the power to stir men‘s 
imagination.‖71 In July 1958 there was an additional urgency as CIA Director Allen Dulles 
reported that the ―Soviet trade with the world had risen 500 %.‖ What was worse was that: ―The 
communists are particularly effective in dealing with one crop countries and are willing to do so at 
great cost to themselves if the political benefits seem large enough. Thus the communists could 
take actions that the private businesses of a profit economy are not geared to take.‖ But competing 
with ―Russia in every country on a dollar for dollar basis‖ simply would not work.72  
 
If the US was unwilling to out-spend the Soviets, it must out-think its adversary.
 
One possibility 
was to recapture the cultural initiative. Repplier, in a speech to the Business Editors of America on 
27 October 1955, exhorted:  
… the word ―people‘s‖ has been kidnapped by the Russians. Yet no word is more 
American. The US constitution begins with ―We, the people,‖ and an immortal 
and inspired definition of democracy is Abraham Lincoln‘s ―government of the 
people, by the people, and for the people.‖ It is high time we liberated this noun 
from the Russians. We cannot let the Soviets steal all our good words …  
George Allen, head of the United States Information Agency (USIA), agreed. He lectured the 
USIA staff in November 1957 on the high road of US cultural offensive: ―To encourage 
                                                 
70 This marked a renewed interest in combating Communism by stressing ―Free World Values,‖ which were narrowly 
equated with US cultural values. The main problem was devising a concrete set of action plan.See, D. E. Booster, Memo 
for the record, 27 October 1958, Special Assistants Chronological Series, Box 13, Greene - Boster Chronological Oct 
(1), JFD Papers, DDEL. 
71 ―Memorandum of the conversation between the President and T. S. Repplier (15 mins),‖ 3 August 1955, ACW Diary 
Series, box 6, ACW Diary July 1955 (5), Ann Whitman File, DDEL; David C. Engerman, ―The Romance of Economic 
Development and New Histories of the Cold War,‖ Diplomatic History Vol. 28, no. 1 (Jan 2004), 37;   
72 Undersecretary of State Douglas Dillion elucidated that the US preferred projects that were ―useful and visible,‖ such 
as a university in Kabul, or easing the way for ―commodity trading‖ [barter trade] with third-world countries. It was only 
in exceptional cases such as India that ―both Russia and the United States are pursuing large programs.‖ See Minutes of 
Cabinet Meeting, 25 July 1958 (0900hrs), Cabinet Series, box 11, Ann Whitman File, DDEL.   
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democratic processes throughout the world, we should give peoples of the world, as openly and 
frankly as we can, explanations of what we are doing, so that they can, in the democratic process, 
make up their mind about us.‖73 
 
Images of American modernity subsequently buttressed all distribution of US foreign aid. Such 
informal popular images eased acceptance by foreigners and there were evidence that non-
Americans were fascinated with US consumerist culture. Items such as Sears and Roebuck & 
Company catalogs were either ―worn out through use,‖ or sold in Indonesia. Overseas USIA 
libraries became a repository of US democracy that were ―telling America‘s story‖; in India, 
―every single chair in a dozen libraries was filled during every open hour and borrowing was 
known literally to empty shelves.‖74 Adroit Cold War warriors thus caught onto the wagon of 
selling US identity abroad as a means to capture hearts and minds. Not only was it a cheaper and 
more effective protection of the American way of life, it was, more importantly, a re-affirmation of 
the ―benevolent conception of American national identity.‖75  
 
4.2 The ROC: National Identity and Nation-Building 
Chiang continued to plague the US about the possibility of a spontaneous revolution on the 
mainland. He noted a ―definite and deep split between Khrushchev and Mao which began three 
years ago [1956].‖ To Undersecretary of State C. Douglas Dillon, Chiang belaboured: ―Mao 
apparently looks down on Khrushchev and would never accept his leadership.‖ Together with the 
failure of the Great Leap Forward, Chiang ―further asserted that the current dissatisfaction... made 
the present time ideal for stirring up defection on the mainland which could lead to overthrow of 
the regime.‖ Curiously, despite Chiang's optimism, he advocated only ―non-military or quasi-
                                                 
73 Michael R. Adamson, ―‗The Most Important Single Aspect of Our Foreign Policy‘?: The Eisenhower Administration, 
Foreign Aid, and the Third World,‖ in The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the 
Cold War, ed. Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns (Lanbam: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 57; Laura 
Belmonte, ―Selling Capitalism: Modernity and US Overseas Propaganda, 1945-1959,‖ in Staging Growth: 
Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War, ed. David C. Engerman, et. al. (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2003), 118; Richard T. Arndt, The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the 
Twentieth Century (Washington, D. C.: Potomac Books, 2005), 292. 
74 Arndt, The First Resort of Kings, 157. 
75 Belmonte, ―Selling Capitalism,‖ 108-117. 
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military methods.‖ But the White House was in no mood to entertain Chiang.76 
 
Chiang insisted on additional preparatory political work for fangong. The Quemoy crisis after-
action 1959 official report, headed by Air Force General Wang Shu-ming, listed the multiple civil 
concerns of a potential KMT takeover of China. These included the roles of security, refugees, 
education and even monetary policies. Such extensive serious paperwork by the KMT government 
seemed incomprehensible. But the ROC‘s higher echelons had been inured to Chiang‘s political 
methods. The perpetuation of the seemingly fatuous fangong preserved the political raison d‘être 
of the ROC through the difficult first two decades. Indeed fangong in relation to Taiwan‘s 
geopolitical position as the bulwark against communism ensured its existence and longevity. 
Hence, Chiang allowed reporters on the offshore islands to ―garner international sympathy and 
support.‖ The ROC authorities deemed this grandstanding ―relatively fruitful,‖ with the 
propaganda media value of engaging the communists via the offshore islands overriding any 
potential military purpose. Having invested in the phony war, the ROC authorities were upset with 
journalists who were ―ill-educated in military matters‖ when their reports seemed to be overly 
enamored of China. 
 
More importantly, the myth of the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis was institutionalized in the ROC‘s 
military establishment. The March 1959 official report grandly presented the Crisis as 
―unprecedented in size and intensity in the ROC‘s military history.‖ The Crisis was transformed 
into a mythical trial by fire for the young ROC‘s military. The report‘s hyperbole rendered the 
conflict beyond its military significance. The defenders possessed virtues: endurance, loyalty, 
selflessness, invincible revolutionary spirit, martial prowess, and contributed to the revolutionary 
cause, ―guided by the brilliant leadership of President Chiang.‖ The report added, with a large dose 
of melodrama, that the communist artillery repeatedly assailed the loyal dead (忠骨) due to a lack 
of crematoriums. This imagery of loyalty beyond death set the tone, with the Crisis now becoming 
the ―most glorious episode of the ROC‘s revolutionary warfare.‖  
                                                 
76 “Synopsis of state and Intelligence material reported to the President,‖ 22 Oct  – 27 Oct 1959, memo,  27 Oct 1959, 




Only by prefacing the report with effusive embellishments did Wang carefully cite the tireless 
improvements made by the PRC. The enemy was unceasing in their training. ―Time,‖ lamented 
Wang, ―is not on our side.‖ Wang‘s report expressed the specters of Chiang‘s fears. The loyalty of 
troops and generals were of utmost priority. Wholesale defections of dispirited KMT troops on the 
eve of 1949 must not happen again. Unblemished reports for the sole purpose of improvement, not 
based on personal agenda, were desired. Factious squabbling in the party must be a thing of the 
past. Finally, the enemy was acknowledged as tenacious in effort and larcenous in intent. China 
did not collapse into chaos under the communists. It even fought the United States to a standstill in 




For the rest of the Taiwanese society, the offshore crisis metamorphosed conveniently for the state 
to underscore values and ideals.  In a 1959 report by the Ministry of Defence, in which militant 
slogans approximated traditional adages in frequency, the narrative started with militant 
imperatives such as ―Stabilize the Frontlines,‖ ―Control the Strait,‖ ―Intensify Firepower,‖ and 
―Counter-attack Whenever Possible.‖ This discourse cast a pall of emergency, danger and crisis, 
coupled with a shock of raw power and a sense of masculinity, extolled against an implacable foe. 
The Defence Ministry stated that against the communists it adhered to a Spartan-like maxim: 
―Steadfast at Arms, Constant in Betterment.‖ It thus raised the phantom of an unappeased 
communist adversary who was constantly probing for weaknesses at the gate.  
 
Such a surreal standoff was even more apparent after a year. The combatants of the ROC and PRC 
greeted each other by off-target artillery fire and ―propaganda artillery rounds.‖ Each shell 
contained propaganda leaflets urging the other to surrender. In 1959, China fired 5,611 such shells 
at Quemoy and Matsu. The Nationalists responded with 4,397 of similar make. Since Quemoy is 
                                                 
77 The report was also candid about various shortcomings, including the ―lack of frontline ground intelligence‖ and the 
―overt dependence on the defense ministry intelligence,‖ and the ―lack of support for the front elements‖ and ―a lack of 
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门炮战作战检讨总讲评” [Jinmen paozhan zuozhan jiantao zong jiangping], Air force General Wang Shu-ming, 25 
March 1959, CKS papers, AH; Drumright to State Department, telegram, 13 July 1959, FRUS (1958-60), vol. XIX, 570 
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less than two miles from Xiamen, both sides broadcast radio programmes and shouted at each with 
loud speakers. Statistics from the Nationalists indicated that such shouting matches lasted nine 
hours. Nevertheless, strident slogans rang the loudest at the frontlines of the offshore islands. How 
else could the state mobilize and control more than 50,000 – 100,000 men on lonely outposts 
without strident belligerent ideology and rhetoric? How else could the society respond to demands 
on the economy and mental and material sacrifices without being constantly overwhelmed with 
news of the offshore islands‘ bombardments? Thus, the offshore islands presented for the 
Taiwanese a metaphor of their existence in the Cold War. More importantly, how else would the 
reluctant ally, the US, be persuaded to part with aid? The 1959 report concluded with the refrain 
that political education along the lines of ―revolutionary spirit‖ and ―revolutionary warfare‖ was to 




Another popular rendering was painting the Crisis as a David-versus-Goliath conflict. ―Our 
strength was by far inferior to the Chicom‘s,‖ asserted a 1965 ROC Minister of Defense report. 
The ROC was described as having responded to communists‘ provocations by openly launching a 
―severe blow‖ which ―has turned completely [China‘s invasion ‗plot‘] into a dream, thus leading to 
a peaceful situation.‖ The ROC‘s air force had heroically performed airdrops and airlifts ―under 
the Chicom artillery fire‖ and the report smugly observed that these were ―still accomplished 
successfully.‖79 However, factual gaps punctured the entire ROC report. The ROC‘s constant 
provocative over-flights into China were made possible by advanced technology given by US aid. 
Such possession of US battle technology belied the myth of the ―besieged‖ island. Especially 
crucial were the air-to-air missiles, Sidewinders. USN telegrams also pointed out that the bulk of 
the supplies were transported by sea. The US complained too that the ROC was overly concerned 
                                                 
78 Michael Szonyi expressed similar ideas in Cold War Island: Quemoy on the Front Line (Cambridge: CUP, 2008). But 
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with the communist artillery, since most of the ROC‘s airlifts were delivered during the ―lull‖ 




In addition, the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis facilitated Taiwan‘s subsequent move to an export-
oriented economy. Although Chiang was forced to announce on 23 October that the recovery of 
the mainland would be through the peaceful means of the Sanmin Zhuyi, he did not overturn this 
direction totally. In his 1959 New Year‘s Day official speech, Chiang elaborated on his stance of 
―making the Sanmin Zhuyi the vanguard and keeping the armed forces as the reserve.‖ This 
gesture set the stage for full consultation with the US on plans for an ―accelerated economic 
development program,‖ while moving further away from the military aims of fangong.81  In part, 
Chiang was compelled by US stipulations that further aid would only be forthcoming if Taiwan 
concentrated on economic development instead of a military fangong. Well knowing that Taiwan‘s 
import substitution economy had run its course, the US promised more aid to the tune of $20-30 
million for Taiwan‘s export-oriented industries.82 To complement this export-oriented thrust, the 
ROC government also instructed technocrat Li Kuo-ting to seek out foreign investments from 
overseas Chinese.
83
 For all intents and purposes, fangong was ritualized into an article of faith and 
Chiang‘s technocrats went along with it so long as it was used to promote further economic growth. 
Fangong dalu acted as a grim reminder that failure was not an option as the ROC‘s source of 
annihilation was just across the Strait, thus motivating the economic planners to channel all their 
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4.3 The PRC:  Consolidation and Reassessment 
In the process of tacit accommodation, the PRC actively sought intelligence from various sources. 
One key piece of information obtained was the unabated US fear of the Chinese leviathan. This 
source came from the Polish Foreign Minister‘s conversation with Washington insider and 
chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, John J. McCloy.
85
 McCloy ominously forecasted: ―In a 
few years‘ time, China may become a powerful third force … Because it advocated an independent 
path, it may be more frightening than the Soviets.‖ Nevertheless, McCloy confirmed Premier 
Zhou‘s perceptions of US strategic needs when he averred: ―The US would never go to war with 
the PRC over the offshore islands … The US is willing to hand the islands to Communist China.‖ 
However, McCloy added that this did not mean a weakening of the US mutual security treaty with 
the ROC: ―If however in protecting the ROC as an independent country, the US detects that the 
PRC is going to conquer Taiwan, that will unequivocally mean war.‖ On the US part, according to 
McCloy, Dulles‘ trip to the ROC was to prevent ―adventurous moves from the Chiang Kai-shek 
elements.‖ McCloy was thus blunt on the limitations of the US treaty obligation towards the ROC, 




Having clear perceptions of the US strategic needs remained vital for the PRC as it embarked upon 
its economic experiments via the Great Leap Forward (GLF). Foreign Minister Chen Yi reasoned 
to Soviet Chargé Antonov: ―If we send bombers [to Taiwan], there is a real danger of causing the 
eruption of a great war. But we are now in the midst of the Great Leap Forward, so there is no 
need to provoke that.‖ Thus, even the rare opportunity to ―show solidarity [with Lebanon] in the 
anti-imperialist protest‖ through the bombardment of Quemoy was emasculated. Chen Yi went on 
to list other safer ways to create ―contradictions‖ between the ROC and the US, as solidarity with 
Third-World countries must necessarily take a backstage to China‘s domestic imperatives.87 
 
                                                 
85 The Poles stressed the importance of the McCloy conduit. According to one study, so highly esteemed was McCloy 
that Eisenhower and Dulles sought advice from this ―statesman.‖ See Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: 
Six Friends and the World They Made (NY: Touchstone Book, 1986), 572. 
86 Record of Conversation between Yu Zhan and the Polish Ambassador, no. 610, 14 Nov 1958 (afternoon), serial no. 
109-00833-02, AMFA 
87 Record of Conversation between Minister Chen Yi and the Soviet Chargé d‘affaires S. F. Antonov, no. 650, 29 Oct 
1958 (1800hrs), serial no. 109-00829-16, AMFA. 
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The PRC further noted that the US authorities and press were engaged in a ―Hate-China 
campaign,‖ targeting especially the people‘s communes. A 35-page report on the current Sino-US 
relations asserted that even the Berlin Crisis did not invite such a chorus of ―hyperbolic‖ 
newspaper commentaries. With remarkable perception, the report then situated the media frenzy as 
symptomatic of the US struggles in forging a coherent policy toward Beijing: while the US found 
it ―increasingly difficult‖ to fathom the PRC, it was deemed ―gradually more important‖ to do so. 
Underpinning this struggle was the realization that Red China spelled ―big trouble.‖ The PRC‘s 
developmental strategy of the GLF might ―seduce‖ and ―bait‖ the developing countries in Asia and 
Africa, acting as an ―inducement to communism.‖88  
 
The report added that to the US, the Taiwan Strait Crisis had demonstrated that the stakes were the 
Chinese nationalistic competitive desire to have a sphere of control in Asia. A ―seat in the UN‖ 
counted for little to Beijing. Hence, the ―paper tiger‖ label for the US was a genuine disdain for US 
threats, coupled with an aspiration to challenge US hegemony. As such, the US ―posits the PRC as 
more dangerous than the Soviet Union.‖ To counter Red China‘s ―bad example,‖ the report stated 
that the US was at pains to provide an alternative economic route through material aid. One such 
new initiative was Eisenhower‘s five-point plan to increase aid to the Colombo Plan countries.  
The US economic warfare was targeted at China‘s GLF and hoped to demonstrate the viability of 
the US system. Neutralist countries such as India, noted the report, had already sought to benefit 




The report also clearly demonstrated that the PRC was aware of the US wedge strategy of 
provoking Sino-Soviet tensions. It alleged that Vice-President Nixon had said in London, during a 
World War II commemorative service in late-November 1958, that the prime strategy of the West 
was to provoke both China and the Soviet Union to oppose each other. It also noted that Eleanor 
Roosevelt, in her capacity as a New York Post columnist, had traveled twice to the Soviet Union 
                                                 
88 The report observed that the first US official comment on the Great Leap Forward was made by Dulles in Seattle in 
November 1958 about Chinese slave labour camps. Thereafter, the 1 December issue of Newsweek featured ―The 
World‘s Most Terrifying Experiment‖ and Time magazine highlighted ―Huge farms of human poultry.‖ 
89  ―台湾海峡的斗争以后的美国对华政策” [Taiwan haixia de douzheng yihou de meiguo duihua zhenche], no. 289, 4 





 Mrs. Roosevelt allegedly claimed that the Soviet leader had 
lamented that ―China is the only country interested in nuclear war.‖ With remarkable candor, the 
report then referred obliquely to Western rumors that Sino-Soviet tensions started since Mao and 
Khrushchev met in July 1958. The report simply listed, without confirming or denying, alleged 
points of contention, such as the Soviet disapproval of the communes, transfer of Soviet nuclear 
technology to the PRC, and the PRC‘s actions in the Taiwan Strait.91 
 
At the broadest level, however, the report highlighted that the PRC was convinced that the Taiwan 
Strait Crisis gave the US an opportunity for a realistic reassessment and tacit recognition of 
China‘s place in Asia. The Crisis also forced Khrushchev to openly support the PRC with the 
Soviet nuclear arsenal and this dealt a significant setback for the potential Soviet détente with the 
Americans. The Taiwan problem was hence considered to have been satisfactorily settled. The 
report further noted with glee that the US, ―for want of a PRC reassurance that it would not 
conquer Taiwan, was willing to toss Chiang Kai-shek aside.‖92 However, the PRC had stood on the 
moral high ground that it would not ―cut this deal with the US‖ and had instead turned to the PRC-
ROC back-channel. According to the report: ―The Chinese government shall not take these islands, 
but allow Chiang to keep them … China and Chiang Kai-shek have reached a tacit agreement to 
oppose the US together.‖ Finally, Chiang‘s Sanmin Zhuyi declaration gave the PRC additional 
reassurance of peace.   
 
                                                 
90 On Nixon‘s London visit (25-28 November 1958), see ―The Vice-Presidency: The Double Dare,‖ Time, Monday, Dec. 
08, 1958; Eleanor Roosevelt visited Russia on 3-28 September 1957 and late-September 1958. See excerpts of 
Roosevelt‘s 1957 interview with Khrushchev, in Eleanor Roosevelt, Eleanor Roosevelt's My Day (New York : Pharos 
Books, 1991), 134-141, 177-180. 
91 Flushed with the success of his American tour in mid-1959, Khrushchev lectured the PRC on the merits of co-
existence on 1 October 1959. He considered testing ―the stability of capitalism by force‖ in the Taiwan Strait foolhardy 
and perilous. The US would not be rendered less dangerous, just because Mao branded it a ―paper tiger.‖ What the 
Chinese comrades needed to do was what Khrushchev had already done: accommodation with the US. To the PRC, 
nothing was so disruptive to tacit accommodation than a lecture from the Soviets. See Harrison E. Salisbury, The New 
Emperors Mao & Deng: A Dual Biography (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1992), 191. 
92 The report considered the most important outcome of the Taiwan Strait Crisis to be the US reticence towards the PRC 
and its silent willingness to accept the status quo in East Asia. Secretary McElroy‘s 13 November 1958 statement about 
the cutback on troop deployments in Asia was eagerly noted by Beijing, relieved that ―the US appetite for war is 
considerably less.‖ However, the report was aware that there would be no changes on such issues as the recognition of 
the PRC, gaining of a UN seat, and US trade embargo. A propaganda blitz against the PRC to placate the US domestic 
audience would also be on the cards. Nonetheless, the US had sought to ―leave itself space for maneuvering,‖ as seen 
during the Warsaw negotiations. 
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With deadly accuracy, the report then speculated that future conflicts would move away from the 
Taiwan Strait to the neighbouring Asian countries bordering China. To counter this communist 
wave of the future, the PRC foresaw several options of the US. The pro-US factions in Asian 
countries would receive material and military aid and military strongmen would be encouraged to 
eradicate the communist elements in their countries. Thailand and Burma had already positioned 
themselves with the US and such Asian countries would provide a network of military bases for 
the US new strategy of ―limited war.‖93 
 
Conclusion 
Beijing closely guarded its tacit accommodation with the Americans, considering such an 
approach to possess many advantages. It dismissed third-party proposals from Britain, the Soviets 
and neutralist Asian countries, viewing most of them as dangerously close to the detested ―two- 
China‖ solution. As Chiang had played the nationalist card, Beijing could not do less. Yet the 
biggest heartburn for China came from such neutralist Asian countries as Indonesia, Burma and 
India which had showered Beijing with uninvited offers. Paradoxically, this came about from 
Beijing‘s earlier successful diplomatic encounters with these nations. Beijing then used the vague 
―Bandung spirit‖ to successfully resolve its international dilemmas. 
 
The US well understood the PRC‘s moderate and ritualized stance and was ready to wind down the 
crisis. More interested in reassuring Beijing than coddling Taipei, Washington exerted pressure on 
the ROC with a stream of rhetorical bombardments. In the face of the US pressure, Taipei sought 
to shore up the perimeter of the rationale, legitimacy and morality of the ROC-US relationship. It 
also used the Taiwan Strait Crisis as a media event to validate Taiwan‘s military prowess. Dulles‘ 
mission to Taipei on 21-23 October demonstrated how the US laid down the line on Taipei. 
Washington also subsequently understood and reciprocated Beijing‘s odd-day bombardment 
announcement, providing yet another example of Sino-US tacit accommodation. Nonetheless, 
there was a glaring blind spot in Washington‘s perceptions of the ROC-PRC relations as it 
                                                 
93  ―台湾海峡的斗争以后的美国对华政策” [Taiwan haixia de douzheng yihou de meiguo duihua zhenche], no. 289, 4 
February 1959, serial no. 109-01913-03, AMFA. 
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continued to show its inability to fathom the implications arising from the shared historical and 
cultural ties of the KMT and the CCP. 
 
The dramatic Taipei-Beijing back-channel, evident in at least three visits by Cao Juren (Chiang 
Ching-kuo‘s secret emissary) to Beijing from August to October, demonstrated the common 
historical and cultural ties shared by the erstwhile belligerents. Through this established ritualized 
mode of communication, Taipei and Beijing tapped on nationalist concerns and maneuvered to 
thwart Washington and avoid the specter of ―two Chinas.‖ While Beijing also had in mind the 
planting of discord in the ROC-US relations and the trumpeting of its goodwill in contrast to the 
alleged neo-imperialism of the US, Taipei adroitly manipulated the channel to pressure the US to 
accede to its demands and succeeded in procuring more military aid even though it had to go along 
with the US request to soft-pedal the belligerent rhetoric of its fangong mission. 
 
In the aftermath of the Crisis, the US reoriented its policy toward communism and promoted more 
actively ―spiritual values of the Free World‖ to counter the perceived increasing international 
appeal of communism. Such a cultural offensive included promoting images of American 
modernity and the ―benevolent conception of American national identity.‖ The ROC, in a similar 
manner, utilized the ―lessons‖ of Quemoy for its nation-building, extolling greater sacrifices and 
social cohesion. Mythologizing of the Crisis was particularly evident in its military establishment 
even as it moved away from the belligerency of the fangong mission to a more reassuring 
upholding of Sun Yat-sen's Sanminzhuyi (Three Principles of the People). The PRC considered the 
Taiwan Strait Crisis to have been satisfactorily settled for a host of reasons. Having achieved tacit 
accommodation with the US, the PRC continued to monitor closely American attitudes and 
policies toward China and communism. While both the US and the PRC recognized the future 
struggles for the hearts and minds of Asians, Beijing was particularly accurate in foreseeing the 






Having analyzed the Taiwan Strait Crises chronologically, this concluding chapter will now return 
to the three central questions posed in Chapter One: 
a. Why did the Taiwan Strait Crises erupt in September 1954 and August 1958 
respectively?  
b. How did each crisis unfold, from outbreak to resolution?  
c. What can such a development of the Taiwan Strait Crises tell us about the 
foreign relations of the PRC, US and ROC in the 1950s? 
These questions will be considered thematically, in the context of existing scholarship.  
 
1. Causes of the Taiwan Strait Crises 
Existing scholarship have explained the causes of the Taiwan Strait Crises in such terms as Sino-
US misperceptions and miscalculations and China‘s domestic imperatives. 
 
This thesis has shown how the genesis of the Taiwan Strait Crises could be traced to 1950 when 
Truman positioned the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait to prevent hostilities between the PRC 
and the ROC. From 1953 to April 1954, despite attempts by Eisenhower to re-assess US policies 
toward China, Taiwan and Southeast Asia, maintaining Chiang‘s Taiwan remained one of the main 
goals of US policy, together with keeping Japan firmly in the US security umbrella and preventing 
communism from spreading in Southeast Asia. US non-recognition of China and economic 
embargo and covert operations against China also persisted. A new course of ―United Action,‖ a 
US proposal to stem the communists‘ high tide in Indochina that would lead to the formation of 
SEATO in September1954, further emerged as a strategy to counter the PRC‘s involvements in 
Indochina. All these actions highlighted the entwining of the Taiwan Strait issue with events in 
Southeast Asia and contributed to the making of the Taiwan Strait Crises, as they would later be 
perceived by the PRC to constitute a US strategy of encircling China and provided a pretext for 
China‘s bombing of the Quemoy and Matsu islands. In the aftermath of the Korean War armistice 
agreements, Beijing was anxious to emerge from diplomatic isolation. Together with the need to 
better prepare China for its participation in the Geneva Conference, China re-assessed its policies 
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toward Taiwan, the US and Southeast Asia. In this re-assessment, China placed the Taiwan Strait 
issue on the backseat for the moment, expressed its concerns regarding the US and ―United 
Action,‖ sought to win over Asian neutralist countries, and advocated a ―talking while fighting‖ 
posture with respect to Vietnam. Such features represented China‘s responses and initiatives in 
dealing with the US actions and played a part in the making of the Taiwan Strait Crises for, had 
these actions elicited what China considered to be acceptable US responses, China would most 
likely not have proceeded with the 1954 bombardments.  
 
This thesis has further located the making of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis in the Geneva 
Conference where many significant issues were not settled, highlighting again the entwining of the 
Taiwan Strait issue with events in Southeast Asia. In Geneva, China‘s aim to break out of 
international isolation led it to take up a position of ―reasonableness,‖ and its efforts to win over 
Asian countries seemed momentarily successful in countering the specter of ―united action.‖ In 
contrast to China‘s improved diplomatic standing, the US initially faced difficulties in gaining 
support from its allies for ―United Action.‖ There were also differences in opinions between 
Eisenhower and his cabinet members regarding US policies toward China. Although the US-
Britain-France disarrayed alliance did reach a compromise eventually to form a ―United Front,‖ it 
was clear that in Geneva, the association of the US with neo-colonialism hampered its efforts in 
developing a regional counter-measure against China. US dissatisfaction with the outcome of the 
Geneva Conference led it to disregard the Geneva Accords and dulled Beijing‘s diplomatic 
achievements. Besides being unhappy with the continued insistence of the US on non-recognition 
of China, Beijing was also frustrated with the formation of SEATO and the likelihood of a 
potential ROC-US defence treaty. Coupled with the onslaught of the ROC‘s commando raids and 
the looming danger of ―two Chinas,‖ the PRC bombarded Quemoy and Matsu on 3 September, 
setting off the First Taiwan Strait Crisis.  
 
To some extent, Sino-US misperceptions and miscalculations played a part in the outbreak of the 
Crisis. Although the US was dissatisfied with the Geneva Accords and decided to disregard it and 
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Washington did view the additional prominence that the PRC gained in Geneva with dread, it also 
noted that China‘s gains in Geneva were limited and the probability of a Communist armed attack 
low. US budgetary constraints, the limitations of US nuclear deterrence and Eisenhower‘s firmness 
against casual belligerency further meant that the US was not about to provoke a war with China. 
While ―united action‖ culminated in the formation of SEATO and this would unsettle China, 
Dulles was aware of the limitations of US sponsorship. As such, the US did not expect that its 
actions in 1953 and 1954 would frustrate China so much that China would register its unhappiness 
by bombarding Quemoy and Matsu. At the same time, the energy which Beijing put in late-1954 
into convincing its Asian neighbors of its peaceful intentions bespoke of China‘s anxiety in 
addressing unexpected tensions in the Strait with remedial actions.  
 
Furthermore, China‘s domestic imperatives also played a part in the outbreak of the Crisis. 
Concerned that the specter of encirclement might lead to an unwanted escalation of international 
conflicts which would derail China from its domestic development, China hoped that its 
bombardments would deter the US from executing further such perceived encirclement actions. 
China‘s desire for a stable international environment to focus on its domestic goals stemmed from 
the deleterious impact of the Korean War. Rehabilitation of the economy was thus China‘s top 
priority. With the signing of the Sino-Soviet Alliance in 1950, the Chinese adopted the Soviet 
model of development. In the first Five-Year Plan (1953-1957), the PRC set aside $20 billion for 
development; the Soviet contributions were mainly in terms of technical knowledge and advisors. 
In a bipolar world in the grip of the Cold War, there seemed no other viable alternative.  
 
This thesis contends that for the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, China‘s decision to bombard 
Quemoy was cast in a mode of defiance against the timidity of the Soviets, together with China‘s 
concerns regarding the specter of US encirclement, perceived American intransigence and 
Taiwan‘s provocations. In the mid-1950s, tensions were building up in Sino-Soviet relations as the 
Soviets spoke of the dangers of nuclear warfare, advocated peaceful co-existence with the US and 
were non-committal about Mao‘s agricultural collectivization. With the launch of the Soviet 
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Sputnik satellite in 1957, Mao advocated a communist bloc energetically led by the Soviet Union. 
To Mao, US provocations such as constructing B-52 nuclear bomber runways in January 1957 and 
placing nuclear-tipped Matador missiles in May 1958 in Taiwan had to be firmly dealt with. For 
the Soviets to ask China to have peaceful co-existence with the US only served to deepen Mao‘s 
ambivalence about Khrushchev. Beijing was also dissatisfied with the Soviet handling of the 
Middle East crisis. It seemed to Mao that the Eisenhower Doctrine, which pledged US aid to any 
Middle East country threatened by communism, could be duplicated in East Asia. Moreover, the 
US appeared infuriatingly tardy in responding to China‘s demands for the resumption of 
ambassadorial talks and the ROC continued with its onslaught of commando raids. In a show of 
defiance, the Chinese Politburo on 17 July 1958 agreed to proceed with further bombardments on 
Quemoy in the near future. Other developments in August reinforced Beijing‘s decision. Dulles‘ 
28 June 1957 speech about the impending passing of Mao‘s régime was repeated on 11 August 
1958 by the US Department of State. At the same time Chiang Kai-shek had increased the troops 
in Matsu and Quemoy to 100,000, twice the number in 1955, and broadcast in August that he 
would return to Mainland China. All these concerns led the PRC to launch artillery barrages on 
Quemoy and Matsu again on 23 August, igniting the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. 
 
To some extent, Sino-US misperceptions and miscalculations also played a part in the outbreak of 
the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. While the US did not expect much from the Sino-US 
ambassadorial talks, the PRC viewed this as an important conduit. The US was also apprehensive 
of possible Sino-Soviet collusion when Khrushchev made a surprise visit to Beijing in August 
1958 and Dulles had mulled over the nuclear option on China before his conciliatory speech on 4 
September. Similarly, Mao had declared to the Supreme State Conference on 5 September that ―I 
simply did not calculate that the world would become so disturbed and turbulent.‖1 Yet, compared 
to the First Crisis, Sino-US misperceptions and miscalculations played a smaller role in the 
outbreak of the Second Crisis, as there were ample evidence that the US, PRC and ROC were 
acutely aware of each other‘s intentions. In the First Crisis, Eisenhower‘s decision on 12 
                                                 
1 See Allen S. Whiting, ―New Light on Mao: Quemoy 1958: Mao‘s Miscalculations,‖ CQ 62 (Jun 1975): 263-270. 
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September 1954 against any military action regarding the offshore islands proved to be consistent 
with the view that he had of China since 1953. In the wake of the Yijiangshan campaign in January 
1955, the US tacitly accepted the PRC‘s international standing and recognized the inevitability of 
another diplomatic engagement with China. Similarly, Beijing understood the value of public 
posturing coupled with tacit agreements. While there could be no ―private compromises,‖ tacit 
understanding not to overstep boundaries was not rejected. By April 1955, both parties had 
reached the liminal stage where the belligerents were socialized with each other‘s maneuvers. The 
UN Secretary-General Hammarskjold accurately perceived the emergence of a ritualized pattern of 
diplomacy where ―inner pressure‖ and ―quiet‖ diplomacy would define the contours of Sino-US 
relations from this point onward.  
 
China‘s domestic imperatives, however, played a larger part in the outbreak of the Second Taiwan 
Strait Crisis than in the First. Besides China‘s desire for a stable international environment to focus 
on its domestic goals, China also seemed to have used the Crisis to support its domestic agenda. 
Throughout the 1950s, the Soviets readily responded with ―the largest transfer of technology in the 
recent era‖ to the PRC.2 However, the Chinese leadership was confronted by unexceptional 
agricultural gains.
3
 Problematic allocation of raw materials and infrastructural inadequacies also 
combined to demonstrate that the path to a great power would be protracted. At the same time, 
Mao carped about the slipping of revolutionary fervor of the CCP cadres and forced the issue with 
his speech, ―On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People,‖ on 27 February 1957. 
Hoping to forestall the same kind of groundswell of unhappiness that had erupted against the 
communist governments in Poland and Hungary, Mao wanted the CCP to acknowledge that elitist 
bureaucratism had eroded its revolutionary spirit and he proposed to resolve the issue by mass 
campaigns.
4
 Although China‘s intellectuals were subsequently unleashed by the Hundred Flowers 
                                                 
2 Bruce Cumings, ―The Political Economy of Chinese Foreign Policy,‖ Modern China, vol. 5, no. 4 (Oct 1979), 415; 
Peter Van Ness, ―Three Lines in Chinese Foreign Relations, 1950-1983: The Development Imperative,‖ in Three Visions 
of Chinese Socialism, ed. Dorothy J. Solinger (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 122. 
3In 1957, China only achieved a 3.5% increase in the gross value of agriculture production. Worst, food grain production 
attained an increase of a miserable 1%. Kenneth R. Walker, Planning in Chinese Agriculture: Socialisation and the 
Private Sector (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1965), 71. 
4 Mao was confident that the intellectuals who had been cleansed by the Thought Reform Movement (1951) and the 
Purge Counter-revolutionaries Movement (1955) would be useful in highlighting the shortcomings of the CCP. As a 
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Campaign in May 1957 to criticize the CCP,
5
 the plan backfired, reminding the CCP that more 
work needed to be done in the area of socializing the party and population.
6
 Mao then believed 
communes that could multiply China‘s agricultural output and accelerate its industrial 
development would be the answer to China‘s economic and political doldrums.7 The Great Leap 
Forward was thus launched in 1958 to ensure the assumption of China‘s rightful place in the 
world. In June, Mao announced a timetable of two to three years to surpass Britain; at the height of 





Evidence existed to show that Beijing was interested in mobilizing the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis 
to support the Great Leap Forward.
 The British Chargé in Beijing reported that ―mammoth 
demonstrations‖ were organized against the US activities in Lebanon in July 1958. In August Mao 
visited rural areas to encourage progression of the Great Leap Forward. From the beginning of 
September, the PRC intensified reporting the Taiwan Strait Crisis to its domestic audience. 
Beijing‘s mass mobilization on 6 September was aimed at deflecting perceived PRC‘s eagerness at 
negotiation while whipping up support for domestic social change. So concerned was the PRC 
with any possibility that critics would latch on its capitulation to the enemy that more strident 
slogans such as ―China will certainly liberate Quemoy and Matsu, and will certainly liberate 
Taiwan‖ appeared. In late September, Vice-Foreign Minister Zhang Wentian revealed that ―they 
are using the situation to mobilize the local militias in an attempt to turn it into a nation-wide 
campaign.‖ 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
result, intellectuals who became cadres formed 16 % of the total CCP membership by 1957. Dickson, Democratization in 
China and Taiwan, 81. 
5 Mao under-estimated the degree of discontentment directed at the CCP. The open publication (6 June 1957) of a 
heavily edited version of ―On Contradictions,‖ which emphasized crushing intellectual dissent, signaled the failure of the 
Hundred Flowers Campaign and the start of the Anti-Rightist Campaign. Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the 
Cultural Revolution: Contradictions among the people Vol. 1 (London: OUP, 1974), 207-210, 218-269. 
6 Between 550,000 and 750,000 were persecuted as rightists. Party cadres were at pains to fulfill the quota of 5% 
stipulated by Beijing. See Fu Zhengyuan, Autocratic Tradition and Chinese politics (Cam.: CUP, 1994), 294. 
7 By returning to the masses, CCP cadres would also receive another dose of revolutionary activism. Wong, 
Contemporary, 23. 
8 Shapiro, Mao‟s War against Nature, 74. 
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The Great Leap Forward also had implications for the foreign relations of the PRC in terms of 
showcasing China‘s role as the revolutionary beacon, the ―leader of the East,‖ with China adopting 
a euphoric posturing to the world comprising a cocktail of nationalistic pride, exhilaration and an 
intense eschatological glimpse of the future. Fraternal countries were impressed. The Bulgarians 
began to collectivize their farms and expand their heavy industries. ―Soviet newspapers,‖ 
complained Khrushchev, ―had also raised the question of borrowing from the Chinese experience 
of building communes,‖ although such speculations were quickly squashed.9 India sent two 
delegations to learn from the Chinese experience and they set about implementing their own 
version of the Great Leap Forward.
10
 The US was extremely wary of the seductiveness of China‘s 
crowing and provided more generous foreign aid to India precisely to counter this trend.  
 
This thesis has further highlighted the important roles played by the ROC, the most directly 
affected party, in accounting for the outbreaks of both Taiwan Strait Crises. In 1950, together with 
US patrols of the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan had stationed troops in Quemoy and Matsu to deter 
China‘s aggression. The Taiwan Strait issue also played a significant role in the formulation and 
implementation of policies to uphold Taiwan‘s political survival and cultural revival. Its 
importance was further seen in the construction of the clarion call to wage fangong dalu (counter-
offensive against the mainland), which led to a militarization of Taiwan‘s society and constituted a 
major component of its foreign policy. Although Taiwan was not a participant in the Geneva 
Conference, it exploited the international crisis in Indochina to advance its fangong mission. After 
the Conference, Taiwan was upbeat regarding US actions in Asia. Even though Taiwan faced the 
threat of increasing international isolation, it was assured by the US adamant position in not 
recognizing China. While Taiwan was concerned that its interests might be neglected in SEATO 
talks, it was assured by the increasing willingness of the US to consider a mutual defense treaty. 
Taiwan further provoked China with its intensification of commando raids and impounding of 
foreign vessels trading with China. The ROC naval forces attacked nearly 76 foreign vessels 
                                                 
9 Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev Vol. 3, 447-450. 
10 Alexander Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade: Implications for U.S. policy (NY: 
McGraw-Hill, 1966), 267-74. 
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bound for China between 1949 and 1954. Chinese fishermen in Zhejiang and Fujian were also at 
the mercy of the ROC‘s actions. One PLA general even recalled the 1954 struggle over the control 
for China‘s coastal seas to be the ―most crucial and the sharpest.‖11 Ironically, China‘s triggering 
of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis offered Taiwan the perfect excuse to secure the US-ROC defence 
treaty, the Formosa Resolution, and the procurement of more US aid. However, the convening of 
the Sino-US ambassadorial talks from August 1955 to December 1957 riled the ROC, which it 
viewed as the harbinger of a potential disaster that could lead to its declining international standing 
and deteriorating US-ROC relations. To express its unhappiness and frustration, Taipei blatantly 
conducted raids on China in the midst of the talks, and continued to provoke China with its 
commando raids through 1958. From January to July 1958, just prior to the outbreak of the Second 
Taiwan Strait Crisis, the ROC forces embarked upon no less than 15 incidents of raids, naval 




2. Mode of Communication 
How did each crisis then unfold, from outbreak to resolution? Existing scholarship have explained 
the mode of communication between the PRC and the US in such terms as probing and deterrence, 
tacit communication, management of crises, and negotiations and tenuous peace. 
 
This thesis supports contentions in existing scholarship that China‘s actions against the offshore 
islands were purposeful, limited probes and did not constitute a prelude to occupying Taiwan. 
Beijing‘s signaling, in the form of bombarding Quemoy and Matsu and occupying the Dachen 
military complex during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, was readily accepted by Washington as a 
limited probe. Beijing‘s signaling of its displeasure was reinforced by its propaganda effort among 
friendly neutralist countries. Mao also closely monitored and severely limited China‘s military 
moves in the Taiwan Strait. Even when approval was given for military action, the aim was 
restricted to securing the coastal areas of Zhejiang for commercial sea traffic. Similarly, political 
                                                 
11 Xiao Jinguang 肖劲光, Xiao Jinguang Huiyilu 肖劲光回忆录 [Memoirs of Xiao Jinguang](Beijing: Jiefangjun 
chubanshe, 1988),124-126; John W. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War 
Strategy in Asia (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 1997), 117-118. 
12 Melvin Gurtov, ―The Taiwan Strait Crisis Revisited: Politics and Foreign Policy in Chinese Motives,‖ Modern China, 
vol. 2, no. 1 (Jan 1976), 73. 
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goals mattered more than military objectives during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. The PRC‘s 
actions were cautious and deliberate right from the start, seeing the bombardment as a ―military 
probe‖ to signal China‘s unhappiness and ―give the US a hard time.‖ The danger of ―two Chinas,‖ 
the secret conduit between Taipei and Beijing, annoying interferences from Asian neutralist 
countries, and the imperative of China‘s domestic economic development meant that the 
possibility of the physical occupation of the offshore islands was remote, let alone the recovery of 
Taiwan. From this perspective, the issue of nuclear deterrence can also be better contextualized 
and not seen as the overwhelming thrust of Eisenhower‘s strategy during the Taiwan Strait Crises; 
this issue will be elaborated in a later section of this chapter. 
 
This thesis expands on the themes of tacit communication, management of crises, and negotiations 
and tenuous peace. Building upon the efforts of McClelland‘s ―tacit communication,‖ Kalicki‘s 
―Sino-American crisis system,‖ and the works of Tucker and Goldstein on negotiations and 
tenuous peace, this thesis further demonstrates how conflict resolution in Sino-US relations took 
place in four main phases during the Taiwan Strait Crises. One, how the foundation for a 
framework of ―tacit communication‖ was laid as early as April-July 1954 during the Geneva 
Conference, which could be seen to have ushered in the first full-fledged opportunity, after the 
Korean War armistice, for the belligerents and allies, including China and the US, to take stock of 
each other and work out a tentative modus operandi. A good example was seen in the initiative 
taken by US representative in Geneva Bedell Smith, without reprimands from Eisenhower, to 
establish personal links with Zhou. Eisenhower too was trying to persuade his colleagues toward 
the eventual loosening of trade sanctions against the PRC. All parties demonstrated room for 
readjustment and change of policies, however limited in manner.  
 
Two, how further steps in ―tacit communication‖ were constructed during the early months of the 
First Taiwan Strait Crisis, leading to ―tacit accommodation‖ in the later months. In the early phase, 
Beijing conveyed its limited belligerencies and political concerns about the Taiwan problem 
through a wide array of international contacts. At this stage, while Washington had not found an 
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adequate way to respond to Beijing‘s peace feelers directly, its attempt to use the UN Security 
Council to engage Beijing could be viewed as a move in tacit communication. In the later phase, 
there did emerge a burgeoning stabilization of the crisis. Both Washington and Beijing 
demonstrated flexibility as they inched toward Bandung with the intention to tacitly resolve the 
crisis. Helped by the ―quiet diplomacy‖ of Hammarskjöld, the US and the PRC made progress, 
with the PRC‘s conciliatory gesture on 23 April 1955 in Bandung paving the way for the Sino-US 
ambassadorial talks to be held in Geneva in August 1955. 
 
Three, how progress in ―tacit accommodation‖ was made but at the same time how its limitations 
became apparent during the period between the two Crises. Although the Sino-US ambassadorial 
talks held in Geneva from August 1955 to December 1957 represented progress from a framework 
of tacit communication toward Sino-US tacit accommodation, different expectations on the issues 
of the US airmen and the Taiwan Strait led to inconclusive results by the end of 1957. 
Nonetheless, even though the talks could not resolve the issues, its long-term consequences were 
noteworthy as it facilitated the way for the holding of future Sino-US ambassadorial talks, which 




Four, how ―tacit accommodation‖ was then consolidated, enabling the rapid resolution of the 
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. Right from the start of this Crisis, both Washington and Beijing 
exercised remarkable restraint. Eisenhower was calm and despite Dulles‘ uncertainty and the 
different views of the US officials, Dulles did hail the experiences gained in 1955 as significant. 
Dulles‘ offer of tacit accommodation on 4 September 1958 was swiftly accepted by Zhou on 6 
September. However, Washington could not elaborate too much on the contours of tacit 
accommodation, thus suffering from public opinion backlash. Indeed, Mao placed each piece 
deliberately to make sure the Americans were not alarmed. He appeared keener in upsetting the 
Soviets. Washington also subsequently understood and reciprocated Beijing‘s odd-day 
bombardment announcement, providing yet another example of Sino-US tacit accommodation. 
                                                 
13
 I am acutely aware that the use of concepts from other fields may not be wholly apt and have thus taken 




In other words, while the Taiwan Strait Crises highlighted conflicts and tensions in Sino-US 
relations (the predominant stress in existing scholarship), this thesis has demonstrated that 
embedded in the crises were also seedlings that prepared the ground for conflict resolution in Sino-
US relations. ―Lessons‖ learnt from the interactions arising from the episodes of the Geneva 
Conference, the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, the inter-crises period, and the Second Taiwan Strait 
Crisis were digested and internalized. Each episode could be seen to have represented one building 
block of tacit understanding, constructed in a complex manner intricately linked to the 
international relations, domestic developments and issues of national identity of Beijing, Taipei 
and Washington. This tortuous path toward mutual understanding was conditioned by realism and 
littered with misperceptions, and laid the groundwork for a substantive change in the nature of 
Sino-American relations – from one of nuclear confrontation in 1954 to one of tacit 
accommodation in 1958.  
 
The transformation of ―tacit communication‖ to ―tacit accommodation‖ was facilitated by 
―ritualization‖ in Sino-US relations. Both parties engaged in ritualized actions that facilitated the 
process of conflict resolution. These actions included the use of such ―soft‖ elements as public 
symbols, identity issues, cultural images and official discourses,
14
 complemented at times by the 
―hard‖ language of ―signaling‖ via military posturing, canvassing for international support, and 
diplomatic negotiations.
15
 This combination of ―soft‖ and ―hard‖ aspects can be seen to constitute 
a ―symbiotic‖ engagement of ritualization. Although ritualization is more commonly used in 
anthropological studies of societies and religion than in the studies of international relations or 
diplomatic history, this thesis contends that it can be a very useful concept in understanding the 
                                                 
14 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., posits ―the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than through coercion‖ as ―soft 
power,‖ an alternative to political coercion and economic pressures. See ―Soft Power,‖ Foreign Policy. (Fall 1990): 153-
171. For an elaboration, see Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power (New York : Basic Books , 1990); 
David Sylvan, et. al., ―Theoretical Categories and Data Constructions in Computational Models of Foreign Policy,‖ in 
Artificial Intelligence and International Politics, ed. Valerie M. Hudson (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 327. 
15 One study explores how naval maneuvers could be constructed as symbolic signaling performed at the state level. Ola 






 This is seen in Catherine Bell‘s conceptualization of rituals as ―a strategic 
form of cultural practice‖: 
Ritual practices are themselves the very production and negotiation of power 
relations … Ritualization as a strategic mode of practice produces nuanced 
relationships of power, relationships characterized by acceptance and resistance, 





If ritualization holds the promise of re-negotiation of power relations, it stands to reason that inter-
state relations such as those of the PRC-US-ROC could profit from such an analytical lens. As 
ritualization engages with elements of tradition, history, foreign threat and national destiny through 
such mass exhortations and persuasions as political speeches, campaigns and generally accepted 
discursive logos, this also makes it a powerful tool in deciphering the intricacies of the Taiwan 
Strait Crises. Analyzing the ―symbiotic‖ ritualization of the processes and methods of war and 
peace can lead to several outcomes. It can render comprehensible one‘s actions to the ―other‖ and 
vice versa, which results in a muted acceptance of political and cultural differences without 
coming to blows, albeit displays of ―predictable‖ belligerencies.18 Ritualization can also show that 
the underlying culture or national identity which cannot be changed must be silently reconciled 
with, socializing reluctant nations with their allies and enemies. With the limits and boundaries 
―ritualized‖ out, strategic withdrawal can be achieved with no loss of prestige.  
 
China‘s symbolic bombardments of Taiwan‘s offshore islands showed how ritualization in war and 
peace could serve equally as a message about political intentions as well as a diplomatic protest. 
Mao was particularly insistent in controlling the number and manner the bombardments were to be 
delivered. Analyzing the data of the communist shells fired upon Quemoy in 1958, Jonathan T. 
Howe found very little amount of ―deep-penetration‖ bunker-destroying shells used. Even 
                                                 
16 Ritualization and state power is discussed in John Pemberton, On the Subject of ―Java‖ (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1994), 4; Clifford Geertz, Negara: The Theater State in Nineteenth-Century Bali (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1980), 13.   
17 Bell, Ritual Theory, 196. 
18 David I. Kertzer, Ritual, Politics and Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 128. 
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communist air raids were limited. The bombing almost seemed perfunctory.
19
 Deliberations in the 
White House indicated that the US was very clear how far the Chinese would go, with references 
constantly made to the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. Likewise, intelligence generated by the ROC 
military demonstrated knowledge of the ritualized bombardments. This ―hard‖ language of 
signaling was accompanied by the PRC‘s frequent ―soft‖ ritualistic refrain of the sacred principle 
of ―One China,‖ with messages about common cultural roots with the KMT delivered publicly and 
covertly throughout the duration of the Taiwan Strait Crises. In similar ways, the predictability of 
the PRC‘s belligerency made Eisenhower‘s job easier in waving off usage of nuclear devices. 
Lloyd Etheredge has further argued that the much vaunted US nuclear deterrence can be 
understood as ―dramatic art‖: ―One creates and manages power as an exercise in applied 
psychology, shaping a dramatic presence that in the minds of others, become their experience of 
reality.‖20 This observation can be aptly applied to Eisenhower‘s administration which had to deal 
with the Old Guard elements of the GOP. Therefore, the rhetoric of Eisenhower and Dulles often 
possessed more bite than action.  
 
Ritualization was also seen in the ROC-US relations, in the reconciliation of differences and re-
negotiation of power relations between Washington and Taipei and Taipei and its populace. In the 
aftermath of the May 1957 Taiwan Riots, the nuances and roles of ritualized apologies stood out. 
Chiang Kai-shek‘s symbolic public apology and the report of the Executive Yuan tenuously 
straddled the domestic demands for justice while upholding the international needs of the state. 
The manner which the ROC state went about placating its populace with sensitive nods to 
ritualized expressions of filial piety, honor and justice, delved neatly with appeals to pragmatic 
appreciation of power realities, that Taiwan needed the US. Washington recognized the symbolism 
of Chiang‘s apologies and quickly accepted them to make up for the initial lapses in justice in the 
death of Liu Tzu-jan and also as recognition of the stress that Taipei felt about the Sino-US 
                                                 
19 Howe exhausted all published English-language materials available then and substantiated his study with numerous 
interviews with US participants. He followed Halperin and Tang‘s interpretation that the Chinese Communists was only 
interested in a limited probe. See Multicrises: Seapower & Global Politics in the Missile Age (Cam., Mass.,: MIT, 1971), 
242. 
20 Lloyd Etheredge, ―One Being More Rational than Rationality Assumption: Dramatic Requirements, Nuclear 
Deterrence and the Agenda for Learning,‖ in Political Psychology and Foreign Policy, ed. E. Singer & Valerie M. 
Hudson (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 62. 
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ambassadorial talks. Yet another example of an adroit ―symbiotic‖ engagement of ritualization was 
seen in Taiwan‘s fangong dalu military planning exercises, whereby Chiang‘s generals would 
begin by first swearing eternal loyalty to Chiang and fangong, before proceeding to eventually 
highlight the difficulties of fangong. More importantly, loud ritualistic adherence to the fantasy of 
fangong loosened the tight fist of American financial and military aid. The US was so concerned 
that Chiang might carry out fangong that it was willing to give the ROC a defensive treaty and 
more defensive military aid. Likewise, Eisenhower would speak boldly of unleashing Chiang, but 
quietly imposed controls on the ROC. 
 
Besides stressing the themes of ―tacit communication,‖ ―tacit accommodation‖ and ―ritualization,‖ 
this thesis has highlighted as well relevant aspects of ―culture‖ to better understand the intricacies 
of the PRC-US-ROC relations.
21
 For instance, this thesis underscores the role played by cultural 
differences in perpetuating the misunderstanding and dissonances among Taipei, Beijing and 
Washington. By using the cultural prism to re-examine the Taiwan Strait Crises, it also advances 
the counter-intuitive possibility of a tacit understanding between belligerents, seen here in how 
Taipei and Beijing could maintain secret back-channels, however briefly and albeit hostile 
rhetoric, out of patriotism that warring brothers should unite to thwart a foreigner from allegedly 
achieving ―two Chinas.‖ Informed by the shared memories of China‘s humiliation by Western 
powers in the late-nineteenth century, both Beijing and Taipei considered Dulles‘ ―two-China‖ 
proposal unacceptable. Indeed, political ideologies were put aside when the Chinese concept of 
guochi (national humiliation) was evoked and issues of political legitimacy at stake. Thus while it 
was incomprehensible to Washington that the belligerents could tacitly band together momentarily, 
it is indicative of the possible influences of historical and cultural commonalities in the realm of 
international relations.  
 
                                                 
21 For a succinct discussion on culture and international relations, see Valerie M. Hudson, ―Culture and Foreign Policy: 




This thesis has shown how cultural sensitivities could also connect otherwise disparate nations. 
One example was how China‘s successful international debut during the Geneva Conference was 
facilitated by a strategy of combining cultural blitzkrieg and realpolitik. Accompanying China‘s 
negotiations grounded in pragmatic national interests was the ample dishing out of food, wine, 
movies and cultural exhibitions, to win friends and establish prestige. Thirty years later, 
Ambassador Wang Bingnan would recount with relish how Undersecretary of State Bedell Smith 
had reached out to the Chinese in an act of personal diplomacy. In this regard, while agreeing with 
recent scholarship that underscored the crucial role Beijing played in Geneva in steering the North 
Vietnamese toward territorial integrity, this thesis has further contributed by showing how China 
had also influenced Cambodia and Laos. Here the poignant but little discussed incidents were how 
such nations (including Burma) had positioned themselves as ―younger brothers‖ in their 
interlocution with the PRC. The US could arrange all kinds of containment defensive treaties 
around the PRC, but China‘s Asian neighbors knew instinctively that the US would be far away 
should trouble break out in the region. In a similar manner, the partition of Vietnam could be 
interpreted partly as the product of such a hierarchical acknowledgement of the cultural hegemony 
and political power of the PRC.    
 
3. The Taiwan Strait Crises and the Foreign Relations of the PRC, US and ROC 
Finally, what can such a development of the Taiwan Strait Crises tell us about the foreign relations 
of the PRC, US and ROC in the 1950s? The analysis here will begin with the PRC, followed by 
the US and the ROC.  
 
3.1 The PRC 
This section will discuss how the findings in this thesis fit in existing scholarship on China‘s 
foreign relations in the 1950s in terms of the ideology-realism debate, the nature of China‘s 
relations with the Soviet Union, and the diplomacy of the PRC‘s re-emergence onto the world 




In the 1950s, the literature on China‘s foreign relations focused mainly on ideological aspects. 
Reflecting the Cold War tensions between Washington and Moscow, China‘s domestic ideology 
and foreign policies were depicted as Soviet-inspired.
22
 A slight variant of the Soviet-inspired 
model advocated that the PRC‘s ideology underwent changes or ―Sinification,‖ such as Mao‘s 
―People‘s War‖ and ―United Front,‖ to suit China‘s situation.23 In the 1960s scholars turned more 
toward a Maoist model, emphasizing Chinese nationalism and Maoism. Mao‘s struggle against 
Wang Ming over Marxist orthodoxy and Soviet authority, the CCP‘s wartime political isolation 
from the Comintern, Mao‘s stress on peasants‘ nationalist consciousness and other aspects of 
―Sinification‖ were all seen as the working of ―revolutionary nationalism‖ in Mao‘s building up of 
the CCP away from the Soviet Union.
24
 Posing an alternative challenge to both the Soviet and 
Maoist schools of thought at the same time was the realist model, which stressed such themes as 
national security and military concerns. Allen Whiting‘s China Crosses the Yalu (1960) explained 
China‘s actions as ―reactive, defensive and for deterrence purposes only.‖ Other scholars in the 
1960s that used the realist model were I. C. Ojha‘s Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition 
(1967) and Samuel B. Griffith‘s The Chinese People‟s Liberation Army (1968).25 
 
The late 1960s and 1970s saw an outpouring of materials in the aftermath of the Cultural 
Revolution. Scholars such as Melvin Gurtov and Harry Harding focused on factionalism within the 
PRC‘s foreign policy making, with China‘s domestic environment seen as exercising influence on 
China‘s foreign policy. The intensification of the Sino-Soviet rift and the rapprochement between 
China and the US prompted others to look at triangular politics among China, the Soviet Union 
and the US.
26
 In the 1980s and 1990s much of the studies expand on the realist model as their 
central organizing theme. James Reardon-Anderson‘s Yenan and the Great Powers (1980) found 
the CCP muddling through 1944-46 without an ideologically-inspired ―master plan.‖ In Uncertain 
                                                 
22 See Chiang Kai Shek‘s Soviet Russia in China (1957); Martin Wilbur & Julie How‘s Documents on Communist 
Nationalism and Soviet Advisers in China (1959); Charles McLane‘s Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communist (1958).   
23 Benjamin Schwartz‘s Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (1951) and Conrad Brandt‘s Stalin‟s Failure in China 
(1958) acknowledged Soviet influences but gave more credit to Mao‘s ―creative adaptations‖ of Marxist-Leninism. 
24 See Stuart Schram‘s The Political Thought of Mao Tse-Tung (1963); Jerome Chen‘s Mao and the Chinese Revolution 
(1965); Chalmers Johnson‘s Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power (1962).  
25 Bin Yu, 239-242. 
26 See Barbara Tuchman‘s Stilwell and the American Experience in China (1971); Ernest R. May‘s The Truman 
Administration and China (1975); Michael Schaller‘s The US Crusade in China (1979); Roger Dingman, ―Lost Chance 
in China,‖ Reviews in American History 9, no. 2 (Jun 1981), 253.   
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Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War‘s (1993), Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and 
Xue Litai contended that: ―Ideological declarations could serve power politics but not determine it. 
Motives found deeply rooted in national traditions far outweighed Marxism-Leninism in 
practice.‖27  
 
Yet others considered such non-realist factors as historical-culture baggage, communist ideology 
and human idiosyncrasies to have played a bigger role in China‘s foreign policy. Efforts to re-
examine such factors gained momentum in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1989. In Deterrence and Strategic Culture (1992), Zhang Shu Guang argued that in analyzing 
Sino-US relations, distinguishing the cultural differences of the antagonists‘ perceptions will offer 
sharper insights than using the conventional deterrence theory of aggressor-versus-defender.
28
 
Michael M. Sheng‘s Battling Western Imperialism (1997) contended that for Mao, the ideology of 
Marxist-Leninism sustained the identity and integrity of the CCP.
29
 Chen Jian‘s Mao‟s China and 
the Cold War (2001) maintained that the ideology of ―continuous revolution‖ underscored both the 
domestic economic policies and foreign policy orientation of China.
30
 While Sheng used the 
psychological concepts developed by Erik Erikson to argue that the communist ideology gave the 
CCP its ―ego identification,‖31 Chen highlighted how the cultural context of China‘s stake in the 
international proletarian revolution dovetailed with China‘s traditional ethnocentrism.32 
 
This study of the Taiwan Strait Crises follows the intellectual mien of Michael H. Hunt‘s The 
Genesis of the Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (1996), which attempts to bridge the gap 
between the realist and non-realist schools. Vivienne Shue has similarly argued that the crux for 
                                                 
27 Goncharov, Lewis & Xue, 220. 
28 Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontation, 1949-1958 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1992). 
29 Michael M Sheng, Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1997), 196. 
30 Cohen, ―The United States and China,‖ 142.   
31 Sheng, Battling Western Imperialism, 196, 123; David Mayers, review of Battling Western Imperialism by Sheng, The 
Journal of American History 85, no. 4 (Mar 1999), 1658; Shu Guang Zhang, review of Battling Western Imperialism by 
Sheng, The China Journal 42, (Jul 1999), 206- 207 




Mao was ―making its ideological goals and its practical goals interlock.‖33 This thesis recognizes 
that realist and non-realist factors are not mutually exclusive. While Mao‘s numerous hesitations 
and deliberations regarding the appropriate degree of bombardment during both Taiwan Strait 
Crises demonstrated a master pragmatist at work, at the same time, the threading of the communist 
ideology in Mao‘s 1957 ―East Wind Prevailing over West Wind‖ speech in Moscow and the 
launching of the Great Leap Forward in 1958 showed that both spectrums of the debate could be 
profitably reconciled. 
 
Nevertheless, this thesis further maintains that an over-emphasis on ideology as the primary factor 
may be inadequate. Andrew G. Walder has pointed out that recognizing the context of Mao‘s 
ideological forays was equally important: ―Mao was no detached philosopher, but a shrewd, often 
ruthless political infighter, and his writings must be approached with this in mind … Like Stalin, 
his ideas were also weapons which he used in political combat.‖34 Two other Chinese scholars 
concurred. Gong Li presented the Taiwan Strait Crises in the light of China‘s domestic and 
international pressures, and contended that Mao had multiple political aims, including the restart of 
negotiations.
35
 Although the PLA generals were puzzled by Mao‘s limited bombardments in the 
1958 crisis, Li Xiaobing concluded that Mao was cognizant of US intentions and adopted a 
―cautious policy.‖36 This thesis too believes that Mao‘s ideological considerations formed only a 
part of the picture. Mao‘s realpolitik rationalization on the partition of Vietnam in 1954 provided a 
good example. Likewise, in the 1958 crisis, Chinese economic developments were deemed more 
important and Vietnam was told firmly that China would not support its Southern Revolution of 
re-unifying Vietnam. When the North Vietnamese displayed over-enthusiasm on the impending 
Chinese recovery of the offshore islands, Mao even informed Ho Chi Minh that the crisis should 
                                                 
33 Vivienne Shue, Peasant China in Transition: The Dynamics of Development Toward Socialism, 1949-1956 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1980), 334-335. 
34 Andrew G. Walder, review of Continuing the Revolution by Starr, Pacific Affairs: 341. 
35 The other aim Gong stressed was ―punitive,‖ for the ROC‘s harassments on the Chinese coast. Gong Li, ―Tension 
across the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s Chinese Strategy and Tactics,‖ in Reexamining the Cold War US China Diplomacy 
1954-1972, 141-171. 
36 Li Xiaobing, ―PLA Attacks and the Amphibious Operations During the Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954-55 and the 
1958,‖ in Chinese War Fighting, ed. Mark A. Ryan, et. al. (NY: ME Sharpe, 2003), 143-172. 
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not be blown out of proportion.
37
 Hence, rather than pigeon-holing Mao into neat compartments, it 
would be more apt to portray him as having at his disposal a wide variety of stratagems and 
tactical postures for foreign and domestic consumption. Mao‘s realism could just as comfortably 
complement his ―military romanticism‖ and ―continuous revolution.‖38 
 
Closely related to the ideology-realism debate was the discourse on the nature of China‘s relations 
with the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Existing scholarship has noted the many complex dimensions 
of Sino-Soviet relations and traced the subsequent Sino-Soviet split to developments in the 1950s. 
This thesis contributes by highlighting further the sharp political and ideological differences 
between the PRC and the Soviets, as well as how cultural differences played a part in reinforcing 
the mistrust between these two allies. As discussed earlier, in the 1950s tensions had built up in 
Sino-Soviet relations over a range of issues and Beijing had viewed Soviet attitudes toward the US 
and the PRC with mounting distrust. As such, China‘s decision to bombard Quemoy in 1958 was 
partly cast in a mode of defiance against the timidity of the Soviets.  
 
In the wake of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, as the PRC worked toward gaining international 
support for its actions, Beijing was eager for Soviet endorsement but chafed at perceived Soviet 
condescendence. Subterranean cultural and historical currents coloured Mao‘s approach to the 
Soviets, who were subsequently taken aback by Mao‘s actions. Although the issue started with 
what the PRC saw as Soviet encroachment upon Chinese sovereignty, it became conflated to the 
larger issue of cultural pride and xenophobia. Mao was not alone in his prejudices, as Khrushchev 
had responded similarly. At the same time, during the Taiwan Strait Crises, Beijing had 
deliberately projected a strategy of ambiguity in the international arena to disguise its limited aims. 
While China‘s actions did not please the Soviets, they received resounding symbolic support from 
fraternal countries, shielding Beijing from Soviet criticisms. Such an approval by fraternal states 
further raises the question of whether Mao and the PRC represented the sole example of 
                                                 
37 Mao to Ho Chi Minh, 10 Sept 1958, JGMWG, vol 7, 413. 
38 In a masterful analysis of Deng Xiaoping‘s reforms, Richard Baum posits that ideological labeling for Chinese 
communists may be counter-effective and prefers a nuanced analysis that provides for changes in policy formulation. 
This useful insight can be applied to Mao‘s era in the 1950s. See Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng 
Xiaoping (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
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―aggressive stance‖ in this period of international communism, as presented in conventional 
scholarship. Ironically, the PRC‘s cultural pride with Chineseness also translated into similar big 
power chauvinism towards lesser fraternal communist nations. This explained why Beijing felt 
perfectly justified in forcing the North Vietnamese to accept Vietnam‘s partition but experienced 
considerable chagrin when the North Vietnamese became ―holier than the pope‖ in urging the 
Chinese to liberate the offshore islands in 1958, which could be seen as a back-handed Vietnamese 
response to Chinese refusal to support the Vietnamese ―Southern Revolution‖ for reunification.   
 
Apart from the ideology-realism debate and the discourse on the nature of China‘s relations with 
the Soviet Union in the 1950s, this thesis also agrees with recent scholarship that underscored 
China‘s successful international debut in the 1954 Geneva Conference. It further illustrates the 
creativity by which the PRC plotted its re-emergence onto the world scene and elaborates on the 
unexpected outcomes that such diplomacy generated.  
 
In the aftermath of the Korean War, the PRC took every opportunity to showcase its new ―public 
face‖ to counter the US attempts to make a pariah out of China. One such occasion was the 1954 
Geneva Conference where world opinions were receptive of the ―reasonableness‖ of the 
communist régime. This new reputation was enhanced at the 1955 Bandung Conference. One 
outcome of the PRC‘s public relations campaign was that friendly Afro-Asian leaders voiced their 
opinions, in quantities considered excessive at times by their Chinese counter-parts, on such issues 
as Asian security, China‘s economic development and the Taiwan problem. During the First 
Taiwan Strait Crisis, the PRC tried to marshal such non-Soviet bloc opinions to its advantage. 
Their efforts were successful as there was no lack of volunteers who aired dissent regarding US 
foreign policy, but these new allies also wished to mediate between the US-ROC and China. Such 
efforts were perceived by China at times not to be in accord with its domestic and strategic 
outlooks. The PRC then embarked upon an active ―management‖ of disparate world opinions, 
which was an entirely new endeavor. Although the PRC tried to provide a sanitized ―script‖ for its 
new friends, most had their own ideas. The volume of third-party interferences grew during the 
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Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. Overwhelmed by such international attention, the PRC responded by 
rejecting the unwelcome mediation efforts and demanded just outright condemnations of the US. 
Thus, ironically, with its growing prominence in international stature, the PRC found itself 
unbearably under the burden of world opinions, a position previously suffered by the US. One 
therefore goes away with the insight that the achievements of the PRC‘s new international strategy 
were mixed. This is an important corrective to the emerging triumphalist interpretation by some 
recent scholars of China‘s foreign policy.39   
 
3.2 The US 
This section will discuss how the findings in this thesis fit in existing scholarship on the foreign 
relations of the US in the 1950s in terms of the performance of the Eisenhower presidency in the 
management of American foreign policies, the strategy of nuclear deterrence, and the influence of 
domestic factors. 
 
Traditional accounts by Marquis Childs, Richard Rovere and Richard Neustadt described the 
Eisenhower presidency negatively.
40
 Most gave the impression of a lethargic administration 
counseled by ―vicious advisors‖ such as White House Chief of Staff Sherman Adams. Studies by 
Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz and Richard Goold-Adams emphasized the dominance of 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. The genial ex-general turned President was depicted as more 




However, in the 1980s, most accounts credited Eisenhower for his handling of crises. Bennett C. 
Rushkoff applauded Eisenhower for demonstrating leadership in rallying the Congress to pass the 
Formosa Resolution. Likewise, Leonard Gordon demonstrated that the White House sought from 
March 1955 to avoid provoking a Chinese Communist invasion and Eisenhower was able to 
                                                 
39 Tao Wang, ―Isolating the Enemy: The Bandung Conference and Sino-American Relations,‖ AHA Conference, (9 Jan, 
2010).  
40 Fred I. Greenstein, ―Eisenhower as an Activist President: A Look at New Evidence,‖ Political Science Quarterly 94, 
no.4 (Winter 1979-1980): 575-599.  
41 Even Eisenhower himself was aware of this common perception, see D.D. Eisenhower to Edgar N. Eisenhower, 1 
April 1953, in The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The Presidency: The Middle Way, ed. Louis Galambos 
(Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), Doc 121 (Hereafter cited as PDDE). 
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deflect the overbearing demands of Chiang Kai-shek.
42
 Similarly, Richard Saunders depicted 
Eisenhower as exercising restraint and deemed his articulation of strategic ambiguity effective 
against the PRC.
43
 To George C. Eliades, excellent US intelligence strengthened Eisenhower‘s 
hand in the 1958 crisis, although left unsaid in Eliades‘ account was the quality of intelligence in 
the 1954-55 crisis.
44
 Amid the positive portrayals, there were dissenters. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. 
concluded that apart from nuclear grand-standing and toppling foreign governments, ―[m]ost of the 
time his [Eisenhower‘s] preference was for doing nothing ─ not always a bad idea in foreign 
affairs.‖45 Robert J. McMahon similarly highlighted that the US treated most Third-World 




This thesis agrees with positive appraisals of the Eisenhower presidency‘s foreign policy to a large 
extent. Among his cabinet members, Eisenhower was so far ahead of his colleagues in proposing 
that economic sanctions against the PRC was hurting US allies that he met with opposition most of 
the time. Eisenhower had also adroitly chosen Nixon, a notorious GOP ―red-baiter,‖ to lead an 
informal re-assessment of the PRC and ROC early in the administration in 1953. For the First 
Taiwan Strait Crisis, good intelligence possessed by Washington made sure that no undue 
escalation resulted. Washington also acknowledged the Bandung Conference as a choice forum for 
signaling the formal winding down of the Crisis. During the inter-crises period, the US further 
participated in ambassadorial talks with the PRC in Geneva from August 1955 to December 1957. 
During the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the White House well understood the PRC‘s moderate and 
ritualized stance and was thus ready to rapidly wind down the crisis. 
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However, Eisenhower‘s mastery of the presidency should also not be exaggerated as the Taiwan 
Strait Crises had proven to be one of the most intractable foreign policy problems the Eisenhower 
administration faced. On more than one occasion, the president had wished that the ―offshore 
islands would sink.‖ One major problem was the difficulty the US faced in convincing the ROC to 
abandon the offshore islands as ―outposts.‖ In as much as the PRC was a thorn at the side of the 
US, its ROC ally was no easy walkover either. Another constraint the Eisenhower administration 
faced was the need to consider world opinion and garner ―allied support.‖ By deftly scripting the 
Taiwan problem into an issue tapping strongly on the discourses of nationalism and sovereignty in 
the wake of decolonization in Asia, Beijing had made it extremely difficult for Washington to 
marshal world opinion and brand Beijing as the aggressor. As Beijing had firmly secured the 
majority of Asia‘s opinion, Washington had the problem of preserving its prestige while quelling 
precipitating factors which might worsen its international position. Despite the disarrayed nature of 
the US-Britain-France alliance, the Eisenhower administration eventually had to count on such 
support when it found itself increasingly isolated by non-aligned Third-World nations. British 
support was particularly important in the formation of SEATO and the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers‘ Conference of 31 January-8 February 1955, which represented a potential forum to 
resolve the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. Persuaded subsequently by London to give up Oracle (NZ 
UN resolution), Washington then displayed ―moderateness‖ toward its allies and attempted to 
court Asian governments so as to safeguard US interests at the Bandung Conference (18-24 April 
1955). In the wake of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, to counteract the growing criticisms of the 
Eisenhower administration from international and American public opinion concerned about a 
potential outbreak of war and nuclear fallout, Washington had to fall back on the obsolete but 
familiar domino theory to rationalize its Taiwan policy. In the aftermath of the Crisis, the US also 
had to reorient its policy toward communism and promote more actively ―spiritual values of the 
Free World‖ to counter the perceived increasing international appeal of communism. Such a 
cultural offensive included promoting images of American modernity and the ―benevolent 
conception of American national identity,‖ illustrating again the need of the US to address 




Closely related to the issue of the performance of the Eisenhower presidency in managing US 
foreign relations was the discourse on the strategy of nuclear deterrence in the 1950s. Historians 
have discussed the extent of Eisenhower‘s strategic vision and the utility of nuclear deterrence. 
While Alexander George and Richard Smoke criticized the White House for lacking the ―classical 
statesmanship in supplementing deterrence with conciliation and flexibility,‖47 Richard Betts 
discerned in Washington a tendency for a ―risk-maximizer‖ approach and explained Eisenhower‘s 
confidence in brandishing nuclear threats as exemplifying the US position of strength.
48
 Others 
have highlighted the domestic needs of Eisenhower‘s ―New Look‖ policy and the constraints that 
accompanied it. Michael S. Sherry maintained that the president had to pacify a conservative 
Congress and enforce cuts in defense spending.
49
 Eisenhower also had the thankless job, according 
to Campbell Craig, of working out a plan to avoid a nuclear war.
50
 To this end, Eisenhower 
paradoxically pursued a thermonuclear war contingency, with all the attending paper planning of 
targets in the Soviet Union and increased budgets for supposedly cheaper nuclear weapons, instead 
of a ―flexible response‖ which was an expansion of ground troops to deal with worldwide 
emergencies. Worse of all, according to H. W. Brands, Eisenhower was hoping that technology 
would solve his budgetary problems; instead, it fettered the administration‘s flexibility in 
responding to the Taiwan Strait Crises, with the New Look (NSC 162/2), a cost-cutting measure, 




This thesis contends that nuclear deterrence should not be seen as the overwhelming thrust of 
Eisenhower‘s strategy during the Taiwan Strait Crises. Although explicit nuclear threats were 
publicly made in March 1955, this should be viewed as theatrical belligerency stemming from 
Eisenhower‘s firm grasp of the Taiwan situation. Despite Washington‘s hot rhetoric, subtle 
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signaling to Beijing was the preferred mode of communication. Swamped by third-party 
emissaries and an overly helpful UN Secretary-General, the US further concluded that dealing with 
the PRC directly was less stressful. Nonetheless, the aggressive rhetoric projected by Washington 
and the emergence of America‘s New Look nuclear deterrence doctrine that emphasized ―massive 
retaliatory power‖ and ―more bang for buck‖ did raise concerns among America‘s allies and also 
led to scholarship interpreting Eisenhower‘s issuance of nuclear threat as an act that escalated the 
Crisis. However, in retrospect, as the Eisenhower administration was extremely cautious in action, 
such US moves can be better interpreted as attempts to justify to American officials and the public 
the ―conventional‖ nature of America‘s New Look nuclear deterrence doctrine. In this regard, the 
PRC had good intelligence and was unruffled by the US atomic threat; instead it was more 
concerned about an Australian proposal for a Commonwealth ―guarantee‖ of Taiwan. Similarly, 
Eisenhower was even more decisive in downplaying nuclear threats in the Second Taiwan Strait 
Crisis. Inured by the PRC‘s maneuvers, Eisenhower decided against the nuclear option even before 
the outbreak of hostilities. Aided by good intelligence, only implicit nuclear threats were hinted at. 
Even then, the US interest in negotiations figured more prominently, as seen in Dulles‘ offer to 
defuse the crisis on 4 September 1958. 
 
During the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, it was Dulles who, concerned about resolving 
contradictions in the US strategic debate, constantly mulled over the issue of nuclear bombing 
China. Indeed there were US military officials who supported the nuclear option, and engaged in 
nuclear discourse and war plans that posited the Chinese Communists as mere bacteria to be 
eliminated. Such an endorsement could probably be explained in the context of what David Alan 
Rosenberg has vividly portrayed as the Kafkaesque ―massive retaliation‖ culture which 
Eisenhower presided over. By April 1954, the destructiveness of US thermonuclear bombs had 
reached 15 megatons and in May, four months before the bombardment of Quemoy, the Advance 
Study Group of the JCS had brazenly suggested ―deliberately precipitating war with the USSR‖ 





 This thesis thus agrees with scholarship that present Eisenhower‘s reluctance, in 
sharp contrast to the eagerness of the US military officials, to use nuclear weapons. 
 
Besides the issue of the performance of the Eisenhower presidency in managing US foreign 
relations and the discourse on the strategy of nuclear deterrence, historians have also highlighted 
the influence of domestic factors in the foreign relations of the US in the 1950s. Robert Dallek 
criticized Eisenhower‘s ―global perspective‖ as just an excuse for branding everything threatening 
as a ―worldwide Communist threat‖ for popular domestic consumption, as tough talk served to 
―rationalize domestic unity or mass conformity‖ against communism.53 The powers of the US 
Congress was highlighted by Gary W. Reichard, who argued that Eisenhower considered it 
pertinent to seek Congressional approval for possible deployment of troops in the defence of 
Formosa.
54
 Likewise, Rosemary Foot contended that rigid posturing by Congress halved the 
bargaining space for Eisenhower, an example being the unanimous decision of Congress to deny 
the PRC a seat in the UN in 1956.
55
 Historians have also underscored US public opinion as another 
important consideration. Marian D. Irish argued that the conduct of Eisenhower‘s foreign policy 
was ―modif[ied]‖ by public sentiments and postulated that a negative report in the 27 September 
1958 edition of Time was the tipping point which forced the White House to adopt what Dulles 
himself characterized as a more ―flexible‖ policy.56 Eliades agreed with Irish that the inclination 
towards methods other than nuclear threats was strongly propelled by public opinion. The Gallup 
polls on 5 September 1958 indicated a whopping 82% supporting negotiations in ending the 
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis.
57
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Based on how domestic considerations had played a part in US policies toward the Taiwan Strait 
Crises, this thesis agrees on the importance of domestic factors in influencing the foreign relations 
of the US in the 1950s. From 1953 to April 1954, despite attempts by Eisenhower to re-assess US 
policies toward China, Taiwan and Southeast Asia, the dominance of domestic conservative 
currents partly accounted for US support of Chiang‘s Taiwan and non-recognition of China. In the 
aftermath of the Geneva Conference, although the US was dissatisfied with the Geneva Accords, 
US budgetary constraints, among other factors, meant that the US was not about to provoke a war 
with China. In the wake of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, domestic conservative currents facilitated 
the conclusion of the US-ROC Mutual Defence Treaty. With the onset of the Yijiangshan 
campaign, Eisenhower, however, had to placate potential unhappiness from Congress and the 
American public concerned about American military entanglement in the Taiwan Strait, by 
presenting the Formosa Resolution as a ―virtuous‖ American act in accordance with American 
―tradition.‖ Following the PRC‘s conciliatory gesture in Bandung, Eisenhower had to persuade the 
China Lobby of the desirability of participating in Sino-US negotiations. In the wake of the Second 
Taiwan Strait Crisis, US public opinion missed the nuances of Sino-US tacit accommodation and 
Eisenhower had to reach out to the public to ―reverse the poll.‖ Moreover, while the president was 
able to garner bipartisan support for his various foreign policy initiatives previously, Eisenhower 
faced more hurdles in the 1958 crisis as not only was the GOP a minority party in the Congress, 
vocal Democrats were voicing opposition to the administration‘s China policy for political gains 
during the midterm elections. It was only with great difficulty that Eisenhower was able to 
subsequently turn the crisis around. 
 
3.3 The ROC 
This section will discuss how the findings in this thesis fit in existing scholarship on the foreign 
relations of the ROC in the 1950s in terms of the nature of the ROC-US relations and the close 




In the debate on the nature of the ROC-US relations, early scholarship by D. F. Fleming, O. 
Edmund Clubb and Tang Tsou discussed how Chiang Kai-shek held the US hostage through 
various nefarious stratagems.
58
 Subsequently, Steve Tsang and Robert Accinelli highlighted the 
domestic political motives of Chiang‘s fangong exhortations and the political cost incurred by 
Eisenhower in supporting Taiwan.
59
 John W. Garver demonstrated that, having enjoyed Taiwan‘s 
strategic position in containing communism, the US then despaired over Chiang‘s independent 
tactics; yet, because the overall benefits outweighed the cost, successive US administrations found 
it expedient to endure Chiang.
60
 Chiu Hungdah and other Taiwanese historians explained why to 




This thesis contends that although the ROC was the junior partner in the ROC-US alliance, it did 
possess and exercise ―the leverage of the weak,‖ a term used by Günter Bischof to argue that even 
small nations were able to exert influence disproportionate to their size on their international 
patrons.
62
 While acknowledging that such influence should not be exaggerated, this thesis does 
view Taiwan to have made considerable gains during the Taiwan Strait Crises. From 1950 to 1958, 
fangong dalu was a major component of Taiwan‘s foreign relations and Taiwan made various 
attempts to win over US officials to its cause. While the US kept Chiang at arm's length despite 
Chiang‘s repeated offers to aid the US to counter the PRC, by situating Taiwan firmly in US 
strategic concerns, Chiang managed to use the First Taiwan Crisis to secure a treaty and more aid 
from the US. In the wake of the Yijiangshan campaign, the US did succeed in persuading Taiwan 
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to evacuate Dachen but Taiwan was mollified by the passage of the Formosa Resolution. Chiang 
also rebuffed the US attempt to consider the offshore islands as ―outposts, not citadels.‖  
 
Not surprisingly, the Sino-US ambassadorial talks of 1955-1957 riled the ROC. Taipei‘s 
uneasiness and paranoia with Washington then played out in two areas: secret negotiations with 
Beijing from 1955 to 1957 and the 1957 Taiwan Riots. While the CIA had intelligence about 
possible secret contacts between the ROC and the PRC, it seemed to have doubted the veracity of 
such information and was persuaded by Chiang Ching-kuo of the steadfastness of the ROC. Yet, 
although the ROC participated in the back-channels, it was intensely wary of the PRC and 
carefully maneuvered between alerting Washington and maintaining links with Beijing. From the 
ROC‘s perspective, secret communication provided an additional security blanket in view of 
perceived US faithlessness. The May 1957 Taiwan Riots provided a case study of the latent 
cultural fault lines between Taipei and Washington. It showed how many Americans were 
prejudiced in their views of the riots, leading to shoddy investigative work, purloined justice and 
sensational reporting. It also presented insights on Taiwanese fractured cultural and nationalistic 
resentments against Americans. Nonetheless, the speed at which Washington accepted Taipei‘s 
apologies also signaled the recognition of mutual pragmatic concerns and the burgeoning maturity 
and tenacity of the ROC-US relations.  
 
More interested in reassuring Beijing than coddling Taipei in the wake of the Second Taiwan Strait 
Crisis, Washington exerted pressure on the ROC with a stream of rhetorical bombardments. In the 
face of the US pressure, Taipei sought to shore up the perimeter of the rationale, legitimacy and 
morality of the ROC-US relationship. Dulles‘ mission to Taipei on 21-23 October 1958 
demonstrated how the US pressured the ROC with an iron fist in a velvet glove. Nonetheless, the 
re-activation of the Taipei-Beijing secret back-channel from August to October 1958 again enabled 
Taipei and Beijing to tap on nationalist concerns and maneuvered to thwart Washington and avoid 
the specter of ―two Chinas.‖ While Beijing also had in mind the planting of discord in the ROC-
US relations and the trumpeting of its goodwill in contrast to the alleged neo-imperialism of the 
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US, Taipei adroitly manipulated the channel to pressure the US to accede to its demands and 
succeeded in procuring more military aid, even though it had to go along with the US request to 
soft-pedal the belligerent rhetoric of its fangong mission. One finds scholars lamenting that 
Taiwan‘s strategic importance had ballooned disproportionate to its size; Akira Iriye noted that 
Taiwan had transformed, for better or worse, into a symbol for freedom or part of ―free Asia.‖63 
 
Closely related to the debate on the nature of the ROC-US relations was the discourse on the close 
linkages between foreign relations and domestic policies. In numerous accounts of Taiwan‘s 
economic miracle, a common observation runs that: ―With the security of Taiwan guaranteed by 
the US, the ROC government was able to devote more energy and resources to agricultural, 
economic and political development and transformed Taiwan from a developing society into a 
modern industrialized country.‖64 Although this simple and straightforward proposition has won 
over many followers, what emerges from the primary sources was a more complicated picture. It 
showed that the early ROC government had devoted just as much time and energy on the quixotic 
―mainland counter-offensive‖ and that the economic miracle that occurred two decades later was 
the joint product of this ―counter-offensive‖ culture. Arguing that previous studies of Taiwan‘s 
economic miracle have under-estimated the impact of the fangong ideology, this thesis stresses the 
centrality of fangong in Taiwan‘s polity and society. Applying Paul Cohen‘s salient study of the 
concept of guochi (national humiliation) in Chinese history, this thesis proposes that fangong was 
an ideology that animated simultaneously the foreign relations and domestic policies of Taiwan, 
and this was manifested in the changing permutations of fangong in the 1950s. 
 
From 1950, the clarion call to wage fangong dalu led to a militarization of Taiwan‘s society and 
constituted a major component of its foreign policy. The outbreak of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis 
further justified the need for political indoctrination, as seen in the Ten Precepts of Chiang Kai-
shek‘s Military Thought. Such a call was also discernible in the popular culture, such as the works 
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of Huang Dashou and Chen Wenquan. In emphasizing fangong, Chiang persisted in reinforcing 
total control of the army by the KMT party and at the same time paid attention to the welfare of the 
soldiers. Yet, although military planning for fangong continued in a ritualistic manner, changing 
domestic and international developments gradually led to the waning of such a vision. With 
defensive thinking quietly given precedence over the belligerency of counter-attack, the slogan of 
―counter-offensive‖ also became subverted into a more pedestrian domestic rallying cliché aimed 
at boosting morale, stabilizing and militarizing society, and disciplining a credible work force. The 
ROC further used the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis as a propaganda event and media opportunity to 
enact myths upholding the valor and courage of its military, and extolled greater sacrifices and 
social cohesion for its nation-building, even as it moved away from the belligerency of fangong to 
a more reassuring upholding of Sun Yat-sen's Sanminzhuyi (Three Principles of the People).  
 
While Taipei emerged from the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis more secure than before and its major 
economic development towards export-oriented industries started from this point onward, the 
significance of fangong lay with not just its saliency in creating a foundation for Taiwan‘s 
economic development. Through the annual multiple war planning sessions of fangong, the ROC‘s 
military elites had used such occasions to proclaim loyalty to Chiang while increasingly noting the 
difficulties involved in the realization of fangong. The other elites of the ROC had employed as a 
state routine this similar rhetoric of pledging allegiance but then subverted fangong to the goal of 
economic development. In this context, although Chiang‘s foreswearing the military reunification 
of China in 1958 was commonly credited to Dulles‘ effort, this thesis complicates the discourse by 
illustrating how the increasingly moribund rhetoric of fangong had actually initiated a movement 
towards the normalization of the Taiwanese society, which coincided with the gradual evolution of 
Sino-US relations from tacit communication to tacit accommodation. What this parallel 
transformation of Sino-US relations and Taiwan‘s polity and society meant for Chiang was that: 
since military reunification of the mainland was no longer possible, it stood to reason that 
showcasing Taiwan‘s economic development as a glowing alternative to China‘s quixotic Great 
Leap Forward would be a better cause. Hence, although existing scholarship rightly noted the role 
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of US economic aid in boosting Taiwan‘s developmental model, this thesis offers an additional 
perspective by demonstrating as well how the ethos of fangong dalu had played significant roles in 
simultaneously propelling military, foreign policy and economic concerns, underscoring how the 
close linkages between the foreign relations and domestic policies of Taiwan were manifested in 
the changing permutations of fangong in the 1950s. 
 
Conclusion 
In sum, this thesis has re-examined the Taiwan Strait Crises and offered new perspectives to 
understanding the crises through the use of newly available primary sources, the simultaneous 
presentations of the perspectives of the PRC, US and ROC, the re-evaluation of some of the major 
arguments in existing scholarship, and the incorporation of analyses relating to ―culture,‖ ―tacit 
communication-tacit accommodation‖ and ―ritualization.‖ Hitherto most accounts have depicted 
the PRC-ROC-US relations in the 1950s as mired in hostilities and nuclear threats. However, this 
thesis contends that the situation was more complicated: tacit communication that was discernible 
during the Geneva Conference of 1954 had allowed for tacit accommodation to take root by 1958. 
Such developments in the PRC-ROC-US relations were contested and negotiated at every stage of 
the Crises. Facilitating this process was the ritualization of discourses, embodied in signaling and 
symbolic gestures. Such a ritualization of foreign policy often happened in a ―symbiotic‖ manner, 
consisting of ―soft‖ and ―hard‖ elements, as an untidy confluence of nationalistic discourse, 
symbols, cultural images, military posturing, canvassing for international support, and diplomatic 
negotiations. The emphasis on ―untidy‖ underscored that the process of tacit accommodation was 
not an inexorable process destined to succeed, but one influenced by a plethora of factors – 
international relations, domestic developments and issues of national identity of Beijing, Taipei 
and Washington. Such an analytical lens has enabled this thesis to appreciate the complexity of 
adversarial and alliance diplomacy, so aptly captured in the many nuances of the PRC-ROC-US 
relations, as revealed in the unfolding of the many turbid diplomatic episodes of the Taiwan Strait 
Crises from 1954 to 1958: the ―silent poetry‖ of diplomacy, the tacit allowances for withdrawals, 
the muted back-channel negotiations, the paradoxically loud denunciations, and the sound and fury 
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of artillery bombardments. 
*** 
The US rapprochement with China in 1972 was a momentous event. Nixon wasted no time in 
expounding to the public that his presidency was instrumental in taking steps ―toward improved 
practical relations with Peking.‖65 However, in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, this 
assertion attributing significant credit to the Nixon presidency was downplayed. Recent 
scholarship that explored Sino-US relations before the Nixon presidency continued this trend. 
Victor Kaufman demonstrated that the debacle in Vietnam, the Great Cultural Revolution and 
Sino-Soviet confrontation were important events in shaping a favourable US perception of China. 
Kaufman further expounded that President Lyndon Johnson‘s ―containment without isolation‖ was 
the real beginning of rapprochement with China. In another prominent study of Nixon‘s 
rapprochement, Evelyn Goh also noted how Nixon used the ―prevailing reconciliation discourse‖ 
which can be ―traced back to 1961‖ (my emphasis). In other words, such Democratic Presidents as 
John F Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, in the spirit of President Roosevelt, had laid the necessary 
discourse groundwork for Nixon‘s 1972 rapprochement.66  
 
Curiously, both excellent monographs failed to acknowledge Nixon‘s role as the Vice-President in 
Eisenhower‘s administration. Even the latest celebratory tome on Nixon‘s rapprochement was 
deficient in this aspect.
67
 Nixon‘s experiences and training under Eisenhower were summarily 
dismissed. Yet studies on Nixon‘s resolution of the Vietnam War have indicated Nixon‘s 
reverence for the Eisenhower presidency.
68
 This thesis has further demonstrated that Nixon‘s 
nascent views on the role of the PRC in the world could be discerned as early as 1953. More 
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importantly, Nixon‘s views coincided with Eisenhower‘s private preferences. After his extensive 
tour in Asia in 1953, Nixon had specifically recommended for the PRC ―containment but with 
trade‖ and that this should take place ―gradually over a long range period based upon the 
assumption that trade is inevitable and will aid the US in getting intelligence out of China.‖69 
Existing scholarship have largely ignored the origins of this body of opinions in fostering a 
tentative tacit accommodation with the PRC. Current scholarship on Sino-US rapprochement 
epitomized this critical omission. In one of the many ironies of history, President Nixon, who 
succeeded in the US rapprochement with China, was Eisenhower‘s ―prat-boy.‖70 Eisenhower could 
only manage, what was possible in his times, a ―tacit accommodation‖ with China; Nixon, a 
witness to all that, completed the process with an aging Mao. 
 
~ The End ~ 
 
                                                 
69 ―Meeting with the Vice President,‖ 8 Jan 1954 (Friday), State Department, DDRS. 
70 Richard Nixon used this highly debatable phrase ―prat-boy.‖ See, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (London: 
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